0' very good Mss. reading `sensu,
0' the majority, it appears, `sexu.
0' If we read `sexu,
0' the absolute unity of the first principle or Monad, may be insisted upon, and in the inferior principle, divided into `violence
0' and `lust,
0' `violence,
0' as implying strength, may be looked on as the male, `lust
0' was, in mythology, represented as female if we take `sensu,
0' it will express the living but unintelligent soul of the world in the Manichaean, as a pantheistic system."-E. B. P.
67 Ps. xviii. 28. Augustin constantly urges our recognition of the truth that God is the "Father of lights." From Him as our central sun, all light, whether of wisdom or knowledge proceedeth, and if changing the figure, our candle which He hath lighted be blown out, He again must light it. Compare Enar. in Ps. xciii. 147; and Sermons, 67 and 341.
68 John i. 16.
69 John i. 9.
70 Jas. i. 17.
71 Jas. iv, 6, and I Pet. v. 5.
72 Ps. lxxviii. 39.
73 It may assist those unacquainted with Augustin's writings to understand the last three sections, if we set before them a brief view of the Manichaean speculations as to the good and evil principles, and the nature of the human soul:-(1) The Manichaeans believed that there were two principles or substances, one good and the other evil, and that both were eternal and opposed one to the other. The good principle they called God, and the evil, matter or Hyle (Con. Faust. xxi. 1, 2). Faustus, in his argument with Augustin, admits that they sometimes called the evil nature "God," but simply as a conventional usage. Augustin says thereon (ibid. sec. 4): "Faustus glibly defends himself by saying, `We speak not of two gods, but of God and Hyle:
0' but when you ask for the meaning of Hyle, you find that it is in fact another god. If the Manichaeans gave the name of Hyle, as the ancients did, to the unformed matter which is susceptible of bodily forms, we should not accuse them of making two gods. But it is pure folly and madness to give to matter the power of forming bodies, or to deny that what has this power is God." Augustin alludes in the above passage to the Platonic theory of matter, which, as the late Dean Mansel has shown us (Gnostic Heresies, Basilides, etc.), resulted after his time in Pantheism, and which was entirely opposed to the dualism of Manichaeus. It is to this "power of forming bodies" claimed for matter, then, that Augustin alludes in our text (sec. 24) as "not only a substance but real life also." (2) The human soul the Manichaeans declared to be of the same nature as God, though not created by Him-it having originated in the intermingling of part of His being with the evil principle, in the conflict between the kingdoms of light and darkness (in Ps. cxl. sec. 10). Augustin says to Faustus: " You generally call your soul not a temple, but a part or member of God " (Con. Faust. xx. 15): and thus, "identifying themselves with the nature and substance of God" (ibid. xii. 13), they did not refer their sin to themselves, but to the race of darkness, and so did not "prevail over their sin." That is, they denied original sin, and asserted that it necessarily resulted from the soul's contact with the body. To this Augustin steadily replied, that as the soul was not of the nature of God, but created by Him and endowed with free will, man was responsible for his transgressions. Again, referring to the Confessions, we find Augustin speaking consistently with his then belief, when he says that he had not then learned that the soul was not a "chief and unchangeable good" (sec. 24), or that "it was not that nature of truth" (sec. 25): and that when he transgressed "he accused flesh" rather than himself: and, as a result of his Manichaean errors (sec. 26), "contended that God's immutable substance erred of constraint, rather than admit that his mutable substance had gone astray of free will, and erred as a punishment."
0'" (Whately's Logic, iv. 2, sec. 1, note). "These are called in Latin the praedicaments, because they can be said or predicated in the same sense of all other terms, as well as of all the objects denoted by them, whereas no other term can be correctly said of them, because no other is employed to express the full extent of their meaning" (Gillies, Analysis of Aristotle, c. 2).
74 John iii. 29.
75 Ps. li. 8, Vulg.
76 As the mathematicians did their figures, in dust or sand.
77 "The categories enumerated by Aristotle are o0usi/a, po/son, poi=on, pro/sti, pou=, po/te, keisqai, e_xein, poiei=n, pa/sxein; which are usually rendered, as adequately as perhaps they can be in our language, substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, situation, possession, action, suffering. The catalogue which certainly is but a very crude one) has been by some writers enlarged, as it is evident may easily be done by subdividing some of the heads; and by others curtailed, as it is no less evident that all may ultimately be referred to the two heads of substance and attribute, or, in the language of some logicians, `accident
78 Isa. xxxii. 13.
79 Gen. iii. 19
80 Luke xv. 12.
81 Ps. lix. 9, Vulg.
82 Luke xv. 13.
83 See iii. 12; iv. 3, 12; v. 19.
84 Ps. xxxvi. 7.
85 Isa xlvi. 4.
86 See xi. sec. 5, note, below.