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The Oberlin Evangelist
January 6, 1841
Professor Finney's Letters. --No. 29.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE OBERLIN EVANGELIST
Dear Brother:
In my lectures on entire sanctification, in the last volume of your paper, I gave an intimation, that I might notice and reply to any objection that might be seriously felt by myself or others, to the view I then presented. There are two objections that seem to have been felt by a number of minds to some things which I adduced, upon which I beg leave to make a few remarks; not by way of controversy, but for the purpose of calling the attention of the brethren to what seems to me to be a full answer to the objections that have been stated.
I have recently received, from a very esteemed brother, a communication in respect to two positions taken by me in my lectures upon the above subject, from which I quote the following:
"What you teach about consciousness as evidence of a state of entire sanctification, I consider as leading to serious error. The sum of what you say is, That consciousness, with the law of God before us as the standard, is the highest and best evidence of a state of entire sanctification, whose testimony we cannot doubt. This I admit, supposing the mind not ignorant, but perfectly acquainted with the claims of the law upon it and with perfect accuracy to recognize its own states and operations. But, my dear brother, how can this be, 'with all the ignorance and debility of body and mind caused by intemperance and abuse of the human constitution, through so many generations?' Can we, in these circumstances, have a consciousness so perfectly enlightened and accurate? Is it not a contradiction? See what our consciousness, with all our ignorance and debility of body and mind, must do. First, it must determine, with unerring accuracy, what all the ignorance and debility which belong to the particular person amounts to, that it may decide how much the law requires of him; for this it must exactly determine, or it cannot tell when he will be conformed to the standard; and then it must know, with the most perfect accuracy, every state of the mind, every feeling, motive and volition, or it cannot testify to the entire sanctification of the person. And I ask, if this is not the work rather of a mind perfect in its powers, and infallible in its knowledge of its own operations, than of a mind ignorant and debilitated in consequence of folly and sin."
l will make a few brief remarks upon this extract, for the purpose, not merely of answering the esteemed writer, but also with a design to obviate the difficulties to which he alludes, as they seem to lie in other minds besides his. In the volume I have published upon this subject, which is just through the press, I trust I have made this subject sufficiently plain. But as it is not yet bound, and will not be in circulation for some weeks, I will in the mean time make the following remarks:
1. The difficulties felt by my brother, upon this subject, seem to be founded--
(1 .) In the assumption, that man can by no possibility know his own present character; or,
(2.) That if he can know it, he can only know it in some other way than by his own consciousness.
Upon the first of these assumptions, I remark:
1. That if man is not naturally able to know his own character, he is not bound to know it.
2. That if a man, through his own fault, had become delirious, or an idiot, his blame lies altogether in that act, or those acts that deprived him of the use of his reason. And that, being an idiot or lunatic, he is no longer a moral agent, and is no longer under moral obligation, while his idiocy or lunacy remains.
3. That if man is not naturally able to know himself, God has no right to require him to know himself. But since God does require him to know himself, as in 2Co_13:5, the presumption is inevitable, that man has natural ability to know himself. "Examine yourselves whether ye be in the faith; prove your ownselves. Know ye not your ownselves, how that Jesus Christ is in you, except ye be reprobates?"
4.Psa_19:12: '"Who can understand his errors?" Jer_17:9: "The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked: who can know it?" These passages do not teach, that men are naturally unable to know their personal characters; but that the deceitfulness of the heart is so great as to render such knowledge extremely difficult.
Upon the second assumption, viz: that if men are able to know their present character, they can acquire this knowledge from some other source than their own consciousness, I remark:
1. There appear to be confused notions among most persons, in respect to what consciousness is. I must, therefore define what I mean by consciousness.
Consciousness is sometimes spoken of as a power or capacity of the mind, and sometimes as an act or effect of that power. It is commonly used in this latter sense, and may be defined to be--the mind's cognizance of its own existence and states, or actions. If this is a correct definition, and I believe it cannot be doubted, we get our whole knowledge, on all subjects, from consciousness. We know absolutely nothing, upon any subject, only as it is revealed to us by consciousness. Every sensation, every thought, every volition, every impression upon the sensibility, every perception, every conception, every act of the imagination or fancy, every act of memory, every act of judgment, every affirmation of the reason, and every other possible or conceivable mental state, or act, is given to us by consciousness, and by consciousness alone. Whatever, then, a man knows, upon any subject, he knows by his own consciousness, and in no other possible way. But it should be understood, that consciousness never reasons, never forms a judgment, never feels. It consists simply in the mind's recognition of its own existence, actions, and whatever impressions are made upon it.
2. In the above extract, it appears to me, that the brother confounds consciousness with those powers of the mind, that action of which is revealed to us by consciousness. Other brethren have supposed, that we are indebted, not to consciousness for a knowledge of our present characters, but that the appeal must be made to the word and Spirit of God. But to this I answer:
3. That to be sure, our opinions in respect to the law of God, and in respect to our own character, are to be formed under the light, and in accordance with the word and Spirit of God. But the questions is, how are we to know what we think of the law of God, or what our opinions are in respect to its requirements? How do we gain the knowledge, that we have any perception at all of the law of God, or any understanding of what it means? How do we know that we exist--that we think--that we read the Bible--that we have certain thoughts and emotions, certain judgments and affirmations of our reason, respecting the law of God, and our own course of feeling and conduct in view of it? To all this I answer, we know these things only by our consciousness. In no other possible way can we know them.
4. Again, I remark--that I have felt not a little surprised, that New School Divines, men who profess to believe the doctrine of the natural ability of men to do all their duty, should reason upon this subject, as if they denied man's natural ability to know his own present character.
5. I should like to inquire of my brethren who take this ground, whether they mean to deny man's ability to know his own present character, or whether they maintain his obligation, and still deny his natural ability? If they deny his obligation to know his own character, then, of course, they must admit, that his ignorance of his own present character is not sinful, and that it is, therefore, in no sense inconsistent with his being in a state of entire sanctification. And if they admit his obligation, but deny his ability to know his present character, then they must give up the doctrine of man's natural ability to do whatever is required of him.
6. Should they admit man's natural ability to know his own present character, or any thing else whatever, I should esteem it a favor to be informed by them, in what other way they are to get this information, but by the testimony of consciousness?
7. I would inquire if a man is to have no opinion in respect to his present character; and if he is, on what this opinion is to be based? Is he to form the judgment that he is a converted, or an unconverted man? On what ground does he form this opinion? If it be answered that he is to receive the testimony of scripture, I ask, if the scripture affirms any where that A B by name, is a converted or unconverted man? and even if it did, how are we to become acquainted with this fact, but by being conscious of the perception of this truth taught in the Bible?
8. I suppose it will be universally admitted that so far as we are capable of knowing our own characters, we come at this knowledge, by a comparison of ourselves with the law of God. But how does this comparison of all those acts of the mind that make up our character, with the law of God, and induce a final judgment in the case, come to be known by us. I answer simply and only by our own consciousness. I cannot therefore but express surprise, that my brethren should stumble as they do, at the assertion that Christians may know when they are in a state of sanctification, by the testimony of their own consciousness.
9. But it is apprehended, that this assertion will lead individuals to deceive themselves, appealing to their own consciousness, instead of the word of God. To this I answer:
The same objection might hold true in respect to the question whether a man has been converted or not; whether he loves God at all or not; whether he believes, or whether he reads his Bible at all, or not. To this it has been said, that he is not to judge from his own consciousness, whether he is converted or not, but by his life and fruits. But to this I answer--it is indeed by his life and fruits that he is to be known, and know himself; but how does he know what his life is, and what his fruits are, but by his own consciousness? How does he know that he has such an affection, puts forth such an action, goes to such a place, does or omits any thing whatever? I answer--he knows it only by his consciousness.
In my Treatise just through the press, I have made the following remarks, in relations to those states of mind, of which we have but slight consciousness:
"While I say that consciousness is the only evidence we have or can have of our spiritual state, and of the exercises of our own minds, it should be distinctly kept in mind, that many thoughts, emotions, and affections pass in our minds, which we do not so distinctly recognize at the time as to remember them for an hour, or perhaps for a moment. We must be indeed slightly conscious of their existence at the time; but our minds being occupied so much with other things, prevent our so distinctly marking them, as to lodge them in our memories. Now of these thoughts, emotions, and affections, which thus often pass through our minds in a great measure unnoticed, the following things should be said, deeply pondered, well understood, and always remembered:
1. Many of them, to say the least, must be sinful or holy.
2. If they are not distinctly noticed by consciousness, their moral character, whether sinful or holy, may be at the time overlooked by us.
3. As we have no distinct recollection of them, we may affirm that we are not conscious of sin, when as a matter of fact we may have been guilty of it in the exercise of these unnoticed thoughts and affections.
4. So that all that a man in this state of existence may ever be able to affirm in respect to his moral character is, that he is not conscious of sin, without being able to say absolutely that he does not, and has not within a given time, had any exercise of mind that is sinful. When his mind is strongly exercised, and his consciousness therefore very clear and distinct, he may be able to affirm, with a good degree of confidence, if not with certainty, that he has had no sinful exercise perhaps for a given time, but yet of the general tenor of his life I do not see how he can affirm any thing more with certainty, than that he does not remember to have been conscious of any sin.
5. This view of the subject will account for the fact to which I have already alluded, that the way in which the Spirit of God often, nay always, convinces of sin, is by awakening in our memories the recollection of past consciousness, and often in this way revealing to us distinctly former states of mind of which we were but very slightly conscious at the time; thus making us to see that we have been guilty of sin, of the commission of which we were not before at all aware.
When therefore I say that by consciousness a man may know whether he is in a state of entire sanctification, I mean that consciousness is the real and only evidence that we can have of being in this state, and that when our minds are exercised strongly, and our consciousness therefore distinct, the testimony of consciousness is clear and explicit, and so satisfactory that we cannot doubt it. But under other circumstances, and in other states of mind, when the exercises of the mind are such as to render consciousness less distinct and vivid, affections may be exercised by us, whether sinful or holy, that are not so distinctly noticed by consciousness, or so fully remembered by us that we can affirm absolutely of them, that they are not sinful.
This, then, is the sum of the whole matter. A man is able to understand the law of God aright, or he is not. If he is not, he is under no obligation to do so. If he has formed as correct a judgment in respect to what the claims of the law of God are, as in the present circumstances of his being, availing himself of such aids as God has vouch-safed to him, he is able to do, he has thus far done his duty, and knows the meaning of the law of God, so far as he is at present bound to know it.
He is able to know whether he is at present in a state of obedience or disobedience to that law, or he is not able to know it. If he is not able to know he is not under any obligation to know. If he has formed the most correct judgment of which he is naturally capable in the present circumstances of his being, with respect to his conformity or non-conformity to the law of God, he knows all upon that subject that he is at present bound to know. And if under these circumstances, he cannot know whether he is or is not in a state of entire sanctification, then he cannot tell whether he is at present in rebellion against God, or whether he is rendering Him an acceptable service. He cannot tell whether he ought to repent of his present state of mind, or whether he ought to regard it as acceptable to God. Now I inquire, if, under these supposed circumstances, of absolute inability to know whether we are or are not obeying God, we can possibly be required to know, or be condemned for not knowing; and might we not just as well be condemned for not flying through the air, or for not having been present at the foundation of the world?
With respect to the liability of this sentiment to abuse, and to foster spiritual pride and self-delusion, I have at present only to say, it is the truth of God, and to be sure, like every other truth, is liable to perversion and abuse; but have ministers of the gospel yet to learn, that this is no good reason why it should not be proclaimed upon the house-tops?
The remaining topic is reserved for the next number.
Your brother in the bonds of the gospel,
C.G. Finney
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The Oberlin Evangelist
January 20, 1841
Professor Finney's Letters. --No. 30.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE OBERLIN EVANGELIST
Dear Brother:
I will now quote the remaining paragraph from the esteemed brother's letter, mentioned in my last, and make a few remarks upon it.
"One point is what you say of the claims of the law, in the Oberlin Evangelist, Vol. 2, p. 50: -- 'The question is, what does the law of God require of Christians of the present generation, in all respects in our circumstances, with all the ignorance and debility of body and mind which have resulted from the intemperance and abuse of the human constitution through so many generations?' But if this be so, then the more ignorant and debilitated a person is in body and mind, in consequence of his own or ancestors' sins and follies, the less the law would require of him, and the less would it be for him to become perfectly holy --and, the nearer this ignorance and debility came to being perfect, the nearer would he be to being perfectly holy, for the less would be required of him to make him so. But is this so? Can a person be perfectly sanctified while particularly that 'ignorance of mind,' which is the effect of the intemperance and abuse of the human constitution, remains? Yea, can he be sanctified at all, only as this ignorance is removed by the truth and Spirit of God; it being a moral and not a physical effect of sinning? I say it kindly; here appears to me at least, a very serious entering wedge of error. Were the effect of human depravity upon man simply physically to disable him, like taking from the body a limb, or destroying in part or in whole, a faculty of the mind, I would not object; but to say, this effect is ignorance, a moral effect wholly, and then say, having this ignorance, the law levels its claims according to it, and that with it, a man can be entirely sanctified, looks not to me like the teachings of the Bible."
1. I have seen the passage from my lecture here alluded to, quoted and commented upon, in different periodicals, and uniformly with entire disapprobation.
2. It has always been separated entirely from the exposition which I have given of the law of God, in the same lectures; with which exposition, no one, so far as I know, has seen fit to grapple.
3. I believe, in every instance, the objections that have been made to this paragraph, were by those who profess to believe in the present natural ability of sinners to do all their duty.
4. I would most earnestly and respectfully inquire, what consistency there is, in denominating this paragraph a dangerous heresy, and still maintaining that men are at present naturally able to do all that God requires of them?
5. I put the inquiry back to those brethren, by what authority do you affirm, that God requires any more of any moral agent in the universe, and of man in his present condition, than he is at present able to perform?
6. I inquire, does not the very language of the law of God prove to a demonstration, that God requires no more of man than, in his present state, he is able to perform? Let us hear its language: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God will all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. Thou shalt love they neighbor as thyself." Now here, God so completely levels his claims, by the very wording of these commandments, to the present capacity of every human being, however young or old, however maimed, debilitated, or idiotic, as, to use the language or sentiment of Prof. Hickock, of Western Reserve College, uttered in my hearing, that "if it were possible to conceive of a moral pigmy, the law requires of him nothing more, than to use whatever strength he has, in the service and for the glory of God."
7. I most respectfully but earnestly inquire of my brethren, if they believe that God requires as much of men as of angels, of a child as a man, of a half-idiot as of a Newton? I mean not to ask whether God requires an equally perfect consecration of all the powers actually possessed by each of these classes; but whether in degree, He really requires the same, irrespective of their present natural ability?
8. I wish to inquire, whether my brethren do not admit that the brain is the organ of the mind, and that every abuse of the physical system has abridged the capacity of the mind, while it remains connected with this tenement of clay? And I would also ask, whether my brethren mean to maintain, at the same breath, the doctrine of present natural ability to comply with all the requirements of God, and also the fact that God now requires of man just the same degree of service that He might have rendered if he had never sinned, or in any way violated the laws of his being? And if they maintain these two positions at the same time, I farther inquire, whether they believe that man has natural ability at the present moment to bring all his faculties and powers, together with his knowledge, on to as high ground and into the same state in which they might have been, had he never sinned? My brethren, is there not some inconsistency here?
9. In the paragraph from the letter above quoted, the brother admits, that if a man by his own act had deprived himself of any of his corporeal faculties, he would not thenceforth he under an obligation to use those faculties. But he thinks this principle does not hold true, in respect to the ignorance of man; because he esteems his ignorance a moral, and not a natural defect. Here I beg leave to make a few inquires:
( 1 .) Should a man wickedly deprive himself of the use of a hand, would not this act be a moral act? No doubt it would.
(2.) Suppose a man by his own act, should make himself an idiot, would not this act be a moral act?
(3.) Would he not in both these cases render himself naturally unable, in the one case, to use his hand, and in the other, his reason? Undoubtedly he would. But how can it be affirmed, with any show of reason, that in the one case his natural inability discharges him from the obligation to use his hand, and that in the other case, his natural inability does not affect his obligation--that he is still bound to use his reason, of which he has voluntarily deprived himself, but not his hand? Now the fact is, that in both these cases the inability is a natural one, and the act that occasioned this inability in both cases, involves the guilt of all the moral default of which it is the cause.
(4.) I ask, if a man has willingly remained in ignorance of God, whether his ignorance is a moral or natural inability? If it is a moral inability, he can instantly overcome it, by the right exercise of his own will. And nothing can be a moral inability that cannot be instantaneously removed by our own volition. Do my brethren believe, that the present ignorance of mankind can be instantaneously removed, and their knowledge become as perfect as it might have been had they never sinned, by an act of volition on the part of men? If they do not, why do they call this a moral inability, or ignorance a moral effect? The fact is, that ignorance is the natural effect of moral delinquency. Neglect of duty occasions ignorance; and this ignorance constitutes a natural inability to do that of which a man is utterly ignorant--just as the loss of a hand, in the case supposed, is the natural effect of a moral act, but in itself constitutes a natural inability to perform those duties that might have been performed, but for the loss of this hand. The fact is, that this ignorance does constitute, while it remains, a natural inability to perform those duties of which the mind is ignorant; and all that can be required is, that from the present moment, the mind should be diligently and perfectly engaged in acquiring what knowledge it can, and in perfectly obeying, as fast as it can obtain the light. If this is not true, it is utter nonsense to talk about natural ability as being a sine qua non of moral obligation. And I would kindly, but most earnestly ask my brethren, by what rule of consistency they maintain, at the same breath, the doctrine of a natural ability to do whatever God requires, and also insist that He requires men to know as much, and in all respects to render Him the same kind and degree of service as if they never had sinned, or rendered themselves in any respect naturally incapable of doing and being, at the present moment, all that they might have done and been, had they never in any instance neglected their duty?
10. The brother, in the above paragraph, seems to feel pressed with the consideration, that if it be true that a man's ignorance can be any excuse for his not at present doing what he might have done, but for this ignorance, it will follow, that the less he knows the less is required of him, and should he become a perfect idiot, he would be entirely discharged from moral obligation. To this I answer: Yes, or the doctrine of natural ability, and the entire government of God, is a mere farce. If a man should annihilate himself, would he not thereby set aside his moral obligation to obey God? Yes, truly. Should he make himself an idiot, has he not thereby annihilated his moral agency; and of course his natural ability to obey God? And will my New School brethren adopt the position of Dr. Wilson of Cincinnati, as maintained on the trial of Dr. Beecher, that "moral obligation does not imply ability of any kind?" The truth is, that for the time being, a man may destroy his moral agency, by rendering himself a lunatic or an idiot; and while this lunacy or idiocy continues, obedience to God is naturally impossible, and therefore not required. The guilt of this act is equivalent to all the default of which it is the cause.
But it is also true, that no human being and no moral agent can deprive himself of reason and moral agency, but for a limited time. There is no reason to believe, that the soul can be deranged, or idiotic, when separated from the body. And therefore moral agency will in all cases be renewed in a future, if not in the present state of existence, when God will hold men fully responsible, for having deprived themselves of power to render Him all that service which they might otherwise have rendered. But do let me inquire again, can my dear brethren maintain, that an idiot or lunatic can be a moral agent? Can they maintain, that any but a moral agent is the subject of moral obligation? Can they maintain, that a man can be the subject of moral obligation, any farther than he is in a state of sanity? Can they maintain, that an infant is the subject of moral obligation, previous to all knowledge? And can they maintain, that moral obligation can, in any case, exceed knowledge? If they can and do--then, to be consistent, they must flatly deny that natural ability is a sine qua non of moral obligation, and adopt the absurd dogma of Dr. Wilson, that 'moral obligation does not imply any ability whatever.' When my brethren will take this ground, I shall then understand and know where to meet them. But I beseech you, brethren, not to complain of inconsistency in me, nor accuse me of teaching dangerous heresy, while I teach nothing more than you must admit to be true, or unequivocally admit, in extenso, the very dogma of Dr. Wilson, as above.
I wish to be distinctly understood. I maintain, that present ignorance is present natural inability, as absolutely as the present want of a hand is present natural inability to use it. And I also maintain, that the law of God requires nothing more of any human being, than that which he is at present naturally able to perform, under the present circumstances of his being. Do my brethren deny this? If they do, then they have gone back to Dr. Wilson's ground. If they do not, why am I accounted a heretic by them, for teaching what themselves maintain.
11. In my treatise upon the subject of entire sanctification, I have shown from the Bible, that actual knowledge is indispensable to moral obligation, and that the legal maxim, "ignorance of the law excuses no one," is not good in morals.
12. Professor Stuart, in a recent number of the Biblical Repository, takes precisely the same ground I have taken, and fully maintains, that sin is the voluntary transgression of a known law. And he further abundantly shows, that this is no new or heterodox opinion. Now Prof. Stuart, in the article alluded to, takes exactly the same position in regard to what constitutes sin that I have done in the paragraph upon which so much has been said. And may I be permitted to inquire, why the same sentiment is orthodox at Andover, and sound theology in the Biblical Repository, but highly heterodox and dangerous at Oberlin?
13. Will my brethren in the New School, to avoid the conclusiveness of my reasoning in respect to the requirements of the law of God, go back to Old School-ism, physical depravity, and accountability, based upon natural inability, and all the host of absurdities belonging to their particular views of orthodoxy? I recollect that Dr. Beecher expressed his surprise at the position taken by Dr. Wilson, to which I have alluded, and said he did not believe that "many men could be found, who could march up without winking, to the maintenance of such a proposition as that." But to be consistent, I do not see but that my brethren, with or "without winking," are driven to the necessity, either of "marching up" to maintaining the same proposition, or they must admit, that this objectionable paragraph in my lecture is the truth of God.
14. I have made these remarks in compliance with an intimation when I published those lectures, that I might notice any thing that appeared to my brethren to be of serious importance in relation to their orthodoxy. But I did not then, nor do I now intend, either to fill the pages of the Evangelist, or occupy my own time, with any thing like a controversial discussion of this subject. I hate controversy. I have something else to do, besides engaging in it. But thus much I must say, that after all I have heard and read upon the subject, I am more and more surprised at the amount of misapprehension and error that have been, and still are prevalent in the Church of God on this subject.
15. I have made extracts from, and remarks upon the letter alluded to, not from any want of fraternal regard for the brother from whom I received it, but because it brought these two objectionable points so fully up, and !aid so legitimate a foundation for these remarks.
Your brother in the bonds of the gospel,
C.G. FINNEY
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The Oberlin Evangelist
February 17, 1841
Professor Finney's Letters.--No. 31
TO THE EDITOR OF THE OBERLIN EVANGELIST
No. 3
Prof. Finney returned from Cleveland in time to write the following letter, for the last side of the paper. His Lecture will resume its place in our next.
Dear Brother:
I have seen several remarks in the papers of late, and have heard several suggestions from various quarters, which have but increased the fear which I have for some time entertained, that multitudes of Christians and indeed many ministers have radically defective views of salvation by faith in Jesus Christ. To the doctrine of entire sanctification in this life, as believed and taught by some of us, it has been frequently of late objected, that prayers offered in accordance with this belief, and by a sanctified soul, would savor strongly of spiritual pride and self-righteousness. I have seen this objection stated in its full force of late, in a religious periodical, in the form of a supposed prayer of a sanctified soul--the object of which was manifestly to expose the shocking absurdity, self-righteousness, and spiritual pride, of a prayer, or rather thanksgiving, made in accordance with a belief that one is entirely sanctified. Now I must confess, that that prayer, together with objections and remarks which suggest the same idea, have created in my mind no small degree of alarm. I not a little fear, that many of our divines, in contending for the doctrines of grace, have entirely lost sight of the meaning of the language they use, and have in reality but very little practical understanding of what is intended by salvation by grace, in opposition to salvation by works. If this is not the case, I know not how to account for their feeling and stating such an objection as this to the doctrine of entire sanctification.
Now If I understand the doctrine of salvation by grace, both sanctification and justification are wrought by the grace of God, and not by any works or merits of our own, irrespective of the grace of Christ through faith. Now if this is the real doctrine of the Bible, what earthly objection can there be to our confessing, professing, and thanking God for our sanctification, any more than for our justification. It is true, indeed, that in our justification our own agency is not concerned, while in our sanctification it is. Yet I understand the doctrine of the Bible to be, that both are brought about by grace through faith, and that we should no sooner be sanctified without the grace of Christ than we should be justified without it. Now who pretends to deny this? And yet, if it is true, of what weight is that class of objections to which I have alluded? These objections manifestly turn upon the idea, no doubt latent and deep seated in the mind, that the real holiness of Christians, in whatever degree it exists, is in some way to be ascribed to some goodness originating in themselves, and not in the grace of Christ. But do let me ask, how is it possible that men who entertain, really and practically, right views upon this subject, can by any possibility feel as if it must be proof conclusive of self-righteousness and Pharisaism, to profess and thank God for sanctification? Is it not understood on all hands, that sanctification is by grace; and that the gospel has made abundant provision for the sanctification of all men? This certainly is admitted by those who have stated this objection. Now if this is so, which is the most honorable to God, to confess and complain of our sins, triumphing and having dominion over us, or to be able truly and honestly to thank Him for having given us the victory over our sins. God has said, "Sin shall not have dominion over you, for ye are not under the law but under grace."
Now, in view of this and multitudes of kindred promises, suppose we come to God and say, "O Lord, thou hast made these great and precious promises, but as a matter of fact they do not accord with our own experience. For sin does continually have dominion over us. Thy grace is not sufficient for us. The blood of Christ does not cleanse us from all sin. We are continually overcome by temptation, notwithstanding thy promise, that in every temptation thou wilt make a way for us to escape. Thou hast said the truth shall make us free, but we are not free. We are still the slaves of our appetites and lusts."
Now which, I inquire, is the most honorable to God, to go on with a string of confessions and self-accusations, that are in flat contradiction to the promises of God, and almost, to say the least, a burlesque upon the grace of the gospel, or to be able, through grace, to confess that we have found it true in our own experience, "that if we confess our sins, He is faithful and just to forgive our sins and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness"--that his grace is sufficient for us--that as our day is so our strength is, as a matter of fact, and that sin does not have dominion over us, because we are not under the law but under grace?
To this I know it will be answered that in thus confessing our sins we do not impeach the grace or faithfulness of God inasmuch as all these promises are conditioned upon faith, and consequently that the reason of our remaining in sin is to be ascribed to our unbelief, and is therefore no disparagement to the grace of Christ. But I beg that it may be duly considered that faith itself is of the operation of God--is itself produced by grace; and therefore the fact of our being obliged to confess our unbelief is a dishonor to the grace of Christ. Is it honorable or dishonorable to God that we should be able to confess that even our unbelief is overcome, and that we are able to testify from our own experience that the grace of the gospel, as a matter of fact, is sufficient for our present salvation and sanctification? There is no doubt a vast amount of self-righteousness in the Church, which while it talks of grace really means nothing by it. For a man to go any farther than to hope that he is converted, seems to many minds to savor of self-righteousness. Now why is this, unless they themselves entertain self-righteous notions in regard to conversion? Many persons would feel shocked to hear a man in prayer unqualifiedly thank God that he had been converted and justified. And they might just as well feel shocked at this, and upon precisely the same principle, as to feel shocked if he should unqualifiedly thank God that he had been sanctified by his grace.
But again I say, that the very fact that a man feels shocked to hear a converted or a sanctified soul unqualifiedly thank God for the grace received, shows that down deep in his heart lies concealed a self-righteous view of the way of salvation, and that in his mind all holiness in Christians is a ground of boasting; and that if persons have become truly and fully sanctified that they really have a ground of boasting before God. I know not how else to account for this wonderful prejudice. For my own part I do not conceive it to be the least evidence of self-righteousness when I hear a man sincerely and heartily thank God for converting and justifying him by his grace. Now should I feel either shocked, horrifed, or disgusted, to hear a man thank God that He had sanctified him wholly by his grace, if in either or both cases I had the corroborative evidence of an apparently holy life, I should bless God, take courage, and feel like calling on all around to glorify God for such an instance of his glorious and excellent grace.
The feeling seems to be very general that such a prayer or thanksgiving is similar in fact and in the principle upon which it rests with that of the Pharisee noticed by our Savior. But what reason is there for this assumption? We are expressly informed that that was a prayer of a Pharisee. But the Pharisees were self-righteous and expressly and openly rejected the grace of Christ.
The Pharisee there boasted of his own righteousness originating in and consummated by his own goodness and not in the grace of Christ. Hence he did not thank God that the grace of Christ has made him unlike other men. Now this prayer was designed to teach us the abomination of any man's putting in a claim to righteousness and true holiness irrespective of the grace of God by Jesus Christ. But certainly this is an infinitely different thing from the thanksgiving of a soul who fully recognizes the grace of Christ, and attributes his sanctification entirely to that grace. And I cannot see how a man can suppose these two prayers to be analogous in their principle and spirit who has entirely divested himself of Pharisaical notions in respect to the doctrine of sanctification.
Your brother in the bonds of the gospel,
C.G. FINNEY
Location: http://www.gospeltruth.net/1841OE/41%20lets_art/410331_oe_editor4.htm
The Oberlin Evangelist
March 31, 1841
Prof. Finney's Letters--No. 32
TO THE EDITOR OF THE OBERLIN EVANGELIST
No. 4
Dear Brother:
Permit me, through your columns, to address the Church upon a subject of great delicacy, and yet of immeasurable importance. From repeated remarks in different Religious Periodicals, I have observed, that a very important distinction is overlooked, which appears to me calculated to work incalculable mischief in the Church. The writers to whom I allude appear to confound censoriousness with Christian faithfulness, than which a more ruinous error could scarcely be entertained or taught; and especially does this confusion seem to exist in their minds, and in their writings, in respect to whatever is said of the delinquencies of ministers of the gospel. They seem to assume, either that ministers of the gospel are universally in a state of entire and permanent sanctification, or if they are not, they are not, like other men, to be reproved for sin, and exhorted to repentance. It would seem, that nothing can be said of the sins of ministers, and that they cannot be reproved or warned, even in the utmost kindness and love, without its being regarded and treated by those writers, as of course censorious and denunciatory.
2. By the class of writers to whom I allude, it seems also to be supposed, that to speak plainly and pointedly of the sins of the Church, "to reprove, warn, exhort, and rebuke" them, in a pointed, though in an affectionate and earnest manner, is also censorious and denunciatory.
3. In short, it seems to be the practice of many writers of the present day, utterly to confound, as I said, Christian faithfulness with censorioushess. Now, if this confusion is suffered to pass without notice, till reproof, instead of being considered a virtue, shall be regarded as a vice, the Church is inevitably ruined. If, to reprove the sins of ministers, or any class of Christians or men whatever, is to be regarded as of course censorious and denunciatory, then the power of the glorious gospel must be destroyed. Permit me now to point out--
I. What I suppose to be the true distinction between censoriousness and Christian faithfulness.
II. To show that Christian faithfulness is universally obligatory.
IIl. That ministers are as much bound to administer reproof to their fellow-ministers, as to any class of persons whatever.
IV. That a disposition to complain of this, is conclusive evidence of a proud and turbulent spirit.
I. The difference between censoriousness and Christian faithfulness.
1. I suppose censoriousness to consist in a disposition to censure, blame, or condemn others, and to manifest itself in speaking of the faults of others, with a selfish and wicked intention.
2. It manifests itself in passing severe and uncharitable judgments in regard to others' motives, when their conduct appears to be right.
3. In giving publicity to their faults, in a manner that is not demanded by the great principle of benevolence.
4. I regard Christian faithfulness, in respect to the delinquencies of others, as consisting in reproving others for their sins, from love to God and the souls of men.
5. In reproving, warning, and exhorting men to forsake their sins, for the honor of God and the good of his Church. Christian faithfulness, so far as reproof is concerned, consists in that plain, faithful, pointed, yet compassionate dealing with all classes of men, which was manifested by the prophets, by Christ, and the Apostles. The sins for which the inspired writers reproved and rebuked men, were not sins which they knew merely by inspiration, but sins which lay open to the public view, and sins of which they knew them to be guilty, by their own observation. In the reproofs, therefore, which they administered, we learn the great fundamental principles upon which reproofs and rebukes are to be administered. And we are to regard those principles as the laws of Christ's kingdom, and to administer reproof in accordance with them. Let me, therefore, be understood to say, that Christian faithfulness in regard to reproving sin, consists in a thorough, yet compassionate and benevolent withstanding, reproving, and if, need be, rebuking every form of sin, in high and low places.
It consists in speaking freely, when the circumstances of the Church and the glory of God demand it, of the public sins of all classes of persons, in high as well as in low places. But again, I say, to speak unnecessarily, or from malicious motives, of the sins of any class of men, however public and outrageous their sins may be, is censorioushess.
It. Christian faithfulness is universally obligatory.
1. This is an express command of the Bible: "Thou shalt in any wise rebuke thy neighbor, and not suffer sin upon him." There are a great many passages of scripture that expressly enjoin this duty.
2. The nature of the case shows, that it must be a universal duty. It is a plain dictate of benevolence. A benevolent man will just as naturally reprove others for their sins, and warn them to flee from the wrath to come, as he would give warning if his neighbor's house was on fire.
III. Ministers are as much bound to reprove their fellow-ministers as to reprove any class of persons whatever.
1. When Peter was to be blamed, Paul withstood him to his face. Here, we have the example of an Apostle reproving an Apostle.
2. Ministers are no where made an exception to the general law of Christ's kingdom--that all men are to be reproved for their sins.
3. There is nothing in the nature of the case demanding that they should be made an exception.
4. The sins of ministers are eminently injurious to the Church and to the world. There is, therefore, an especial reason why they should be dealt faithfully with for their sins.
5. As they are regarded as public examples to the people, their sins should be especially pointed out, as sins, and publicly reproved; lest their sinfulness should be overlooked by the people, and come to be imitated by them as virtues.
6. Their professions of piety are such, as to render them eminently deserving of reproof, if they do not walk uprightly.
7. Just in proportion to the importance of their calling, their public station, and their great influence, is it important that they should be faithfully dealt with by all classes of men, and especially by their brother ministers. Respect should always be had to their official character, and reproof should be administered to them especially, and indeed to all men, in great candor, kindness, compassion, and yet with great and searching faithfulness.
IV. To complain of this is evidence of a proud and turbulent spirit.
1. A disposition to resist or resent reproof, administered in a spirit of Christian faithfulness, is, on its face, wholly an anti-christian spirit. If persons cannot be reproved, or even buffeted, for their faults, and yet take it patiently, they are certainly far enough from being in a Christian temper. Peter says, "What glory is it, if, when ye are buffeted for your faults, ye shall take it patiently? But if, when ye do well, and suffer for it, ye take it patiently, this is acceptable with God. For even hereunto were ye called; because Christ also suffered for us, leaving us an example, that we should follow his steps: who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth; who, when He was reviled, reviled not again; when He suffered, He threatened not; but committed Himself to Him that judgeth righteously." Now the Apostle plainly teaches, in this passage, that even to suffer rebuke or buffeting patiently, when we are really in fault, is no evidence of a Christian spirit, but a refusal to do so, must of course be an evidence of a proud and turbulent spirit.
2. When any class of men think themselves so far above reproof, either from their exalted station or great influence, that others have no right to reprove them for their sins, they must be in any thing but a Christian temper of mind; and especially, when they refuse reproof from their brethren, who are not only naturally but ecclesiastically their equals.
3. In short, when any men, or set of men, are in such a state of mind as to be unwilling to be reproved for sin by the merest child or novice, they are in a proud and impenitent state of mind. And in that state of mind, God cannot and will not bless them.
REMARKS.
1. It is greatly to be wished, that there were much more of Christian faithfulness, in respect to administering reproof for every form and degree of sin, than there is, in the Church.
2. There must be a great deal more of this, or the Church cannot prosper.
3. It is greatly desirable, that ministers should be much more faithful than they are in reproving each other, both in public and in private.
4. It is greatly to be desired, that this should be done in a much better spirit, than that in which it generally is done.
5. That it should be done very thoroughly, and in a manner that will reach the very seat of the difficulty.
5. It is of infinite importance, that such plain dealing should be received in a right spirit, and that ministers especially should consider well the example of David, who, although a king, when he was personally and pointedly rebuked by Nathan, instead of resenting it, and complaining of censoriousness and denunciation, exclaimed with all humility, like a man of God, "I have sinned against the Lord!"
7. As long as ministers are disposed to complain, and to treat all reproof, however kindly administered, as of course ccnsoriousness and denunciation, they need not expect the blessing of the Lord.
8. When this compliant is made, we should examine carefully and prayerfully our spirit, motive, and manner of administering reproof; but should by no means be deterred from following up reproof, in a thorough, searching, benevolent, compassionate manner; either until there is reformation, or the case becomes so hopeless as to come within the principle laid down by Christ, when He commanded his disciples to let the religious teachers of his day alone, because, "they were blind leaders of the blind."
Now, brethren, I have written this letter in the kindness and affection of my heart, and I am not without my apprehensions, that even in this I shall be charged with censoriousness--and that what I know to be spoken in love, will be confounded with a spirit of censoriousness. But, my brethren, I cannot help it; I wish to call the attention of the Church and of the Ministry, to this plain distinction, and beg of them duly and prayerfully to consider it, whenever they find themselves reproved. "Let the righteous smite me, it shall do me good. It shall be an excellent oil."
Your brother in the love and fellowship of the blessed gospel,
C.G.FINNEY
Location: http://www.gospeltruth.net/1841OE/41%20lets_art/410526_eo_editor5.htm
The Oberlin Evangelist
May 26, 1841
Prof. Finney's Letters.--No. 33.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE OBERLIN EVANGELIST
No. 5
Dear Brother:
As I have continued to read what has been said in various publications, on the subject of entire sanctification, I have been more and more struck with the fact, that the difficulties in the way of a right understanding of the subject in most minds, and especially in the minds of ministers, are more fundamental than might have been expected on so plain a subject. In preparing my course of lectures for the press, I aimed mostly at placing the subject before the public simply as a Bible question, and avoiding, so far as I consistently could, the discussion of the metaphysical matters pertaining thereto. This, to the minds of common readers, I then supposed, and now suppose, to be the most acceptable and profitable method of presenting this great truth. But there is still a large class of minds who need to have their attention called to the consideration of certain metaphysical questions, which belong rather to the philosophy of the subject, than to the plain Bible announcement of it.
As the subject is continually up for investigation, and the interest of the Church in it perpetually increasing, I purpose, through your columns, to present still another view of this subject to the churches, not inconsistent with what I have before said, but in some respects a more fundamental and philosophical view of the subject. I have been considering the best method of presenting it, and have sometimes thought I would write a review of the leading articles that have been published in opposition to this doctrine. But I have ever been afraid even of the form of controversy, and greatly prefer to take up an original investigation of it, in my own way, without either the form or the spirit of controversy. In doing this I of course intend so to present the subject as to meet the principal objections and difficulties I have seen stated; but in a way that shall avoid any such collision with my brethren as might produce controversy. I shall endeavor to condense my articles as much as I can, and still have them perspicuous. I design to write for thinkers, and for those who are willing to take the trouble to give the subject a somewhat fundamental examination.
That your readers may be apprised of something like the outline of what I intend to present, I will in this article state the main positions I design to discuss, reserving to myself, however, the privilege of making any addition to, or alteration of the prescribed train of thought which may seem to be called for, from any new light that may dawn from any quarter upon the subject. The outline I shall give will contain a summary of the principal positions that seem at present to require investigation.
I. What is implied in moral obligation.
II. Wherein moral character consists.
III. What constitutes right character, or holiness.
IV. What constitutes wrong character, or sinfulness.
V. That moral character is always wholly right or wholly wrong, and never partly right and partly wrong at the same time.
VI. What entire sanctification is.
VII. That regeneration is entire sanctification.
VIII. The difference between entire sanctification, considered as an act, and entire sanctification, considered as a state; or, the difference between entire present sanctification and continued sanctification.
IX. That faith is entire sanctification, considered as an act, but as a state faith is a condition of entire sanctification.
X. Entire sanctification, as a state, is attainable in this life.
XI. It has been attained.
XII. In the Millenium this state will be the common attainment of Christians.
XIII. It is the duty and privilege of all persons to enter at once into this state.
XIV. Why they do not.
XV. Make some inferences and remarks.
Before I begin the discussion, perhaps it may be well to remark, that some of your readers may inquire why we dwell so much upon the subject of entire sanctification? To this I answer:
1. The subject needs to be and must be discussed, till it is understood by the Church.
2. There is now sufficient excitement in the Church upon the subject, to induce them to read what is written.
3. I have myself said comparatively little, directly upon the subject, except in the course of lectures which appeared in the last volume of your paper.
4. As a general thing, it is at present the most interesting and important subject of consideration and discussion, that is before the Church.
5. Although the minds of some may be so well settled as not to need farther investigation, yet I am persuaded, that, as a general thing, no subject could be more acceptable and important to the general class of readers than this.
I will proceed with the investigation and show:
I. What things are implied in moral obligation:
1. Moral obligation implies that possession of the powers of moral agency; namely, Understanding, Reason, Conscience, Free-will, and Sensibility. Some of these powers may be possessed by mere animals. Reason, Free-will, and Conscience, are the characteristics that distinguish moral agents from mere animals. It is, however, believed, at least by me, that a being would not be a moral agent, who did not possess all the above named powers and susceptibilities.
But here, for the benefit of many of my readers, it will be important to go a little into explanation, as it respects the meaning of these words.
(1.) By Understanding, I mean that power or faculty of the mind that receives the perceptions of the senses with respect to the existence and qualities of sensible objects, forms notions of them, combines, and classifies them, &c. This faculty is employed solely about sensible objects.
(2.) By Reason, I intend that power of the mind that is employed solely about absolute, eternal, infinite, and necessary truths. The reason takes knowledge of absolute and necessary truths, by a direct perception of them, just as the perceiving faculty takes knowledge of sensible objects by direct perceptions.
(3.) By Conscience, I mean that function of the reason that perceives and enforces moral obligation--that pronounces the sentence of condemnation or approbation, upon disobedience or obedience.
(4.) By Free-will, I intend the power which a moral agent possesses, of choosing in any direction, in view of motives.
(5.) By the Sensibility, I mean the susceptibility to pleasure and pain, or the faculty of feeling.
2. Moral obligation implies moral liberty, or natural ability. By this it is intended, that a moral agent must not only possess the faculties of a moral agent, but the power and ability to use them, according to his sovereign election, in acts of obedience or disobedience; being always responsible for the manner in which he uses his natural ability or moral liberty.
3. Moral obligation implies, so much light or knowledge, as to enable the agent to affirm oughtness of any action or occupation: that is--law, in order to be obligatory, must be prescribed, or published; and the agent, before he can be under a moral obligation to obey, must have sufficient light to perceive, that he ought or ought not, to do or omit the thing in question. If the powers of moral agency exist, it is of no use, unless the agent possess sufficient light to perceive obligation. And when obligation is perceived, the very perception of a thing as obligatory, implies that there is natural ability to obey or disobey. It should always, then, be understood, that moral obligation implies the possession of the powers of moral agency, natural power or ability to use them in the prescribed or required manner, together with so much light or knowledge as to produce the conviction of obligation; or, in other words, so much knowledge as to enable the conscience to affirm moral obligation.
4. And here it should be distinctly understood, that moral obligation can only be commensurate with natural ability, including in the idea of natural ability that degree of knowledge I have just mentioned. I know it has been denied by a certain class of philosophers, that moral obligation implies natural ability in the sense I have explained it. With this class of philosophers I have, at present, nothing to do, as I write to those and for those who have long professed to embrace the doctrine of natural ability, as indispensable to moral obligation.
Please to observe, now, and bear it always in mind, that those who are called New School Divines have all along, for many years, admitted the doctrine of natural ability as here explained, and have based their exhortations to sinners upon the fact, that men really possess natural faculties and powers to obey God; or, in other words, to do all their duty, and that, in every case, human responsibility and moral obligation are commensurate, and only commensurate with natural ability, including a knowledge of duty. And here let me say, that from this ground they can never be driven, so long as the law of God remains the rule of human action; for the very letter and spirit of the law of God requires of men, just the use of all, and no more than all the strength that each moral agent possesses.
5. I have been surprised that some of the principal New School writers and reviewers, in their controversy with the doctrine of entire sanctification, should not only depart from and overlook the doctrine of natural ability, but make assumptions as the very foundation of their opposition, that are as far as possible from the New School admissions and views upon the subject of natural ability, and from their own well known former views upon this subject. For example, in opposition to the doctrine of entire sanctification, it has been urged that men must be sure that they understand the law of God in all its applications to human action, or they cannot be entirely sanctified, or know that they were, even if they were. Now who does not see that this objection assumes that men can be under moral obligation where they have no knowledge or light? In other words that something can be their duty of which they have no knowledge. But this is the same thing as to deny that moral obligation implies the possession of the powers of moral agency, together with sufficient light or knowledge to produce the affirmation of oughtness before obligation can in any case attach.
6. Again, it has been assumed in opposition to this doctrine, that a man must know the exact measure of his own ability, before he can know whether he fully obeys God. But this again assumes that he may be under obligation beyond what he is able to know to be his duty. As if an individual could be under a moral obligation to exert a greater measure of ability in the service of God than he knows himself to possess. In other words, that moral obligation can exceed that degree of light which produces the affirmation of oughtness. But this is a flat denial of the doctrine of natural ability as universally held by New School divines.
7. Again, it has been assumed that a man must be sure that his judgment is in every case infallible, before he can perfectly obey God, or know that he obeys Him, if he doe