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APPENDIX, NO. IV.
REMARKS IN MENTAL PHILOSOPHY--THE MIND
There are four distinct series of these manuscript Notes or Remarks,
which from the handwriting, as well as from other evidence, were
obviously commenced by him during his collegiate life, and as nearly
as can be judged in the following order. The first, entitled "The
Mind," is a brief collection of discussions and remarks in mental
philosophy. The second is without a title, and consists of "Notes on
Natural Science." The third is entitled "Notes on the Scriptures." The
fourth is entitled, "Miscellanies." and consists chiefly of
observations on the doctrines of the Scriptures. The two last he
continued through life.
The following series of remarks, entitled "The Mind." appears to have
been composed either during, or soon after, his perusal of Locke's
Essay on the Human Understanding.
"THE MIND."
Title. The Natural History of the Mental World, or of the Internal
World: being a Particular Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Mind,
with respect to both its Faculties--the Understanding and the
Will--and its various Instincts, and Active and Passive Powers.
Introduction. Concerning the two worlds--the External and the
Internal: the External, the subject of Natural Philosophy; the
Internal, our own Minds. How the Knowledge of the latter is, in many
respects, the most important. Of what great use the true knowledge of
this is; and of what dangerous consequence errors, here, are more than
in the order.
Subjects to be handled in the Treatise on the Mind.
1. Concerning the difference between Pleasure and Pain, and Ideas, or
the vast difference between the Understanding and the Will.
2. Concerning Prejudices; the influence of Prejudice to cloud the
mind. The various sorts of prejudices in particular, and how they come
to cloud the mind; particularly Prejudices of Interest--the true
reason why they cloud the judgment.--Prejudices of Education and
Custom. Their universal influence on wise, and learned, and rational,
as well as other men; demonstrated from fact and experience--of their
insensible influence, how it is insensible on great men.--How
difficultly a people are got out of their old customs. In husbandry,
how difficult to persuade that a new way is better.--Another prejudice
is the general cry, and fashion, and vogue, of an age. Its exceeding
strong influence, like a strong stream, that carries all that way.
This influence on great men, Prejudices of People, in favour of
individual great men, to the contempt of others.--Again, the voice of
men in power, riches, or honourable place.--How some Churches would
laugh at their ceremonies, if they were without them.--How a man's
being rich, or in high place, gives great weight to his word.--How
much more weighty a man's sayings are, after he becomes a Bishop, than
before--another prejudice is from ridicule, or an high, strong,
overbearing, contemptuous style.
3. Either after or before this, to have a dissertation concerning the
exceeding vanity, blindness, and weakness of the mind of man.--What
poor fallible creatures men are. How every man is insensible of his
own; thinks himself best.--Concerning the Pride of men; how ready to
think they shall be great men, and to promise themselves great things.
4. How some men have Strong Reason, but not Good Judgment.
5. Concerning Certainty and Assurance. How many things that are
demonstrations in themselves, are not demonstrations to men, and yet
are strong arguments; no more demonstrations than a boy may have, that
a cube of two inches may be cut into eight cubes of one inch, for want
of proper clearness, and full comprehension of the ideas. How
assurance is capable of infinite degrees.--How none have such a
degree, but that it might be heightened--even of that, that two and
two make four. It may be increased by a stronger sight, or a greater
clearness of ideas. Minds of clearer and stronger sight may be more
assured of it, than those of more obscure vision. There may be beings
of a thousand times stronger sight than we are. How God's sight only
is infinitely clear and strong. That which is demonstration at one
time, may be only probable reasoning at another, by reason of
different degrees of clearness and comprehension. It is almost
impossible, that a long demonstration should beget so great assurance
as a short one; because many ideas cannot be so clearly comprehended
at one time, as a few. A very long demonstration may beget assurance,
by a particular examination of each link of the chain, and so by
recollection, that we were very careful and assured in the time of it;
but this is less immediate, and less clear.
6. Why it is proper for Orators and Preachers to move the
Passions--needful to show earnestness, &c. how this tends to convince
the judgment, and many other ways is good and absolutely necessary.
7. Of the nature of the Affections or Passions--how only strong and
lively exercises of the Will, together with the effect on the Animal
nature.
8. In treating oh Human Nature, treat first of Being in general, and
show what in Human Nature, necessarily existing from the nature of
Entity. And then, concerning Perceiving or Intelligent Beings, in
particular, and show what arises from the nature of such. And then
Animal Nature, and what from that.
9. Concerning Enthusiasm, Inspiration, Grace, &c.
10. Concerning a two-fold ground of Assurance of the Judgment--a
reducing things to an Identity or Contradiction, as in Mathematical
demonstrations,--and by a natural, invincible inclination to a
connexion, as when we see any Effect to conclude a Cause--an
opposition to believe a thing can begin without a Cause. This is not
the same with the other, and cannot be reduced to a contradiction.
11. Difference between Natural Appetites and Rational Desires.
12. Whether any difference between the Will and Inclination. Imperate
acts of the Will, nothing but the prevailing Inclination, concerning
what should be done that moment. So hath God ordained that the motions
of the Body should follow that.
13. Concerning the Influence which Nearness, or Remoteness, of Time
has in Determining the Will, and the Reason of it.
14. Concerning Speculative Understanding, and Sense of Heart. Whether
any difference between the Sense of the Heart, and the Will or
Inclination. How the Scriptures are ignorant of the Philosophic
distinction of the Understanding, and the Will; and how the Sense of
the Heart is there called Knowledge, or Understanding.
15. Of what nature are Ideas of what is Internal or Spiritual. How
they are the same thing over again.
16. Concerning Liberty, wherein it consists.
17. Concerning the prime and proper foundation of Blame.
18. How far men may be to blame for their Judgments; or for Believing,
or Not Believing, this or that.
19. Concerning great Prejudices from the ambiguous and equivocal use
of Words--such as Liberty, Force, Power, &c. How from this many things
seem to be, and are called, Natural Notions, that are not Song of Solomon 20. Concerning Beauty and Deformity, Love and Hatred, the nature of
Excellency or Virtue, &c.
21. Whether or no Self-Love be the ground of all Love.
22. Concerning the Corruption of Man's Nature. How it comes to be
corrupt. What is the positive cause of corruption.
23. How greatly things lose their influence on the mind, through
persons being used to them; as Miracles, and the Evidence of the Being
of God, which we daily behold. The greatest Demonstrations--most plain
and direct Proofs. Use makes things fail of their influence on the
Understanding, so on the Will and Affections--things most satisfying
and convincing--things otherwise most moving.
24. Consider of what nature is that inward sensation, that a man has
when he Almost thinks of a thing--a name or the like--when we say it
is at our tongue's end.
25. Concerning Moral Sense: what Moral Sense is Natural.
26. How Natural men have a taste of, and Delight in, that External
Beauty, that is a resemblance to Love.
27. Sensitive Appetites: How far they consist in some Present Pain,
attended with the idea of Ease, habitually connected, or associated,
with the idea of such an object--Whether the sight of Food excites the
appetite of one who is hungry, any other way.
By what means persons come to long after a particular thing; either
from an idea of Pleasure, or the Removal of Pain, associated.
Not immediately after the Thing itself, but only the pleasure, or the
removal of pain.
28. Judgment. Wherein an Act of the judgment consists, or an Assent to
a thing as true, or a Dissent from it as false. Show it to be
different from mere Perception such as is in the mere presence of an
idea in the mind: and so not the Perception of the Agreement and
Disagreement of Ideas.
29. Sensation. How far all acts of the mind are from Sensation. All
ideas begin from thence; and there never can be any idea, thought, or
act of the mind, unless the mind first received some ideas from
Sensation, or some other way equivalent, wherein the mind is wholly
passive in receiving them.
30. Separate State. How far the Soul, in a Separate State, must depend
on Sensation, or some way of passively receiving ideas equivalent to
Sensation, in order to conversing with other minds, to the knowing of
any occurrence, to beholding any of the works of God, and to its
further improvement in knowledge.
31. Sensation. Whether all ideas, wherein the mind is merely passive,
and which are received immediately without any dependence on
Reflexion, are not ideas of Sensation, or External ideas? Whether
there be any difference between these? Whether it be possible for the
Soul of man, in this manner, to be originally, and without dependence
on Reflexion, capable of receiving any other ideas than those of
sensation, or something equivalent, and so some external idea? And
whether the first ideas of the angels, must not be of some such kind?
32. Angels. Separate Spirits. How far the Angels and Separate Spirits,
being in some respects in place, in the Third Heaven, where the body
of Christ is; their removing from place to place; their coming down
from Heaven, then ascending to Heaven; their being with Christ at the
Day of Judgment; their seeing bodies; their beholding the Creation of
the Material Universe; their having, in their ministry, to do with the
bodies of men, with the body of Christ, and other material things; and
their seeing God's works of Providence, relating to the Material
Universe;--how far these things necessarily imply, that they have some
kind of Sensations like ours; and, Whether these things do not show
that, by some laws or other, they are united to some kind of Matter?
33. Concerning the great Weakness and Fallibility of the Human Mind,
in its present state.
34. Concerning Beauty.
35. How the Affections will suggest words, and expressions, and
thoughts, and make eloquent.
36. The manifest analogy between the Nature of the Human Soul and the
Nature of other things. How Laws of nature take place alike. How it is
Laws, that constitute all permanent being, in created things, both
corporeal and spiritual.
37. Wherein there is an agreement between Men and Beasts. How many
things, in Men, are like instincts in Brutes.
38. Whether the mind perceives more than One object at a time.
39. How far the mind may perceive, without adverting to what it
perceived; as in the winking of the eyelids, and many other like
things.
. How far there may be Acts of the Will, without our adverting to
it; as in walking, the act of the will for each individual step, and
the like.
41. The agreement between Objects of Sight, and Objects of Feeling; or
Visible Magnitude and Figure, and Tangible Magnitude and Figure, as to
Number and Proportion.
42. How far Imagination is unavoidable, in all Thinking; and Why?
43. Connexion of Ideas. Concerning the Laws by which Ideas follow each
other, or call up one another, in which one thing comes into the mind
after another, in the course of our thinking. How far this is owing to
the Association of ideas; and how far, to any Relation of Cause and
Effect, or any other Relation. And whether the whole may not be
reduced to these following: Association of Ideas; Resemblance of some
kind; and that Natural Disposition in us, when we see any thing being
to be, to suppose it owing to a Cause.--Observe how these laws, by
which one idea suggests and brings in another, are a kind of mutual
attraction of ideas.--Concerning the importance, and necessity, of
this mutual attraction and adhesion of ideas--how rarely our minds
would serve us, if it were not for this. How the mind would be without
ideas, except as suggested by the Senses. How far Reasoning,
Contemplation, &c. depend on this.
44. How far the Love of Happiness is the same with the Faculty of the
Will? It is not distinct from the mere Capacity of enjoying and
suffering, and the Faculty of the Will is no other.
45. Whether it be possible for a man to love any thing better than
himself; and in what sense it is Song of Solomon 46. Example. To inquire, What are the true reasons of so strong an
inclination, in mankind, to follow Example. How great its influence
over men, in their opinions, their judgment, their taste, and the
whole man. How by this means, at certain times, a particular thing
will come to be in great vogue, and men's passions will all, as it
were, be moved at once, as the trees in the wood, by the same wind, or
as things floating with the tide, the same way. Men follow one another
like a flock of sheep. How sometimes the vogue lasts an age; at other
times, but a short time; and the reason of this difference.
47. In what respects men may be, and often are, ignorant of their own
hearts; and how this comes to pass.
48. Concerning the Soul's Union with the Body, its Laws, and
Consequences.
49. One section, particularly to show wherein Men differ from Beasts.
50. In how many respects the very Being of Created things depends on
Laws, or stated methods, fixed by God, of events following one
another.
51. Whether all the Immediate Objects of the mind are properly called
Ideas; and what inconvenience and confusion arises from giving every
Subjective Thought that name. What prejudices and mistakes it leads
to.
52. In what respects Ideas, or thoughts, and judgments, may be said to
be Innate, and in what respects not.
53. Whether there could have ever been any such thing as Thought,
without External Ideas, immediately impressed by God, either according
to some law, or otherwise. Whether any Spirit, or Angel, could have
any Thought, if it had not been for this. Here particularly explain
what I mean by External Ideas.
54. How words came to have such a mighty influence on thought and
judgment, by virtue of the Association of Ideas, or from Ideas being
habitually tied to words.
55. How far, through Habit, men move their bodies without thought or
consciousness.
56. Whether Beauty (Natural and Moral.) and the pleasure that arises
from it, in ourselves or others, be not the only object of the Will;
or whether Truth be not also the object of the Will. [103]
THE MIND.
[12.] Being. It seems strange sometimes to me, that there should be
Being from all Eternity: and I am ready to say, What need was there
that any thing should be? I should then ask myself, Whether it seems
strange that there should be either Something, or Nothing? If so, it
is not strange that there should BE; for that necessity of there being
Something, or Nothing, implies it.
[26.] Cause is that, after or upon the existence of which, or the
existence of it after such a manner, the existence of another thing
follows.
[27.] Existence. If we had only the sense of Seeing, we should not be
as ready to conclude the visible would to have been an existence
independent of perception, as we do; because the ideas we have by the
sense of Feeling, are as much mere ideas, as those we have by the
sense of Seeing. But we know, that the things that are objects of this
sense, all that the mind views by Seeing, are merely mental
Existences; because all these things, with all their modes, do exist
in a looking-glass, where all will acknowledge, they exist only
mentally.
It is now agreed upon by every knowing philosopher, that Colours are
not really in the things, no more than pain is in a needle; but
strictly no where else but in the mind. But yet I think that Colour
may have an existence out of the mind, with equal reason as any thing
in Body has any existence out of the mind, beside the very substance
of the body itself, which is nothing but the Divine power, or rather
the Constant Exertion of it. For what idea is that, which we call by
the name of Body? I find Colour has the chief share in it. "Tis
nothing but Colour, and Figure, which is the termination of this
Colour, together with some powers, such as the power of resisting, and
motion, &c. that wholly makes up what we call Body. And if that, which
we principally mean by the thing itself, cannot be said to be in the
thing itself, I think nothing can be. If Colour exists not out of the
mind, then nothing belonging to Body exists out of the mind but
Resistance, which is Solidity, and the termination of this Resistance,
with its relations, which is Figure, and the communication of this
Resistance, from space to space, which is Motion; though the latter
are nothing but modes of the former. Therefore, there is nothing out
of the mind but Resistance. And not that neither, when nothing is
actually resisted. Then, there is nothing but the Power of Resistance.
And as Resistance is nothing else but the actual exertion of God's
power, so the Power can be nothing else, but the constant Law or
Method of that actual exertion. And how is there any Resistance,
except it be in some mind, in idea? What is it that is resisted? It is
not Colour. And what else is it? It is ridiculous to say, that
Resistance is resisted. That does not tell us at all what is to be
resisted. There must be something resisted before there can be
Resistance; but to say Resistance is resisted, is ridiculously to
suppose Resistance, before there is any thing to be resisted. Let us
suppose two globes only existing, and no mind. There is nothing there,
ex confesso, but Resistance. That is, there is such a Law, that the
space within the limits of a globular figure shall resist. Therefore,
there is nothing there but a power, or an establishment. And if there
be any Resistance really out of the mind, one power and establishment
must resist another establishment and law of Resistance, which is
exceedingly ridiculous. But yet it cannot be otherwise, if any way out
of the mind. But now it is easy to conceive of Resistance, as a mode
of an idea. It is easy to conceive of such a power, or constant manner
of stopping or resisting a colour. The idea may be resisted, it may
move, and stop, and rebound; but how a mear power, which is nothing
real, can move and stop, in inconceivable, and it is impossible to say
a word about it without contradiction. The world is therefore an ideal
one; and the Law of creating, and the succession, of these ideas is
constant and regular.
[28.] Coroll. 1. How impossible is it that the world should exist from
Eternity, without a Mind.
[30.] Coroll. 2. Since it is so, and that absolute Nothing is such a
dreadful contradiction; hence we learn the necessity of the Eternal
Existence of an All-comprehending Mind; and that it is the
complication of all contradictions to deny such a mind.
[34.] When we say that the World, i.e. the material Universe, exists
no where but in the mind, we have got to such a degree of strictness
and abstraction, that we must be exceedingly careful, that we do not
confound and lose ourselves by misapprehension. That is impossible,
that it should be meant, that all the world is contained in the narrow
compass of a few inches of space, in little ideas in the place of the
brain; for that would be a contradiction; for we are to remember that
the human body, and the brain itself, exist only mentally, in the same
sense that other things do; and so that, which we call place, is an
idea too. Therefore things are truly in those places; for what we
mean, when we say so, is only, that this mode of our idea of place
appertains to such an idea. We would not therefore be understood to
deny, that things are where they seem to be. For the principles we lay
down, if they are narrowly looked into, do not infer that. Nor will it
be found, that they at all make void Natural Philosophy, or the
science of the Causes or Reasons of corporeal changes; for to find out
the reasons of things, in Natural Philosophy, is only to find out the
proportion of God's acting. And the case is the same, as to such
proportions, whether we suppose the World only mental, in our sense,
or no.
Though we suppose, that the existence of the whole material Universe
is absolutely dependent on Idea, yet we may speak in the old way, and
as properly and truly as ever. God, in the beginning, created such a
certain number of Atoms, of such a determinate bulk and figure, which
they yet maintain and always will, and gave them such a motion, of
such a direction, and of such a degree of velocity: from whence arise
all the Natural changes in the Universe, for ever, in a continued
series. Yet, perhaps all this does not exist any where perfectly, but
in the Divine Mind. But then, if it be inquired, What exists in the
Divine Mind; and how these things exist there? I answer, There is his
determination, his care, and his design, that Ideas shall be united
for ever, just so, and in such a manner, as is agreeable to such a
series. For instance, all the ideas that ever were, or ever shall be
to all eternity, in any created mind, are answerable to the existence
of such a peculiar Atom in the beginning of the Creation, of such a
determinate figure and size, and have such a motion given it: That is,
they are all such, as Infinite Wisdom sees would follow, according to
the series of nature, from such an Atom, so moved. That is, all ideal
changes of creatures are just so, as if just such a particular Atom
had actually all along existed even in some finite mind, and never had
been out of that mind, and had, in that mind, caused these effects,
which are exactly according to nature, that is, according to the
nature of other matter, that is actually perceived by the mind. God
supposes its existence; that is, he causes all changes to arise, as if
all these things had actually existed in such a series, in some
created mind, and as if created minds had comprehended all things
perfectly. And, although created minds do not; yet, the Divine Mind
doth; and he orders all things according to his mind, and his ideas.
And these hidden things do not only exist in the Divine idea, but in a
sense in created idea; for that exists in created idea, which
necessarily supposes it. If a ball of lead were supposed to be let
fall from the clouds, and no eye saw it, till it got within ten rods
of the ground, and then its motion and celerity was perfectly
discerned in its exact proportion; if it were not for the imperfection
and slowness of our minds, the perfect idea of the rest of the motion
would immediately, and of itself, arise in the mind, as well as that
which is there. So, were our thoughts comprehensive and perfect
enough, our view of the present state of the world would excite in us
a perfect idea of all past changes.
And we need not perplex our minds with a thousand questions and doubts
that will seem to arise: as, To what purpose is this way of exciting
ideas? and, What advantage is there in observing such a series? I
answer, It is just all one, as to any benefit or advantage, any end
that we can suppose was proposed by the Creator, as if the Material
Universe were existent in the same manner as is vulgarly thought. For
the corporeal would is to no advantage but to the spiritual; and it is
exactly the same advantage this way as the other, for it is all one,
as to any thing excited in the mind.
[51.] It is hardly proper to say, that the dependence of ideas of
sensation upon the organs of the body, is only the dependence of some
of our ideas upon others. For the organs of our bodies are not our
ideas, in a proper sense, though their existence be only mental. Yet
there is no necessity of their existing actually in our minds, but
they exist mentally, in the same manner as has been explained. See
above, No. 34. The dependence of our ideas upon the organs, is the
dependence of our ideas on our bodies, after the manner there
explained, mentally existing. And if it be inquired, To what purpose
is this way of exciting ideas? I answer, To exactly the same purpose
as can be supposed, if our organs are actually existing, in the manner
vulgarly conceived, as to any manner of benefit, or end, that can be
mentioned.
It is not proper at all, nor doth it express the thing we would, to
say that bodies do not exist without the mind. For the scheme will not
allow the mind to be supposed determined to any place, in such a
manner as to make that proper; for Place itself is mental, and Within
and Without are mere mental conceptions. Therefore, that way of
expressing, will lead us into a thousand difficulties and
perplexities. But when I say the Material Universe exists only in the
mind, I mean, that it is absolutely dependent on the conception of the
mind for its existence, and does not exist as Spirits do, whose
existence does not consist in, nor in dependence on, the conception of
other minds. We must be exceedingly careful, lest we confound
ourselves in these by mere imagination. It is from hence I expect the
greatest opposition. It will appear a ridiculous thing, I suppose,
that the material world exists no where, but in the soul of man,
confined within his skull; but we must again remember what sort of
existence the head and brain have.--The soul, in a sense, has its seat
in the brain; and so, in a sense, the visible world is existent out of
the mind, for it certainly, in the most proper sense, exists out of
the brain.
[36.] Things, as to God, exist from all Eternity, alike; that is, the
idea is always the same, and after the same mode. The existence of
things, therefore, that are not actually in created minds, consists
only in Power, or in the Determination of God, that such and such
ideas shall be raised in created minds, upon such conditions.
[40.] Since all material existence is only idea, this question may be
asked, In what sense may those things be said to exist, which are
supposed, and yet are in no actual idea of any Created minds? I
answer, they existed only in Uncreated idea. But how do they exist,
otherwise than they did from all Eternity, for they always were in
Uncreated idea and Divine appointment? I answer, They did exist from
all Eternity in Uncreated idea, as did every thing else, and as they
do at present, but not in Created idea. But it may be asked, How do
those things exist, which have an actual existence, but of which no
created mind is conscious?--For instance, the Furniture of this room,
when we are absent, and the room is shut up, and no created mind
perceives it; How do these things exist?--I answer, There has been in
times past such a course and succession of existences, that these
things must be supposed to make the series complete, according to
Divine appointment, of the order of things. And there will be
innumerable things consequential, which will be out of joint, out of
their constituted series, without the supposition of these. For, upon
the supposition of these things, are infinite numbers of things
otherwise than they would be, if these were not by God thus supposed.
Yea, the whole Universe would be otherwise; such an influence have
these things, by their attraction and otherwise. Yea, there must be a
universal attraction, in the whole system of things, from the
beginning of the world to the end; and, to speak more strictly and
metaphysically, we must say, in the whole system and series of ideas
in all Created minds; so that these things must necessarily be put in,
to make complete the system of the ideal world. That is, they must be
supposed, if the train of ideas be, in the order and course, settled
by the Supreme mind. So that we may answer in short. That the
existence of these things is in God's supposing of them, in order to
the rendering complete the series of things, (to speak more strictly,
the series of ideas,) according to his own settled order, and that
harmony of things, which he has appointed.--The supposition of God,
which we speak of, is nothing else but God's acting, in the course and
series of his exciting ideas, as if they (the things supposed) were in
actual idea.
But you may object, But there are many things so infinitely small,
that their influence is altogether insensible; so that, whether they
are supposed or not, there will no alteration be made in the series of
Ideas. Answer, But though the influence is so small, that we do not
perceive, yet, who knows how penetrating other spirits may be, to
perceive the minutest alterations. And whether the alterations be
sensible, or not, at present, yet the effect of the least influence
will be sensible, in time. For instance, Let there be supposed to be a
Leaden Globe, of a mile in diameter, to be moving in a right line,
with the swiftness of a cannon ball, in the Infinite Void, and let it
pass by a very small Atom, supposed to be at rest. This Atom will
somewhat retard this Leaden Globe in its motion, though at first, and
perhaps for many ages, the difference is altogether insensible. But
let it be never so little, in time it will become very sensible. For
if the motion is made so much slower, that in a million of years it
shall have moved one inch less than it would have done otherwise, in a
million million it will have moved a million inches less. So now the
least Atom, by its existence or motion, causes an alteration, more or
less, in every other Atom in the Universe; so the alteration in time
will become very sensible; so the whole Universe, in time, will become
all over different from what it would otherwise have been. For if
every other Atom is supposed to be either retarded, or accelerated, or
diverted; every Atom, however small for the present, will cause great
alterations, as we have shown already, of Retardation. The case is the
same as to Acceleration; and so as to Diversion, or varying the
direction of the motion. For let the course of the body be never so
little changed, this course, in time, may carry it to a place
immensely distant from what the other would have carried it to, as is
evident enough. And the case is the same still, if the motion that
before was never so slow is wholly stopped; the difference in time
will be immense; for this slow motion would have carried it to an
immense distance, if it were continued.
But the Objector will say, I acknowledge it would be thus, if the
bodies, in which these insensible alterations are made, were free, and
alone, in an Infinite Void; but I do not know but the case may be far
otherwise, when an insensible alteration is made in a body, that is
among innumerable others, and subject to infinite jumbles among
them.--Answer. The case is the same, whether the bodies be alone in a
Void, or in a System of other bodies; for the influence of this
insensible alteration continues as steadily for ever, through all its
various interchanges and collisions with other bodies, as it would if
it were alone in an Infinite Void: so that in time, a particle of
matter, that shall be on this side of the Universe, might have been on
the other. The existence and motion of every Atom, has influence, more
or less, on the motion of all other bodies in the Universe, great or
small, as is most demonstrable from the Laws of Gravity and Motion. An
alteration, more or less, as to motion, is made on every Fixed Star,
and on all its Planets, Primary and Secondary. Let the alteration made
in the Fixed Stars be never so small, yet in time it will make an
infinite alteration, from what otherwise would have been. Let the
Fixed Stars be supposed, for instance, before to have been in perfect
rest; let them now be all set in motion, and this motion be never so
small, yet, continued for ever, where will it carry those immense
bodies, with their Systems. Let a little alteration be made in the
motion of the Planets, either Retardation or Acceleration; this, in
time, will make a difference of many millions of Revolutions: and how
great a difference will that make in the floating bodies of the
Universe.
Coroll. By this we may answer a more difficult question, viz. If
material existence be only mental, than our bodies and organs are
ideas only; and then in what sense is it true, that the Mind receives
Ideas by the Organs of Sense; seeing that the Organs of Sense,
themselves, exist no where but in the Mind?--Answer. Seeing our
Organs, themselves, are ideas; the connexion, that our ideas have with
such and such a mode of our Organs, is no other than God's
constitution, that some of our ideas shall be connected with others,
according to such a settled Law and Order, so that some ideas shall
follow from others as their cause.--But how can this be, seeing that
ideas most commonly arise from Organs, when we have no idea of the
mode of Organs, or the manner of external objects being applied to
them? I answer, Our Organs, and the motions in them and to them, exist
in the manner explained above.
"Plato, in his `Subterranean Cave,' so famously known, and so
elegantly described by him, supposes men tied with their backs towards
the Light, placed at a great distance from them, so that they could
not turn about their heads to it neither, and therefore could see
nothing but the shadows of certain substances behind them, projected
from it; which shadows they concluded to be the only substance and
realities. And when they heard of sounds made by those bodies, that
were betwixt the Light and them, or their reverberated echoes, they
imputed them to those shadows which they say. All this is a
description of the state of those men, who take Body to be the only
Real and Substantial Thing in the world, and to do all that is done in
it; and therefore often impute Sense, Reason, and Understanding, to
nothing but Blood and Brains in us."
CUDWORTH'S INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM.
[9.] Space. Space, as has been already observed, is a necessary being,
if it may be called a being; and yet we have also shown, that all
existence is mental, that the existence of all exterior things is
ideal. Therefore it is a necessary being, only as it is a necessary
idea, so far as it is simple idea, that is necessarily connected with
other simple exterior ideas, and is, as it were, their common
substance or subject. It is in the same manner a necessary being, as
any thing external is a being.
Coroll. It is hence easy to see in what sense that is true, that has
been held by some, That, when there is nothing between any two bodies,
they unavoidably must touch.
[13.] The real and necessary existence of Space, and its Infinity,
even beyond the Universe, depend upon a like reasoning as the
Extension of Spirits, and to the supposition of the reality of the
existence of a Successive Duration, before the Universe: even the
impossibility of removing the idea out of the mind. If it be asked, If
there be Limits of the Creation, whether or no it be not possible that
an Intelligent being shall be removed beyond the limits; and then
whether or no there would not be distance between that Intelligent
being and the limits of the Universe, in the same manner, and as
properly, as there is between Intelligent beings and the parts of the
Universe, within its limits; I answer, I cannot tell what the Law of
Nature, or the Constitution of God, would be in this case.
Coroll. There is, therefore, no difficulty in answering such questions
as these, What cause was there why the Universe was placed in such a
part of Space? and, Why was the Universe created at such a Time? for,
if there be no Space beyond the Universe, it was impossible that it
should be created in another place; and if there was no Time before,
it was impossible it should be created at another time.
The idea we have of Space, and what we call by that name, is only
Coloured Space, and is entirely taken out of the mind, if Colour be
taken away. And so all that we call Extension, Motion, and Figure, is
gone, if Colour is gone. As to any idea of Space, Extension, Distance,
or Motion, that a man born blind might form, it would be nothing like
what we call by those names. All that he could have would be only
certain sensations or feelings, that in themselves would be no more
like what we intend by Space, Motion, &c. than the pain we have by the
scratch of a pin, or that the ideas of taste and smell. And as to the
idea of Motion, that such a one could have, it could be only a
diversification of those successions in a certain way, by succession
as to time. And then there would be an agreement of these successions
of sensations, with some ideas we have by sight, as to number and
proportions; but yet the ideas, after all, nothing akin to that idea
we now give this name to.--And, as it is very plain, Colour is only in
the mind, and nothing like it can be out of all mind. Hence it is
manifest, there can be nothing like those things we call by the name
of Bodies, out of the mind, unless it be in some other mind or minds.
And, indeed, the secret lies here: That, which truly is the Substance
of all Bodies, is the infinitely exact, and precise, and perfectly
stable Idea, in God's mind, together with his stable Will, that the
same shall gradually be communicated to us, and to other minds,
according to certain fixed and exact established Methods and Laws: or
in somewhat different language, the infinitely exact and precise
Divine Idea, together with an answerable, perfectly exact, precise,
and stable Will, with respect to correspondent communications to
Created Minds, and effects on their minds.
[61.] Substance. [104] It is intuitively certain, that , if Solidity
be removed from Body, nothing is left but empty space. Now, in all
things whatsoever, that which cannot be removed without removing the
whole thing, that thing which is removed is the thing itself, except
it be mere circumstance and manner of existence, such as Time and
Place; which are in the general necessary, because it implies a
contradiction to existence itself, to suppose that it exists at no
time and in no place, and therefore in order to remove time and place
in the general, we must remove the thing itself: So if we remove
Figure and Bulk and Texture, in the general; which may be reduced to
that necessary circumstance of Place.
If, therefore, it implies a contradiction to suppose that body, or any
thing appertaining to Body, beside Space, exists, when Solidity is
removed; it must be, either because Body is nothing but Solidity and
Space, or else, that Solidity is such a mere circumstance and relation
of existence, which the thing cannot be without, because whatever
exists must exist in some circumstances or other, as at some time or
some place. But we know, and every one perceives, it to be a
contradiction to suppose, that Body or Matter exists without Solidity,
for all the notion we have of Empty Space, is Space without Solidity,
and all the notion we have of Full Space, is Space Resisting.
The reason is plain; for if it implies a contradiction to suppose
Solidity absent, and the thing existing, it must be because Solidity
is that thing, and so it is a contradiction to say the thing is absent
from itself; or because it is such a mode, or circumstances, or
relation, of the existence, as it is a contradiction to suppose
existence at all without it, such as Time and Place, to which both
Figure and Texture are reduced. For nothing can be conceived of so
necessarily in an existence, that it is a contradiction to suppose it
without it, but the Existence itself, and those general Circumstances
or Relations of existence, which the very supposition of existence
itself implies.
Again, Solidity or Impenetrability is as much Action, or the immediate
result of Action, as Gravity. Gravity by all will be confessed to be
immediately from some active influence. Being a continual tendency in
bodies to move, and being that, which will set them in motion though
before at perfect rest, it must be the effect of something acting on
that body. And it is as clear and evident, that action is as requisite
to stop a body, that is already in motion, as in order to set bodies a
moving, that are at perfect rest. Now we see continually, that there
is a stopping of all motion, at the limits of such and such parts of
Space, only this stoppage is modified and diversified according to
certain Laws; for we get the idea and apprehension of Solidity, only
and entirely, from the observation we make of that ceasing of motion,
at the limits of some parts of Space, that already is, and that
beginning of motion, that till now was not, according to a certain
constant manner.
And why is it not every whit as reasonable, that we should attribute
this action, or effect, to the influence of some Agent, as that other
action or effect which we call Gravity which is likewise derived from
our observation of the beginning and ceasing of motion, according to a
certain method? In either case, there is nothing observed, but the
beginning, increasing, directing, diminishing, and ceasing of motion.
And why is it not as reasonable to seek a reason, beside that general
one, that it is something; which is no reason at all? I say, Why is it
not as reasonable to seek a reason or cause of these actions, as will
in one as in the other case? We do not think it sufficient to say, It
is the nature of the unknown substance, in the one case; and why
should we think it a sufficient explication of the same actions or
effects, in the other. By Substance, I suppose it is confessed, we
mean only Something; because of Abstract Substance we have no idea,
that is more particular than only existence in general. Now why is it
not as reasonable, when we see something suspended in the air, set to
move with violence towards the Earth, to rest in attributing of it to
the nature of the something that is there; as when we see that motion,
when it comes to such limits, all on a sudden cease, for this is all
that we observe in falling bodies. Their falling is the action we call
Gravity: their stopping upon the surface of the Earth, the action
whence we gain the idea of Solidity. It was before agreed on all
hands, that there is something there, that supports that resistance.
It must be granted now, that that Something is a Being, that acts
there, as much as that Being, that causes bodies to descent towards
the centre. Here is something in these parts of space, that of itself
produces effects, without previously being acted upon; for that Being
that lays an arrest on bodies in motion, and immediately stops them
when they come to such limits and bounds, certainly does as much, as
that Being that sets a body in motion, that before was at rest. Now
this Being, acting altogether of itself, producing new effects, that
are perfectly arbitrary, and that are no way necessary of themselves;
must be Intelligent and Voluntary. There is no reason, in the nature
of the thing itself, why a body, when set in motion, should stop at
such limits, more than at any other. It must therefore be some
arbitrary, active, and voluntary Being, that determines it. If there
were but one body in the Universe, that always in time past had been
at rest, and should now, without any alteration, be set i motion; we
might certainly conclude, that some voluntary Being set it in motion,
because it can certainly be demonstrated, that it can be for no other
reason. So with just the same reason, in the same manner, we may
conclude, if the body had hitherto been in motion, and is at a certain
point of space now stopped. And would it not be every whit as
reasonable to conclude, it must be from such an Agent, as if, in
certain portions of space, we observed bodies to be attracted a
certain way, and so at once to be set into motion, or accelerated in
motion. And it is not at all the less remarkable, because we receive
the ideas of light and colours from those spaces; for we know that
light and colours are not there, and are made entirely by such a
resistance, together with attraction, that is antecedent to these
qualities, and would be a necessary effect of a mere resistance of
space without other substance.
The whole of what we any way observe, whereby we get the idea of
Solidity, or Solid Body, are certain parts of Space, from whence we
receive the ideas of light and colours; and certain sensations by the
sense of feeling; and we observe that the places, whence we receive
these sensations, are not constantly the same, but are successively
different and this light and colours are communicated from one part of
space to another. And we observe that these parts of Space, from
whence we receive these sensations, resist and stop other bodies,
which we observe communicated successively through the parts of Space
adjacent; and that those that there were before at rest, or existing
constantly in one and the same part of Space, after this exist
successively in different parts of Space, and these observations are
according to certain stated rules. I appeal to any one that takes
notice and asks himself, whether his be not all that ever be
experienced in the world, whereby he got these ideas; and that this is
all that we have or can have any idea of, in relation to bodies. All
that we observe of Solidity is, that certain parts of Space, from
whence we receive the ideas of light and colours, and a few other
sensations, do likewise resist any thing coming within them. It
therefore follows, that if we suppose there be any thing else, than
what we thus observe, it is but only by way of Inference.
I know that it is nothing but the Imagination will oppose me in this:
I will therefore endeavour to help the Imagination thus. Suppose that
we receive none of the sensible qualities of light, colours, &c. from
the resisting parts of Space, (we will suppose it possible for
resistance to be without them,) and they were, to appearance, clear
and pure; and all that we could possibly observe, was only and merely
Resistance; we simply observed that Motion was resisted and stopped,
here and there, in particular parts of Infinite Space. Should we not
then think it less unreasonable to suppose, that such effects should
be produced by some Agent, present in those parts of Space, though
Invisible. If we, when walking upon the face of the Earth, were
stopped at certain limits, and could not possible enter into such a
part of Space, nor make any body enter into it; and we could observe
no other difference, no way, nor at any time, between that and other
parts of clear space: should we not be ready to say, What is it stops
us? What is it hinders all entrance into that place?
The reason why it is so exceedingly natural to men to suppose that
there is some Latent Substance, or Something that is altogether hid,
that upholds the properties of bodies, is, because all see at first
sight, that the properties of bodies are such as need some Cause, that
shall every moment have influence to their continuance, as well as a
Cause of their first existence. All therefore agree, that there is
Something that is there, and upholds these properties. And it is most
true, there undoubtedly is; but men are wont to content themselves in
saying merely, that it is Something; but that Something is He "by whom
all things consist."
[25.] The distribution of the objects of our thoughts, into Substances
and Modes, may be proper; if, by Substance, we understand, a
complexion of such ideas, which we conceive of as subsisting together,
and by themselves; and, by Modes, those simple ideas which cannot be
by themselves, or subsist in our mind alone.
[38.] Body infinite? If we dispute, whether Body is capable of being
Infinite; let us in the first place put the question, Whether motion
can be infinite; that is, Whether there can be a motion infinitely
swift. I suppose that every one will see, that, if a body moved with
infinite swiftness, it would be in every part of the distance passed
through exactly at once, and therefore it could not be said to move
from one part of it to another. Infinite motion is therefore a
contradiction. Supposing therefore a Body were infinitely great, it
could doubtless be moved by Infinite Power, and turned round some
point or axis. But if that were possible, it is evident that some part
of that Infinite Body would move with Infinite Swiftness; which we
have seen is a contradiction. Body therefore cannot be infinite.
[21.] Matter thought. It has been a question with some, Whether or no
it was not possible with God, to the other properties or powers of
Matter to add that of Thought; whether he could not, if he had
pleased, have added Thinking, and the power of Perception, to those
other properties of Solidity, Mobility, and Gravitation. The question
is not here, Whether the Matter that now is, without the addition of
any new primary property, could not be so contrived and modelled, so
attenuated, wrought, and moved, as to produce thought: but, whether
any Lump of matter, a solid Atom, for instance, is not capable of
receiving, by the Almighty Power of God, in addition to the rest of
its powers, a new power of thought.
Here, if the question be, Whether or no God cannot cause the faculty
of thinking to be so added to any parcel of matter, so as to be in the
same place, (if thought can be in place,) and that inseparably, where
that matter is, so that by a fixed law, that thought should be where
that matter is, and only there, being always bound to solid extension,
mobility, and gravity; I do not deny it. But that seems to me quite a
different thing from the question, Whether Matter can think; or,
Whether God can make Matter think; and is not worth the disputing. For
if Thought be in the same place where Matter is, yet, if there be no
manner of communication, or dependence, between that and any thing
that is material; that is, any of that collection of properties that
we call Matter; if none of those properties of Solidity, Extension,
&c. wherein Materiality consists;--which are Matter or, at least
whereby Matter is Matter;--have any manner of influence towards the
exerting of Thought; and if that Thought be no way dependent on
Solidity or Mobility, and they no way help the matter, but Thought
could be as well without those properties; then Thought is not
properly in Matter, though it be in the same place. All the
properties, that are properly said to be in Matter, depend on the
other properties of Matter, so that they cannot be without them. Thus
Figure is in Matter: it depends on Solidity and Extension; and so doth
Motion; so doth Gravity; and Extension itself depends on Solidity, in
that it is the extension of the Solidity; and Solidity on Extension,
for nothing can be solid except it be extended. These ideas have a
dependence on one another; but there is no manner of connexion between
the ideas of Perception and Solidity, or Motion, or Gravity. They are
simple ideas, of which we can have a perfect view; and we know there
is no dependence. Nor can there be any dependence, for the ideas in
their own nature are independent and alien one to another. All the
others either include the rest, or are included in them: and, except
the the property of Thought be included in the properties of Matter, I
think it cannot properly be said, that Matter has Thought, or if it
can, I see not a possibility of Matter, in any other sense, having
Thought.--If Thought's being so fixed to Matter, as to be in the same
place where Matter is, be for Thought to be in Matter; Thought not
only can be in Matter, but actually is, as much as Thought can be, in
place. It is so connected with the Bodies of men, or, at least, with
some parts of their bodies, and will be for ever after the
Resurrection.
[65.] Motion. If Motion be only mental, it seems to follow that there
is no difference between Real and Apparent motion, or that Motion is
nothing else but the change of position between bodies; and then of
two bodies that have their position changed, Motion may with equal
reason be ascribed to either of them, and the Sun may as properly be
said to move as the Earth. And then returns this difficulty. If it be
so, how comes it to pass that the Laws of Centrifugal Force are
observed to take place, with respect to the Earth, considered as
moving round the Sun, but not with respect to the Sun, considered as
moving round the Earth?--I answer, it would be impossible it should be
so, and the Laws of gravitation be observed. The Earth cannot be kept
at a distance from a body, so strongly attracting it as the Sun, any
other way than by such a motion as is supposed. That body therefore
must be reputed to move, that can be supposed so to do, according to
the Laws of Nature universally observed in other things. It is upon
them that God impresses that Centrifugal Force.
n.b. This answers the objection that might be raised from what Newton
says of Absolute, and Relative, Motion, and that distinguishing
property of absolute Circular Motion, that there was a Centrifugal
Force in the body moved; for God causes a Centrifugal Force in that
body, that can be supposed to move circularly, consistently with the
Laws of Motion, in that and in all other things, on which it has a
near, or a remote, dependence, and which must be supposed to move in
order to the observance of those Laws in the Universe. For instance,
when a bushel, with water in it, is violently whirled round, before
the water takes the impression, there is a continual change of
position between the water and the parts of the bushel; but yet that
must not be supposed to move as fast as that position is altered;
because if we follow it, it will not hold out consistent with the Laws
of motion in the Universe, for if the Water moves, then the bushel
does not move; and if the Bushel does not move, then the Earth moves
round the bushel, every time that seems to turn round; but there can
be no such alteration in the motion of the Earth created naturally, or
in observance of the Laws of Nature.
[2.] Place of minds. Our common way of conceiving of what is
Spiritual, is very gross, and shadowy, and corporeal, with dimensions
and figure, &c. though it be supposed to be very clear, so that we can
see through it. If we would get a right notion of what is Spiritual,
we must think of Thought, or Inclination, or Delight. How large is
that thing in the Mind which they call Thought? Is Love square, or
round? Is the surface of Hatred rough, or smooth? Is Joy an inch, or a
foot, in diameter? These are Spiritual things, and why should we then
form such a ridiculous idea of Spirits, as to think them so long, so
thick, or so wide; or to think there is a necessity of their being
square, or round, or some other certain figure?
Therefore Spirits cannot be in place, in such a sense, that all,
within the given limits, shall be where the Spirit is, and all without
such a circumscription, where he is not; but in this sense only, that
all created Spirits have clearer and more strongly impressed ideas of
things, in one place than in another, or can produce effects here, and
not there; and as this place alters, so Spirits move. In Spirits
united to bodies, the Spirit more strongly perceives things where the
body is, and can there immediately produce effects; and in this sense
the soul can be said to be in the same place where the body is. And
this law is, that we call the Union between soul and body. So the soul
may be said to be in the brain; because ideas, that come by the body,
immediately ensue, only on alterations that are made there; and the
soul most immediately produces effects no where else.
No doubt that all Finite Spirits, united to bodies or not, are thus in
place; that is, that they perceive, or passively receive, ideas, only
of created things, that are in some particular place at a given time.
At least a Finite Spirit cannot thus be in all places at a time,
equally. And doubtless the change of the place, where they perceive
most strongly and produce effects immediately, is regular and
successive; which is the motion of Spirits.
[31.] From what is said above, we learn, that the seat of t