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TOPIC: Edwards, Jonathan - Personal Writings (Other Topics in this Collection)
SUBJECT: 28b
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In Memory, in mental principles, habits, and inclinations, there is
something really abiding in the mind, when there are no acts or
exercises of them: much in the same manner, as there is a chair in
this room, when no mortal perceives it. For when we say, There are
chairs in this room, when none perceives it, we mean, that minds would
perceive chairs here, according to the Law of Nature in such
circumstances. So when we say, A person has these and those things,
laid up in his memory, we mean, they would actually be repeated in his
mind, upon some certain occasions, according to the Law of Nature;
though we cannot describe, particularly, the Law of Nature about these
mental acts, so well as we can about other things.
[11.] Personal identity. Well might Mr. Locke say, that Identity of
person consisted in identity of consciousness; for he might have said
that identity of spirit, too, consisted in the same consciousness; for
a mind or spirit is nothing else but consciousness, and what is
included in it. The same consciousness is, to all intents and
purposes, individually, the very same spirit, or substance; as much as
the same particle of matter can be the same with itself, at different
times.
[72.] Identity of person is what seems never yet to have been
explained. It is a mistake, that it consists in sameness, or identity,
of consciousness--if, by sameness of consciousness, be meant, having
the same ideas hereafter, that I have now, with a notion or
apprehension that I had had them before; just in the same manner as I
now have the same ideas, that I had in time past, by memory. It is
possible, without doubt, in the nature of things, for God to
annihilate me, and after my annihilation to create another being that
shall have the same ideas in his mind that I have, and with the like
apprehension that he had had them before, in like manner as a person
has by memory; and yet I be in no way concerned in it, having no
reason to fear what that being shall suffer, or to hope for what he
shall enjoy.--Can any one deny, that it is possible, after my
annihilation, to create two beings in the Universe, both of them
having my ideas communicated to them, with such a notion of their
having had them before, after them manner of memory, and yet be
ignorant one of another; and, in such case, will any one say, that
both these are one and the same person, as they must be, if they are
both the same person with me. It is possible there may be two such
beings, each having all the ideas that are now in my mind, in the same
manner that I should have by memory, if my own being were continued;
and yet these two beings not only be ignorant one of another, but also
be in a very different state, one in a state of enjoyment and
pleasure, and the other in a state of great suffering and torment.
Yea, there seems to be nothing of impossibility in the Nature of
things, but that the Most High could, if he saw fit, cause there to be
another being, who should begin to exist in some distant part of the
Universe, with the same ideas I now have, after the manner of memory:
and should henceforward co-exist with me; we both retaining a
consciousness of what was before the moment of his first existence, in
like manner; but thenceforward should have a different train if ideas.
Will any one say, that he, in such a case, is the same person with me,
when I know nothing of his sufferings, and am never the better for his
joys.
[29.] Power. We have explained a Cause to be that, after, or upon, the
Existence of which, or its Existence is such a manner, the existence
of another thing follows. The Connexion between these two existences,
or between the Cause and Effect, is what we call Power. Thus the Sun,
above the Horizon, enlightens the Atmosphere. So we say the Sun has
power to enlighten the Atmosphere. That is, there is such a connexion
between the Sun, being above the Horizon, after such a manner, and the
Atmosphere being enlightened, that one always follows the other. So
the Sun has power to melt wax: That is, the Sun and wax so existing,
the melting of the wax follows. There is a connexion between one and
the other. So Man has power to do this or that: That is, if he exists
after such a manner, there follows the existence of another thing: if
he wills this or that, it will be so. God has power to do all things,
because there is nothing but what follows upon his willing of it. When
Intelligent beings are said to have power to do this or that; by it is
meant, the Connexion between this or that, upon this manner of their
existing, their willing: in which sense they have power to do many
things that they never shall will.
Coroll. Hence it follows, that men, in a very proper sense, may be
said to have power to abstain from sin, and to repent, to do good
works and to live holily; because it depends on their Will.
[59.] Judgment. The mind passes a judgment, in multitudes of cases,
where it has learned to judge by perpetual experience, not only
exceedingly quick, as soon as one thought can follow another, but
absolutely without any reflection at all, and at the same moment,
without any time intervening. Though the thing is not properly
self-evident, yet it judges without any ratiocination, merely by force
of habit. Thus, when I hear such and such sounds, or see such letters,
I judge that such things are signified without reasoning. When I have
such ideas coming in by my sense of seeing, appearing after such a
manner, I judge without any reasoning, that the things are further
off, than others that appear after such a manner. When I see a globe,
I judge it to be a globe, though the image impressed on my sensory is
only that of a flat circle, appearing variously in various parts. And
in ten thousand other cases, the ideas are habitually associated
together, and they come into the mind together.--So likewise, in
innumerable cases, men act without any proper act of the Will at that
time commanding, through habit. As when a man is walking, there is not
a new act of the Will every time a man takes up his foot and sets it
down.
Coroll. Hence there is no necessity of allowing reason to Beasts, in
many of those actions, that many are ready to argue are rational
actions. As cattle in a team are wont to act as the driver would have
them, upon his making such and such sounds, either to stop or go
along, or turn hither or thither, because they have been forced to do
it, by the whip, upon the using of such words. It is become habitual,
so that they never do it rationally, but either from force or from
habit. So of all the actions that beasts are taught to perform, dogs,
and horses, and parrots, &c. And those, that they learn of themselves
to do, are merely by virtue of appetite and habitual association of
ideas. Thus a horse learns to perform such actions for his food,
because he has accidentally had the perceptions of such actions,
associated with the pleasant perceptions of taste: and so his appetite
makes him perform the action, without any reason or judgment.
The main difference between Men and Beasts is, that Men are capable of
reflecting upon what passes in their own minds. Beasts have nothing
but direct consciousness. Men are capable of viewing what is in
themselves, contemplatively. Man was made for spiritual exercises and
enjoyments, and therefore is made capable, by reflection, to behold
and contemplate spiritual things. Hence it arises that Man is capable
of Religion.
A very great difference between Men and Beasts is, that Beasts have no
voluntary actions about their own thoughts; for it is in this only,
that reasoning differs from mere perception and memory. It is the act
of the Will, in bringing its ideas into Contemplation, and ranging and
comparing of them in Reflection and Abstraction. The minds of Beasts,
if I may call them minds, are purely passive with respect to all their
ideas. The minds of Men are not only passive, but abundantly active.
Herein probably is the most distinguishing difference between Men and
Beasts. Herein is the difference between Intellectual, or Rational,
Will, and mere Animal Appetite, that the latter is a simple
Inclination to, or Aversion from, such and such Sensations, which are
the only ideal that they are capable of, that are not active about
their ideas: for former is a Will that is active about its own ideas,
in disposing of them among themselves, or Appetite towards those ideas
that are acquired by such action.
The Association of ideas in Beasts, seems to be much quicker and
stronger than in Men: at least in many of them.
It would not suppose any exalted faculty in Beasts, to suppose that
like ideas in them, if they have any, excite one another. Nor can I
think why it should be so any the less for the weakness and narrowness
of their faculties; in such things, where to perceive the argument of
ideas, requires neither attention nor comprehension. And experience
teaches us, that what we call thought in them, is thus led from one
thing to another.
[17.] Logic. One reason why, at first, before I knew other Logic, I
used to be mightily pleased with the study of the Old Logic, was,
because it was very pleasant to see my thoughts, that before lay in my
mind jumbled without any distinction, ranged into order and
distributed into classes and subdivisions, so that I could tell where
they all belonged, and run them up to their general heads. For this
Logic consisted much in Distributions and Definitions; and their
maxims gave occasion to observe new and strange dependencies of ideas,
and a seeming agreement of multitudes of them in the same thing, that
I never observed before.
[66.] Ideas. All sorts of ideas of things are but the repetitions of
those very things over again--as well the ideas of colours, figures,
solidity, tastes, and smells, as the ideas of thought and mental acts.
[67.] Love is not properly said to be an idea, any more than
Understanding is said to be an idea. Understanding and Loving are
different acts of the mind entirely; and so Pleasure and Pain are not
properly ideas.
Though Pleasure and Pain may imply perception in their nature, yet it
does not follow, that they are properly ideas. There is an Act of the
mind in it. An idea is only a perception, wherein the mind is passive,
or rather subjective. The Acts of the mind are not merely ideas. All
Acts of the mind, about its ideas, are not themselves mere ideas.
Pleasure and Pain have their seat in the Will, and not in the
Understanding. The Will, Choice, &c. is nothing else, but the mind's
being pleased with an idea, or having a superior pleasedness in
something thought of, or a desire of a future thing, or a pleasedness
in the thought of our union with the thing, or a pleasedness in such a
state of ourselves, and a degree of pain while we are not in that
state, or a disagreeable conception of the contrary state at that time
when we desire it.
[7.] Genus. The various distributing and ranking of things, and tying
of them together, under one common abstract idea, is, although
arbitrary, yet exceedingly useful, and indeed absolutely necessary:
for how miserable should we be, if we could think of things only
individually, as the beasts do; how slow, narrow, painful, and endless
would be the exercise of thought.
What is this putting and tying things together, which is done in
abstraction? It is not merely a tying of them under the same name; for
I do believe, that deaf and dumb persons abstract and distribute
things into kinds. But it is so putting of them together, that the
mind resolves hereafter to think of them together, under a common
notion, as if they were a collective substance; the mind being as
sure, in this proceeding, of reasoning well, as if it were of a
particular substance; for it has abstracted that which belongs alike
to all, and has a perfect idea, whose relations and properties it can
behold, as well as those of the idea of one individual. Although this
ranking of things be arbitrary, yet there is much more foundation for
some distributions than others. Some are much more useful, and much
better serve the purposes of abstraction.
[24.] There is really a difference that the mind makes, in the
consideration of an Universal, absolutely considered, and a Species.
There is a difference in the two ideas, when we say Man, including
simply the abstract idea; and when we say, the Human Sort of Living
Creature. There is reference had to an idea more abstract. And there
is this act of the mind in distributing an Universal into Species. It
ties this abstract idea to two or more less abstract ideas, and
supposes it limited by them.
It is not every property that belongs to all the particulars included
in, and proper to, a Genus, and that men generally see to be so, that
is a part of that complex abstract idea, that represents all the
particulars, or that is a part of that nominal essence. But so much is
essential, which, if men should see any thing less, they would not
call it by the name, by which they call the Genus. This indeed is
uncertain, because men never agreed upon fixing exact bounds.
[25.] A part, is one of those many ideas, which we are wont to think
of together. A whole, is an idea containing many of these.
[47.] the foundation of the most considerable Species or Sorts, in
which things are ranked, is the order of the world--the designed
distribution of God and nature. When we, in distributing things,
differ from that design, we don't know the true essences of things. If
the world had been created without any order, or design, or beauty,
indeed, all species would be merely arbitrary. There are certain
multitudes of things, that God has made to agree, very remarkably in
something, either as to their outward appearance, manner of acting,
the effects they produce, or that other things produce on them, the
manner of their production, or God's disposal concerning them, or some
peculiar perpetual circumstances that they are in. Thus diamonds agree
in shape; pieces of gold, in that they will be divided in aqua regia;
loadstones, in innumerable strange effects that they produce; many
plants, in the peculiar effects they produce on animal bodies; men, in
that they are to remain after this life. That inward conformation,
that is the foundation of an agreement in these things, is the real
essence of the thing. For instance, that disposition of parts, or
whatever it be, in the matter of the loadstone, from whence arises the
verticity to the poles, and its influence on other loadstones and
iron, is the real essence of the loadstone that is unknown to us.
[41.] As there is great foundation in Nature for those abstract ideas,
which we call Universals; so there is great foundation in the common
circumstances and necessities of mankind, and the constant method of
things proceeding, for such a tying of simple modes together to the
constituting such mixed modes. This appears from the agreement of
languages; for language is very much made up of the names of Mixed
Modes; and we find that almost all those names, in one language, have
names that answer to them in other languages. The same Mixed Mode has
a name given to it by most nations. Whence it appears that most of the
inhabitants of the Earth have agreed upon putting together the same
Simple Modes into Mixed ones, and in the same manner. The learned and
polished have indeed many more than others: and herein chiefly it is,
that languages do not answer one to another.
[42.] The agreement or similitude of Complex ideas, mostly consists in
their precise identity, with respect to some third idea of some of the
simples they are compounded of. But it there be any similitude or
agreement between simple ideas themselves, it cannot consist in the
identity of a third idea that belongs to both; because the ideas are
simple; and if you take any thing that belongs to them, you take all.
Therefore no agreement between simple ideas can be resolved into
Identity, unless it be the identity of Relations. But there seems to
be another infallible agreement between simple ideas. Thus some
Colours are more like one to another than others, between which there
is yet a very manifest difference. So between Sounds, Smells, Tastes,
and other Sensations. And what is that common agreement of all these
ideas we call colours, whereby we know immediately that that name
belongs to them. Certainly all colours have an agreement one to
another, that is quite different from any agreement that Sounds can
have to them. So is there some common agreement to all Sounds, that
Tastes cannot have to any Sound. It cannot be said that the agreement
lies only in this, that these simple ideas come all by the ear; so
that their agreement consists only in their relation they have to that
organ. For if it should have been so that we had lived in the world,
and had never found out the way we got these ideas we call Sounds, and
never once thought or considered any thing about it, and should hear
some new simple sound, I believe nobody would question, but that we
should immediately perceive an agreement with other ideas, that used
to come by that sense, though we knew not which way one of them came,
and should immediately call it a Sound; and say we had heard a strange
Noise. And if we had never had any such sensation as the Headache, and
should have it, I do not think we should call that a new Sound; for
there would be so manifest a disagreement between those simple ideas,
of another kind from what simple ideas have one with another.
I have thought, whether or no the agreement of Colours did not
consist, in a Relation they had to the idea of Space; and whether
Colour in general might not be defined, that idea that filled Space.
But I am convinced, that there is another sort of agreement beside
that; and the more, because there can no such common relation be
thought of, with respect to different Sounds. It is probable that this
agreement may be resolved into Identity. If we follow these ideas to
their original in their Organs, like sensations may be caused from
like motions in the Animal Spirits. Herein the likeness is perceived,
after the same manner as the harmony in a simple colour; but if we
consider the ideas absolutely, it cannot be.
Coroll. All Universals, therefore, cannot be made up of ideas,
abstracted from Particulars; for Colour and Sound are Universals, as
much as Man or Horse. But the idea of Colour, or Sound, in general
cannot be made up of ideas, abstracted from particular Colours, or
Sounds; for from simple ideas nothing can be abstracted. But these
Universals are thus formed. The mind perceives that some of its ideas
agree, in a manner very different from all its other ideas. The mind
therefore is determined to rank those ideas together in its thoughts;
and all new ideas, it receives with the like agreement, it naturally,
and habitually, and at once, places to the same rank and order, and
calls them by the same name; and by the nature, determination, and
habit of the mind, the idea of one excites the idea of others.
[43.] Many of our Universal ideas are not Arbitrary. The tying of
ideas together, in Genera and Species, is not merely the calling of
them by the same name, but such an union of them, that the
consideration of one shall naturally excite the idea of others. But
the union of ideas is not always arbitrary, but unavoidably arising
from the nature of the Soul; which is such, that the thinking of one
thing, of itself, yea, against our wills, excites the thought of other
things that are like it. Thus, if a person, a stranger to the Earth,
should see and converse with a man, and a long time after should meet
with another man, and converse with him; the agreement would
immediately excite the idea of that other man, and those two ideas
would be together in his mind, for the time to come, yea, in spite of
him. So if he should see a third, and afterwards should find
multitudes, there would be a Genus, or Universal Idea, formed in his
mind, naturally, without his counsel or design. So I cannot doubt but,
if a person had been born blind, and should have his eyes opened, and
should immediately have blue placed before his eyes, and then red.
Then green, then yellow; I doubt not, they would immediately get into
one General Idea--they would be united in his mind without his
deliberation.
Coroll. So that God has not only distributed things into species, by
evidently manifesting, by his making such an agreement in things, that
he designed such and such particulars to be together in the mind; but
by making the Soul of such a nature, that those particulars, which he
thus made to agree, are unavoidably together in the mind, one
naturally exciting and including the others.
[37.] Genus and Species, indeed, is a mental thing; yet, in a sense,
Nature has distributed many things into Species without our minds.
That is, God evidently designed such Particulars to be together in the
mind, and in other things. But `tis not so indeed, with respect to all
genera. Some therefore may be called Arbitrary Genera, others Natural.
Nature has designedly made a distribution of some things; other
distributions are of a mental original.
[56.] Number is a train of differences of ideas, put together in the
mind's consideration in orderly succession, and considered with
respect to their relations one to another, as in that orderly mental
succession. This mental succession is the succession of Time. One may
make which they will the first, if it be but the first in
consideration. The mind begins where it will, and runs through them
successively one after another. It is a collection of differences; for
it is its being another, in some respect, that is the very thing that
makes it capable of pertaining to multiplicity. They must not merely
be put together, in orderly succession; but it's only their being
considered with reference to that relation, they have one to another
as differences, and in orderly mental succession, that denominates it
Number.--To be of such a particular number, is for an idea to have
such a particular relation, and so considered by the mind, to other
differences put together with it, in orderly succession.--So that
there is nothing inexplicable in the nature of Number, but what
Identity and Diversity is, and what Succession, or Duration, or
Priority and Posteriority, is.
[57.] Duration. Pastness, if I may make such a word, is nothing but a
Mode of ideas. This Mode, perhaps, is nothing else but a certain
Veterascence, attending our ideas. When it is, as we say, Past, the
idea, after a particular manner, fades and grows old. When an idea
appears with this mode, we say it is Past, the idea, and according to
the degree of this particular inexpressible mode, so we say the thing
is longer or more lately past. As in distance, it is not only by a
natural trigonometry of the eyes, or a sort of parallax, that we
determine it; because we can judge of distances, as well with one eye,
as with two. Nor is it by observing the parallelism or aperture of the
rays, for the mind judges by nothing, but the difference it observes
in the idea itself, which alone the mind has any notice of. But it
judges of distance, by a particular mode of indistinctness, as has
been said before. So it is with respect to distance of time, by a
certain peculiar inexpressible mode of fading and indistinctness,
which I call Veterascence.
[65.] I think we find by experience, that when we have been in a sound
sleep, for many hours together, if we look back to the time when we
were last awake, the ideas seem farther off to us, than when we have
only ceased thinking a few minutes: which cannot be because we see a
longer train of intermediate ideas in one case, than in the other; for
I suppose we see none in neither. But there is a sort of Veterascence
of ideas, that have been a longer time in the mind. When we look upon
them, they do not look just as those that are much nearer. This
Veterascence consists, I think, in blotting out the little
distinctions, the minute parts, and fine strokes of it. This is one
way of judging of the distance of Visible objects. In this respect, a
house, a tree, do not look at a little distance, as they do very near.
They not only do not appear so big; but a multitude of the little
distinctions vanish, that are plain when we are near.
[53.] Sensation. Our Senses, when sound, and in ordinary
circumstances, are not properly fallible in any thing: that is, we
mean our Experience by our Senses. If we mean any thing else, neither
fallibility nor certainty in any thing at all, any other way, than by
constant experience by our Senses. That is, when our Senses make such
or such representations, we constantly experience, that things are in
themselves thus or thus. So, when a thing appears after such a manner,
I judge it to be at least two rods off, at least two feet broad; but I
only know, by constant experience, that a thing, that makes such a
representation, is so far off, and so big. And so my senses are as
certain in every thing, when I have equal opportunity and occasion to
experience. And our senses are said to deceive us in some things,
because our situation does not allow us to make trial, or our
circumstances do not lead us to it, and so we are apt to judge by our
experience, in other and different cases. Thus, our Senses make us
think, that the Moon is among the clouds, because we cannot try it so
quick, easily, and frequently, as we do the distance of things, that
are nearer. But the Senses of an Astronomer, who observes the Parallax
of the Moon, do not deceive him, but lead him to the truth. Though the
idea of the Moon's distance will never be exercised, so quick and
naturally, upon every occasion, because of the tediousness and
infrequency of the trial; and there are not so many ways of trial, so
many differences in the Moon's appearance, from what a lesser thing
amongst the clouds would have, as there are in things nearer. I can
remember when I was so young, that seeing two things in the same
building, one of which was twice so far off as the other, yet seeing
one over the other, I thought they had been of the same distance, one
right over the other. My senses then were deceitful in that thing,
though they made the same representations as now, and yet now they are
not deceitful. The only difference is in experience. Indeed, in some
things, our senses make no difference in the representation, where
there is a difference in the things. But in those things, our
experience by our Senses will lead us not to judge at all, and so they
will deceive. We are in danger of being deceived by our Senses, in
judging of appearances, by our experience in different things, or by
judging where we have had no experience, or the like.
[19.] Things, that we know by immediate Sensation, we know
intuitively; and they are properly self-evident truths: as, Grass is
green; The Sun shines; Honey is sweet. When we say that Grass is
green, all that we can be supposed to mean by it, is--that, in a
constant course, when we see Grass, the idea of green is excited by
it; and this we know self-evidently.
[55.] Appetite of the Mind. As all ideas are wholly in the mind, so is
all Appetite. To have Appetite towards a thing is as remote from the
nature of Matter, as to have Thought. There are some of the Appetites,
that are called Natural Appetites, that are not indeed natural to the
Soul; as the Appetite to meat and drink. I believe when the Soul has
that sort of pain, which is in hunger and thirst, if the Soul never
had experienced that food and drink remove that pain, it would create
no Appetite to any thing. A man would be just as incapable of such an
Appetite, as he is to food he never smelt nor tasted. So the Appetite
of scratching when it itches.
[15.] Truth. After all that had been said and done, the only adequate
definition of Truth is, The agreement of our ideas with existence. To
explain what this existence is, is another thing. In abstract ideas,
it is nothing but the ideas themselves; so their truth is their
consistency with themselves. In things that are supposed to be without
us, it is the determination and fixed mode of God's exciting ideas in
us. So that Truth, in these things, is an agreement of our ideas with
that series in God. It is existence; and that is all that we can say.
It is impossible that we should explain a perfectly abstract and mere
idea of existence; only we always find this, by running of it up, that
God and Real Existence are the same.
Coroll. Hence we learn how properly it may be said, that God is, and
that there is none else; and how proper are these names of the Deity,
jehovah, and i am that i am.
[6.] Truth is The perception of the relations there are between ideas.
Falsehood is The supposition of relations between ideas that are
inconsistent with those ideas themselves; not their disagreement with
things without. All truth is in the mind, and only there. It is ideas,
or what is in the mind, alone, that can be the object of the mind; and
what we call Truth, is a consistent supposition of relations, between
what is the object of the mind. Falsehood is an inconsistent
supposition of relations. The Truth, that is in a mind, must be in
that mind as to its object, and every thing pertaining to it. The only
foundation of Error is inadequateness and imperfection of ideas; for,
if the idea were perfect, it would be impossible but that all its
relations should be perfectly perceived.
[10.] Truth, in the general, may be defined, after the most strict and
metaphysical manner, The consistency and agreement of our ideas with
the ideas of God. I confess this, in ordinary conversation, would not
half so much tend to enlighten one in the meaning of the word, as to
say, The agreement of our ideas with the things as they are. But it
should be inquired, What is it for our ideas to agree with things as
they are? seeing that corporeal things exist no otherwise than
mentally; and as for most other things, they are only abstract ideas.
Truth, as to external things, is the consistency of our ideas with
those ideas, or that train and series of ideas, that are raised in our
minds, according to God's stated order and law.
Truth, as to abstract ideas, is the consistency of our ideas with
themselves. As when our idea of a circle, or a triangle, or any of
their parts, is agreeable to the idea we have stated and agreed to
call by the name of a circle, or a triangle. And it may still be said,
that Truth is, the consistency of our ideas with themselves. Those
ideas are false, that are not consistent with the series of ideas,
that are raised in our minds, by according to the order of nature.
Coroll. 1. Hence we see, in how strict a sense it may be said, that
God is Truth, itself.
Coroll. 2. Hence it appears, that Truth consists in having perfect and
adequate ideas of things: For instance, if I judge truly how far
distant the Moon is from the Earth, we need not say, that this Truth
consists, in the perception of the relation, between the two ideas of
the Moon and the Earth, but in the adequateness.
Coroll. 3. Hence Certainty is the clear perception of this perfection.
Therefore, if we had perfect ideas of all things at once, that is,
could have all in one view, we should know all truth at the same
moment, and there would be no such thing as Ratiocination, or finding
our Truth. And Reasoning is only of use to us, in consequence of the
paucity of our ideas, and because we can have but very few in view at
once.--Hence it is evident, that all things are self-evident to God.
[5.] certainty. Determined that there are many degrees of certainty,
though not indeed of absolute certainty; which is infinitely strong.
We are certain of many things upon demonstration, which yet we may be
made more certain of by more demonstration; because although,
according to the strength of the mind, we see the connexion of the
ideas, yet a stronger mind would see the connexion more perfectly and
strongly, because it would have the ideas more perfect. We have not
such strength of mind, that we can perfectly conceive of but very few
things; and some little of the strength of an idea is lost, in a
moment of time, as we, in the mind, look successively on the train of
ideas in a demonstration.
[8.] rules of reasoning. It is no matter how abstracted our notions
are--the farther we penetrate and come to the prime reality of the
thing, the better; provided we can go to such a degree of abstraction,
and carry it out clear. We may go so far in abstraction, that,
although we may thereby, in part, see Truth and Reality, and farther
than ever was seen before, yet we may not be able more than just to
touch it, and to have a few obscure glances. We may not have strength
of mind to conceive clearly of the Manner of it. We see farther
indeed, but it is very obscurely and indistinctly. We had better stop
a degree or two short of this, and abstract no farther than we can
conceive of the thing distinctly, and explain it clearly: otherwise we
shall be apt to run into error, and confound our minds.
[54.] Reasoning. We know our own existence, and the existence of every
thing, that we are conscious of in our own minds intuitively; but all
our reasoning, with respect to Real Existence, depends upon that
natural, unavoidable, and invariable disposition of the mind, when it
sees a thing begin to be, to conclude certainly, that there is a Cause
of it; or if it sees a thing to be in a very orderly, regular, and
exact manner, to conclude that some Design regulated and disposed it.
That a thing that begins to be should make itself, we know implies a
contradiction; for we see intuitively, that the ideas, that such an
expression excites, are inconsistent. And that any thing should start
up into being, without any cause at all, itself, or any thing else, is
what the mind, do what we will, will for ever refuse to receive, but
will perpetually reject. When we therefore see any thing begin to be,
we intuitively know there is a cause of it, and not by ratiocination,
or any kind of argument. This is an innate principle, in that sense,
that the soul is born with it--a necessary, fatal propensity, so to
conclude, on every occasion.
And this is not only true of every new existence of those we call
Substances, but of every alteration that is to be seen: any new
existence of any new mode, we necessarily suppose to be from a cause.
For instance, if there had been nothing but one globe of solid matter,
which in time past had been at perfect rest; if it starts away into
motion, we conclude there is some cause of that alteration. Or if that
globe, in time past, had been moving in a straight line, and turns
short about at right angles with its former direction: or if it had
been moving with such a degree of celerity, and all at once moves with
but half that switfness. And it is all one, whether these alterations
be in Bodies, or in Spirits, there is in a Spirit, after it is
created, let it be an alteration in what it will; and so the rest. So,
if a Spirit always, in times past, had had such an inclination, for
instance, always loved and chosen sin, and then has a quite contrary
inclination, and loves and chooses holiness; the beginning of this
alteration, or the first new existence in that Spirit towards it,
whether it were some action, or whatsoever, had some cause.
And, indeed, it is no mater, whether we suppose a being has a
beginning or no, if we see it exists in a particular manner, for which
way of existing we know that there is no more reason, as to any thing
in the thing itself, than any other different manner; the mind
necessarily concludes, that there is some cause of its existing, more
than any other way. For instance, if there is but one piece of mater
existing from all eternity, and that be a square; we unavoidably
conclude, there is some cause why it is square, seeing there is
nothing in the thing itself that more inclines it to that figure, than
to an infinite number of other figures. The same may be said as to
rest, or motion, or the manner of motion; and for all other bodies
existing, the mind seeks a Cause why.
When the mind sees a being existing very regularly, and in most exact
order, especially if the order consists in the exact regulation of a
very great multitude of particulars, if it be the best order, as to
use and beauty, that the mind can conceive of, that it could have
been, the mind unavoidably concludes, that its Cause was a being that
had design: for instance, when the mind perceives the beauty and
contrivance of the world; for the world might have been one infinite
number of confusions, and not have been disposed beautifully and
usefully; yea, infinite times an infinite number, and so, if we
multiply infinite by infinite, in infinitum. So that, if we suppose
the world to have existed from all eternity, and to be continually all
the while without the guidance of design, passing under different
changes; it would have been, according to such a multiplication,
infinite to one, whether it would ever have hit upon this form or no.
Note--This way of concluding is a sort or ratiocination.
[58.] Reasoning does not absolutely differ from Perception, any
further than there is the act of the will about it. It appears to be
so in demonstrative Reasoning. Because the knowledge of a self-evident
truth, it is evident, does not differ from Perception. But all
demonstrative knowledge consists in, and may be resolved into, the
knowledge of self-evident truths. And it is also evident, that the act
of the mind, in other reasoning, is not of a different nature from
demonstrative Reasoning.
[71.] Knowledge is not the perception of the agreement, or
disagreement, of ideas, but rather the perception of the union, or
disunion, of ideas--or the perceiving whether two or more ideas belong
to one another.
Coroll. Hence it is not impossible to believe, or know, the Truth of
mysteries, or propositions that we cannot comprehend, or see the
manner how the several ideas, that belong to the proposition, are
united. Perhaps it cannot properly be said, that we see the agreement
of the ideas, unless we see how they agree. But we may perceive that
they are united, and know that they belong one to another; though we
do not know the manner how they are tied together.
[22.] Prejudice. Those ideas, which do not pertain to the prime
essence of things,--such as all colours that are every where objected
to our eyes; and sounds that are continually in our ears: those that
affect the touch, as cold and heats; and all our
sensations,--exceedingly clog the mind, in searching into the
innermost nature of things, and cast such a mist over things, that
there is need of a sharp sight to see clearly through; for these will
be continually in the mind, and associated with other ideas, let us be
thinking of what we will; and it is a continual care and pains to keep
clear of their entanglements, in our scrutinies into things. This is
one way, whereby the body and the senses observe the views of the
mind. The world seems so differently to our eyes, to our ears, and
other senses, from the idea we have of it by reason, that we can
hardly realize the latter.
[18.] Words. We are used to apply the same words a hundred different
ways; and ideas being so much tied and associated with the words, they
lead us into a thousand real mistakes; for where we find that the
words may be connected, the ideas being by custom tied with them, we
think the ideas may be connected likewise, and applied every where,
and in every way, as the Words.
[23.] The reason why the names of Spiritual things are all, or most of
them, derived from the names of Sensible or Corporeal ones--as
Imagination, Conception, Apprehend, &c.--is, because there was no
other way of making others readily understand men's meaning, when they
first signified these things by sounds, than by giving of them the
names of things sensible, to which they had an analogy. They could
thus point it out with the finger, and so explain themselves as in
sensible things.
[48.] Definition. That is not always a true Definition, that tends
most to give us to understand the meaning of a word; but that, which
should give any one the clearest notion of the meaning of the word, if
he had never been in any way acquainted with the thing signified by
that word. For instance, if I was to explain the meaning of the word
Motion, to one that had seen things move, but was not acquainted with
the word; perhaps I should say, Motion is a things' going from one
place to another. But, if I was to explain it to one, who had never
seen any thing move, (if that could be,) I should say, Motion is a
Body's existing successively in all the immediately contiguous parts
of any distance, without continuing any time in any.
[20.] Inspiration. The evidence of immediate Inspiration that the
prophets had, when they were immediately inspired by the Spirit of God
with any truth, is an absolute sort of certainty; and the knowledge is
in a sense intuitive--much in the same manner as Faith, and Spiritual
Knowledge of the truth of Religion. Such bright ideas are raised, and
such a clear view of a perfect agreement with the excellencies of the
Divine Nature, that it is known to be a communication from him. All
the Deity appears in the thing, and in every thing pertaining to it.
The prophet has so divine a sense, such a divine disposition, such a
divine pleasure; and sees so divine an excellency, and so divine a
power, in what is revealed, that he sees as immediately that God is
there, as we perceive one another's presence, when we are talking
together face to face. And our features, our voice, and our shapes,
are not so clear manifestations of us, as those spiritual resemblances
of God, that are in the Inspiration, are manifestations of him. But
yet there are doubtless various degrees in Inspiration.
[21.] The Will. It is not that which appears the greatest good, or the
greatest apparent good, that determines the Will. It is not the
greatest good apprehended, or that which is apprehended to be the
greatest good; but the Greatest Apprehension of good. It is not merely
by judging that any thing is a great good, that good is apprehended,
or appears. There are other ways of apprehending good. The having a
clear and sensible idea of any good, is one way of good's appearing,
as well as judging that there is good. Therefore, all those things are
to be considered--the degree of the judgment, by which a thing is
judged to be good, and the contrary evil; the degree of goodness under
which it appears, and the evil of the contrary; and the clearness of
the idea and strength of the conception of the goodness and of the
evil. And that Good, of which there is the greatest apprehension or
sense, all those things being taken together, is chosen by the Will.
And if there be a greater apprehension of good to be obtained, or evil
escaped, by doing a thing, than in letting it alone, the Will
determines to the doing it. The mind will be for the present most
uneasy in neglecting it, and the mind always avoids that, in which it
would be for the present most uneasy. The degree of apprehension of
good, which I suppose to determine the Will, is composed of the degree
of good apprehended, and the degree of apprehension. The degree of
apprehension, again, is composed of the strength of the conception,
and the judgment.