Online Resource Library
Commentary Index | Return to PrayerRequest.com | DownloadJonathan Edwards Collection: Edwards, Jonathan - Rational Biblical Theology: Chapt 32 Edwards on Virtue
TOPIC: Edwards, Jonathan - Rational Biblical Theology (Other Topics in this Collection)
SUBJECT: Chapt 32 Edwards on Virtue
Other Subjects in this Topic:
During his exile in this frontier village in Western Massachusetts, Edwards produced an ensemble of his greatest literary works. When the college of West Jersey later called him to be its president, he did not want to leave Stockbridge knowing that it was an ideal situation for completing his magnum opus, A Rational Account of the Main Doctrines of the Christian Religion. *1* Apparently he broke down in tears when his friends urged him to accept the invitation, as if he sensed the advice would prove catastrophic. As we noted, he did die almost immediately after arriving at Princeton. In any case, it is probable that Edwards never could have completed his “life-work” had he lived there.
While Edwards was still in Stockbridge he finished and published two of his greatest works, the second going through the presses when he died. The first was the immortal Inquiry Concerning the Freedom of the Will. Perry Miller and Paul Ramsey and many others have expressed the opinion that this work alone establishes Edwards as the greatest philosopher/theologian ever to grace the American scene. In many ways, his other great published work, The Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin was of even more importance and lasting significance. Freedom of the Will was, to use Ramsey’s expression, the “Super-dread-naught” which virtually sank the Arminian galleons. *2* Williston Walker believes that book delayed the Arminian conquest of New England Theology by 100 years. *3* If Freedom of the Will has been devastating for Arminianism past and present, The Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin has been perhaps even more devastating for Pelagian liberalism. Arminianism did, after all, profess to be evangelically Christian, including the “hesitating” Calvinist, Isaac Watts, among its adherents (in the area of the will). *4* John Taylors work on original sin was, by contrast, in everything but name, a denial of Christian doctrine which elicited from John Wesley as horrified a refutation as from Jonathan Edwards. *5*
The other two smaller but great works of this exilic period were Concerning the End for Which God Created the World and The Nature of True Virtue. *6* Whether Edwards himself saw his work in this period as we see it now, I cannot say. But it amounted to a virtual silencing in his first two books of the opposition to Reformed Christianity coming from Arminian and Pelagian sources, while in these latter two we have a positive sketch of the Reformed way of Christian faith. Concerning the End for Which God Created the World virtually answers philosophically and biblically the question: “What is God’s chief end?” “God’s chief end is the glory of God and the enjoyment of himself in his creatures.” The Nature of True Virtue deals with the question: “What is man’s chief end?” *7* Its answer is, “Man’s chief end is to glorify God and enjoy or endure him forever.” Historian Walker says that this work exerted more early influence than The Freedom of the Will itself, contributing powerfully to the early New England missionary movement.
The Nature of True Virtue
The Nature of True Virtue is a little book that is getting big attention from major thinkers in recent years. Not only did H. Richard Niebuhr consider this the fourth in a list of ten books that definitively shaped his vocation, *8* but William K. Frankena at the University of Michigan, considers it
a philosophical work of great originality and penetration, which deserves to be ranked with anything written on the same subject by any of the more recent Americans (Pierce, James, Royce, Dewey, and Santayana). . . . *9*
Frankena rates its author as perhaps the greatest philosophical defender that Calvinism has ever had. *10*
This little book is even smaller than it seems to be. Its theme is the nature of true virtue, but strictly speaking, only the first of the eight chapters deals directly with that subject. In that chapter, and that chapter alone, the author deals directly with the nature of true virtue. In the remaining seven chapters, though he does not say so, Edwards is dealing with the nature of false virtue. What we have in The Nature of True Virtue is one chapter defining true virtue and seven, on the basis of that definition, attacking the prevailing false theories of virtue. *11* Still, we call this an essentially positive rather than negative work because its negatives are used positively to define more sharply the nature of true virtue.
In the first chapter Edwards comes quickly to the heart of his thesis:
True virtue most essentially consists in benevolence to Being in general. Or perhaps to speak more accurately, it is that consent, propensity and union of heart to Being in general, that is immediately exercised in a general good will. *12*
Then after distinguishing between a love of benevolence and a love of complacency, he observes that:
The first object of a virtuous benevolence is Being, simply considered: and if Being, simply considered, be its object, then Being in general is its object; and the thing it has an ultimate propensity to, is the highest good of Being in general. *13*
A little later he adds “the second object of a virtuous propensity of heart is benevolent being.” *14*
We have said that the last seven chapters of this book deal with the nature of false virtue. However, one would not realize that from the title of Chapter II which is “Showing how that love wherein true virtue consists respects the Divine Being and created beings.” *15* What Edwards is saying in chapter two is, in his own words:
There seems to be an inconsistence in some writers on morality, in this respect, that they don’t wholly exclude a regard to the Deity out of their schemes of morality, but yet mention it so slightly, that they leave me room and reason to suspect they esteem it a less important and subordinate part of true morality; and insist on benevolence to the created system in such a manner as would naturally lead one to suppose they look upon that as by far the most important and essential thing in their scheme. *16*
A utilitarian way of thinking was being held by Christian thinkers though it degenerated rather quickly into an obviously un-Christian view. Here Edwards is noticing “Christian” utilitarians. While they did not deny that God should be included in the object of benevolence, they so minimized the divine aspect as virtually to eliminate it. In fact, ultimately, Edwards says, this type of thinking would “become itself an opposition to that [Divine] object. *17* Edwards concludes: “From these things, I think, it is manifest that no affection limited to any private system, not dependent on, nor subordinate to Being in general can be of the nature of true virtue. . . .” *18*
The third chapter entitled “Concerning the secondary and inferior kind of beauty” is particularly interesting. The true nature of virtue is concerned with the beauty of Being-in-general, but this false view is concerned with secondary beauty or harmony in the created cosmic and moral order which, though valuable in itself, is false when placed, as is often the case, in the primary position. Edwards admits a certain resemblance which secondary beauty has to true spiritual beauty, but he cites Hutcheson in his treatise on beauty as tending to confuse the harmony which God has built into the creation with the true beauty of his own Being-in-general. *19* After examining this secondary beauty and harmony in some detail, Edwards’ conclusion is that it
is entirely a different thing from a truly virtuous taste. For it has been shown that this kind of beauty is entirely diverse from the beauty of true virtue, whether it takes place in material or immaterial things. And therefore it will follow that a taste of this kind of beauty is entirely a different thing from a taste of true virtue. . . . A taste of this inferior beauty in things immaterial is one thing which has been mistaken by some moralists for a true virtuous principle, implanted naturally in the hearts of all mankind. *20*
What is no doubt the most important negative part of The Nature of True Virtue is chapter IV: “Of self-love and its various influence to cause love to others, or the contrary.” *21* The chapter starts out with something which was becoming common in Edwards’ day and is becoming even more common in ours: “Many assert that all love arises from self-love.” *22* The self-love of which Edwards is speaking here is “a man’s regard to his confined private self, or love to himself with respect to his private interest.” This is what Bishop Butler called “other disregarding” self-interest. A self-interest which finds a joy in benefiting others is not here considered “private” self-interest. But, Edwards continues, there is not more true virtue in a man loving his friends from self-love than there is in the principle of self-love itself. He points out that robbers and pirates from self-love can be grateful to others who help them in their nefarious activities. Many things are approved that are worthy, though merely out of self-love, as when a poor person approves liberality. This chapter concludes:
There are no particular moral virtues whatsoever, but what in some or other of these ways, and most of them in several of these ways, come to have some kind of approbation from self-love, without the influence of a truly virtuous principle; nor any particular vices, but what by the same means meet with some disapprobation. *23*
Being produced by private self-love, these are “bad good works.” One thinks here of Pro_16:2, “All the ways of a man are clean in his own eyes; but the Lord weigheth the spirits.”
Faust and Johnson note that Mandeville also agrees with Edwards that mankind was motivated by self-love, but “Mandeville accepted mankind as he found it gladly; Edwards regarded a depraved humanity with loathing.” *24* This statement is not so much incorrect as misleading. It suggests that Edwards loathed sinners or hated them. It is indisputable, as Faust and Johnson show in this very section, that Edwards felt fallen men (himself included) were polluted, filthy and despicable in the eyes of God. Nevertheless, God had an eternal saving love of benevolence for elect sinners and, after redeeming them, had a love of complacency for them in Jesus Christ as well. Edwards and all true Christians had a love of benevolence for all men and a love of complacency for the fellow-redeemed. If Jonathan Edwards ever personally “loathed” any human being who had not committed the unpardonable sin, he would have repented to God, and to that man, and begged forgiveness of both.
This next chapter, “Of natural conscience, and the moral sense,” as we will see, is a frequent source of Calvinistic criticism against the Edwardsian theory of virtue. *25* We must understand Edwards’ definition of conscience in order to understand why he considers it a source of false theory. First, it is that
disposition to approve or disapprove the moral treatment which passes between us and others, from a determination of the mind to be easy, or uneasy, in a consciousness of our being consistent or inconsistent with ourselves. *26*
In other words, the first aspect of conscience is easiness or uneasiness concerning our own behavior. Though Edwards does not cite Rom_2:14, one cannot but suppose he was thinking that the conscience either “accuses or excuses” our consistent or inconsistent behavior.
The second thing in which our natural conscience exerts itself is the “sense of desert.” This is that “secondary beauty” or harmony between a certain type of behavior and a certain sequel to it. As a result, conscience
tastes no sweetness in benevolence to Being in general, simply considered, or loves it not for Being in general’s sake (for nothing but general benevolence itself can do that), yet this natural conscience, common to mankind, may approve of it from that uniformity, equality and justice which there is in it. . . . *27*
Consequently, a well-informed natural conscience does approve true virtue without actually having a taste for it, thus implying no truly spiritual sense.
Edwards tries to prove his point by reference to the Day of Judgment. It is well he does for his Nature of True Virtue is going to meet its own day of judgment from fellow Reformed theologians, especially for denying that conscience is of the “nature of true virtue.” On that day, says Edwards, conscience will be perfectly awakened to see what is right and what is wrong, but at the same time, so far from loving and having a taste of true virtue, it will hate, as never before, Being-in-general. *28*
Chapter VI is entitled “Of particular instincts of nature which in some respects resemble virtue.” *29* Here Edwards is thinking of such natural affections as love of husbands and wives for each other and parents for children. These principles do not arise, he says, from a principle of virtue nor do they have any tendency toward true virtue.
I agree with Hutcheson and Hume in this, that there is a foundation laid in nature for kind affections between the sexes, that are truly diverse from all inclinations to sensitive pleasure, and don’t properly arise from any such inclination. There is doubtless a disposition both to a mutual benevolence and mutual complacence that are not naturally and necessarily connected with any sensitive desires. But yet ’tis manifest such affections as are limited to opposite sexes are from a particular instinct, thus directing and limiting them; and not arising from a principle of general benevolence; for this has no tendency to any such limitation. And though these affections don’t properly arise from the sensitive desires which are between the sexes, yet they are implanted by the Author of nature chiefly for the same purpose, viz. the preservation or continuation of the world of mankind. . . . *30*
Again, Edwards does not deny that there may be such a thing as virtuous pity, but pity as such is not necessarily virtuous: “natural pity is of a nature very different from true virtue. . . .” *31* In hell there will be no disposition to pity or any natural affection between the opposite sexes. There, there will be total misery yet total absence of pity, because of the total absence of true virtue or good will.
To conclude what I have to say on the natural instinct disposing men to pity others in misery, I would observe that this is a source of a kind of abhorrence in men of some vices, as cruelty and oppression; and so, of a sort of approbation of the contrary virtues, humanity, mercy, etc. Which aversion and approbation, however, so far as they arise from this cause only, are not from a principle of true virtue. *32*
Chapter VII, entitled “The reasons why those things that have been mentioned, which have not the essence of virtue, have yet by many been mistaken for true virtue” *33* is something of a restatement of what has gone before except that there is introduced this particular idea:
The reason why men are so ready to take these private affections for true virtue is the narrowness of their views; and above all, that they are so ready to leave the Divine Being out of their view, and to neglect him in their consideration, or to regard him in their thoughts as though he were not properly belonging to the system of real existence, but as a kind of shadowy, imaginary being. And though most men allow that there is a God, yet in their ordinary view of things, his being is not apt to come into the account. . . . *34*
This leads Edwards to observe that the utilitarian “greatest good of the greatest number” is really no more virtuous than crass hedonism:
those private systems bear no greater proportion to the whole of universal existence than one alone, yet they bear a greater proportion to the extent of the view and comprehension of men’s minds, and are more apt to be regarded as if they were all, or at least as some resemblance of the universal system. *35*
The conclusion comes with Chapter VIII, “In what respects virtue or moral good is founded in sentiment; and how far it is founded in the reason and nature of things.” *36* Edwards does not develop this, especially because he feels that Hutcheson, among others, had done so quite adequately. In modern terminology, Edwards would be denying the relativity of morals, even in the moral consciousness. He distinguishes between that and
a certain spiritual sense given them of God, whereby they immediately perceive pleasure in the presence of the idea of true virtue in their minds, or are directly gratified in the view or contemplation of this object. . . . *37*
It is evident therefore by this, that the way we come by the idea or sensation of beauty, is by immediate sensation of the gratefulness of the idea called “beautiful”; and not by finding out by argumentation any consequences, or other things that it stands connected with; any more than tasting the sweetness of honey, or perceiving the harmony of a tune, is by argumentation on connections and consequences. *38*
The statement above “Divine and Supernatural Light” plus Religious Affections in epitome. Nevertheless, so far as we have noticed, not a single verse of Scripture has been cited and/or quoted in the entire Dissertation. “Divine and Supernatural Light,” of 1734, is a sermon expounding Mat_16:17, and Religious Affections, of 1746, is a series of sermons on 1Pe_1:8. This dissertation cites no text yet is as biblical as anything Edwards ever preached, at least in its aim and execution, as the knowledgeable reader cannot but recognize. Admittedly, the Dissertation is philosophical and heavily analytical but in that it differs only in degree from the sermons which, though loaded with proof texts, are no insult to anyone’s intelligence.
Still, one may ask why Edwards’ drastic shift in style? Can there be any doubt? Edwards was addressing the “cultured despisers” who then as now acknowledge no definitive authority of the Word of God in their thinking, even as they gave God himself no adequate role in their theories of virtue. In his sermons, Edwards proves that the Bible condemns them and in his Dissertation that sound thinking also leaves them without rational excuse. The clue to the whole work may be in this sentence, “It is impossible that anyone should truly relish this beauty, consisting in general benevolence, who has not that temper himself.” *39* According to Jonathan Edwards, it is impossible that anyone has this temper (proven by the Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin) to whom it has not been given by God (proven by the Treatise on Grace). Furthermore, it is impossible that anyone to whom He has given this grace, God had not determined to give it from eternity, as shown in his sermons and Miscellanies. ** The Nature of True Virtue is but another pearl in the Edwardsian string.
The Calvinistic Critics of Edwards’ Theory of Virtue
It is interesting that though Frankena considers Edwards possibly the greatest philosophical defender Calvinism has ever had, Calvinism itself has questioned some of his defenses. It is particularly in the highly philosophical areas that Calvinists have greatest reservations about Edwards. They are particularly critical of the concept of identity which he uses to justify imputation of sin, the concept of continuous creation, his philosophical idealism, *41* the evangelistic method of seeking, and finally, his philosophical theory of virtue.
While Calvinists have been uncomfortable with these doctrines, some non-Calvinists, such as Elwood, consider Edwards a “neo-Calvinist.” *42* T’Hooft sees The Nature of True Virtue as altering Calvinism. *43* Aldridge goes so far as to view The Nature of True Virtue as only a commentary on Hutcheson. *44* Watts thinks that Thomas More was an important source of Edwards’ view on virtue, but does not see that Edwards differs that profoundly on the source of true virtue. *45*
We focus our attention here on the matter of Edwards in the hands of his fellow-Calvinists. We will see that some blamed the disciple (Hopkins) more than the master, and Conforti has argued that Hopkins did modify Edwards’ ethical theory significantly. *46*
The issue concerning the nature of true virtue is mainly philosophical. Of course, Calvinistic critics generally believe that Edwards’ view is a violation of the biblical view of virtue, but they believe it is Edwards’ philosophical thinking that is at the root of his error. Some suppose it is his desire for simplicity that makes him vulnerable in this highly complex area. As Dabney put it: “Edwards was probably impelled to this piece of false analysis by his love of simplifying. His desire was to unify the ultimate principles of the rational spirit as much as possible.” *47*
As we noticed, of the entire eight chapters of True Virtue, only the first one is devoted to the setting forth of the very simple and easily-understood concept that true virtue is benevolence to Being-in-general. It is a simple concept, yet an infinite one, and Edwards found it quite adequate to describe true virtue and distinguish it from the false forms which have appeared.
Before we take up the Calvinistic criticism, we should remember that there was a whole Calvinistic tradition in New England, frequently called “Consistent Calvinism,” which was thoroughly persuaded of the soundness of The Nature of True Virtue. Also it should be noted that William Hart as early as 1771 contended that The Nature of True Virtue militated against Calvinism, *48* but since Hart did not write as a true Calvinist, we will by-pass his contentions. Those interested may consult Hopkins’ response. *49*
First, we will cross the Atlantic to note the critique by Henry Rogers the Calvinist (echoing Arminian Robert Hall). Next we will notice that Princeton’s Archibald Alexander, generally an admirer of Edwards, took exception at this point in a very fundamental manner, as did, in the third place, his more famous successor, Charles Hodge. *50* Fourth, Robert L. Dabney in the Southern Presbyterian Church was as devastating as any Presbyterian critic. Finally, we shall see that Colgate Rochester’s great Calvinistic Baptist, A. H. Strong, took fundamental exception to The Nature of True Virtue.
1. Henry Rogers
Let us begin with Henry Rogers if for no other reason than that he writes the earliest standard Reformed appraisal, “The Genius of Jonathan Edwards.” *51* This essay sees Edwards as perhaps the greatest intellectual athlete of all time and finds many of his writings definitive of the subjects covered. The Nature of True Virtue is an exception. In Rogers’ opinion it is “the least satisfactory of all Edwards’ pieces.” *52*
(1) The Nature of True Virtue is too deductive.
The Nature of True Virtue is “least satisfactory” because of its author’s passion for deductive reasoning in which area he was admittedly one of the greatest thinkers ever. Since Rogers does not show wherein Edwards is too deductive we are obliged to deduce that this objection is without substance.
(2) There cannot be different degrees of Being.
There may be varying degrees in which powers and faculties are possessed, but not degrees of being. This seems a strange argument, for no one, including Rogers, questions the difference between infinite and finite being. Among all Edwards’ Reformed critics, I do not recall ever again encountering this contention.
(3) Edwards’ virtue excluded love to particular individuals.
Jonathan Edwards cannot call particular love in “some sense virtuous” without abandoning his basic principle, continues Henry Rogers. While Edwards argues that the only way love for particular beings can be virtuous is by its aiming at Being-in-general, Rogers thinks this makes it impossible. What for Edwards makes particular love possible, Rogers thinks makes it impossible.
We have seen Edwards’ argument. Rogers’ critique is merely dissent, not refutation, nor even response. *53* If doing all to the glory of God (love to Being-in-general) is what makes love to lesser beings truly virtuous, how can it exclude such love?
(4) Love to Being-in-general is impossible.
Rogers does not put his fourth argument quite that bluntly but his objection amounts to the above: “To any practical application of this [Edwardsian] theory under any modification, the insuperable objection is that the limitation of our faculties will not permit us to use it.” *54*
Granted, Edwards said that “object who has most of being, or has the greatest share of existence, other things being equal . . . will have the greatest share of the propensity and benevolent affections of the heart.” *55* He, however, qualified that statement “as far as such a being is exhibited in our faculties.” Admittedly, it is sometimes very difficult to determine duty to Being-in-general, the degree of being not being clearly “set in our view.” Further, other things being equal must be considered. On the other hand, how is duty ever determined except by Edwards’ principle?
For example, six persons survive a crash and only one can live on the provisions available. Which one is it to be? Certainly if the will of God (Being-in-general) is known, that settles the matter immediately, clearly, and decisively. If it is not known, what remains for the six to do ethically but try to determine what His will is? What principle should guide them to determine that if not determining which of the six is most valuable to society-in-general (society being the closest human approximation to Being-in-general though infinitely less)? The six’s love for that which has greatest being “set in [their] view” (society) determines which one should survive. If this sounds like Edwardsian utilitarianism someone is not listening well. It is not love for the greatest good of the greatest number that determines love for Being-in-general, but love for infinite Being-in-general that determines love for the greatest approximation to Him though infinitely less. Society is a function of the love of God (Jonathan Edwards) and not God a function of the love of society (John Stuart Mill).
2. Archibald Alexander
Archibald Alexander was another of the Reformed admirers of Jonathan Edwards who was not so admiring of his theory of virtue. The founder in 1812 of the later-to-become Princeton Seminary felt that Edwards and his New England successors of Edwards were highly defective in their principles of conduct.
(1) Benevolence cannot be the essence of virtue.
According to Alexander, Edwards’ “definition of virtue has surprised all his admirers: it is, ‘the love of being as such’ [sic]. When, however, this strange definition comes to be explained, by himself and his followers, it amounts to the same as that which we have been considering, which makes all virtue to consist in disinterested benevolence,” *56* which cannot even be virtuous if not regulated, for example, by justice.
Edwards agrees that virtue in essence is benevolence or good will toward Being-in-general, not merely toward “being as such,” which was a substantively incorrect quotation. Benevolence flows in the banks of justice and all other of its adjectival descriptions. But justice, for example, is not virtue per se. Edwards argues: “doubtless ’tis a great mistake in any to suppose all that moral sense which appears and is exercised in a sense of desert is the same thing as a love of virtue. . . .” *57*
Love of justice is merely love of harmony felt and practiced even by pirates toward those who befriend them. *58* If these pirates had love for God they would see that those who befriend them in their piracy were to be “hated” and those who opposed them in their piracy were to be loved.
(2) Virtue can be reduced to no one category.
Virtue, Alexander contends, is not merely unsatisfactorily identified with benevolence but it would be unsatisfactorily identified with any one virtue. It is artificial, one-sided, inadequate to reduce all sin or all virtue to one category.
Yet it is standard with theists that God Himself is one, and His being and attributes are one. *59* Virtue, with God, presumably even Alexander would admit, is one. All the divine excellencies can be reduced to one category, holiness. Perhaps, Alexander has in mind only man or creatures when he claims virtue cannot be reduced to one category. He gives no argument except that point (3) below seems implied, and if so that is an argument which must be answered, or Edwards would be the first one to admit that his ethical doctrine must be wrong. But so far as the present point is concerned we find a somewhat characteristic cryptic dogmatism in Outlines of Moral Science.
According to Alexander, the disposition to reduce all religion to philanthropy is a dangerous vice. Still we have no argument unless guilt by alleged association is an argument. Even if some reduce all religion to a form of humanitarian ethics this would not militate against reducing all virtue to benevolence to Being-in-general. Alexander in his objection sees some connection here that is not visible to the naked eye. Could it be that because some make benevolence to man into all virtue that those who make all virtue into benevolence to God are guilty of the same mistake? Alexander sees a sequitur here where there is a non sequitur.
(3) Reduction of all virtue to benevolence spells the best possible world universalism
“Nor is that all” continues the Presbyterian Calvinist against the Congregational Calvinist: “If benevolence is the sum of all goodness, then it is the only element in God’s moral character. He is therefore disposed to produce all the happiness possible in the universe.” *60*
Now this is an argument indeed - devastating, if sound. And it seems sound. God is infinite benevolence, infinite virtue. It emanates from Him and emanates to Him. It is no wonder that some have found an inescapable pantheism (or panentheism) in Jonathan Edwards - a benevolent pantheism. God is all - God is good - all is good! All this from the man most famous for his doctrine of eternal hell. *61*
It is Alexander who answers his own objection. Benevolence must be just. Agreeing, Edwards says it must also be sovereign, wise, good, and in every way excellent. *62* So it is best for Being-in-general that all being not be happy. We will examine this Alexander objection more fully when we consider Hodge’s criticism to the same effect.
(4) Universal benevolence is not prudent.
Alexander definitely felt that Edwards had turned into a path he (Alexander) feared to tread. “A prudent regard to our own welfare and happiness is undoubtedly a virtue.” *63* Love to Being-in-general leading to disinterested benevolence was the displacing of prudence. By contrast, Alexander found Bishop Butlers ethics to be a defense of prudence, which apparently he considered Edwards to have opposed.
It is rather strange that Alexander does not go on to remark on the apparent paradox of a most prudential Puritan being opposed to prudence. Without doubt Edwards was one of the most prudent of men and at the same time one of the most consistent. Alexander should have suspected something wrong here. Closer reflection would show that Edwards not only acted with consummate prudence, but taught the same, also. It is profoundly prudent to be disinterestedly benevolent in Edwards’ scheme of ethics. Disinterested benevolence meant that a person acted not out of private self-love, but from a love for Being-in-general, which was the most prudent and profitable way to behave and most beneficial for the self. One did not behave that way because it was prudent (that would not be disinterested benevolence); but it was prudent to behave that way (indeliberately interested or “disinterested benevolence”).
Many of Edwards’ sermons extol a laying up of treasure in heaven and defend the profit motive. *64* Many ethicists find it difficult to combine these seemingly mutually exclusive concepts of prudence and disinterested benevolence. For Edwards, they were not mutually exclusive, but mutually inclusive. Only as a person acts from disinterested benevolence is he benevolent toward Being-in-general, including even his own being. Yet if he acts out of concern only for his own being, and thus is interestedly benevolent, he is actually selfish and self-destructive. While knowing that disinterested benevolence will work to his own best interest, he acts in the interest of Being-in-general and not for being-in-particular, his own person. In fact, as we have seen, Edwards argues that interested benevolence benefits the other person, but not the one thus motivated. *65* Bishop Butler may not have carried his prudentialism to the point of self-destruction; but, as it is practiced by some, prudentialism is imprudent.
Edwards sees Christian charity as intimately bound with union with Christ.
How unsuitable is it for us, who live only by kindness, to be unkind! What would have become of us, if Christ had been so saving of his blood, and loath to bestow it, as many men are of their money or goods? or if he had been as ready to excuse himself from dying for us, as men commonly are to excuse themselves from charity to their neighbour? If Christ would have made objections of such things, as men commonly object to performing deeds of charity to their neighbour, he would have found enough of them.
Besides, Christ, by his redemption, has brought us into a more near relation one to another, hath made us children of God, children in the same family. We are all brethren, having God for our common Father; which is much more than to be brethren in any other family. He hath made us all one body; therefore we ought to be united, and subserve one another’s good, and bear one another’s burdens, as is the case with the members of the same natural body. If one of the members suffer, all the other members bear the burden with it, 1Co_12:26. If one member be diseased or wounded, the other members of the body will minister to it, and help it. So surely it should be in the body of Christ: Gal_6:2. “Bear ye one another’s burdens, and so fulfill the law of Christ.” *66*
Before he enters his characteristic thorough analysis of the excuses his parishioners offered to any great generosity, he acknowledges “Don’t the papists shame us in this respect [charity]?”
(5) Against Conscience
According to Alexander, conscience immediately recognizes virtue and its opposite. Therefore, virtue is defined as that which is intuitively, by taste, approved by conscience.
Such a definition would not necessarily preclude the Edwardsian definition. At least theoretically, it could be benevolence to Being-in-general which conscience instinctively approves as virtuous. However, in Alexander’s view Edwards is wrong on three points here: first, he does not extract his definition of virtue from this only source from which it could be extracted; second, what he does define is not what conscience teaches; and, third, Edwards does not even recognize conscience as the source of virtue.
On the first point, Edwards cannot be faulted by Alexander. So long as virtue admits of definition the effort to define cannot - as an effort - be an error. Even if Edwards were looking in the wrong place for definition, this looking itself is proper.
The second point depends for its validity on the third. If conscience reveals the meaning of virtue and Edwards finds a meaning contrary to it, Edwards must be wrong. However, unless conscience can be shown to be the ex cathedra definer and legislator of morals, Edwards is not demonstratively in error.
The third point is utterly crucial. Edwards is surely in error if he does not recognize the only source of infallible information about the definition of virtue. But Edwards has argued that conscience is not that source and Alexander has only asserted that it is. An argument may be wrong but it can never be refuted by an assertion from anyone other than God Himself.
An article in Bibliotheca Sacra *67* a century and a half ago defends Edwards against the Alexander critique. In the anonymous piece the writer could only say of Alexander: “That he intended to be unjust we do not believe. That he has been unjust is only too obvious.” *68*
The article takes exception to a critic who had disparaged Edwards’ The Nature of True Virtue as a “tentative effort, made late in life.” In refuting that, our author gives such a fine summary of Edwards’ early ethical thought that I can do no better than summarize what he says following his reference to notes on “The Mind:”
He begins by showing that Edwards founded his theory on the Bible:
10. As to that excellence that created spirits partake of, that it is all to be resolved into love, none will doubt that knows what is the sum of the ten commandments; or believes what the Apostle says, that love is the fulfilling of the law; or what Christ says, that on these two, loving God and our neighbor, hang all the law and the prophets. This doctrine is often repeated in the New Testament. We are told that the end of the commandment is love, that to love is to fulfill the royal law, and that all the law is fulfilled in this one word, love. *69*
The author then notes that in natural harmony, symmetry and beauty, Edwards saw an image of holy love:
When one thing sweetly harmonizes with another, as the notes in music, the notes are so conformed and have such proportion one to another that they seem to have respect one to another, as if they loved one another. So the beauty of figures and motions is, when one part has such consonant proportion with the rest as represents a general agreeing and consenting together; which is very much the image of love in all the parts of a society united by a sweet consent and charity of heart. *70*
The author notes that for Edwards the harmony and consent in natural things, “is pleasant to the mind because it is a shadow of love.” *71* He describes Edwards as student-like, illustrating these statements by various diagrams. Next is quoted Edwards’ description of his conception of excellence:
[45]. EXCELLENCE. 1. When we spake of excellence in bodies we were obliged to borrow the word “consent” from spiritual things. But excellence in and among spirits is, in its prime and proper sense, being’s consent to being. There is no other proper consent but that of minds, even of their will; which, when it is of minds towards minds, it is love, and when of minds towards other things it is choice. *72*
Our author’s summary follows Edwards as he proves that this consent, in order to be true excellence, must extend to the whole system, even to being in general. He then cites from Edwards another important element of his view:
7. Wherefore all virtue, which is the excellency of minds, is resolved into love to being. And nothing is virtuous or beautiful in spirits any otherwise than as it is an exercise, or fruit, or manifestation of this love; and nothing is sinful or deformed in spirits but as it is the defect of, or contrary to, these. *73*
According to our author’s exposition Edwards proceeds to show that of “being in general” God is infinitely the greatest part, and therefore deserves our chief and supreme love. Bibliotheca Sacra concludes:
From these views he with great clearness develops and vindicates the idea of justice, as an exercise of love to being in general, manifested in dissent from its enemies, and a disposition to oppose and punish them for the defense of the general good. He says: “Dissent from such beings, if that be their fixed nature, is a manifestation of consent to being in general; for consent to being is dissent from that which dissents from being.” *74* This he regards as the basis of “Vindictive Justice.” He adds: “Justice is no otherwise excellent, than as it is the exercise, fruit and manifestation of the mind’s love or consent to being.” *75*
Compare with this his final definition of virtue in his Dissertation: “True virtue consists most essentially in BENEVOLENCE TO BEING IN GENERAL. Or perhaps, to speak more accurately, it is that consent, union and propensity of heart to being in general, which is immediately exercised in a general good will.” *76*
Is it not plain, then, to a demonstration, that his theory of virtue is one of Edwards’s earliest views? We might quote pages of proof of our position, but this brief general reference must suffice. *77*
3. Charles Hodge
In the Index to Hodge’s three-volume Systematic Theology no reference to Edwards’ theory of virtue is found. However, in the systematician’s treatment of sin we find a lengthy discussion/critique of “The Theory that all Sin consists in Selfishness.” *78* No one could feasibly use such a caption to describe Jonathan Edwards’ thought. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that Hodge considers this related to his views: “As happiness is the only and ultimate good, benevolence, or the disposition or purpose to promote happiness, must be the essence and sum of virtue.” *79*
Hodge continues concluding that this theory makes this “the best possible world” and that “there is no more sin in the world than is necessary to secure the greatest happiness of the universe.” *80* As we cannot say - since Hodge does not - that these points are directed at Edwards, we can only say that this might have been. Consider Hodge’s critique.
(1) Happiness as the goal means selfishness is sin and the only sin
Edwards taught that happiness is infinite and perfect in God. *81* Its promotion, therefore, could concern only the creatures since it added nothing to the ever-blessed God. The greatest amount of happiness comes to some (the elect saved by grace) partly because of the contrast with the misery of others (the reprobate damned by justice). However, the ethical way to happiness (benevolence) while necessarily making selfishness (private self-interest) sin certainly promotes true self-interest which, being benevolent, is other-regarding and not other-disregarding (selfishness). Since the morally responsible person must have benevolence for infinite being, love only for his own being, or some extension of it (selfishness), must be sin and the only sin.
(2) Benevolence implies that promoting happiness is the essence of virtue
Benevolence “and the love of benevolence” are indeed the essence of virtue as Edwards demonstrates and Hodge does not attempt to refute. Since benevolence does produce happiness, the promotion of happiness is incidentally - not essentially - virtuous.
(3) Implies “Best Possible World"
That this is “the best possible world” is a deduction which Edwards refuses to draw giving no less than ten arguments against it. *82* At this point I agree with Hodge and cannot accept the arguments Edwards offers against this conclusion. However, I differ with both Edwards and Hodge - with Edwards’ denial that “best possible world” is an implication and with Hodge’s explicit denial that this is the best possible world.
If there was a better world to accomplish God’s purpose why would He not have created it. Heaven is the best possible world and Hell is the worst possible world. In their own way heaven and hell are the best possible worlds to reveal perfect mercy and just wrath.
(4) Sin in the actual amount existing is necessary
Likewise, Edwards probably would not have accepted Hodge’s contention that on his view “there is no more sin in the world than is necessary to secure the greatest happiness of the universe.” *83* There is no more sin in the world than God is pleased to permit, but since He has not aimed at the best possible world in the abstract, there conceivably could have been more or less if God had some other goal than the one He is pursuing. Since I think Edwards is wrong in opposing the “best possible world,” I think he is wrong here, because consistent. Later, when I come to A. H. Strong, I will consider another criticism by Hodge for which Strong does not cite the source.
4. Robert L. Dabney
The great southern theologian writes of Edwards: “This great and good man would probably be shocked to have his speculation as to “The Nature of Virtue” classed with those of the infidel, utilitarian school.” *84*
According to Dabney, the historical development of Edwards’ speculation since his death proves the justice of that charge. In the hands of Samuel Hopkins and Jonathan Edwards Jr., love to Being-in-general becomes simply the affection of benevolence, which reduces to this: “that benevolence is all virtue and all virtue is benevolence.” *85* From this Dabney sees only a short step to the greatest good of the greatest number.
It seems strange that so astute a theologian as Dabney would not note how Edwards would protest such a reduction. Edwards, as we noticed, pointed out in his presentation that love to particular being, no matter how many beings - if it were not for love to Being-in-general - was not at all virtuous.
(1) Anti-scriptural benevolence to being
Dabney sees the Edwardsian view as contrary to the Scriptures from which Edwards thought he derived all of his basic doctrines (and Long rightly contends that the only essential difference between Edwards and Augustine and Luther is the former’s use of philosophical concepts). *86*
When the Scriptures declare love to God the great commandment, they mean a very different thing from Edwards’ benevolence to being; “a propensity to its highest good.” The supreme object of holy love in the Scriptures is always God’s holiness. *87*
Here again Dabney seems to be ignoring what Edwards had pointed out: that creatures’ benevolence to a God who cannot be benefited is indeed a glorification of his excellence or holiness. It is “adoration” of God’s holiness” *88* or excellence which is definitely quite different from “kindness.” Edwards never entertained a notion in his Dissertation, or in his sermons, or in any of his writings, that the benevolence one renders to Being-in-general could ever be in the nature of kindness for which Being-in-general could be considered grateful. It is ironical that Dabney could charge Edwards with an error against which Edwards fought so ceaselessly. *89*
(2) Error of grounding virtue on harmony
Dabney is rather interesting on the harmony question. He insists that Edwards errs in grounding virtue in harmony. In his own opinion moral beauty differs from the aesthetic and the logical in its conformity to the original intuition of conscience. This is different from Edwards to be sure. But it is nevertheless a grounding of virtue on harmony. It is harmony with conscience which is, of course, a part of Being-in-general in Edwards’ and in Dabney’s thinking, too (I would suppose). Furthermore, for Edwards conscience is a form of consistency, as we have seen. Harmony is of the essence, though there are different varieties of harmony, as there are of beauty. *90*
(3) Love of benevolence not the essence of virtue
An even more fundamental Dabney criticism is that Edwards’ love of complacency flows from the love of benevolence. *91* For Dabney, love of benevolence is simply not the essence of virtue.
It is rather interesting, if not odd, when Dabney differs from Edwards on a point like this. Both are Calvinistic theologians par excellence. As such they believe that God is the ultimate being. His being brings all other being into existence. God is by biblical definition the One Who Is, the “I Am.” It would seem to biblical theologians to be self-evident that God is Being-in-general. Edwards certainly uses God and Being-in-general interchangeably in The Nature of True Virtue. As we have observed earlier, there can be no moral being without being, though theoretically there could have been being without moral being. So complacency would logically and necessarily, if it exists at all, rest on conformity with Being-in-general, and that would be the essence of virtue.
We assume that the reason for Dabney’s apparent disagreement with Edwards here is his conviction that virtue is conformity to conscience. But if conscience itself is, as it appears to be in Dabney, nothing but an aspect of ultimate being, conformity to it would be nothing but a conformity to Being-in-general, or what Edwards calls benevolence to Being-in-general.
(4) Love to being is impersonal
“Only a person can oblige us to a duty.” *92* But, complains Dabney, Edwards’ love to Being is impersonal. Furthermore, ordinary people cannot think of Being-in-general when loving particularly. Also, Dabney continues (contradicting himself), this imagined obligation to Being-in-general, and that being which has most being, would lead a son to rescue a gifted stranger in preference to his own father. *93* But if in that imaginary situation the son made a judgment to save his father, even that would indicate that he is able to distinguish between degrees of being. If he could distinguish between greater and lesser finite being, it would be quite easy for him to distinguish between finite and infinite being.
Furthermore, Dabney is overlooking a principle that Edwards constantly mentions - “everything else being equal.” There is a special obligation that a person has to members of his own family which he would not have toward a stranger that, in a sense, increases the being of those nearest to him in relation to the being of those further from him. Edwards does not develop this point, but he does refer to it, and such a development would seem to be his meaning. Furthermore, those soldiers of David who said he was worth thousands of them would save David though it cost their own lives (2Sa_18:3).
(5) Quality not quantity of being determines virtue
On this grand “Calvinistic” objection to Edwards’ theory of virtue, Dabney is most emphatic: “It is [God’s moral perfections], not existence, which constitute Him the object of our moral homage. This fact alone overthrows Edwards’ whole speculation.” *94*
What is supposed to overthrow Edwards’ whole speculation is something which Edwards constantly emphasized. In fact, he emphasized it even more than Dabney himself. It was the second part of the very definition of virtue. Edwards argued that “The second object of a virtuous propensity of heart is benevolent being. A secondary ground of pure benevolence is virtuous benevolence itself in its object.” *95* God is not only quantitatively infinite but qualitatively infinite as well. Being-in-general is moral Being-in-general.
(6) Self-love is not sin
The statement of Dabney that Edwards cannot reduce “the selfish into that of sin” *96* shows that Dabney is careless in a way that neither Butler nor Edwards were. *97* Both of them distinguished carefully between self-love that is selfish and intrinsically evil, and a self-love that is not necessarily evil and may even be, if properly directed, virtuous. In this context Dabney tries futilely to show utilitarianism is inevitably involved in Edwardsian thought. He argues that “All men see the moral distinction between right and wrong actions. . . . but regard them as immediate and intuitive . . . impossible for them to question its rational authority. . . .” *98*
Self-evident, necessary, and universal are the moral intuitions. Strange as it may seem to Dabney and other intuitionists, Edwards does not certainly disagree with this declaration. He believed that men do see that benevolence to Being-in-general is the nature of true virtue, and they see it as self-evident and necessary and universal. It is simply Edwards’ way of stating it that is so unusual and makes the self-evident a little less self-evident. Even William Frankena, as others, judges Edwards’ views to be inimical to intuitionalism of all sorts. *99* He is right, of course, in seeing Edwards’ view as opposed to the usual intuitionalism which contends that man, as such, accepts the principles of virtue. Edwards maintains that only for man as regenerate is virtue a matter of “taste.”
5. A. H. Strong
(1) Virtue is love for good being
Strong speaks of Edwards as follows:
Edwards, Nature of Virtue, in Works, 2:263 - Love of benevolence does not presuppose beauty in its object. Love of complacence does presuppose beauty. Virtue is not love to an object for its beauty. The beauty of intelligent beings does not consist in love for beauty, or virtue in love for virtue. Virtue is love for being in general, exercised in a general good will. This is the doctrine of Edwards. We prefer to say that virtue is love, not for being in general, but for good being, [the standard Reformed objection] and so for God, the holy One. The love of compassion is perfectly compatible with hatred of evil and with indignation against one who commits it. Love does not necessarily imply approval, but it does imply desire that all creatures should fulfil the purpose of their existence by being morally conformed to the holy One. . . . *100*
With all of that (except the last sentence with which all Calvinists must disagree because what God desires He does) Jonathan Edwards would not necessarily disagree. In what follows, Strong carries benevolent love to a point Edwards never does:
We ought to love our enemies, and Satan is our worst enemy. We ought to will the good of Satan, or cherish toward him the love of benevolence though not the love of complacence. This does not involve a condoning of his sin, or an ignoring of his moral depravity. . . . *101*
While Edwards’ disagreement is implicit enough in The Nature of True Virtue, there can be no missing it in his sermon on Rev_18:20 : “When the saints in glory see the wrath of God executed on ungodly men, it will be no occasion of grief to ’em, but of rejoicing.” *102* The reason such feeling is now forbidden Christians is that they do not know, (except possibly in the case of those who commit the unpardonable sin) what men are eternally rejected of God. But they now know that Satan is, and therefore may have no such love of benevolence for him as Strong enjoins (except for his mere being or existence, even in hell, which being is distinguishable from his abuse of it).
(2) Holiness is not reducible to love
According to Strong
Holiness is not identical with, or a manifestation of, love. Since self-maintenance must precede self-impartation, and since benevolence has its object, motive, standard and limit in righteousness, holiness the self-affirming attribute can in no way be resolved into love the self-communicating. . . . In his treatise on The Nature of Virtue, Jonathan Edwards defines virtue as regard for being in general. He considers that God’s love is first of all directed toward himself as having the greatest quantity of being, and only secondarily directed towards his creatures whose quantity of being is infinitesimal as compared with his. God therefore finds his chief end in himself, and God’s self-love is his holiness. This principle has permeated and dominated subsequent New England theology, from Samuel Hopkins, Works, II:9-66, who maintains that holiness=love of being in general, to Horace Bushnell, Vicarious Sacrifice, who declares: “Righteousness, transferred into a word of the affections, is love; and love, translated back into a word of the conscience, is righteousness; the eternal law of right is only another conception of the law of love; the two principles, right and love, appear exactly to measure each other.” So Park, Discourses, 155-180. *103*
We will have to disregard Strong’s interesting reference to post-Edwardsian ethical development and address only his trenchant criticism of Edwards. I think this is the profoundest criticism any Reformed theologian ever offered Jonathan Edwards in the area of ethical theory. Holiness is the essence of God (Being-in-general) and benevolence is its expression. So virtue is holiness, not benevolence, which is the expression of virtue. Yet if there is a difference between Strong and Edwards here, it is either merely terminological or deeply metaphysical - it can scarcely be ethical. Metaphysically speaking, God is for Edwards “actus purus” and the same for Strong. *104* So God, whose moral essence is holiness, is eternally expressing that holiness in the infinite Trinity, and then in time toward His finite creatures. *105* Holiness is not “reduced” to benevolence, but its eternal expression goes by that name. Benevolence is communicated not “reduced” holiness.
(3) Edwards makes it virtuous to love Satan
Approvingly, Strong cites Charles Hodge:
if obligation is primarily due to being in general, then there is no more virtue in loving God than there is in loving Satan. Virtue, we hold, must consist, not only in love for being in general, but in love for good being, that is, in love for God as holy. Love has no moral value except as it is placed upon a right object and is proportioned to the worth of that object. “Love of being in general” makes virtue an irrational thing, because it has no standard of conduct. Virtue is rather the love of God as right and as the source of right. *106*
Both great Calvinists, Strong and Hodge, seem to forget that the even greater Calvinist they are criticizing made the benevolence of being an aspect of love to Being-in-general. *107*
Also, although it is a trivial point, if the virtuous person were to love Satanic being it would be infinitesimally less than the love for God, and pertain only to Satan’s being as such, and not his anti-benevolence, which is his essential moral nature.
So much for mainly 19th century Calvinistic criticism of Edwards’ theory of virtue. I asked my Yale student researcher to see what he could find on this subject in B. B. Warfield, H. B. Smith, Louis Berkhof, Gerritt Berkouwer, Cornelius Van Til, Oliver Buswell or any other twentieth-century Calvinistic theologian. This was his reply:
I have continued to look for Reformed critiques of Edwards’s theory of virtue, but aside from the brief remark made by Warfield, and the information enclosed by Smith, I've not been very successful. The main figures I have researched (i.e., all major works in the Yale system and religious periodicals in the last