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TOPIC: Edwards, Jonathan - Rational Biblical Theology (Other Topics in this Collection)
SUBJECT: Chapt 18 Imputation
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Edwards was not conscious of differing essentially from the reformed tradition with respect to the entrance of sin into the world. He simply went deeper into the matter and got into deeper difficulty thereby. His problems were not different from others, but the others tended to let sleeping dogs lie.
On the other hand, with regard to the doctrine of imputation, Edwards is clearly departing from the Reformed tradition fundamentally, and seems fully aware of it. Here the problem is not that the reformed tradition tended to be silent about the subject, but that the solution it offered did not satisfy Edwards. The generally accepted tradition was that the first man represented all his descendants in the probation and because he sinned representing them by covenant, or federally, they suffered the same consequences which he did, for they were thus involved in the same sin with him. Because of this close representation, their guilt was immediate and the imputation of that guilt was immediate. Although Calvin shared the federal idea he did not see the immediacy consequences and so at the point of imputation, Calvin was not a Calvinist.
Edwards’ viewpoint is drastically different from Calvin and most of the Calvinists. His representation was far more intimate and the imputational consequence far more immediate as we shall see in what follows.
Edwards thus explains the pattern of sin and guilt in Adam and posterity:
The depraved disposition of Adam’s heart is to be considered two ways. (1) As the first rising of an evil inclination in his heart, exerted in his first act of sin, and the ground of the complete transgression. (2) An evil disposition of heart continuing afterwards, as a confirmed principle, that came by God’s forsaking him; which was a punishment of his first transgression. This confirmed corruption, by its remaining and continued operation, brought additional guilt on his soul.
And in like manner, depravity of heart is to be considered two ways in Adam’s posterity. The first existing of a corrupt disposition in their hearts is not to be looked upon as sin belonging to them, distinct from their participation of Adam’s first sin: it is as it were the extended pollution of that sin, through the whole tree, by virtue of the constituted union of the branches with the root; or the inherence of the sin of that head of the species in the members, in the consent and concurrence of the hearts of the members with the head in that first act. . . . But the depravity of nature, remaining an established principle in the heart of a child of Adam, and as exhibited in after-operations, is a consequence and punishment of the first apostasy thus participated, and brings new guilt. The first being of an evil disposition in the heart of a child of Adam, whereby he is disposed to approve of the sin of his first father, as fully as he himself approved of it when he committed it, or so far as to imply a full and perfect consent of heart to it, I think, is not be looked upon as a consequence of the imputation of that first sin, any more than the full consent of Adam’s own heart in the act of sinning; which was not consequent on the imputation of his sin to himself, but rather prior to it in the order of nature. Indeed the derivation of the evil disposition to the hearts of Adam’s posterity, or rather the coexistence of the evil disposition, implied in Adam’s first rebellion, in the root and branches, is a consequence of the union, that the wise Author of the world has established between Adam and his posterity: but not properly a consequence of the imputation of his sin; nay, rather antecedent to it, as it was in Adam himself. The first depravity of heart, and the imputation of that sin, are both the consequences of that established union: but yet in such order, that the evil disposition is first, and the charge of guilt consequent; as it was in the case of Adam himself. *1*
1. The Doctrine of Personal Identity
The portions of the above quotation that we have italicized show the point of departure of Edwards from the general Reformed tradition. The guilt of Adam’s posterity for Adam’s initial transgression is not because it was imputed to them by virtue of their being represented in Adam, but by virtue of their constituted identity with Adam - “By virtue of the constituted union of the branches with the root.” The guilt is “a consequence of the union that the wise author of the world has established between Adam and his posterity.” Adam’s sin was not imputed to them; it was theirs in verity. They sinned as truly and as actually as Adam did. If that is so what is more proper than that they be held responsible? They are not held responsible for something done by another but for something done by themselves. They are blameworthy in exactly the same way that Adam himself was blameworthy. What could be more just? Any objection that was ever raised on the ground that one person could not properly be held accountable for something he never did himself is completely removed. He is no longer blamed for something another did. He did it himself! He is blamed solely for something which he himself committed. It is obvious that Edwards’ answer to this perpetual criticism is utterly devastating, but it rests entirely on the validity of his doctrine of personal identity. To this I now turn.
The initial form of Edwards’ doctrine of personal identity in “The Mind” was that of John Locke:
[11]. Person. Well might Mr. Locke say that identity of person consisted in identity of consciousness; for he might have said that identity of spirit, too, consisted in the same consciousness. A mind or spirit is nothing else but consciousness, and what is included in it. The same consciousness is to all intents and purposes the very same spirit or substance, as much as the same particle of matter can be the same with itself at different times. *2*
In his final entry, however, Edwards changes his position on, having encountered an objection to which he can find no answer: Again we quote in full because his view of identity is so crucial to much of his thought:
[72]. Identity of person is what seems never yet to have been explained. It is a mistake that it consists in sameness or identity of consciousness, if by sameness of consciousness be meant having the same ideas hereafter that I have now, with a notion or apprehension that I had had them before, just in the same manner as I now have the same ideas that I had in time past by memory. It is possible without doubt in the nature of things for God to annihilate me, and after my annihilation to create another being that shall have the same ideas in his mind that I have, and with the like apprehension that he had had them before in like manner as a person has by memory; and yet I be in no way concerned in it, having no reason to fear what that being shall suffer, or to hope for what he shall enjoy.
Can anyone deny that it is possible, after my annihilation, to create two beings in the universe, both of them having my ideas communicated to them with such a notion of their having had them before, after the manner of memory, and yet be ignorant one of another? And in such case, will anyone say that both these are one and the same person, as they must be if they are both the same person with me? It is possible there may be two such beings, each having all the ideas that are now in my mind in the same manner that I should have by memory if my own being were continued, and yet these two beings not only be ignorant one of another, but also be in a very different state, one in a state of enjoyment and pleasure, and the other in a state of great suffering and torment.
Yea, there seems to be nothing of impossibility in the nature of things, but that the Most High could, if he saw fit, cause there to be another being who should begin to exist, in some distant part of the universe, with the same ideas I now have after the manner of memory, and should henceforward co-exist with me, we both retaining a consciousness of what was before the moment of his first existence in like manner, but thenceforward should have a different train of ideas. Will anyone say that he, in such a case, is the same person with me, when I know nothing of his suffering and am never the better for his joys? *3*
It would seem that Edwards came to rest with respect to personal identity with the above doctrine that it is divinely constituted. It is closely related to the doctrine of continuous creation. Just as the only real difference between creation and providence is that creation is referred to the first time that God brought things into being ,while providence is the term for all subsequent times, so the only difference between Adam’s sin and his posterity’s is that Adam’s is simply the first. His posterity’s sin is the same as his because their personal identity is the same, but it is the second, third, fourth etc. - a difference not in the thing itself but in the number of the thing. All members of the posterity repeat the very same sin as Adam. It is not truly imputed to them but repeated by them. It is true continuous repetition - a continuous creation in so far as a creature is capable of such a thing.
In an early sermon Edwards dealt with the standard objection against being judged for another man’s sin. *4* His answer even then was that if we have a hand in another’s sin we are responsible for it. If men have a hand in another’s hatred they are guilty of it. So the question is whether we have a hand in Adam’s sin. He goes on to prove not only that we had a hand in Adam’s sin but that it was our sin; we committed it.
He insists that there is no “deviation” here.
Adam’s posterity came by the corruption of nature by God’s withholding his Spirit and image from them judicially for their breach of the first covenant. It is not derived down naturally but God withholds his Spirit from them in judgment for their first sin viz. for their eating the forbidden fruit. *5*
He continues saying that his posterity came by corruption the same way that Adam did. “They are looked upon as having eaten the forbidden fruit as well as Adam. They transgressed in Adam and therefore are subject to the same judgment.” The corruption also is transmitted no differently than the guilt. “The guilt of the breach of the covenant of works is imputed to them and so they suffered the consequences and ill fruits of it which with loss of spiritual and holy principles and the consequent reigning of corruption is one.” But one can see that this is no transmission of the guilt to them but the imputing of their own guilt. Edwards does not hesitate to say that “Adam’s posterity were as much concerned in the covenant of works as he himself.” But even that is understatement. The posterity is more than “concerned.” They acted identically as much as if they were there (in fact they were) and ate the fruit themselves (which according to this view of identity they did).
What about the man Christ Jesus? Edwards says that he escaped defilement because “he was not reckoned in the covenant that God made with Adam.” Apart from that fact, “there is as much natural cause why the human nature of Christ should be infected as why the human nature of any man.” In other words, God did not constitute this identity between Adam and Christ as he did between Adam and all other posterity.
Fisher pictures the matter interestingly. Adam and his posterity in Edwards are not distinct. He cites Original Sin: “The sin of apostasy is not theirs merely because God imputes to them, but because truly and properly theirs, and on that ground God imputes it to them.” He finds this doctrine realistic but not traducian and traces it to Locke’s view of identity and diversity not apparently aware of Edwards’ change. *6* It is thought to be an application of the Berkeleyan view of mind which Berkeley himself failed to apply.
Foster sees three new elements in Edwards at this point. All sin is voluntary; the removal of the idea of taint; and the maintenance of depravity by an established order of nature. *7* Foster’s noticing the first point that Edwards implies that all sin is voluntary is something that Edwards himself did not stress but which his successors made fundamental. Yet Smith supposes that this doctrine had no effect on his followers. *8* Either they did not recognize it in Edwards or it is not in Edwards. I say that it is in Edwards but Edwards himself does not stress it, hardly notices it apparently. That is, he does not arrive at this doctrine because of a conviction about the voluntariness of all moral action but because of his doctrine of personal identity and perhaps a desire to answer the standing objection to representationism. Removal of taint surely was implicit in this doctrine of imputation as I shall show when we examine the nature of sin. The third observation is obvious, and should have been placed first, for the other two derive from it.
2. Mediate or Immediate Imputation?
Foster, *9* Berkhof, *10* and Boardman *11* see mediate imputationism in Edwards, and his successors following him, in this deviation from the usual Reformed view. Hodge apparently does not recognize the impact of the really novel element of personal identity, and for that reason fails to notice that this is no doctrine of mediate imputationism. *12* Indeed it is not a doctrine of imputation - mediate or immediate. As Edwards says in his important unpublished sermon on Gen_3:11, there is no need for a transmission of sin. *13* The withdrawal of the Holy Spirit is sufficient to the evil of the days.
Of those who see Edwards teaching immediate imputation, Miller is typical. *14* In fact, as Manspeaker observes generally,
Despite Miller’s avowed concern “not to be the apologist of a party,” his Princeton affiliation is more than apparent in his attempt to claim Edwards as an “Old Calvinist;” to dissociate Edwards from his so-called followers (“not a few of his professed admirers are, insidiously, attempting to turn his heavy artillery against that very citadel which it was his honor to have long and successfully defended”). . . . *15*
Even B. B. Warfield missed the point. If Edwards’ doctrine is to be expressed in traditional terms, he said, it would have to be immediate in spite of the organic metaphor of tree and branches. He also notes that there is an identity of the human race with its head. But Warfield does not note that this is no traditional concept of identity and therefore fails to see that it is no traditional doctrine of immediate imputation. It is not a federal doctrine at all. W. G. T. Shedd granted that there is a representative or natural union in Adam but this is far less than Edwards was claiming. *16* Nor was Edwards saying merely what the organic school had in mind by “in whose loins we were, and therefore sinned . . . we would have made such ill choice.”
Haroutunian also is inadequate. “Edwards replied that men are punished not merely because they inherit the sin of Adam, but because they themselves are sinners.” *17* According to Edwards, men do not inherit guilt but are punished for their own sins, for even the first sin was theirs by their own action.
Our most recent commentator, Holbrook, clearly states Edwards’ position by citing him: “‘The sin of apostasy is not theirs, merely because God imputes it to them; but it is truly and properly theirs, and on that ground, God imputes it to them.’” *18* But Holbrook does not seem to follow Edwards’ justification of the statement. He is simply perplexed by the fact that Edwards had seemed to agree with Locke whose view was different. *19* However, Holbrook does raise a problem in Edwards’ interpretation by the discussion of the fate of infants: “Edwards never satisfactorily resolved the problem of the exact time in a human life when sin declares itself . . . (in his) persistent wrestlings with the issue of the damnation of infants. . . .” In a footnote our commentator develops the matter more fully:
Since death fell so heavily upon children three years of age and under, according to JEs’ reckoning, he was forced to conclude at one point in the “Book of Controversies” that there were “more influences of this fruit of sin on those that are in infancy than of any other age” (Yale Collection, Folder 28, p. 87). He also indulged himself with the idea that “the infant that has a disposition in his heart to believe in Christ if he had a capacity and opportunity is looked upon and accepted as if he actually believed in Christ and so is entitled to eternal life through Christ,” but he balanced the books by adding “so the infant that has a full disposition in his heart to seek an act of rebellion as Adam’s is looked upon and treated as though he actually so rebelled and is actually condemned to eternal death through him” (Ibid., p. 65). Miscellanies, M 849, offers the ameliorative opinion that “yet ’tis generally supposed to be a common thing that the infants of the godly that die in infancy are saved.” *20*
G. C. Berkouwer rather likes Edwards’ approach because it eliminates the “double guilt.” *21* But apparently the Dutch theologian did not notice the heavy price that Edwards had to pay for this accomplishment.
As for the influence of Edwards’ doctrine on his posterity, the reports are conflicting. Shelton Smith, as noted above, says that the “theory of personal identity fell flat so far as his theological successors were concerned.” *22* Nathanael Emmons would certainly seem to confirm such an estimate. Samuel Hopkins had said the same, but Emmons went a step beyond insisting that knowledge of the law was necessary and that this fact excluded infants. His opinion was that God “works in them to will and to do of his good pleasure; or produce those moral exercises in their hearts in which moral depravity properly and essentially consists.” *23* This strong assertion of voluntarism continued through Edwards Amasa Park, the last of the New England school.
But was voluntarism a scuttling of Edwards or the fruition of his thought? As we have observed above, he probably did not develop his doctrine of imputation in the interests of voluntarism, but of personal identity. There nevertheless can be no question that the doctrine supports voluntarism. It eliminated any vestige of representationism or federalism.
3. Objections to the Personal Identity View
(1) From Edwards himself
In spite of grounding his doctrine of imputation in personal identity, Edwards does not hesitate to use the traditional language. If one did not know his peculiar views he would never guess it from the following exposition of Rom_5:12-21 :
As this place in general is plain and full, so the doctrine of the corruption of nature, as derived from Adam, and also the imputation of his first sin, are both clearly taught in it. The imputation of Adam’s one transgression, is indeed most directly and frequently asserted. *24*
Again in the sermon on Luk_13:5 we read of Adam’s sin that Adam was our “representative who stood in our room.” *25* Note also the following statement in Original Sin:
[Paul’s] meaning can’t be, that the offense of Adam, merely as his personally, should abound; but, as it exists in its derived guilt, corrupt influence, and evil fruits, in the sin of mankind in general, even as a tree in its root and branches. *26*
It is clear in Original Sin, which develops the doctrine of personal identity, that Edwards was still contending for the traditional doctrine of imputation. Whether his doctrine obliterates the doctrine or not there can be no doubt from the following statement that Edwards did not think so:
[T]hat the word “impute” is never expressly applied to Adam’s sin, does no more argue, that it is not imputed to his posterity, than it argues, that pride, unbelief, lying, theft, oppression, persecution, fornication, adultery, sodomy, perjury, idolatry, and innumerable other particular moral evils, are never imputed to the persons that commit them, or in whom they are; because the word “impute,” though so often used in Scripture, is never applied to any of these kinds of wickedness. *27*
However much the above statements tend to suggest that Edwards saw himself as champion of the traditional Reformed doctrine, these statements are incompatible with his doctrine of personal identity. In his own mind, apparently, personal identity was simply the way representation was most soundly explained. In Adam all sinned. So the Bible taught and so Edwards believed. His reverence for the Bible was such that he would believe what it taught regardless of what he thought it implied and would so conclude.
(2) Objections by Others
If Edwards’ position is to be opposed it must be opposed on its own ground. Objections to Edwards’ doctrine for things it does not teach do not advance the cause of learning. Only those who oppose the doctrine of personal identity are really relevant. There are exceedingly few of those.
One, however, who objects on this ground is Crabtree. Edwards “turned the flank of the Placaean attack” (on immediate imputation) “by eliminating the federal conceptions and returning to the original Calvinistic notion of the original unity of Adam and his posterity. ‘All are looked upon as sinning in and with their common root.’” *28* He goes on to explain the personal identity theory on which this Edwardsian exposition is based and offers this criticism:
It tells us that two things are identical if God wills them to be so. It tells that if his teaching conflicted with its teaching he must be in error. Obviously he had no such notion concerning the doctrine of personal identity. He was aware that it was different from ordinary reformed thinking but he did not think it inconsistent with . . . the Bible, but, in fact, most satisfactorily explained it.
Charles Hodge looked more closely than Crabtree. *29* He saw Edwards in Original Sin (IV, iii) agreeing with Placaeus (“evil disposition is first and the charge of guilt consequent”), though Edwards was an immediate imputationist from the beginning, in Hodge’s opinion. Yet Edwards was not aroused to express it polemically (by his bizarre philosophical doctrine of identity!) until God’s fairness in directly imposing the guilt of Adam on his descendants was questioned.
But here Hodge does not seem to grasp the immediate immediacy of Jonathan Edwards. Placaeus was merely departing from traditional Reformed orthodoxy of immediate to mediate imputation while Edwards was refuting Placaeus by going traditional Reformed orthodoxy one better. Adam’s act was not even immediately imputed to descendants, but was the descendants very own.
John Murray locates Edwards between the immediate and mediate views of imputation, but, like Hodge, sees that the pollution that follows on Adam’s sin includes the disposition as well as the Acts *30*
If this is the only criticism that Edwards’ doctrine of personal identity has received, it has received no criticism at all. We have shown above, passim, what Edwards identifies. He identifies Adam and every one of his descendants at the time he acted as their representative. What Edwards is saying most clearly is that when Adam represented them he did more than that - he was identified with them - by a divine constitution, the very same constitution by which God identifies all of us with our separate selves.
Traditional Reformed orthodoxy never did (and does not today) accept Edwards’ identity doctrine; but, like Hodge, it correctly sees Edwards as traditionally orthodox though by an untraditional route. Let me spell this out:
1. It is universally granted that a person cannot be blamed for something he did not himself choose and do.
2. Immediate imputationists maintain that all men are responsible for Adam’s sin because fairly imputed to them by God who appointed Adam to act on their behalf.
3. Mediate imputationists insist that the descendants did not themselves so chose and act and so could not be justly liable.
4. Immediate imputationists respond that God’s appointing Adam to choose and act for the descendants is the same thing as their so doing (and even fairer because making the descendants’ destiny ride on Adam’s choice adds an even greater incentive to persevere in holiness than each individual choosing for himself alone could have had).
5. Mediate imputationists insist that an individual cannot be blamed (or praised) for something he did not himself (God’s appointment notwithstanding) choose to do!
6. Edwards (whether he accepted that as a valid objection to the traditional form of orthodoxy or not) argued that God identified Adam with his posterity so that his choice and act was their act and choice. That is federal representationism with a vengeance.
7. Traditional orthodoxy (Old Princeton, for example) saw Edwards as an orthodox imputationist in spite of his identity doctrine. However, general confusion resulted as Edwards’ method of defending orthodoxy became identified with Calvinistic orthodoxy in the so-called “consistent Calvinists” (Hopkins, et al) to whom the Princetonians were opposed for other reasons and thus threw out the Edwardsian baby with the Hopkinsian wash.
Nevertheless, whatever the vicissitudes of this debate, it may be that Edwards’ intimate friend and neighbor, Joseph Bellamy, in the book Edwards himself endorsed, may have stated the end of the the matter best of all the Edwardsians:
Obj. But I was brought into this state by Adam’s fall.
Ans. Let it be by Adam’s fall, or how it will, yet if you are an enemy to the infinitely glorious God, your Maker, and that voluntarily, you are infinitely to blame, and without excuse; for nothing can make it right for a creature to be a voluntary enemy to his glorious Creator, or possibly excuse such a crime. It is, in its own nature, infinitely wrong; there is noting, therefore, to be said; you stand guilty before God. It is vain to make this or any other pleas, so long as we are what we are, not by compulsion, but voluntarily. And it is in vain to pretend that we are not voluntary in our corruptions, when they are nothing else but the free, spontaneous inclinations of our own hearts. Since this is the case, every mouth will be stopped, and all the world will become guilty before God, sooner or later. *31*