Online Resource Library
Commentary Index | Return to PrayerRequest.com | DownloadChurch Fathers: Post-Nicene Fathers Vol 09: 29.02.07 Orthodox Faith Bk II Pt 3
TOPIC: Post-Nicene Fathers Vol 09 (Other Topics in this Collection)
SUBJECT: 29.02.07 Orthodox Faith Bk II Pt 3
Other Subjects in this Topic:
Further, body and soul were formed at one and the same timehyperlink , not first the one and then the other, as Origen so senselessly supposes.
God then made man without evil, upright, virtuous, free from pain and care, glorified with every virtue, adorned with all that is good, like a sort of second microcosm within the great worldhyperlink . another angel capable of worship, compound, surveying the visible creation and initiated into the mysteries of the realm of thought, king over the things of earth, but subject to a higher king, of the earth and of the heaven, temporal and eternal, belonging to the realm of sight and to the realm of thought, midway between greatness and lowliness, spirit and flesh: for he is spirit by grace, but flesh by overweening pride: spirit that he may abide and glorify his Benefactor, and flesh that he may suffer, and suffering may be admonished and disciplined when he prides himself in his greatnesshyperlink : here, that is, in the present life, his life is ordered as an animal's, but elsewhere, that is, in the age to come, he is changed and-to complete the mystery-becomes deified by merely inclining himself towards God; becoming deified, in the way of participating in the divine glory and not in that of a change into the divine beinghyperlink .
But God made him by nature sinless, and endowed him with free will. By sinless, I mean not that sin could find no place in him (for that is the case with Deity alone), bat that sin is the result of the free volition he enjoys rather than an integral part of his naturehyperlink ; that is to say, he has the power to continue and go forward in the path of goodness, by co-operating with the divine grace, and likewise to turn from good and take to wickedness, for God has conceded this by conferring freedom of will upon him. For there is no virtue in what is the result of mere forcehyperlink .
The soul, accordinglyhyperlink , is a living essence, simple, incorporeal, invisible in its proper nature to bodily eyes, immortal, reasoning and intelligent, formless, making use of an organised body, and being the source of its powers of life, and growth, and sensation, and generationhyperlink , mind being but its purest part and not in any wise alien to it; (for as the eye to the body, so is the mind to the soul); further it enjoys freedom and volition and energy, and is mutable, that is, it is given to change, because it is created. All these qualities according to nature it has received of the grace of the Creator, of which grace it has received both its being and this particular kind of nature.
Marg. The different applications of "incorporeal."
We understand two kinds of what is incorporeal and invisible and formless: the one is such in essence, the other by free gift: and likewise the one is such in nature, and the other only in comparison with the denseness of matter. God then is incorporeal by nature, but the angels and demons and souls are said to be so by free gift, and in comparison with the denseness of matter.
Further, body is that which has three dimensions, that is to say, it has length and breadth and depth, or thickness. And every body is composed of the four elements; the bodies of living creatures, moreover, are composed of the four humours.
Now there are, it should be known, four elements: earth which is dry and cold: water which is cold and wet: air which is wet and warm: fire which is warm and dry. In like manner there are also four humours, analogous to the four elements: black bile, which bears an analogy to earth, for it is dry and cold: phlegm, analogous to water, for it is cold and wet: blood, analogous to airhyperlink , for it is wet and warm: yellow bile, the analogue to fire, for it is warm and city. Now, fruits are composed of the elements, and the humours are composed of the fruits, and the bodies of living creatures consist of the humours and dissolve back into them. For every thing that is compound dissolves back into its elements.
Marg. That man has community alike with inanimate things and animate creatures, whe ther they are devoid of or possess the faculty of reason.
Man, it is to be noted, has community with things inanimate, and participates in the life of unreasoning creatures, and shares in the mental processes of those endowed with reason. For the bond of union between man and inanimate things is the body and its composition out of the font elements: and the bond between man and plants consists, in addition to these things, of their powers of nourishment and growth and seeding, that is, generation: and finally, over and above these links man is connected with unreasoning animals by appetite, that is anger and desire, and sense and impulsive movement.
There are then five senses, sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. Further, impulsive movement consists in change from place to place, and in the movements of the body as a whole and in the emission of voice and the drawing of breath. For we have it in our power to perform or refrain from performing these actions.
Lastly, man's reason unites him to incorporeal and intelligent natures, for he applies his reason and mind and judgment to everything, and pursues after virtues, and eagerly follows after piety, which is the crown of the virtues. And so man is a microcosm.
Moreover, it should be known that division and flux and changehyperlink are peculiar to the body alone. By change, I mean change in quality, that is in heat and cold and so forth: by flux, I mean change in the way of depletionhyperlink , for dry things and wet things and spirithyperlink suffer depletion, and require repletion: so that hunger and thirst are natural affections. Again, division is the separation of the humours, one from another, and the partition into form and matterhyperlink .
But piety and thought are the peculiar properties of the soul. And the virtues are common to soul and body, although they are referred to the soul as if the soul were making use of the body.
The reasoning part, it should be understood, naturally bears rule over that which is void of reason. For the faculties of the soul are divided into that which has reason, and that which is without reason. Again, of that which is without reason there are two divisions: that which does not listen to reason, that is to say, is disobedient to reason, and that which listens and obeys reason. That which does not listen or obey reason is the vital or pulsating faculty, and the spermatic or generative faculty, and the vegetative or nutritive faculty: to this belong also the faculties of growth and bodily formation. For these are not under the dominion of reason but under that of nature. That which listens to and obeys reason, on the other hand is divided into anger anti desire. And the unreasoning part of the soul is called in common the pathetic and the appetitivehyperlink . Further, it is to be understood, that impulsive movementhyperlink likewise belongs to the part that is obedient to reason.
The parthyperlink which does not pay heed to reason includes the nutritive and generative and pulsating faculties: and the name "vegetativehyperlink " is applied to the faculties of increase and nutriment and generation, and the name "vital" to the faculty of pulsation.
Of the faculty of nutrition, then, there are four forces: an attractive force which attracts nourishment: a retentive force by which nourishment is retained and not suffered to be immediately excreted: an alterative force by which the food is resolved into the humours: and an excretive force, by which the excess of food is excreted into the draught and cast forth.
The forces againhyperlink , inherent in a living creature are, it should be noted, partly psychical, partly vegetative, partly vital. The psychical forces are concerned with free volition, that is to say, impulsive movement and sensation. Impulsive movement includes change of place and movement of the body as a whole, and phonation and respiration. For it is in our power to perform or refrain from performing these acts. The vegetative and vital forces, however, are quite outside the province of will. The vegetative, moreover, include the faculties of nourishment and growth, and generation, and the vital power is the faculty of pulsation. For these go on energising whether we will it or not.
Lastly, we must observe that of actual things, some are good, and some are bad. A good thing in anticipation constitutes desire: while a good thing in realisation constitutes pleasure. Similarly an evil thing in anticipation begets fear, and in realisation it begets pain. And when we speak of good in this connection we are to be understood to mean both real and apparent good: and, similarly, we mean real and apparent evil.
Chapter XIII.
Concerning Pleasures.
There are pleasures of the soul and pleasures of the body. The pleasures of the soul are those which are the exclusive possession of the soul, such as the pleasures of learning and contemplation. The pleasures of the body, however, are those which are enjoyed by soul and body in fellowship, and hence are called bodily pleasures: and such are the pleasures of food and intercourse and the like. But one could not find any class of pleasureshyperlink belonging solely to the bodyhyperlink .
Again, some pleasures are true, others false. And the exclusively intellectual pleasures consist in knowledge and contemplation, while the pleasures of the body depend upon sensation. Further, of bodily pleasureshyperlink , some are both natural and necessary, in the absence of which life is impossible, for example the pleasures of food which replenishes waste, and the pleasures of necessary clothing. Others are natural but not necessary, as the pleasures of natural and lawful intercourse. For though the function that these perform is to secure the permanence of the race as a whole, it is still possible to live a virgin life apart from them. Others, however, are neither natural nor necessary, such as drunkenness, lust, and surfeiting to excess. For these contribute neither to the maintenance of our own lives nor to the succession of the race, but on the contrary, are rather even a hindrance. He therefore that would live a life acceptable to God must follow after those pleasures which are both natural and necessary: and must give a secondary place to those which are natural but not necessary, and enjoy them only in fitting season, and manner, and measure; while the others must be altogether renounced.
Those then are to be considered moralhyperlink pleasures which are not bound up with pain, and bring no cause for repentance, and result in no other harm and keephyperlink within the bounds of moderation, and do not draw us far away from serious occupations, nor make slaves of us.
Chapter XIV.
Concerning Pain.
There are four varieties of pain, viz., anguishhyperlink , griefshyperlink , envy, pity. Anguish is pain without utterance: grief is pain that is heavy to bear like a burden: envy is pain over the good fortune of others: pity is pain over the evil fortune of others.
Chapter XV.
Concerning Fear.Fear is divided into six varieties: viz., shrinkinghyperlink , shame, disgrace, consternation, panic, anxietyhyperlink .
Shrinkinghyperlink is fear of some act about to take place. Shame is fear arising from the anticipation of blame: and this is the highest form of the affection. Disgrace is fear springing from some base act already done, and even for this form there is some hope of salvation. Consternation is fear originating in some huge product of the imagination. Panic is fear caused by some unusual product of the imagination. Anxiety is fear of failure, that is, of misfortune: for when we fear that our efforts will not meet with success, we suffer anxiety.
Chapter XVI.
Concerning Anger.
Anger is the ebullitionhyperlink of the heart's bloodhyperlink produced by bilious exhalation or turbidity. Hence it is that the words xolh/ and xo/lojhyperlink are both used in the sense of anger. Anger is sometimes lust for vengeance. For when we are wronged or think that we are wronged, we are distressed, and there arises this mixture of desire and anger.
There are three forms of anger: rage, which the Greeks also call xolh/ or xo/loj, mh=nij and ko/toj. When anger arises and begins to be roused, it is called rage or xolh/ or xo/loj. Wrath again implies that the bile endures, that is to say, that the memory of the wrong abides: and indeed the Greek word for it, mh=nijis derived from me/nein, and means what abides and is transferred to memory. Rancour, on the other hand, implies watching for a suitable moment for revenge, and the Greek word for it is ko/toj from kei=sqai.
Anger further is the satellite of reason, the vindicator of desire. For when we long after anything and are opposed in our desire by some one, we are angered at that person, as though we had been wronged: and reason evidently deems that there are just grounds for displeasure in what has happened, in the case of those who, like us, have in the natural course of things to guard their own position.
Chapter XVII.
Concerning Imagination.
Imaginationhyperlink is a faculty of the unreasoning part of the soul. It is through the organs of sense that it is brought into action, and it is spoken of as sensation. And further, what is imaginedhyperlink and perceived is that which comes within the scope of the faculty of imagination and sensation. For example, the sense of sight is the visual faculty itself, but the object of sight is that which comes within the scope of the sense of sight, such as a stone or any other such object. Further, an imagination is an affection of the unreasoning part of the soul which is occasioned by some object acting upon the sensation. But an appearancehyperlink is an empty affection of the unreasoning part of the soul, not occasioned by any object acting upon the sensation. Moreover the organ of imagination is the anterior ventricle of the brain.
Chapter XVIII.
Concerning Sensation.
Sensation is that faculty of the soul whereby material objects can be apprehended or discriminated. And the sensoria are the organs or members through which sensations are conveyed. And the objects of sense are the things that come within the province of sensation. And lastly, the subject of sense is the living animal which possesses the faculty of sensation. Now there are five senses, and likewise five organs of sense.
The first sense is sight: and the sensoria or organs of sight are the nerves of the brain and the eyes. Now sight is primarily perception of colour, but along with the colour it discriminates the body that has colour, and its size and form, and locality, and the intervening space and the numberhyperlink : also whether it is in motion or at rest, rough or smooth, even or uneven, sharp or blunt, and finally whether its composition is watery or earthy, that is, wet or dry.
The second sense is hearing, whereby voices and sounds are perceived. And it distinguishes these as sharp or deep, or smooth or loud. Its organs are the soft nerves of the brain, and the structure of the ears. Further, man and the ape are the only animals that do not move their ears.
The third sense is smell, which is caused by the nostrils transmitting the vapours to the brain: and it is bounded by the extreme limits of the anterior ventricle of the brain. It is the faculty by which vapours are perceived and apprehended. Now, the most generic distinction between vapours is whether they have a good or an evil odour, or form an intermediate class with neither a good nor an evil odour. A good odour is produced by the thorough digestion in the body of the humours. When they are only moderately digested the intermediate class is formed, and when the digestion is very imperfect or utterly wanting, an evil odour results.
The fourth sense is taste: it is the faculty whereby the humours are apprehended or perceived, and its organs of sense are the tongue, and more especially the lips, and the palate (which the Greeks call su0rani/skoj), and in these are nerves that come from the brain and are spread out, and convey to the dominant part of the soul the perception or sensation they have encounteredhyperlink . The so-called gustatory qualities of the humours are these:-sweetness, pungency, bitterness, astringency, acerbity, sourness, saltness, fattiness, stickiness; for taste is capable of discriminating all these. But water has none of these qualities, and is therefore devoid of taste. Moreover, astringency is only a more intense and exaggerated form of acerbity.
The fifth sense is touch, which is common to all living thingshyperlink . Its organs are nerves which come from the brain and ramify all through the body. Hence the body as a whole, including even the other organs of sense, possesses the sense of touch. Within its scope come heat and cold, softness and hardness, viscosity and brittlenesshyperlink , heaviness and lightness: for it is by touch alone that these qualities are discriminated. On the other hand, roughness and smoothness, dryness and wetness, thickness and thinness, up and down, place and size, whenever that is such as to be embraced in a single application of the sense of touch, are all common to touch and sight, as well as denseness and rareness, that is porosity, and rotundity if it is small, and some other shapes. In like manner also by the aid of memory and thought perception of the nearness of a body is possible, and similarly perception of number up to two or three, and such small and easily reckoned figures. But it is by sight rather than touch that these things are perceived.
The Creator, it is to be noted, fashioned all the other organs of sense in pairs, so that if one were destroyed, the other might fill its place. For there are two eyes, two ears, two orifices of the nose, and two tongues, which in some animals, such as snakes, are separate, but in others, like man, are united. But touch is spread over the whole body with the exception of bones, nerves, nails, horns, hairs, ligaments, and other such structures.
Further, it is to be observed that sight is possible only in straight lines, whereas smell and hearing are not limited to straight lines only, but act in all directions. Touch, again, and taste act neither in straight lines, nor in every direction, but only when each comes near to the sensible objects that are proper to it.
Chapter XIX.
Concerning Thought.
The faculty of thought deals with judgments and assents, and impulse to action and disinclinations, and escapes from action: and more especially with thoughts connected with what is thinkable, and the virtues and the different branches of learning, and the theories of the arts and matters of counsel and choicehyperlink . Further, it is this faculty which prophesies the future to us in dreams, and this is what the Pythagoreans, adopting the Hebrew view, hold to be the one true form of prophecy. The organ of thought then is the mid-ventricle of the brain, and the vital spirit it containshyperlink .
Chapter XX.
Concerning Memory.
The faculty of memory is the causehyperlink and storehouse of remembrance and recollection. For memory is a fantasyhyperlink that is left behind of some sensation and thoughthyperlink manifesting itself in action; or the preservationhyperlink of a sensation and thoughthyperlink . For the soul comprehends objects of sense through the organs of sense, that is to say, it perceives, and thence arises a notion: and similarly it comprehends the objects of thought through the mind, and thence arises a thought. It is then the preservation of the types of these notions and thoughts that is spoken of as memory.
Further, it is worthy of remark that the apprehension of matters of thought depends on learning, or natural process of thought, and not on sensation. For though objects of sense are retained in the memory by themselves, only such objects of thought are remembered as we have learned, and we have no memory of their essence.
Recollection is the name given to the recovery of some memory lost by forgetfulness. For forgetfulness is just loss of memory. The faculty of imaginationhyperlink then, having apprehended material objects through the senses, transmits this to the faculty of thought or reason (for they are both the same), and this after it has received and passed judgment on it, passes it on to the faculty of memory. Now the organ of memory is the posterior ventricle of the brain, which the Greeks call the paregkefali/j, and the vital spirit it contains.
Chapter XXI.
Concerning Conception and Articulation.
Again the reasoning part of the soul is divided into conception and articulation. Conception is an activity of the soul originating in the reason without resulting in utterance. Accordingly, often, even when we are silent we run through a whole speech in our minds, and hold discussions in our dreams. And it is this faculty chiefly which constitutes us all reasoning beings. For those who are dumb by birth or have lost their voice through some disease or injury, are just as much reasoning beings. But articulation by voice or in the different dialects requires energy: that is to say, the word is articulated by thetongue and mouth, and this is why it is named articulation. It is, indeed, the messenger of thought, and it is because of it that we are called speaking beings.
Chapter XXII.
Concerning Passion and Energy.
Passion is a word with various meanings. It is used in regard to the body, anti refers to diseases and wounds, and again, it is used in reference to the soul, and means desire anti anger. But to speak broadly and generally, passion is an animal affection which is succeeded by pleasure anti pain. For pain succeeds passion, but is not the same thing as passion. For passion is an affection of things without sense, but not so pain. Pain then is not passion, but the sensation of passion: and it must be considerable, that is to say, it must be great enough to come within the scope of sense.
Again, the definition of passions of the soul is this: Passion is a sensible activity of the appetitive faculty, depending on the presentation to the mind of something good or bad. Or in other words, passion is an irrational activity of the soul, resulting from the notion of something good or bad. For the notion of something good results in desire, and the notion of something bad results in anger. But passion considered as a class, that is, passion in general, is defined as a movement in one thing caused by another. Energy, on the other hand, is a drastic movement, and by "drastic" is meant that which is moved of itself. Thus, anger is the energy manifested by the part of the soul where anger resides, whereas passion involves the two divisions of the soul, and in addition the whole body when it is forcibly impelled to action by anger. For there has been caused movement in one thing caused by another, and this is called passion.
But in another sense energy is spoken of as passion. For energy is a movement in harmony with nature, whereas passion is a movement at variance with nature. According, then, to this view, energy may be spoken of as passion when it does not act in accord with nature, whether its movement is due to itself or to some other thing. Thus, in connection with the heart, its natural pulsation is energy, whereas its palpitation, which is an excessive and unnatural movement, is passion and not energy.
But it is not every activity of the passionate part of the soul that is called passion, but only the more violent ones, and such as are capable of causing sensation: for the minor and unperceived movements are certainly not passions. For to constitute passion there is necessary a considerable degree of force, and thus it is on this account that we add to the definition of passion that it is a sensible activity. For the lesser activities escape the notice of the senses, and do not cause passion.
Observe also that our soul possesses twofold faculties, those of knowledge, and those of life. The faculties of knowledge are mind, thought, notion, presentation, sensation: and the vital or appetitive faculties are will and choice. Now, to make what has been said clearer, let us consider these things more closely, and first let us take the faculties of knowledge.
Presentation and sensation then have already been sufficiently discussed above. It is sensation that causes a passion, which is called presentation, to arise in the soul, and from presentation comes notion. Thereafter thought, weighing the truth or falseness of the notion, determines what is true: and this explains the Greek word for thought, dia/noia, which is derived from dianoei=n, meaning to think and discriminate. That, however, which is judgedhyperlink and determined to be true, is spoken of as mind.
Or to put it otherwise: The primary activity of the mind, observe, is intelligence, but intelligence applied to any object is called a thought, and when this persists and makes on the mind an impression of the object of thought, it is named reflection, and when reflection dwells on the same object and puts itself to the test, and closely examines the relation of the thought to the soul, it gets the name prudence. Further, prudence, when it extends its area forms the power of reasoning, and is called conception, and this is defined as the fullest activity of the soul, arising in that part where reason resides, and being devoid of outward expression: and from it proceeds the uttered word spoken by the tongue. And now that we have discussed the faculties of knowledge, let us turn to the vital or appetitive faculties.
It should be understood that there is implanted in the soul by nature a faculty of desiring that which is in harmony with its nature, and of maintaining in close union all that belongs essentially to its nature: and this power is called will or qe/lhsij. For the essence both of existence and of living yearns after activity both as regards mind and sense, and in this it merely longs to realise its own natural and perfect being. And so this definition also is given of this natural will: will is an appetite, both rational and vital, depending only on what is natural. So that willhyperlink is nothing else than the natural and vital and rational appetite of all things that go to constitute nature, that is, just the simple faculty. For the appetite of creatures without reason, since it is irrational, is not called will.
Again bou/lhsij or wish is a sort of natural will, that is to say, a natural and rational appetite for some definite thing. For there is seated in the soul of man a faculty of rational desire. When, then, this rational desire directs itself naturally to some definite object it is called wish. For wish is rational desire and longing for some definite thing.
Wish, however, is used both in connection with what is within our power, and in connection with what is outside our power, that is, both with regard to the possible and the impossible. For we wish often to indulge lust or to be temperate, or to sleep and the like, and these are within our power to accomplish, and possible. But we wish also to be kings, and this is not within our power, or we wish perchance never to die, and this is an impossibility.
The wishhyperlink , then, has reference to the end alone, and not to the means by which the end is attained. The end is the object of our wish, for instance, to be a king or to enjoy good health: but the means by which the end is attained, that is to say, the manner in which we ought to enjoy good health, or reach the rank of king, are the objects of deliberationhyperlink . Then after wish follow inquiry and speculation (zh/thsij and ske/yij), and after these, if the object is anything within our power, comes counsel or deliberation (boulh/ or bou/leusij): counsel is an appetite for investigating lines of action lying within our own power. For one deliberates, whether one ought to prosecute any matter or not, and next, one decides which is the better, and this is called judgment (kri/sij). Thereafter, one becomes disposed to and forms a liking for that in favour of which deliberation gave judgment, and this is called inclination (gnw/mh). For should one form a judgment and not be disposed to or form a liking for the object of that judgment, it is not called inclination. Then, again, after one has become so disposed, choice or selection (proai/resij and e0piloge/) comes into play. For choice consists in the choosing and selecting of one of two possibilities in preference to the other. Then one is impelled to action, and this is called impulse (o9rmh/): and thereafter it is brought into employment, and this is called use (xrh=sij). The last stage after we have enjoyed the use is cessation from desire.
In the case, however, of creatures without reason, as soon as appetite is roused for any-tiring, straightway arises impulse to action. For the appetite of creatures without reason is irrational, and they are ruled by their natural appetite. Hence, neither the names of will or wish are applicable to the appetite of creatures without reason. For will is rational, free and natural desire, and in the case of man, endowed with reason as he is, the natural appetite is ruled rather than rules For his actions are free, and depend upon reason, since the faculties of knowledge and life are bound up together in man. He is free in desire, free in wish, free in examination and investigation, free in deliberation, free in judgment, free in inclination, free in choice, free in impulse, and free in action where thai is in accordance with nature.
But in the case of Godhyperlink , it is to be remembered, we speak of wish, but it is not correct to speak of choice. For God does not deliberate, since that is a mark of ignorance, and no one deliberates about what he knows. But if counsel is a mark of ignorance, surely choicehyperlink must also be so. God, then, since He has absolute knowledge of everything, does not deliberatehyperlink .
Nor in the case of the soul of the Lord do we speak of counsel or choice, seeing that He had no part in ignorance. For, although He was of a nature that is not cognisant of the future, yet because of His oneness in subsistence with God the Word, He had knowledge of all things, and that not by grace, but, as we have said, because He was one in subsistencehyperlink . For He Himself was both God and Man, and hence He did not possess the will that acts by opinionhyperlink or disposition. While He did possess the natural and simple will which is to be observed equally in all the personalities of men, His holy soul had not opinionhyperlink (or, disposition) that is to say, no inclination opposed to His divine will, nor aught else contrary to His divine will. For opinion (or, disposition) differs as persons differ, except in the case of the holy and simple and uncompound and indivisible Godheadhyperlink . There, indeed, since the subsistences are in nowise divided or separated, neither is the object of will divided. And there, since there is but one nature, there is also but one natural will. And again, since the subsistences are unseparated, the three subsistences have also one object of will, and one activity. In the case of men, however, seeing that their nature is one, their natural will is also one, but since their subsistenceshyperlink are separated and divided from each other, alike in place and time, and disposition to things, and in many other respects, for this reason their acts of will and their opinions are different. But in the case of our Lord Jesus Christ, since He possesses different natures, His natural wills, that is, His volitional faculties belonging to Him as God and as Man are also different. But since the subsistence is one, and He Who exercises the will is one, the object of the willhyperlink the gnomic willhyperlink , is also one, His human will evidently following His divine will, and willing that which the divine will willed it to will.
Footnotes
161 Cf. Greg. Naz., Orat. 31; Jerome, Epist. 82; August., De Genesi, x. 28, &c.
162 e0n mikrw= me/gan, is read in Nazianz. Hom. 38 and 42: so also in Nicetas, who says that `the world is small in comparison with man, for whose sake all was made.
0' But Combefis emended it.
163 The text read, tw= mege/qei filotimou/menos' to\ de\ i!na pa/sxwn u0pomimnh/skhtai, kai\ paideu/htai zw=on. On the basis of varios manuscripts and the works of Gregory of Nazianzum, it is corrected so-i!na pa/sxh, kai\ pa/sxwn, u0pommimnh/skhtai, kai\ paideu/h tai tw= mege/qei filotimou/menon.
164 Greg. Naz., Orat. 38 and 42.
165 Reading, ou0x w0j en0 th= fu/sei, for a0ll0 ou0k e0n th fu/sei.
166 Athan. llib. de inob. contr. Apoll.
167 The Fathers objected to Aristotle's definition of the soul as the e0ntele/xeia prw/th sw/matoj fusikou= o0rganikou= taking it to imply that the soul had no independent existence but was dissolved with the body. Cicero explains it otherwise, Tusc. Quaest., bk. I.
168 Maxim., opus de Anima.
169 Supplying the words, tw= u!dati, yuxro\n ga\r kai\ u0gro/n' ai[ma, a0nalogou=.
170 tomh\, kai\ p0eu=sij. kai\ metabolh/.
171 Nemes., ae Nat. Hom., ch. I.
172 Or, breath, pneu=ma.
173 Nemes., ae Nat. Hom., ch. I.
174 paqhtiko\n kai\ o0rektiko/n.
175 h0 kaq' o0rmh\n ki/nhsij.
176 The following three paragraphs, as found in manuscripts and the old translation, are placed at the end of ch. 32, "Concerning Anger," but do not suit the context there.
177 Supplying the word futiko/n from Nemesius.
178 Nemes., ch. 23.
179 Reading, ou0k a@n eu!roi tij i0di/aj h0dona/j.
180 Nemes., ch. 18: Chrys., Hom. in Joan., 74.
181 See Chrysostom, Hom. in Joannem, 74; Cicero, De fin. bon. et mal., I.
182 kala/j, honourable, good.
183 Text, xwrou/saj. Variant, paraxwrou/saj.
184 a!xoj.
185 a!xqoj.
186 o!knoj, dread.
187 a0gwni/a.
188 Nemesius and certain manuscripts give these species of fear in a different order, viz., dread, consternation, panic, anxiety, shame, disgrace.
189 ze/dij, boiling.
190 tou= peri\ kardi/an ai!matoj, the blood about the heart.
191 Nemes., ch. 21.
192 fantastiko/n.
193 Or, presented.
194 See Aristotle, De anima, III. c.7.
195 Nemes., ch. 71.
196 Nemes., ch. 9.
197 Ibid., ch. 8.
198 chro/n is added in some mss. but wrongly: for it is what is percived by touch alone that is here spoken of, whereas, below, we are told that dryness is recognised also by sight; so also in Nemesius.
199 Nemes., ch. II.
200 Greg. Nyss., De opif. Hom., ch. 13.
201 Text, ai!tion. R. 2930, a0ggei=on.
202 fantasi/a.
203 kai\ noh/sewj is wanting in some mss., nor is it found in Nemesius, who borrowed his description from Origen.
204 Text, swthri/a. Variant, swrei/a, a heaping up, "coacervatio." Faber has "confirmatio," which is nearer swthri/a, conservatio, which is found in Nemesius, &c.
205 Nemes., ch. 13.
206 to\ fantastiko/n, the faculty of fantasy.
207 Cf. I Cor. i. 10.
208 Max. ad Marin. et ad Incert. p.98.
209 to\ boulhto/n.
210 Max. Dial. cum Pyrrh. et Epist. I ad Marin.
211 Thomas Aquinas (I-2, Quaest. 4, a. I and 2) lays down the position in accordance with John of Damascus, that there is no "counsel" in God quatenus est appetitus inquisitivus, but that there is quantum ad certitudinem judicii. Basil (Hexaem. Hom. I), arguing against the ancient philosophers who taught that the world was made a0proaire/twj, affirms "counsel" in God in the latter sense.
212 Max., Epist. I ad Marin.
213 Text, o9 de\ Qeo\j pa/nta ei0dw\j a9plw=j, ou0 bouleu/etai. Various reading is, o9 de\ Qeo\j pa/nta ai9dw\j a9plw=j bou/letai.
214 Max., Dial. cum Pyrrh.
215 dio\ ou0de\ gnwmiko\n ei\xe qe\lhma.
216 gnwmh\n.
217 u. infr., lib. iii. ch. 14.
218 Or, personalities.
219 Text, qelhto/n, as given by Faber. Variant, qelhtiko/n.
220 to\ gnwmiko\n qe/lhma, the will of individual opinion, or, the dispositional will.