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TOPIC: Edwards, Jonathan - Rational Biblical Theology (Other Topics in this Collection)
SUBJECT: Chapt 21 Providence
Other Subjects in this Topic:
1. Creation and Providence
As we have seen, creation and providence are the same in Edwards’ thought. Creation is merely the first time that God brought something out of “nothing.” Providence is all the subsequent times. Continuous creation is his doctrine of creation and we might say that continuing creation is his doctrine of providence. Later we will see that, in a sense, continuous sanctification is his doctrine of sanctification.
The relation of providence to God is not merely continuing creation, but God’s knowledge is continuous knowledge, or foreknowledge and afterknowledge. That is, God’s knowledge is eternally present to His mind so that He not only foreknows providence but eternally continuously knows it.
2. Providence, Foreknowledge and the Arminians
Foreknowledge ;is the form in which providence is most significant against the Arminians. Edwards shows in the Freedom of the Will that God’s perfect foreknowledge of human choices proves them to be absolutely certain from eternity and impossible of being otherwise. “GOD’S CERTAIN FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE FUTURE VOLITIONS OF MORAL AGENTS, INCONSISTENT WITH SUCH A CONTINGENCE OF THOSE VOLITIONS, AS IS WITHOUT ALL NECESSITY.” *1*
Having demonstrated the actuality of divine foreknowledge, Edwards then contends that the events foreknown must be indissolubly connected with that demonstrated foreknowledge:
So that it is perfectly demonstrable, that if there be any infallible knowledge of future volitions, the event is necessary; or, in other words, that it is impossible but the event should. For if it ben’t impossible but that it may be otherwise, then it is not impossible but that the proposition which affirms its future coming to pass, may not now be true. But how absurd is that, on the supposition that there is now an infallible knowledge (i.e. knowledge which it is impossible should fail) that it is true. *2*
The obviousness of this point made from the demonstrated biblical doctrine of foreknowledge is what makes this argument so very difficult to deny, although it necessarily spells the end of “contingency” as we saw in the discussion of the decrees. The usual way of attempted escape from this argument is to think of foreknowledge, in the case of God, as somehow different from the proper meaning of the word. Or, perhaps we should say, it is an appeal to God’s knowledge as too high for us. We cannot attain to it and therefore cannot assert anything (such as implied necessity) about it. To this Edwards turns in his second argument:
II. That no future event can be certainly foreknown, whose existence is contingent, and without all necessity, may be proved thus; ’tis impossible for a thing to be certainly known to any intellect without evidence. To suppose otherwise, implies a contradiction: because for a thing to be certainly known to any understanding, is for it to be evident to that understanding: and for a thing to be evident to any understanding, is the same thing, as for that understanding to see evidence of it: but no understanding, created or uncreated, can see evidence where there is none: for that is the same thing, as to see that to be, which is not. *3*
In M 1154 Edwards wrote: “God cannot discern evidence where there is none. If God knows things without evidence, then they are evident without evidence. If they are evident to God he knows the evidence.” This seems to be evident to every one but the Arminians who seem to feel that some things can be known without being knowable. Therefore Edwards turns to this type of reasoning in the next paragraph of Freedom of the Will:
But if there be any future event, whose existence is contingent, without all necessity, the future existence of that event is absolutely without evidence. If there be any evidence of it, it must be one of these two sorts, either self-evidence, or proof; for there can be no other sort of evidence but one of these two; an evident thing must be either evident in itself, or evident in something else; that is, evident by connection with something else. But a future thing, whose existence is without all necessity, can have neither of these sorts of evidence. It can’t be self-evident: for if it be, it may be now known by what is now to be seen in the thing itself; either its present existence, or the necessity of its nature: but both these are contrary to the supposition. It is supposed, both that the thing has no present existence to be seen; and also that it is not of such a nature as to be necessarily existent for the future; so that its future existence is not self-evident. And secondly, neither is there any proof, or evidence in anything else, or evidence of connection with something else that is evident; for this also is contrary to the supposition. ’Tis supposed, that there is now nothing existent, with which the future existence of the contingent event is connected. For such a connection destroys its contingence, and supposes necessity. Thus ’tis demonstrated, that there is in the nature of things absolutely no evidence at all of the future existence of that event, which is contingent, without all necessity (if any such event there be); neither self-evidence nor proof. And therefore the thing in reality is not evident; and so can’t be seen to be evident, or, which is the same thing, can’t be known. *4*
Thus, foreknowledge being granted, all contingency is ruled out. If indeterminacy exists anywhere, foreknowledge cannot co-exist there. Edwards will show elsewhere that it cannot exist there, or anywhere, because all things are so interrelated that if any part is unknown all is unknown. Twentieth century’s indeterminacy principle would be Arminian physics; logically it rules out any foreknowledge, even by the Great Mathematician - and not merely human foreknowledge of quantum movements. But the worst is yet to come in the next paragraph. Before that, Edwards turns aside to illustrate, by saying that if the world came into existence out of nothing by contingence it could not be foreknown by God for there would be nothing to be foreknown and God would know that. *5* To suppose inconsistency
is to suppose God’s knowledge to be inconsistent with itself. For to say, that God certainly, and without all conjecture, knows that a thing will infallibly be, which at the same time he knows to be so contingent, that it may possibly not be, is to suppose his knowledge inconsistent with itself; or that one thing that he knows is utterly inconsistent with another thing that he knows. ’Tis the same thing as to say, he now knows a proposition to be of certain infallible truth, which he knows to be of contingent uncertain truth. . . . If volitions are in themselves contingent events, without all necessity, then ’tis no argument of perfection of knowledge in any being to determine peremptorily that they will be; but on the contrary, an argument of ignorance and mistake: because it would argue, that he supposes that proposition to be certain, which in its own nature, and all things considered, is uncertain and contingent. To say in such a case, that God may have ways of knowing contingent events which we can’t conceive of, is ridiculous; as much so, as to say, that God may know contradictions to be true, for ought we know, or that he may know a thing to be certain, and at the same time know it not to be certain, though we can’t conceive how; because he has ways of knowing, which we can’t comprehend. *6*
Now Edwards is after the final refuge of the Arminian: God’s knowing the unknowable, the paradox, the contradiction, coupled with an appeal made in the name of reverence for faith in divine transcendence. For Edwards, this is the worship of fools and he does not hesitate to call the appeal “ridiculous.” What would he say to the twentieth century Arminian who calls the ridiculous sublime and glories in the paradox and circular reasoning and worships not the unknown God but the unknowable and unknowing One? This is the end of the nonsense road: for God to know what by its nature is unknowable and to see what does not exist.
Corol. I. From what has been observed it is evident, that the absolute decrees of God are no more inconsistent with human liberty, on account of any necessity of the event which follows from such decrees, than the absolute foreknowledge of God. Because the connection between the event and certain foreknowledge, is as infallible and indissoluble, as between the event and an absolute decree. *7*
Samuel Clarke had written that since the decree “implies no other certainty but only a certainty of event which the thing would equally have on being foreknown, ’tis evident that it also implies no necessity.” *8* It is obvious that Clarke is in agreement with Edwards here, though Edwards is arguing specifically for “necessity.” But Clarke, who concedes absolute certainty, means to exclude only compulsion by avoiding the word “necessity” while Edwards uses the word necessity without including compulsion in human volitions. It is unfortunate that he does not take the time to say so here as he had already done in the earlier discussion of necessity. A “decree can’t make an event surer,” and if foreknowledge is consistent with liberty (which virtually all evangelical Arminians admit), the decree is also. But Dr. Whitby disagrees and Edwards takes the rest of the corollary to answer him:
Dr. Whitby supposes, there is a great difference between God’s foreknowledge, and his decrees, with regard to necessity of future events. In his Discourse on the Five Points, p. 474, etc. he says, “. . . Should God . . . by immediate revelation, give me the knowledge of the event of any man’s state or actions, would my knowledge of them have any influence upon his actions? Surely none at all. . . . Our knowledge doth not affect the things we know, to make them more certain, or more future, than they would be without it. . . . As therefore knowledge has no influence on things that are, so neither has foreknowledge on things that shall be. And consequently, the foreknowledge of any action that would be otherwise free, cannot alter or diminish that freedom. Whereas God’s decree of election is powerful and active, and comprehends the preparation and exhibition of such means, as shall unfrustrably produce the end. . . . Hence God’s prescience renders no actions necessary.” *9*
We saw why Whitby would affirm foreknowledge while denying decrees. Election is “powerful and active” while foreknowledge is not. Foreknowledge proves certainty; but, according to Whitby, something “powerful and active” must produce “necessity”. So Edwards’ corollary that the decree is no more inconsistent with liberty than foreknowledge, because it represents no increase in certainty, is challenged. Decree does produce necessity, says Whitby, which is never present in mere foreknowledge. Edwards faces up to Whitby’s point:
The whole of the seeming force of this evasion lies in this; that, inasmuch as certain foreknowledge don’t cause an event to be necessary, as a decree does; therefore it don’t prove it to be necessary, as a decree does. But there is no force in this arguing: for it is built wholly on this supposition, that nothing can prove, or be an evidence of a thing’s being necessary, but that which has a causal influence to make it so. But this can never be maintained. If certain foreknowledge of the future existing of an event, be not the thing which first makes it impossible that it should fail of existence; yet it may, and certainly does demonstrate, that it is impossible it should fail of it, however that impossibility comes. If foreknowledge be not the cause, but the effect of this impossibility, it may prove that there is such an impossibility, as much as if it were the cause. It is as strong arguing from the effect to the cause, as from the cause to the effect. *10*
This is a wasted paragraph. Edwards is simply repeating what he has already argued without answering Whitby until the next paragraph. Here Edwards arbitrarily insists on the word “necessity” which includes causality in the very meaning of the word while Whitby is using the term “certainty” which does not include causality in the very meaning of the word, though it may imply it. But that implication needs to be shown. And it is not shown in this paragraph, which makes Edwards’ response sound merely petulant. In the next paragraph he still has not gotten to the point. In fact, he admits as much: “I freely allow, that foreknowledge don’t prove a thing to be necessary any more than after knowledge. . . .” *11* Then he goes on to show that both prove certainty past and future. But, how the event in the past was rendered a fact, or the event in the future will be rendered a fact, is not stated by mere knowledge. Whitby is right and Edwards is still prevaricating. Will he never get to the point? Further on Edwards is still prevaricating and becoming petulant insisting on his word necessity without facing the issue raised by Whitby and Clarke. “Knowledge of futurity, supposes futurity; and a certain knowledge of futurity, supposes certain futurity, antecedent to that certain knowledge.” *12* But Whitby has admitted all this. Now Edwards comes to the point but merely to insist on his own phrasing: “But there is no other certain futurity of a thing, antecedent to certainty of knowledge, than a prior impossibility but that the thing should prove true; or (which is the same thing) the necessity of the event.” *13* But that is most certainly not the “same thing” in the mind of Clarke, Whitby and a few million other Arminians. They grant certain futurity but they have not granted that foreknowledge proves that it comes to pass of necessity meaning (in their use of the word) compulsion. Edwards has yet to prove that “necessity” does not include compulsion. In the next paragraph Homer continues to nod as Edwards resorts to virtual fantasy as argument:
[Foreknowledge] shews the existence of the event to be so settled and firm, that it is as if it had already been; inasmuch as in effect it actually exists already; its future existence has already had actual influence and efficiency, and has produced an effect, viz. prescience: the effect exists already; and as the effect supposes the cause, is connected with the cause, and depends entirely upon it, therefore it is as if the future event, which is the cause, had existed already. *14*
Edwards is saying here what none of the disputants is denying; namely, that foreknowledge already exists as a fact and in the next paragraph takes the trouble to give us an illustration. That, however, is not the question; but, what is the nature of foreknowledge and its effects. Its effect is to prove all foreknown things certain not necessary (as Clarke and Whitby understand necessity). Edwards is still not speaking to this point but continuing to drive home, what all agree upon, that foreknowledge proves future things to be certain, incapable of not coming to pass.
So Edwards ends his discussion of this point without ever explicitly refuting his opponents. This is all the more surprising because the answer to this is stock in trade in the Calvinistic arsenal. Augustine, Calvin, Luther and Edwards elsewhere, have always argued that the decrees alone can account for the power that is implied in the certainty that is proved by foreknowledge. In other words, the decrees are implied in foreknowledge. Foreknowledge could not exist if God had not determined the things He therefore foreknows.
Foreknowledge proves decrees implicitly and decrees prove “necessity” Edwards says, but he clearly infers that decrees do not involve compulsion because they do not make future events any more certain than foreknowledge proves them to be.
Another thing which has been said by some Arminians, to take off the force of what is urged from God’s prescience, against the contingence of the volitions of moral agents, is to this purpose; “that when we talk of foreknowledge in God, there is no strict propriety in our so speaking; and that although it be true, that there is in God the most perfect knowledge of all events from eternity to eternity, yet there is no such thing as before and after in God, but he sees all things by one perfect unchangeable view, without any succession.” *15*
Edwards grants that God’s knowledge is without succession and all knowledge is present with him: “that is as much as to say, that future events are always in God’s view as evident, clear, sure and necessary, as if they already were.” *16* If there never is a time wherein the existence of the event is not present with God, then there never is a time wherein it is not as much impossible for it to fail of existence, as if its existence were present, and were already come to pass. This makes it impossible that moral actions should not come to pass. Furthermore, they are more necessary than ever, which Edwards still more thoroughly proves in the context:
Corol. 2. Hence the doctrine of the Calvinists, concerning the absolute decrees of God, does not at all infer any more fatality in things, than will demonstrably follow from the doctrine of most Arminian divines, who acknowledge God’s omniscience, and universal prescience. Therefore all objections they make against the doctrine of the Calvinists, as implying Hobbes’ doctrine of necessity, or the Stoical doctrine of fate, lie no more against the doctrine of Calvinists, than their own doctrine: and therefore it don’t become those divines, to raise such an outcry against the Calvinists, on this account. *17*
Edwards is again missing the point and this time by the use of still another word, “fatality.” He contends that the doctrine of foreknowledge is no less or no more fatalistic than the doctrine of decrees when all that has been shown is that it is no more nor no less certain, which the Arminians do not dispute. Edwards must keep on proving that certainty includes all that necessity does without implying compulsion. Meanwhile this tu quoque is gratuitous:
Corol. 3. Hence all arguing from necessity, against the doctrine of the inability of unregenerate men to perform the conditions of salvation, and the commands of God requiring spiritual duties, and against the Calvinistic doctrine of efficacious grace; I say, all arguings of Arminians (such of ’em as own God’s omniscience) against these things, on this ground, that these doctrines, though they don’t suppose men to be under any constraint or coaction, yet suppose ’em under necessity, with respect to their moral actions, and those things which are required of ’em in order to their acceptance with God; and their arguing against the necessity of men’s volitions, taken from the reasonableness of God’s commands, promises, and threatenings, and the sincerity of his counsels and invitations; and all objections against any doctrines of the Calvinists as being inconsistent with human liberty, because they infer necessity; I say, all these arguments and objections must fall to the ground, and be justly esteemed vain and frivolous, as coming from them; being maintained in an inconsistence with themselves, and in like manner leveled against their own doctrine, as against the doctrine of the Calvinists. *18*
This sweeping final corollary shows how unfortunate it is that Edwards never really faced up to the point in this section. Thinking that he has successfully and devastatingly refuted the Arminian “contingency” he claims victory in the related moral fields (that he will deal with in detail in the third part of Freedom of the Will). The celebration of the victory is premature if he has not shown that the “certainty” demonstrated by foreknowledge does involve the kind of “necessity” with which Arminians charge his doctrine of the decrees. But Section 13 of the treatise promises to do just that and to it we turn.
SECTION 13. WHETHER WE SUPPOSE THE VOLITIONS OF MORAL AGENTS TO BE CONNECTED WITH ANYTHING ANTECEDENT, OR NOT, YET THEY MUST BE NECESSARY IN SUCH A SENSE AS TO OVERTHROW ARMINIAN LIBERTY
Every act of the will has a cause, or it has not. If it has a cause, then, according to what has already been demonstrated, it is not contingent, but necessary; the effect being necessarily dependent and consequent on its cause; and that, let the cause be what it will. If the cause is the will itself, by antecedent acts choosing and determining; still the determined and caused act must be a necessary effect. *19*
Whether Edwards proved the necessity in certainty above, he surely proves it here in this absolutely crucial area: the human will. The will always has a cause for its foreknown certain choices!
The concluding paragraph of the section focuses on the determination of the will by the dictate of the understanding. We remember that Edwards himself hedged his bets on that principle by his broad and virtually undefined definition of understanding and the bypassing of the problem of what makes motives motivate.
On the other hand, if Edwards has correctly stated and critiqued the Arminian position, he has the right to his concluding exclamation:
But what dignity or privilege is there, in being given up to such a wild contingence as this, to be perfectly and constantly liable to act unintelligently and unreasonably, and as much without the guidance of understanding, as if we had none, or were as destitute of perception as the smoke that is driven by the wind! *20*
In all of this argument with the Arminians, Edwards is not denying that the creatures actions in providence are anything other than free in the sense of voluntary. We need not pursue it here but his whole case is to show that no action in providence can be truly voluntary unless it is caused. It is the existence of the causal chain that makes foreknowledge possible and foreknowledge is evidence or proof that these free choices are necessary ones in divine providence.
3. Puritan Providential Prosperity
However much debate there may be about the decrees and discussions of providence, there was no debate - in Edwards’ mind - on the profitability of good choices even in this present evil world.
The general thrust of Edwards’ sermons is surely that righteousness obviously exalts a nation and sin is obviously a reproach to any people. For example, he preaches that the absence of rain is “because of our sins.” *21* He cites Psa_107:33; Deu_1:16-17; Deu_15:23; Amo_4:7 and Hag_1:9-10 in addition to his text, 1Ki_8:35 f. This deprivation is a sign as much as if God sent a prophet to the offending people. Favorable circumstances are more commonly cited as providential indications of the divine favor. God rewards a merely visibly religious people with external blessings. He gives encouragement to those who are only striving and have not achieved as yet (if ever), not only in spiritual but also in temporal favors.
Though this outward goodness is “But the shadow and outward form of goodness and the rewards are but the shadows of happiness” still they show that mere morality is blessed. The doctrine of this sermon on Mat_6:2 is “Hypocrites will never get anything by their religion but only what they get in this world.” *22*
While Edwards is apparently speaking especially to the saints in the sermon on Rom_12:17 still he makes the following Puritan principle apply to all who formally exhibit morality:
[B]ut Christianity abundantly shows us that the likeliest way to promote our own [interest] is to provide things honest for others. . . . It shows us that this is the likeliest way to have temporal prosperity. . . . It promises us a competent portion of the good things of this life, and that he will care for us and provide for us if we keep in the way of our duty, and [he] promises that which makes us truly happy without these things.
Again the doctrine is interesting: “It becomes Christians in all things relating to their outward estate to live honestly with their neighbors.” *23*
In spite of this natural tendency of even the wicked to prosper when they practice outward morality, it is clear to Edwards that this is an evil world: “The whole creation does as it were groan under the sins of wicked men.” *24* There are many “plain intimations that it is not a natural but forced and violent state of things. Thus the world once did as it were spew out all its inhabitants at once. . . .” *25* In the application of this sermon on Rom_8:22 he argues that this state of affairs makes a final day of judgment credible. In spite of all, “This is my Father’s world” make the saints sing.
Edwards seems far more interested in showing, as the Bible which he preaches does show, that providence favors the truly righteous far more than the merely outwardly righteous who reap some of the benefits of righteousness. In fact, “the interest of a people mainly consists in the interest of religion among them.” *26* He preached that as he saw signs of the beginning of a new awakening in 1740. He urged his people to put their hand to the ethical plow and begin by forgiving one another. Again: “To exercise wisdom for our spiritual and eternal interest is the surest way to be provided with temporal good things.” *27* It assures the saint against frustration and curse. On the other hand, in seeking the world we are in danger of losing both our souls as well as the world. So Edwards offers this biblical advice: “We ought to show ourselves as wise for our spiritual and eternal interest as worldly minded men are wont to do for their temporal interest.” *28*
The general principle is that “when persons have strictly adhered to their duty under temptation and opposition they commonly afterwards in this world find that benefit and reward of it that make them glad they have done so.” *29* Abraham was blessed more than ever after obediently offering his son to be sacrificed and Ruth and Joseph likewise flourished after their faithfulness to duty. Not always is the reward so prompt and obvious. Sometimes the doing of duty seems to bring disadvantage, Edwards teaches citing Psa_73:13-14; 2Ki_6:33; Ecc_11:1-4. Contrary behavior would seem to be advantageous on some occasions. But the advantages are often temporal and always spiritual especially when duty is performed under great difficulty. “Christians have never found so much of the sweet and joyful presence of God as when they have cleaved to him under great suffering.” In the application Edwards notes that many professing Christians do not have this by-product because they do not cleave to their duty which he then exhorts them to do:
[’T]is not so in fact that ordinarily a man must suffer in his worldly interest keeping to strict rules of heaven in his dealings with his neighbor but the contrary. As hard as the times are yet ordinarily it will be for a man’s worldly advantage to be strictly just and upright in all his dealings. ’Tis the way even to temporal prosperity. Such a man is [on] the way to be blessed and prospered in his ways if we give any credit to the Scripture. 1Pe_3:13 . . . Pro_10:9 . . . Pro_28:20. Strict uprightness is not only the way to God’s blessing but it has a natural tendency to a man’s prosperity. Such a man will have more credit and esteem among all sorts of people which will be a great advantage to his worldly interest. . . . And he’ll be the more readily improved by the public. And however there are some that may enrich themselves by dishonesty and knavery, yet experience will show that exact justice in dealing is the directest way to being succeeded and prospered in the world and living comfortably in it even in these corrupt times.
The sermon 2Ch_25:9 is especially interesting on the ways of divine providence as the Puritan saw them. “The way of duty is the way of prosperity.” *30* There is a natural tendency of virtue to prosperity in matters of health, quietness, flourishing. Virtue however can bring adversity as well as prosperity, for God actually does bring either as He pleases. But He promises to the godly that He will give what is good for them. Especially, He promises this to a godly people. Outward prosperity may be given to the wicked but it brings no benefit; brimstone is scattered all over it. Edwards goes on to reprove those parishioners who think it a duty not to give because others benefit but they do not. Perhaps you have never met the condition of blessing, he suggests, having coveted only the reward rather than loving the unfortunate. Furthermore, how do you know what misfortune you have been spared? In any case, be patient for the promises of God are yea and amen. He concludes practically urging the people to build the new meeting house.
Doctrine I of the sermon on Ecc_2:26 tells the same salutary story: “That ’tis to the godly alone that God give wisdom to know how to use worldly good things they possess and that He enables truly to enjoy the comforts of them.” *31* In fact, Edwards teaches in a sermon on Pro_9:12 that “[i]n all that God requires of us and counsels us to in religion he does but direct us to be friendly to ourselves.” *32* Again, the sermon on Pro_30:24-27 (4) argues this proposition: “Wisdom and industry is the way for those that are mean and contemptible to come to riches and heaven.” *33*
In conclusion I submit Edwards’ most comprehensive reflections on divine providence: Ezekiels wheels of providence.
IV. Hence we may see what a consistent thing divine providence is. The consideration of what has been may greatly serve to show us the consistence, order, and beauty of God’s works of providence. If we behold the events of providence in any other view than that in which it has been set before us, it will all look like confusion, like a number of jumbled events coming to pass without any order or method, like the tossing of the waves of the sea. Things will look as though one confused revolution came to pass after another merely by blind chance, without any regular design or certain end.
But if we consider the events of providence in the light in which they have been set before us, they appear far from being jumbled and confused, but an orderly series of events, all wisely ordered and directed in excellent harmony and consistence, tending all to one end. The wheels of providence are not turned round by blind chance, but they are full of eyes round about, as Ezekiel represents; and they are guided by the Spirit of God, where the Spirit goes they go [Eze_1:18; Eze_1:20]. And all God’s works of providence through all ages: they meet in one at last as so many lines meeting in one center.
’Tis with God’s work of providence as it is with his work of creation: ’tis but one work. The events of providence ben’t so many distinct independent works of providence, but they are rather so many different parts of one work of providence: ’tis all one work, one regular scheme. God’s works of providence ben’t disunited and jumbled, without connection or dependence. But are united, just as the several parts of one building: there are many stones, many pieces of timber, but all are so joined and fitly framed together that they make but one building. They have all but one foundation, and are united at last in one topstone.
God’s providence may not unfitly be compared to a large and long river, having innumerable branches beginning in different regions, and at a great distance one from another, and all conspiring to one common issue. After their very diverse and contrary courses which they hold for a while, yet all gathering more and more together the nearer they come to their common end, and all at length discharging themselves at one mouth into the same ocean. The different streams of this river are ready to look like mere jumble and confusion to us because of the limitedness of our sight, whereby we can’t see from one branch to another and can’t see the whole at once, so as to see how all are united in one. A man that sees but one or two streams at a time can’t tell what their course tends to. Their course seems very crooked, and the different streams seem to run for a while different and contrary ways. And if we view things at a distance, there seem to be innumerable obstacles and impediments in the way to hinder their ever uniting and coming to the ocean, as rocks and mountains and the like. But yet if we trace them they all unite at last and all come to the same issue, disgorging themselves out into the same great ocean. Not one of all the streams fail of coming hither at last. *34*
4. Providence as a “Weary Pilgrimage”
In spite of all the puritan’s providential prosperity and Christian joy, his journey through life was a “weary pilgrimage.” Jonathan Edwards shared this view of the “veil of tears” when he wrote to his Scottish friend Thomas Gillespie:
As to my circumstances, I still meet with trouble, and expect no other, as long as I live in this world. . . . Let us then endeavour to help one another, though at great distance, in traveling through this wide wilderness; that we may have the more joyful meeting in the land of rest, when we have finished our weary pilgrimage. *35*
Though written near his journey’s end, this expression reflects the same sensibility recorded some thirty-four years earlier, when in his diary on Saturday night, June 6, 1724, Edwards had noted, “I have now abundant reason to be convinced of the troublesomeness and vexation of the world, and that it will never be another kind of world.” *36*
At times the providence of God with regard to the state of New England yielded a no less gloomy picture. Referring to recent victories of Colonial forces against the French and Indians in 1747 Edwards wrote:
[O]ur enemies own that the heavens are on our side, and fight for us; but here are no such effects of these mercies upon us that are the subjects of them, as God requires, and most justly expects. The mercies are acknowledged in words, but we are not led to repentance by them; there appears no such thing as any reformation or revival of religion in the land. God’s so wonderfully protecting and delivering a people, whose provocations have been so great, and who do so continue in apostasy and provocation, is very marvellous; and I can think of no account that can be given of it, so probable as this, that God has a design of mercy to the rising generation, and that there are a great number of the elect among our children, born and unborn, and that for these elects sake, God will not suffer us to be destroyed, having a design to bring forth a seed of the posterity of this people, to inherit and dwell in this land, that shall be a holy seed, and a generation of his servants. . . . I am full of apprehensions, that God has no design of mercy to those that were left unconverted, of the generation that were on the stage, in the time of the late extraordinary religious commotion, and striving of God’s Spirit; unless it be perhaps a small gleaning from among them.” *37*
And yet Edwards believed that the glorious latter days of the church were not far off!
The weary pilgrimage of this world led to a problem for Edwards’ doctrine of providence, a problem that he faced squarely in notebooks and sermons. How does one reconcile the providential rule of a just God with the troublesomeness and vexation of the godly in this world? The facts were clear:
There is nothing in God’s disposals towards men in this world, to make his distributive justice and judicial equity manifest or visible but all things are in the greatest confusion . . . the wicked are mounted on thrones, while the righteous remain in cottages. *38*
How can this confusion be cleared? By the grand conclusion Edwards’ drew from his study of providence (as infallibly informed by Scripture): the necessity of future divine judgment.
This world is a world of confusion; it hath been filled with irregularity and confusion ever since the fall. . . .
Though justice sometimes takes place, yet how often do injustice, cruelty, and oppression prevail! How often are the righteous condemned, and the wicked acquitted and rewarded! How common is it for the virtuous and pious to be depressed, and the wicked to be advanced! How many thousands of the best men have suffered intolerable cruelties, merely for their virtue and piety, and in this world have had no help, no refuge to fly to! The world is very much ruled by the pride, covetousness, and passions of men. . . . *39*
Now, it is very mysterious, that the holy and righteous Governor of the world, whose eye beholds all the children of men, should suffer it so to be, unless we look forward to the day of judgment; and then the mystery is unravelled. . . . When God shall have put an end to the present state, these things shall all be brought to rights. Though God suffers things to be so for the present, yet they shall not proceed in this course always; comparatively speaking, the present state of things is but for a moment. When all shall be settled and fixed by a divine judgment, the righteous shall be exalted, honoured, and rewarded, and. . . . shall come off conquerors, and shall see the just vengeance of God executed upon those who now hate and persecute them. **
Further, beyond this present veil of tears, and beyond the great judgment of the last day, there was the indescribable delight of being swallowed up in the love of the God of Providence, and with His saints, perfectly and forever - an event Edwards was no doubt anticipating as soon to be.
Then God will make more abundant manifestations of his glory, and of the glory of his Son; then he will more plentifully pour out his Spirit, and make answerable additions to the glory of the saints, and by means of all these will so increase the happiness of the saints, as shall be suitable to the commencement of the ultimate and most perfect state of things, and to such a joyful occasion, the completion of all things. In this glory and happiness will the saints remain for ever and ever. *41*