0' frame in which the soul exists. But Celsus, not liking this, would have us believe that people have waking dreams and `imagine as true, in accordance with their wishes, a wild piece of unreality.
0' In sleep we may well believe that this is the case: not so in waking hours, unless some one is quite out of his senses, or is melancholy mad." But Origen here quotes Plato in connection with the reality of the Resurrection body of Christ: Gregory refers to ghosts only, with regard to the filoswmatoi, whose whole condition after death he represents very much in Plato's words. See Phaedo, p. 81 B.
88 prolabwn; on the authority of five Codd., for proslabwn.
89 kata to emprosqen authj.
90 any particular good, not as Oehler, "jenseits alles Guten." The Divine Being is the complement, not the negation, of each single good.
91 en eauth blepousa. But Augentius and Sifanus seem to have read eauthn: and this is supported by three Codd.
92 to monon tw onti agaphton kai erasmion.
93 katastolhn. Cf. 1 Cor. xiii. 8-13.
94 Schmidt well remarks that there lies in legwn here not a causal but only a concessive force: and he puts a stop before eikotwj. Oehler has not seen that agaph is governed by the preposition sun in the verb "by the side of love," and quite mistranslates the passage.
95 ereisma.
96 upostasij. Heb. xi 1.
97 reduced to quiescence, atremountwn. This is the reading adopted by Krabinger, from four Codd., instead of the vex nihili of the editions, euthremontwn. The contrast must be between "remaining in activity (energeia)," and "becoming idle," and he quotes a passage from Plotinus to show that atremein has exactly this latter sense. Cf. 1 Cor. xiii. 8, 1 Cor. xiii. 10, katarghfhsontai, katarghfhsetai.
98 whereby alone, kaf o dokei monon pwj authj, k. t. l, the reading of Sifanus.
99 the insolence of satiety cannot touch. Krabinger quotes from two of his Codd. a scholium to this effect: "Then this proves to be nonsense what Origen has imagined about the satiety of minds, and their consequent fall and recall, on which he bases his notorious teaching about the pre-existence and restoration of souls that are always revolving in endless motion, determined as he is, like a retailer of evil, to mingle the Grecian myths with the Church's truth." Gregory, more sober in his idealism, certainly does not follow on this point his great Master. The phrase ubristhj koroj is used by Gregory Naz. also in his Poems (p. 32 A), and may have been suggested to both by some poet, now lost. "Familiarity breeds contempt" is the modern equivalent.
100 But suppose, &c. Moller (Gregorii doctrina de hom. natur., p. 99) shows that the following view of Purgatory is not that taught by the Roman Church.
101 by the nails of propension. This metaphor is frequently used by Gregory. Cf. De Virginit. c 5: "How can the soul which is riveted (proshlwfeisa) to the pleasures of the flesh, and busied with merely human longings, turn a disengaged eye upon its kindred intellectual light ?" So De Beatitud. Or. viii. (I. p. 833), &c.
102 purgatorial, kafarsiw. Five of Krabinger's Codd. and the versions of Augentius and Sifanus approve this reading. That of the Editions is akoimhtw. [This last epithet is applied to God's justice () by Isidore of Pelusium, Ep. 90: and to the "worm," and, on the other hand, the Devil, by Cyril Alexand. Act. Ephes., p. 252. Cf. S. S. Math. iii. 12; S. Mark ix. 48.] It is the same with aiwniw before puri just below. The Editions have it; the Codd. and Latin versions have not: Krabinger therefore has not hesitated to expunge it.
103 h tou puroj dapanh These words can have no other meaning to suit the sense. Krabinger's reproduction of Sifanus' Latin, "ignis ille consumens," makes the sentence a tautology.
104 proj olon aiwna. But cf. Plato, Timaeus, 37, 39 D.
105 Macrina's answer must begin here, though the Paris Editt. take no notice of a break. Krabinger on the authority of one of his Codd. has inserted fhsin h didaskaloj after pronohteon.
106 distuinguishes between. The word here is oiden, which is used of "teaching," "telling," after the fashion of the later Greek writers, in making a quotation.
107 of a farthing. No mention is made of this in the Parable (S. Matt. xviii. 23; S. Luke vii. 41). The "uttermost farthing" of S. Matt. v. 26does not apply here.
108 dia thj basanou.. Of course dia cannot go with ofeilhn, though Krabinger translates "per tormenta debita." He has however, with Oehler, pointed the Greek right, so as to take oflhma as in opposition to ofeilhn.
109 a state which owns no master and is self-regulating, &c. He repeats this, De Hom. Opif. c. 4: "For the soul immediately shows its royal and exalted character, far removed from the lowliness of private station, in that it owns no master, and is self-governed, swayed autocratically by its own will,-for to whom else does this belong than to a king?" and c. 16: "Thus, there is in us the principle of all excellence, all virtue, and every higher thing that we conceive: but pre-eminent among all is the fact that we are free from necessity, and not in bondage to any natural force, but have decision in our power as we please: for virtue is a voluntary thing, subject to no dominion:" and Orat. Catech. c. 5: "Was it not, then, most right that that which is in every detail made like the Divine should possess in its nature a self-ruling and independent principle, such as to enable the participation of the good to be the reward of its virtue?" It would be possible to quote similar language from the Neoplatonists (e.g. Plotinus vi. 83-6): but Gregory learnt the whole bearing and meaning of moral liberty from none but Origen, whose so-called "heresies" all flowed from his constant insistence on its reality.
110 This (1 Cor. xv. 28) is a text much handled by the earlier Greek Fathers. Origen especially has made it one of the Scripture foundations upon which he has built up theology. This passage in Gregory should be compared with the following in Origen, c. Cels. iv. 69, where he has been speaking of evil anti its origin, and its disappearance: "God checks the wider spread of evil, and banishes it altogether in a way that is conducive to the good of the whole. Whether or not there is reason to believe that after the banishment of evil it will again appear is a separate question. By later corrections, then. God does put right some defects: for although in the creation of the whole all the work was fair and strong, nevertheless a certain healing process is needed for those whom evil has infected, and for the world itself which it has as it were tainted; and God is never negligent in interfering on certain occasions in a way suitable to a changeful and alterable world," &c. "He is like a husbandman performing different work at different times upon the land, for a final harvest." Also viii. 72: "This subject requires much study and demonstration: still a few things must and shall be said at once tending to show that it is not only possible, but an actual truth, that every being that reasons 'shall agree in one law (quoting Celsus' words) Now while the Stoics hold that when the strongest of the elements has by its nature prevailed over the rest, there shall be the Conflagration, when all things will fall into the fire, we hold that the Word shall some day master the whole of `reasoning nature,
0' and shall transfigure it to its own perfection, when each with pure spontaneity shall will what it wishes, and act what it wills. We hold that there is no analogy to be drawn from the case of bodily diseases, and wounds, where some things are beyond the power of any art of healing. We do not hold that there are any of the results of sin which the universal Word, and the universal God, cannot heal. The healing power of the Word is greater than any of the maladies of the soul, and, according go the will, He does draw it to Himself: and so the aim of things is that evil should be annihilated: whether with no possibility whatever of the soul ever turning to it again, is foreign to the present discussion. It is sufficient now to quote Zephaniah" (iii. 7-13, LXX.).
111 But, when A. Jahn, as quoted by Krabinger asserts that Gregory and Origen derived their denial of the eternity of punishment from a source "merely extraneous," i. e. the Platonists, we must not forget that Plato himself in the Phaedo, 113 F (cf. also Gorgias, 525 C, and Republic, x. 615), expressly teaches the eternity of punishment hereafter, for he uses there not the word aiwn or aiwnioj, but oupote.. They were influenced rather by the late Platonists.
112 Reading sumforaij,, i. e. death especially.
113 Such are the wonders. There is here, Denys (De la Philosophie d'Origene, p. 484) remarks, a great difference between Gregory and Origen. Both speak of an "eternal sabbath," which will end the circle of our destinies. But Origen, after all the progress and peregrinations of the soul, which he loves to describe, establishes "the reasoning nature" at last in an unchangeable quiet and repose; while Gregory sets before the soul an endless career of perfections and ever ncreasing happiness. This is owing to their different conceptions of the Deity. Origen cannot understand how He can know Himself or be accessible to our thonght, if He is Infinite: Gregory on the contrary conceives Him as Infinite, as beyond all real or imaginable boundaries, pashj perigrafhz ektoj (Orat. Cat. viii. 65); this is the modern, rather than the Greek view. In the following description of the life eternal Gregory hardly merits the censure of Ritter that he "introduces absurdity" into it.
114 such a magnitude as. Reading, ef o, with Schmidt. The "limit" is the present body, which must be laid aside in order to cease to be a hindrance to such a growth. Krabinger reads ef wn on the authority of six Codd., and translates "ii in quibus nullus terminus interrumpit incrementum." But tosouton can answer to nothing before, and manifestly refers to the relative clause.
115 Macrina may be here alluding to Gregory's brotherly affection for her.
116
But on high
A record lives of thine identity!
Thou shalt not lose one charm of lip or eye;
The hues and liquid lights shall wait for thee,
And the fair tissues, whereso'er they be!
Daughter of heaven ! our grieving hearts repose
On the dear thought that we once more shall see
Thy beauty-like Himselfour Master rose.
C. Tennyson Turner.-Anastasis.
117 idein ...ina mh amfiballh. This is the reading of the Paris Editt.: idein seems to go closely with alhfej: so that Krabinger's dein is not absolutely necessary.
118 some extend this absurdity even to trees: Empedocles for instance. Cf. Philosophumena (of Hippolytus, falsely attributed to Origen), p. 50, where two lines of his are quoted. Chrysostom's words (I. iv. p. 196), "There are those amongst them who carry souls into plants, into shrubs, and into dogs," are taken by Matthaeus to refer to Empedocles. Cf. Celsus also (quoted in Origen, c. Cels. viii. 53), "Seeing then men are born bound to a body-no matter whether the economy of the world required this, or that they are paying the penalty for some sin, or that the soul is weighted with certain emotions till it is purified from them at the end of its destined cycle, three myriad hours, according to Empedocles, being the necessary period of its wanderings far away from the Blessed Ones, during which it passes successively into every perishable shape-we must believe any way that there exist certain guardians of this prison-house." See De Hom. Opif. c. 28. Empedocles can be no other, then, than "the philosopher who asserts that the same thing may be born in anything:" below (p. 232 D). Anaxagoras, however, seems to have indulged in the same dictum (pan en panti), but with a difference; as Nicetas explains in his commentary on Gregory Naz., Orations: "That everything is contained in everything Empedocles asserted, and Anaxagoras asserted also: but not with the same meaning. Empedocles said it of the four elements, namely, that they are not only divided and self-centred, but are also mingled with each other. This is clear from the fact that every animal is engendered by all four. But Anaxagoras, finding an old proverb that nothing can be produced out of nothing, did away with creation, and introduced `differentiation
0' instead, &c." See also Greg. Naz., Poems, p. 170. Navigation
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