Jonathan Edwards Collection: Edwards, Jonathan - Personal Writings: 28c
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Jonathan Edwards Collection: Edwards, Jonathan - Personal Writings: 28c
TOPIC: Edwards, Jonathan - Personal Writings (Other Topics in this Collection)
SUBJECT: 28c
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[60.] Will, Its Determination. The greatest mental existence of Good,
the greatest degree of the mind's sense of Good, the greatest degree
of apprehension, or perception, or idea of own Good, always determines
the Will. Where three things are to be considered, that make up the
proportion of mental existence of own good; for it is the proportion
compounded of these three proportions that always determines the Will.
1. The degree of good apprehended, or the degree of good represented
by idea. This used to be reckoned by many the only thing that
determined the Will.--2. The proportion or degree of apprehension or
perception--the degree of the view the mind has of it, or the degree
of the ideal perceptive presence of the good in the mind. This
consists in two things. (1.) In the degree of the judgment. This is
different from the first thing we mentioned, which was the judgment of
the degree of good; but we speak now of the degree of that judgment,
according to the degree of assurance or certainty. (2.) The Deepness
of the sense of the goodness; or the clearness, liveliness, and
sensibleness of the goodness or sweetness, or the strength of the
impression on the mind. As one, that has just tasted honey, has more
of an idea of its goodness, than one that never tasted, though he also
fully believes that it is very sweet, yea as sweet as it is. And he
that has seen a great beauty, has a far more clear and strong idea of
it, than he that never saw it. Good, as it is thus most clearly and
strongly present to the mind, will proportionally more influence the
mind to incline and will.--3. There is to be considered the proportion
or degree of the mind's apprehension of the Propriety of the good, or
of its Own Concernment in it. Thus the soul has a clearer and stronger
apprehension of a pleasure, that it may enjoy the next hour, than of
the same pleasure that it is sure it may enjoy ten years hence, though
the latter doth really as much concern it as the former. There are
usually other things concur, to make men choose present, before
future, good. They are generally more certain of the good, and have a
stronger sense of it. But if they were equally certain, and it were
the very same good, and they were sure it would be the same, yet the
soul would be most inclined to the nearest, because they have not so
lively an apprehension of themselves, and of the good, and of the
whole matter. And then there is the pain and uneasiness of enduring
such an appetite so long a time, that generally comes in. But yet this
matter wants to be made something more clear, why the soul is more
strongly inclined to near than distant good.
It is utterly impossible but that it should be so, that the
inclination and choice of the mind should always be determined by
Good, as mentally or ideally existing. It would be a contradiction to
suppose otherwise, for we mean nothing else by Good, but that which
agree with the inclination and disposition of the mind. And surely
that, which agrees with it, must agree with it. And it also implies a
contradiction, to suppose that that good, whose mental or ideal being
is greatest, does not always determine the Will; for we mean nothing
else, by Greatest Good, but that which agrees most with the
inclination and disposition of the soul. It is ridiculous to say, that
the soul does not incline to that most, which is most agreeable to the
inclination of the soul.--I think I was not mistaken when I said that
nothing else is meant by Good, here, but that that agrees with the
Inclination and Disposition of the mind. If they do not mean that that
strikes the mind, that that is agreeable to it, that that pleases it,
and falls in with the disposition of its nature; then I would know,
What is meant.
The Will is no otherwise different from the Inclination, than that we
commonly call that the Will, that is the Mind's Inclination, with
respect to its own Immediate Actions.
[70.] that it is not Uneasiness, in our present circumstances, that
always determines the Will, as Mr. Locke supposes, is evident by this,
that there may be an Act of the Will, in choosing and determining to
forbear to act, or move, when some action is proposed to a man; as
well as in choosing to act. Thus, if a man be put upon rising from his
seat, and going to a certain place; his voluntary refusal is an act of
the Will, which does not arise from any uneasiness in his present
circumstances certainly. An act of voluntary refusal is as truly an
act of the Will, as an act of refusal. The Will chooses to neglect: it
prefers the opposite of that which is refused.
[39.] Conscience. Beside the two sorts of Assent of the mind, called
Will and Judgment, there is a third, arising from a sense of the
General Beauty and Harmony of things, which is Conscience. There are
some things, which move a kind of horror in the mind, which yet the
mind wills and chooses; and some, which are agreeable in this way to
its make and constitution, which yet it chooses not. These Assents of
Will and Conscience have indeed a common object, which is Excellency.
Still they differ. The one is always General Excellency: that is
Harmony, taking in its relation to the Whole System of beings. The
other, that Excellency which most strongly effects, whether the
Excellency be more general or particular. But the degree, wherein we
are affected by any Excellency, is in proportion compounded of the
Extensiveness, and the Intensiveness, of our view of that Excellency.
[1.] Excellency. There has nothing been more without a definition,
than Excellency; although it be what we are more concerned with than
any thing else whatsoever; yea, we are concerned with nothing else.
But what is this Excellency? Wherein is one thing excellent, and
another evil; one beautiful, and another deformed? Some have said that
all Excellency is Harmony, symmetry, or Proportion; but they have not
yet explained it. We would know, Why Proportion is more excellent than
Disproportion; that is, why Proportion is pleasant to the mind, and
Disproportion unpleasant? Proportion is a thing that may be explained
yet further. It is an Equality, or Likeness of ratios; so that it is
the Equality that makes the Proportion. Excellency therefore seems to
consist in Equality. Thus, if there be two perfect equal circles, or
globes, together, there is something more of beauty than if they were
unequal, disproportionate magnitudes. And if two parallel lines be
drawn, the beauty is greater, than if they were obliquely inclined
without proportion, because there is equality of distance. And if
betwixt two parallel lines, two equal circles be placed, each at the
same distance from each parallel line, as in Fig. 1, the beauty is
greater, than if they stood at irregular
1
2
3
4
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
distances from the parallel lines. If they stand, each in a
perpendicular line, going from the parallel lines (Fig. 2,) it is
requisite that they should each stand at an equal distance from the
perpendicular line next to them; otherwise there is no beauty. If
there be three of these circles between two parallel lines, and near
to a perpendicular line run between them, (Fig. 3,) the most beautiful
form perhaps, that they could be placed in, is in an equilateral
triangle with the cross line, because there are most equalities. The
distance of the two next to the cross line is equal from that, and
also equal from the parallel lines. The distance of the third from
each parallel is equal, and its distance from each of the other two
circles is equal, and is also equal to their distance from one
another, and likewise equal to their distance from each end of the
cross line. There are two equalateral triangles: one made by the three
circles, and the other made by the cross line and two of the sides of
the first protracted till they meet that line. And if there be another
like it, on the opposite side, to correspond with it, and it be taken
altogether, the beauty is still greater, where the distances from the
lines, in the cone are equal to the distances in the other; also the
two next to the cross lines are at equal distances from the other two;
or, if you go crosswise, from corner to corner. The two cross lines
are also parallel, so that all parts are at an equal distance, and
innumerable other equalities might be found.
This simple Equality, without Proportion, is the lowest kind of
Regularity, and may be called Simple Beauty. All other beauties and
excellencies may be resolved into it. Proportion is Complex Beauty.
Thus, if we suppose that there are two points, A B, placed at two
inches distance, and the next, C, one inch farther; (Fig. 1,)
Fig. 1
Fig. 2
·
·
·
·
I
I
I
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
it is requisite, in order to regularity and beauty, if there be
another, D, that it should be at half an inch distance; otherwise
there is no regularity, and the last, D, would stand out of its proper
place; because now the relation that the space C D bears to B C, is
equal to the relation that B C bears to A C; so that B C D is exactly
similar to A B C. It is evident, this is a more complicated excellency
than that which consisted in Equality, because the terms of the
relation are here complex, and before were simple. When there are
three points set in a right line, it is requisite, in order to
regularity, that they should be set at an equal distance, as A B C
(Fig. 2,) where A B is similar to B C, or the relation of C to B is
the same as of B to A. But in the other are three terms necessary in
each of the parts, between which is the relation, B C D is as A B C:
so that here more simple beauties are omitted, and yet there is a
general complex beauty: that is, B C is not as A B nor is C D as B C,
but yet B C D is as A B C. It is requisite that the consent or
regularity of C D to B C be omitted, for the sake of the harmony of
the whole. For although, if C D were perfectly equal to B C, there
would be regularity and beauty with respect to them two; yet, if A B
be taken into the idea, there is nothing but confusion. And it might
be requisite, if these stood with others, even to omit this
proposition, for the sake of one more complex still. Thus, if they
stood with other points, where B stood at four inches distance from A,
C at two from B, and D at six from C: the place where D must stand in,
if A, B, C, D, were alone, viz. one inch from C, must be so as to be
made proportionate with the other points beneath;
A B C D
| I | I | I | I | I | I |
| I | I | I | I | I | I | I | I | I | I | I | I
A B C D
So that although A, B, C, D, are not proportioned, but are confusion
among themselves; yet taken with the whole they are proportioned and
beautiful.
All beauty consists in similarness or identity of relation. In
identity of relation consists all likeness, and all identity between
two consists in identity of relation. Thus, when the distance between
two is exactly equal, their distance is their relation one to another,
the distance is the same, the bodies are two; wherefore this is their
correspondency and beauty. So bodies exactly of the same figure, the
bodies are two, the relation between the parts of the extremities is
the same, and this is their agreement with them. But if there are two
bodies of different shapes, having no similarness of relation between
the parts of the extremities; this, considered by itself, is a
deformity, because being disagrees with being, which must undoubtedly
be disagreeable to perceiving being; because what disagrees with
Being, must necessarily be disagreeable to Being in general, to every
thing that partakes of Entity, and of course to perceiving being; and
what agrees with Being, must be agreeable to Being in general, and
therefore to perceiving being. But agreeableness of perceiving being
is pleasure, and disagreeableness is pain. Disagreement or contrariety
to Being, is evidently an approach to Nothing, or a degree of Nothing;
which is nothing else but disagreement or contrariety of Being, and
the greatest and only evil: And Entity is the greatest and only good.
And by how much more perfect Entity is, that is without mixture of
Nothing, by so much the more Excellency. Two beings can agree one with
another in nothing else but Relation; because otherwise the notion of
their twoness (duality) is destroyed, and they become one.
And so, in every case, what is called Correspondency, Symmetry,
Regularity, and the like, may be resolved into Equalities; though the
Equalities in a beauty, in any degree complicated, are so numerous,
that it would be a most tedious piece of work to enumerate them. There
are millions of these Equalities. Of these consist the beautiful shape
of flowers, the beauty of the body of man, and of the bodies of other
animals. That sort of beauty which is called Natural, as of vines,
plants, trees, &c. consists of a very complicated harmony; and all the
natural motions, and tendencies, and figures of bodies in the Universe
are done according to proportion, and therein is their beauty.
Particular disproportions sometimes greatly add to the general beauty,
and must necessarily be, in order to a more universal proportion.--So
much equality, so much beauty; though it may be noted that the
quantity of equality is not to be measured only by the number, but the
intenseness, according to the quantity of being. As bodies are shadows
of being, so their proportions are shadows of proportion.
The pleasures of the senses, where harmony is not the object of
judgment, are the result of equality. Thus in Music, not only in the
proportion which the several notes of a tune bear one among another,
but in merely two notes there is harmony; whereas it is impossible
there should be proportion between only two terms. But the proportion
is in the particular vibrations of the air, which strike on the ear.
And so, in the pleasantness of light, colours, tastes, smells, and
touch, all arise from proportion of motion. The organs are so
contrived that, upon the touch of such and such particles, there shall
be a regular and harmonious motion of the animal spirits.
Spiritual harmonies are of vastly larger extent: i.e. the proportions
are vastly oftener redoubled, and respect mere beings, and require a
vastly larger view to comprehend them; as some simple notes do more
effect one, who has not a comprehensive understanding of Music.
The reason why Equality thus pleases the mind, and Inequality is
unpleasing, is because Disproportion, or Inconsistency, is contrary to
Being. For Being, if we examine narrowly, is nothing else but
Proportion. When one being is inconsistent with another being, then
Being is contradicted. But contradiction to Being, is intolerable to
perceiving being, and the consent to Being, most pleasing.
Excellency consists in the Similarness of one being to another--not
merely Equality and Proportion, but any kind of Similarness--thus
Similarness of direction. Supposing many globes moving in right lines,
it is more beautiful, that they should move all the same way, and
according to the same direction, than if they moved disorderly; one,
one way, and another, another. This is a universal definition of
Excellency:--The Consent of Being to Being, or Being's Consent to
Entity. The more the Consent is, and the more extensive, the greater
is the Excellency.
How exceedingly apt are we, when we are sitting still, and
accidentally casting our eye upon some marks or spots in the floor or
wall, to be ranging of them into regular parcels and figures: and, if
we see a mark out of its place, to be placing of it right, by our
imagination; and this, even while we are meditating on something else.
So we may catch ourselves at observing the rules of harmony and
regularity, in the careless motions of our heads or feet, and when
playing with our hands, or walking about the room.
Pleasedness, in perceiving Being, always arises, either from a
perception of Consent to Being in general, or of Consent to that Being
that perceives. As we have shown, that Agreeableness to Entity must be
agreeable to perceiving Entity; it is as evident that it is necessary
that Agreeableness to that Being must be pleasing to it, if it
perceives it. So that Pleasedness does not always arise from a
perception of Excellency; [in general;] but the greater a Being is,
and the more it has of Entity, the more will Consent to Being in
general please it. Him, become the same; for so far as a thing
consents to Being in general, so far it consents to Him; and the more
perfect Created Spirits are, the nearer do they come to their Creator,
in this regard.
That, which is often called Self-Love, is exceedingly improperly
called Love, for they do not only say that one loves himself, when he
sees something amiable in himself, the view of which begets delight.
But merely an inclination to pleasure, and averseness to pain, they
call Self-Love; so that the devils, and other damned spirits, love
themselves, not because they see any thing in themselves which they
imagine to be lovely, but merely because they do not incline to pain
but to pleasure; for pain and pleasure include an inclination to
agreeableness, and an aversion to disagreeableness. Now how improper
is it to say, that one loves himself, because what is agreeable to him
is agreeable to him, and what is disagreeable to him is disagreeable
to him: which mere Entity supposes. So that this, that they call
Self-Love, is no affection, but only the Entity of the thing, or his
being what he is.
One alone, without any reference to any more, cannot be excellent; for
in such case, there can be no manner of relation no way, and therefore
no such thing as Consent. Indeed what we call One may be excellent
because of a consent of parts, or some consent of those in that being,
that are distinguished into a plurality some way or other. But in a
being that is absolutely without any plurality, there cannot be
Excellency, for there can be no such thing as consent or agreement.
One of the highest excellencies is Love. As nothing else has a proper
being but Spirits, and as Bodies are but the shadow of being,
therefore the consent of bodies one to another, and the harmony that
is among them, is but the shadow of Excellency. The highest Excellency
therefore must be the consent of Spirits one to another. But the
consent of Spirits consists half in their mutual love one to another.
And the sweet harmony between the various parts of the Universe, is
only an image of mutual love. But yet a lower kind of love may be
odious, because it hinders, or is contrary to, a higher and more
general. Even a lower proportion is often a deformity, because it is
contrary to a more general proportion.
Coroll. 1. If so much of the beauty and excellency of Spirits consist
in Love, then the deformity of evil spirits consists as much in hatred
and malice.
Coroll. 2. The more any doctrine, or institution, brings to light of
the Spiritual World, the more will it urge to Love and Charity.
Happiness strictly consists in the perception of these three things:
of the consent of being to its own being; of its own consent to being;
and of being's consent to being.
[14.] Excellence, to put it in other words, is that which is beautiful
and lovely. That which is beautiful, considered by itself separately,
and deformed, considered as a part of something else more extended; or
beautiful, only with respect to itself and a few other things, and not
as a part of that which contains all things--the Universe;--is false
beauty and a confined beauty. That which is beautiful, with respect to
the university of things, has a generally extended excellence and a
true beauty; and the more extended, or limited, its system is, the
more confined or extended is its beauty.
[62.] As Bodies, the objects of our external senses are but the
shadows of beings; that harmony, wherein consists sensible excellency
and beauty, is but the shadow of excellency. That is, it is pleasant
to the mind, because it is a shadow of love. When one thing sweetly
harmonizes with another, as the Notes in music, the notes are so
conformed, and have such proportion one to another, that they seem to
have respect one to another, as if they loved one another. So the
beauty of figures and motions is, when one part has such consonant
proportion with the rest, as represents a general agreeing and
consenting together; which is very much the image of Love, in all the
parts of a Society, united by a sweet consent and charity of heart.
Therein consists the beauty of figures, as of flowers drawn with a
pen; and the beauty of the body, and of the features of the face.
There is no other way, that sensible things can consent one to another
but by Equality, or by Likeness, or by Proportion. Therefore the
lowest or most simple kind of beauty is equality or likeness; because
by equality or likeness, one part consents with but one part; but by
Proportion one part may sweetly consent to ten thousand different
parts; all the parts may consent with all the rest; and not only so,
but the parts, taken singly, may consent with the whole taken
together. Thus, in the figures or flourishes drawn by an acute penman,
every stroke may have such a proportion, both by the place and
distance, direction, degree of curvity, &c. that there may be a
consent, in the parts of each stroke, one with another, and a
harmonious agreement with all the strokes, and with the various parts,
composed of many strokes, and an agreeableness to the whole figure
taken together.
There is a beauty in Equality, as appears very evident by the very
great respect men show to it, in every thing they make or do. How
unbeautiful would be the body, if the parts on one side were unequal
to those on the other; how unbeautiful would writing be, if the
letters were not of an equal height, or the lines of an equal length,
or at an equal distance, or if the pages were not of an equal width or
height; and how unbeautiful would a building be, if no equality were
observed in the correspondent parts.
Existence or Entity is that, into which all Excellency is to be
resolved. Being or Existence is what is necessarily agreeable to
Being; and when Being perceives it, it will be an agreeable
perception; and any contradiction to Being or Existence is what Being,
when it perceives, abhors. If Being, in itself considered, were not
pleasing, Being's consent to Being would not be pleasing, nor would
Being's disagreeing with Being be displeasing. Therefore, not only may
Greatness be considered as a capacity of Excellency; but a Being, by
reason of his greatness considered alone, is the more excellent,
because he partakes more of Being. Though if he be great, if he
dissents from more general and extensive Being, or from Universal
Being; he is the more odious for his greatness, because the dissent or
contradiction to Being in general is so much the greater. It is more
odious for his greatness, because the dissent or contradiction to
Being in general is so much the greater. It is more grating to see
much Being dissent from Being than to see little; and his greatness,
or the quantity of Being he partakes of, does nothing towards
bettering his dissent from Being in general, because there is no
proportion between Finite Being, however great, and Universal Being.
Coroll. 1. Hence it is impossible that God should be any otherwise
than excellent; for he is the Infinite, Universal, and
All-comprehending Existence.
2. Hence God infinitely loves himself, because his Being is Infinite.
He is in himself, if I may so say, an Infinite Quantity of Existence.
3. Hence we learn one reason, why persons, who view Death merely as
Annihilation, have a great abhorrence of it, though they live a very
afflicted life.
[63.] Sensible Things, by virtue of the harmony and proportion that is
seen in them, carry the appearance of perceiving and willing being.
They evidently show at first blush, the action and governing of
understanding and volition. The Notes of a tune or the strokes of an
acute penman, for instance, are placed in such exact order, having
such mutual respect one to another, that they carry with them, into
the mind of him that sees or hears, the conception of an understanding
and will exerting itself in these appearances: and were it not that
we, by reflection and reasoning, are led to an extrinsic intelligence
and will, that was the cause, it would seem to be in the Notes and
Strokes themselves. They would appear like a society of so many
perceiving beings, sweetly agreeing together. I can conceive of no
other reason why Equality and Proportion should be pleasing to him
that perceives, but only that it has an appearance of Consent.
[64.] Excellency may be distributed into Greatness and Beauty. The
former is the Degree of Being; the latter is Beings' Consent to Being.
[49.] It is reasonable to suppose that the mere perception of Being is
agreeable to perceiving Being, as well as Being's consent to Being. If
absolute Being were not agreeable to perceiving Being, the
contradiction of Being to Being would not be unpleasant. Hence there
is in the mind an inclination to perceive the things that are, or the
Desire of Truth. The exercise of this disposition of the soul, to a
high degree, is the passion of admiration. When the mind beholds a
very uncommon object, there is the pleasure of a new perception, with
the excitation of the appetite of knowing more of it, as the causes
and manner of production and the like, and the uneasiness arising from
its being so hidden. These compose that emotion called Admiration.
[45.] Excellence. 1. when we spake of Excellence in Bodies, we were
obliged to borrow the word, Consent, from Spiritual things; but
Excellence in and among Spirits is, in its prime and proper sense,
Being's consent to Being. There is no other proper consent but that of
Minds, even of their Will; which, when it is of Minds towards Minds,
it is Love, and when of Minds towards other things, it is Choice.
Wherefore all the Primary and Original beauty or excellence, that is
among Minds, is Love; and into this may all be resolved that is found
among them.
2. When we spake of External excellency, we said that Being's consent
to being must needs be agreeable to Perceiving Being. But now we are
speaking of Spiritual things, we may change the phrase, and say, that
Mind's love to Mind must needs be lovely to Beholding Mind; and
Being's love to Being, in general, must needs be agreeable to Being
that perceives it, because itself is a participation of Being in
general.
3. As to the proportion of this Love;--to greater Spirits, more, and
to less, less;--it is beautiful, as it is a manifestation of love to
Spirit or Being in general. And the want of this proportion is a
deformity, because it is a manifestation of a defect of such a love.
It shows that it is not Being, in general, but something else, that is
loved, when love is not in proportion to the Extensiveness and
Excellence of Being.
4. Seeing God has so plainly revealed himself to us; and other minds
are made in his image, and are emanations from him; we may judge what
is the Excellence of other minds, by that is his, which we have shown
is Love, His Infinite Beauty, is His Infinite mutual Love of Himself.
Now God is the Prime and Original Being, the First and Last, and the
Pattern of all, and has the sum of all perfection. We may therefore,
doubtless, conclude, that all that is the perfection of Spirits may be
resolved into that which is God's perfection, which is Love.
5. There are several degrees of deformity or disagreeableness of
dissent from Being. One is, when there is only merely a dissent from
Being. This is disagreeable to Being, (for Perceiving Being only is
properly Being). Still more disagreeable is a dissent to very
excellent Being, or, as we have explained, to a Being that consents in
a high degree to Being, because such a Being by such a consent becomes
bigger; and a dissenting from such a Being includes, also, a
dissenting from what he consents with, which is other Beings, or Being
in general. Another deformity, that is more odious than mere dissent
from Being, is, for a Being to dissent from, or not to consent with, a
Being who consents with his Being. It is a manifestation of a greater
dissent from Being than ordinary; for the Being perceiving, knows that
it is natural to Being, to consent with what consents with it, as we
have shown It therefore manifests an extraordinary dissent, that
consent to itself will not draw its consent. The deformity, for the
same reason, is greater still, if there be dissent from consenting
Being. There are such contrarieties and jars in Being, as must
necessarily produce jarring and horror in perceiving Being.
6. Dissent from such Beings, if that be their fixed nature, is a
manifestation of Consent to Being in general; for consent to being is
dissent from that which dissents from Being.
7. Wherefore all Virtue, which is the Excellency of minds, is resolved
into Love to Being; and nothing is virtuous or beautiful in Spirits,
any otherwise than as it is an exercise, or fruit, or manifestation,
of this love; and nothing is sinful or deformed in Spirits, but as it
is the defect of, or contrary to, these.
8. When we speak of Being in general, we may be understood of the
Divine Being, for he is an Infinite Being; therefore all others must
necessarily be considered as nothing. As to Bodies, we have shown in
another place, that they have no proper Being of their own. And as to
Spirits, they are the communications of the Great Original Spirit; and
doubtless, in metaphysical strictness and propriety, He is, as there
is none else. He is likewise Infinitely Excellent, and all Excellence
and Beauty is derived from him, in the same manner as all being. And
all other Excellence, is, in strictness only, a shadow of his. We
proceed, therefore, to show how all Spiritual Excellence is resolved
into Love.
9. As to God's Excellence, it is evident it consists in the Love of
himself; for he was as excellent before he created the Universe, as he
is now. But if the Excellence of Spirits consists in their disposition
and action, God could be excellent no other way at that time; for all
the exertions of himself were towards himself. But he exerts himself
towards himself, no other way, than in infinitely loving and
delighting in himself; in the mutual love of the Father and the Son.
This makes the Third, the Personal Holy Spirit, or the Holiness of
God, which is his infinite Beauty; and this is God's Infinite Consent
to Being in general. And his love to the creature is his excellence,
or the communication of Himself, his complacency in them according as
they partake of more or less of Excellence and beauty, that is, of
holiness (which consists in love); that is, according as he
communicates more or less of his Holy Spirit.
10. As to that Excellence, that Created Spirits partake of; that it is
all to be resolved into Love, none will doubt, that knows what is the
Sum of the Ten Commandments; or believes what the Apostle says, That
Love is the fulfilling of the Law; or what Christ says, That on these
two, loving God and our neighbour, hang all the Law and the Prophets.
This doctrine is often repeated in the New Testament. We are told that
the End of the Commandment is Love; that to Love, is to fulfill the
Royal Law; and that all the Law is fulfilled in this one word, Love.
11. I know of no difficulties worth insisting on, except pertaining to
the spiritual excellence of Justice; but enough has been said already
to resolve them. Though Injustice is the greatest of all deformities,
yet justice is no otherwise excellent, than as it is the exercise,
fruit, and manifestation of the mind's love or consent to Being; nor
Injustice deformed any otherwise, than as it is the highest degree of
the contrary. Injustice is not to exert ourselves towards any Being as
it deserves, or to do it contrary to what it deserves, in doing good
or evil, or in acts of Consent or Dissent. There are two ways of
deserving our Consent, and the acts of it: (By deserving any thing, we
are to understand that the nature of being requires it:) By
extensiveness and excellence; and by consent to that particular being.
The reason of the deformity of not proportioning our consent, and the
exercise of it, may be seen in paragraphs 3 and 5. As to the beauty of
Vindictive Justice, see paragraph 6.
12. `Tis peculiar to God, that he has beauty within himself,
consisting in Being's consenting with his own Being, or the love of
himself, in his own Holy Spirit. Whereas the excellence of others is
in loving others, in loving God, and in the communications of his
Spirit.
13. We shall be in danger, when we meditate on this love of God to
himself, as being the thing wherein his infinite excellence and
loveliness consists, of some alloy to the sweetness of our view, by
its appearing with something of the aspect and cast of what we call
self-love. But we are to consider that this love includes in it, or
rather is the same as, a love to every thing, as they are all
communications of himself. So that we are to conceive of Divine
Excellence as the Infinite General Love, that which reaches all,
proportionally, with perfect purity and sweetness; yea, it includes
the true Love of all creatures, for that is his Spirit, or which is
the same thing, his Love. And if we take notice, when we are in the
best frames meditating on Divine Excellence, our idea of that
tranquillity and peace, which seems to be overspread and cast abroad
upon the whole Earth, and Universe, naturally dissolves itself into
the idea of a General Love and Delight, every where diffused.
14. Conscience is that Sense the Mind has of this Consent: Which Sense
consist in the Consent of the Perceiving Being, to such a General
Consent; (that is, of such perceiving Beings, as are capable of so
general a perception, as to have any notion of Being in general;) and
the Dissent of his mind to a Dissent from Being in general. We have
said already, that it is naturally agreeable to Perceiving Being that
Being should consent to Being, and the contrary disagreeable. If by
any means, therefore, a particular and restrained love overcomes this
General Consent;--the foundation of that Consent yet remaining in the
nature, exerts itself again, so that there is the contradiction of one
consent to another. And as it is naturally agreeable to every Being,
to have being consent to him; the mind, after it has thus exerted an
act of dissent to Being in general, has a sense that Being in general
dissents from it, which is most disagreeable to it. And as he is
conscious of a dissent from Universal Being, and of that Being's
dissent from him, wherever he is, he sees what excites horror. And by
inclining or doing that, which is against his natural inclination as a
Perceiving Being, he must necessarily cause uneasiness, inasmuch as
that natural inclination is contradicted. And this is the Disquiet of
Conscience. And, though the Disposition be changed, the remembrance of
his having so done in time past, and the idea being still tied to that
of himself, he is uneasy. The notion of such a dissent any where, as
we have shown, is odious; but the notion of its being in himself,
renders it uneasy and disquieting. But when there is no sense of any
such dissent from Being in general, there is no contradiction to the
natural inclination of Perceiving Being. And when he reflects, he has
a sense that Being in general doth not dissent from him; and then
there is Peace of Conscience; though he has a remembrance of past
dissensions with nature. Yet if by any means it be possible, when he
has the idea of it, to conceive of it as not belonging to him, he has
the same Peace. And if he has a sense not only of his not dissenting,
but of his consenting to Being in general, or Nature, and acting
accordingly; he has a sense that Nature, in general, consents to him:
he has not only Peace, but Joy, of mind, wherever he is. These things
are obviously invigorated by the knowledge of God and his Constitution
about us, and by the light of the Gospel.
[The preceding articles were written as comments on the various
subjects treated of, while the author was studying the Essay on the
Human Understanding. It is not improbable that some of the later
numbers were written while the author was a tutor in College.]
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[103] The preceding articles were set down from time to time at the
close of the work, in two series; the first ending with No. 26.
[104] This article, and the numbers following, viz. 62, 63. &c. are
inserted in the manuscript distinctly from the rest, and were written
probably at a somewhat later period of life.