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TOPIC: Post-Nicene Fathers Vol 09 (Other Topics in this Collection)
SUBJECT: 29.02.08 Orthodox Faith Bk II Pt 4
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Further note, that will (qe/lhsij_) and wish (bou/lhsij) are two different things: also the object of will (to\ qelhto/n) and the capacity for will (qelhtiko/n), and the subject that exercises will (o9 qe/lwn), are all different. For will is just the simple faculty of willing, whereas wish is will directed to some definite object. Again, the object of will is the matter underlying the will, that is to say, the thing that we will: for instance, when appetite is roused for food. The appetite pure and simple, however, is a rational will. The capacity for will, moreover, means that which possesses the volitional faculty, for example, man. Further, the subject that exercises will is the actual person who makes use of will.
The word to\ qelh/ma, it is well to note, sometimes denotes the will, that is, the volitional faculty, and in this sense we speak of natural will: and sometimes it denotes the object of will, and we speak of will (qe/lehma gnwmiko/n) depending on inclinationhyperlink .
Chapter XXIII.
Concerning Energy.
All the facultieshyperlink we have already discussed, both those of knowledge and those of life, both the natural and the artificial, are, it is to be noted, called energies. For energyhyperlink is the natural force and activity of each essence: or again, natural energy is the activity innate in every essence: and so, clearly, things that have the same essence have also the same energy, and things that have different natures have also different energies. For no essence can be devoid of natural energy.
Natural energy again is the force in each essence by which its nature is made manifest. And again: natural energy is the primal, eternally-moving force of the intelligent soul: that is, the eternally-moving word of the soul, which ever springs naturally from it. And yet again: natural energyhyperlink is the force and activity of each essence which only that which is not lacks.
But actionshyperlink are also called energies: for instance, speaking, eating, drinking, and such like. The natural affectionshyperlink also are often called energies, for instance, hunger, thirst, and so forthhyperlink . And yet again, the result of the force is also often called energy.
Things are spoken of in a twofold way as being potential and actual. For we say that the child at the breast is a potential scholar, for he is so equipped that, if taught, he will become a scholar. Further, we speak of a potential and an actual scholar, meaning that the latter is versed in letters, while the former has the power of interpreting letters, but does not put it into actual use: again, when we speak of an actual scholar, we mean that he puts his power into actual use, that is to say, that he really interprets writings.
It is, therefore, to be observed that in the second sense potentiality and actuality go together; for the scholar is in the one case potential, and in the other actual.
The primal and only true energy of nature is the voluntary or rational and independent life which constitutes our humanity. I know not how those who rob the Lord of this can say that He became manhyperlink .
Energy is drastic activity of nature: and by drastic is meant that which is moved of itself.
Chapter XXIV.
Concerning what is Voluntary and what is Involuntary.
The voluntaryhyperlink implies a certain definite action, and so-called involuntariness also implies a certain definite action. Further, many attribute true involuntariness not only to suffering, but even to action. We must then understand action to be rational energy. Actions are followed by praise or blame, and some of them are accompanied with pleasure and others with pain; some are to be desired by the actor, others are to be shunned: further, of those that are desirable, some are always so, others only at some particular time. And so it is also with those that are to be shunned. Again, some actions enlist pity and are pardonable, others are hateful and deserve punishment. Voluntariness, then, is assuredly followed by praise or blame, and renders the action pleasurable and desirable to the actor, either for all time or for the moment of its performance. Involuntariness, on the other hand, brings merited pity or pardon in its train, and renders the act painful and unde sirable to the doer, and makes him leave it in a state of incompleteness even though force is brought to bear upon him.
Further, what is involuntary, depends in part on force and in part on ignorance. It depends on force when the creative beginning in cause is from without, that is to say, when one is forced by another without being at all persuaded, or when one does not contribute to the act on one's own impulse, or does not co-operate at all, or do on one's own account that which is exacted by forcehyperlink . Thus we may give this definition: "An involuntary act is one in which the beginning is from without, and where one does not contribute at all on one's own impulse to that which one is force" And by beginning we mean the creative cause. All involuntary act depends, on the other hand, on ignorance, when one is not the cause of the ignorance one's self, but events just so happen. For, if one commits murder while drunk, it is an act of ignorance, but yet not involuntaryhyperlink : for one was one's self responsible for the cause of the ignorance, that is to say, the drunkenness. But if while shooting at the customary range one slew one's father who happened to be passing by, this would be termed an ignorant and involuntary act.
As, then, that which is involuntary is in two parts, one depending on force, the other on ignorance, that which is voluntary is the opposite of both. For that which is voluntary is the result neither of force nor of ignorancehyperlink . A voluntary act, then, is one of which the beginning or cause originates in an actor, who knows each individual circumstance through which and in which the action takes place. By "individual" is meant what the rhetoricians call circumstantial elements: for instance, the actor, the sufferer, the action (perchance a murder), the instrument, the place, the time, the manner, the reason of the action.
Notice that there are certain things that occupy a place intermediate between what is voluntary and what is involuntary. Although they are unpleasant and painful we welcome them as the escape from a still greater trouble; for instance, to escape shipwreck we cast the cargo overboardhyperlink .
Notice also that children and irrational creatures perform voluntary actions, but these do not involve the exercise of choice: further, all our actions that are done in anger and without previous deliberation are voluntary actions, but do not in the least involve free choicehyperlink . Also, if a friend suddenly appears on the scene, or if one unexpectedly lights on a treasure, so far as we are concerned it is quite voluntary, but there is no question of choice in the matter. For all these things are voluntary, because we desire pleasure from them, but they do not by any means imply choice, because they are not the result of deliberation. And deliberation must assuredly precede choice, as we have said above.
Chapter XXV.
Concerning what is in our own power, that is, concerning Free-willhyperlink .
The first enquiry involved in the consideration of free-will, that is, of what is in our own power, is whether anything is in our powerhyperlink : for there are many who deny this. The second is, what are the things that are in our power, and over what things do we have authority? The third is, what is the reason for which God Who created us endued us with free-will? So then we shall take up the first question, and firstly we shall prove that of those things which even our opponents grant, some are within our power. And let us proceed thus.
Of all the things that happen, the cause is said to be either God, or necessity, or fate, or nature, or chance, or accident. But God's function has to do with essence and providence: necessity deals with the movement of things that ever keep to the same course: fate with the necessary accomplishment of the things it brings to pass (for fate itself implies necessity): nature with birth, growth, destruction, plants and animals; chance with what is rare and unexpected. For chance is defined as the meeting and concurrence of two causes, originating in choice but bringing to pass something other than what is natural: for example, if a man finds a treasure while digging a ditchhyperlink : for the man who hid the treasure did not do so that the other might find it, nor did the finder dig with the purpose of finding the treasure: but the former hid it that he might take it away when he wished, and the other's aim was to dig the ditch: whereas something happened quite different from what both had in view. Accident again deals with casual occurrences that take place among lifeless or irrational things, apart from nature and art. This then is their doctrine. Under which, then, of these categories are we to bring what happens through the agency of man, if indeed man is not the cause and beginning of actionhyperlink ? for it would not be right to ascribe to God actions that are sometimes base and unjust: nor may we ascribe these to necessity, for they are not such as ever continue the same: nor to fate, for fate implies not possibility only but necessity: nor to nature, for nature's province is animals and plants: nor to chance, for the actions of men are not rare and unexpected: nor to accident, for that is used in reference to the casual occurrences that take place in the world of lifeless and irrational things. We are left then with this fact, that the man who acts and makes is himself the author of his own works, and is a creature endowed with free-will.
Further, if man is the author of no action, the faculty of deliberation is quite superfluous for to what purpose could deliberation be put if man is the master of none of his actions? for all deliberation is for the sake of action. But to prove that the fairest and most precious of man's endowments is quite superfluous would be the height of absurdity. If then man deliberates, he deliberates with a view to action. For all deliberation is with a view to and on account of action.
Chapter XXVI.
Concerning Eventshyperlink .
Of eventshyperlink , some are in our hands, others are not. Those then are in our hands which we are free to do or not to do at our will, that is all actions that are done voluntarily (for those actions are not called voluntary the doing of which is not in our hands), and in a word, all that are followed by blame or praise and depend on motive and law. Strictly all mentalhyperlink and deliberative acts are in our hands. Now deliberation is concerned with equal possibilities: and an `equal possibility' is an action that is itself within our power and its opposite, and our mind makes choice of the alternatives, and this is the origin of action. The actions, therefore, that are in our hands are these equal possibilities: e.g. to be moved or not to be moved, to hasten or not to hasten, to long for unnecessaries or not to do so, to tell lies or not to tell lies, to give or not to give, to rejoice or not to rejoice as fits the occasion, and all such actions as imply virtue or vice in their performance, for we are free to do or not to do these at our pleasure. Amongst equal possibilities also are included the arts, for we have it in our power to cultivate these or not as we please.
Note, however, that while the choice of what is to be done is ever in our power, the action itself often is prevented by some dispensation of the divine Providencehyperlink .
Chapter XXVII.
Concerning the reason of our endowment with Free-will.
We hold, therefore, that free-willhyperlink comes on the scene at the same moment as reason, and that change and alteration are congenital to all that is produced. For all that is produced is also subject to changehyperlink . For those things must be subject to change whose production has its origin in change. And change consists in being brought into being out of nothing, and in transforming a substratum of matter into something different. Inanimate things, then, and things without reason undergo the aforementioned bodily changes, while the changes of things endowed with reason depend on choice. For reason consists of a speculative and a practical part. The speculative part is the contemplation of the nature of things, and the practical consists in deliberation and defines the true reason for what is to be done. The speculative side is called mind or wisdom, and the practical side is called reason or prudence. Every one, then, who deliberates does so in the belief that the choice of what is to be done lies in his hands, that he may choose what seems best as the result of his deliberation, and having chosen may act upon it. And if this is so, free-will must necessarily be very closely related to reason. For either man is an irrational being, or, if he is rational, he is master of his acts and endowed with free-will. Hence also creatures without reason do not enjoy free-will: for nature leads them rather than they nature, and so they do not oppose the natural appetite, but as soon as their appetite longs after anything they rush headlong after it. But man, being rational, leads nature rather than nature him, and so when he desires aught he has the power to curb his appetite or to indulge it as he pleases. Hence also creatures devoid of reason are the subjects neither of praise nor blame, while man is the subject of both praise and blamehyperlink .
Note also that the angels, being rational, are endowed with free-will, and, inasmuch as they are created, are liable to change. This in fact is made plain by the devil who, although made good by the Creator, became of his own free-will the inventor of evil, and by the powers who revolted with himhyperlink , that is the demons, and by the other troops of angels who abode in goodness.
Chapter XXVIII.
Concerning what is not in our hands.
Of things that are not in our hands some have their beginning or cause in those that are in our power, that is to say, the recompenses of our actions both in the present and in the age to come, but all the rest are dependent on the divine will. For the origin of all things is from God, but their destruction has been introduced by our wickedness for our punishment or benefit. For God did not create death, neither does He take delight in the destruction of living thingshyperlink . But death is the work rather of man, that is, its origin is in Adam's transgression, in like manner as all other punishments. But all other things must be referred to God. For our birth is to be referred to His creative power; and our continuance to His conservative power; and our government and safety to His providential power; and the eternal enjoyment of good things by those who preserve the laws of nature in which we are formed is to be ascribed to His goodness. But since some deny the existence of Providence, let us further devote a few words to the discussion of Providence.
Chapter XXIX.
Concerning Providence.
Providence, then, is the care that God takes over existing things. And again: Providence is the will of God through which all existing things receive their fitting issuehyperlink . But if Providence is God's will, according to true reasoning all things that come into being through Providence must necessarily be both most fair and most excellent, and such that they cannot be surpassed. For the same person must of necessity be creator of and provider for what exists: for it is not meet nor fitting that the creator of what exists and the provider should be separate persons. For in that case they would both assuredly be deficient, the one in creating, the other in providinghyperlink . God therefore is both Creator and Provider, and His creative and preserving and providing power is simply His good-will. For whatsoever the Lord pleased that did He in heaven and in earthhyperlink , and no one resisted His willhyperlink . He willed that all things should be and they were. He wills the universe to be framed and it is framed, and all that He wills comes to pass.
That He provides, and that He provides excellentlyhyperlink , one can most readily perceive thus. God alone is good and wise by nature. Since then He is good, He provides: for he who does not provide is not good. For even men and creatures without reason provide for their own offspring according to their nature, and he who does not provide is blamed. Again, since He is wise, He takes the best care over what exists.
When, therefore, we give heed to these things we ought to be filled with wonder at all the works of Providence, and praise them allhyperlink , and accept them all without enquiry, even though they are in the eyes of many unjust, because the Providence of God is beyond our ken and comprehension, while our reasonings and actions and the future are revealed to His eyes alone. And by "all" I mean those that are not in our hands: for those that are in our power are outside the sphere of Providence and within that of our Free-will.
Now the works of Providence are partly according to the good-willhyperlink (of God) and partly according to permissionhyperlink . Works of good-will include alL those that are undeniably good, while works of permission are ......hyperlink . For Providence often permits the just man to encounter misfortune in order that he may reveal to otHers the virtue that lies concealed within himhyperlink , as was the case with Jobhyperlink . At other times it allows something strange to be done in order that something great and marvellous might be accomplished through the seemingly-strange act, as when the salvation of men was brought about through the Cross. In another way it allows the pious man to suffer sore trials in order that he may not depart from a right conscience nor lapse into pride on account of the power and grace granted to him, as was the case with Paulhyperlink .
One man is forsaken for a season with a view to another's restoration, in order that others when they see his state may be taught a lessonhyperlink , as in the case of Lazarus and the rich manhyperlink . For it belongs to our nature to be east down when we see persons in distress. Another is deserted by Providence in order that another may be glorified, and not for his own sin or that of his parents, just as the man who was blind from his birth ministered to the glory of the Son of Manhyperlink . Again another is permitted to suffer in order to stir up emulation in the breasts of others, so that others by magnifying the glory of the sufferer may resolutely welcome suffering in the hope of future glory and the desire for future blessings, as in the case of the martyrs. Another is allowed to fall at times into some act of baseness in order that another worse fault may be thus corrected, as for instance when God allows a man who takes pride in his virtue and righteousness to fall away into fornication in order that he may be brought through this fall into the perception of his own weakness and be humbled and approach and make confession to the Lord.
Moreover, it is to be observedhyperlink that the choice of what is to be done is in our own handshyperlink : but the final issue depends, in the one case when our actions are good, on the cooperation of God, Who in His justice brings help according to His foreknowledge to such as choose the good with a right conscience, and, in the other case when our actions are to evil, on the desertion by God, Who again in His justice stands aloof in accordance with His foreknowledgehyperlink .
Now there are two forms of desertion: for there is desertion in the matters of guidance and training, and there is complete and hopeless desertion. The former has in view the restoration and safety and glory of the sufferer, or the rousing of feelings of emulation and imitation in others, or the glory of God: but the latter is when man, after God has done all that was possible to save him, remains of his own set purpose blind and uncured, or rather incurable, and then he is handed over to utter destruction, as was Judashyperlink . May God be gracious to us, and deliver us from such desertion.
Observe further that the ways of God's providence are many, and they cannot be explained in words nor conceived by the mind.
And remember that all the assaults of dark and evil fortune contribute to the salvation of those who receive them with thankfulness, and are assuredly ambassadors of help.
Also one must bear in mindhyperlink that God's original wish was that all should be saved and come to His Kingdomhyperlink . For it was not for punishment that He formed us but to share in His goodness, inasmuch as He is a good God. But inasmuch as He is a just God, His will is that sinners should suffer punishment.
The first then is called God's antecedent will and pleasure, and springs from Himself, while the second is called God's consequent will and permission, and has its origin in us. And the latter is two-fold; one part dealing with matters of guidance and training, and having in view our salvation, and the other being hopeless and leading to our utter punishment, as we said above. And this is the case with actions that are not left in our handshyperlink .
But of actions that are in our hands the good ones depend on His antecedent goodwill and pleasure, while the wicked ones depend neither on His antecedent nor on His consequent will, but are a concession to free-will For that which is the result of compulsion has neither reason nor virtue in it. Godhyperlink makes provision for all creation and makes all creation the instrument of His help and training, yea often even the demons themselves, as for example in the cases of Job and the swinehyperlink .
Chapter XXX.
Concerning Prescience and Predestination.
We ought to understandhyperlink that while God knows all things beforehand, yet He does not predetermine all thingshyperlink . For He knows beforehand those things that are in our power, but He does not predetermine them. For it is not His will that there should be wickedness nor does He choose to compel virtue. So that predetermination is the work of the divine command based on fore-knowledgehyperlink . But on the other hand God predetermines those things which are not within our power in accordance with His prescience. For already God in His prescience has prejudged all things in accordance with His goodness and justice.
Bear in mind, toohyperlink , that virtue is a gift from God implanted in our nature, and that He Himself is the source and cause of all good, and without His co-operationhyperlink and help we cannot will or do any good thing, But we have it in our power either to abide in virtue and follow God, Who calls us into ways of virtue, or to stray from paths of virtue, which is to dwell in wickedness, and to follow the devil who summons but cannot compel us. For wickedness is nothing else than the withdrawal of goodness, just as darkness is nothing else than the withdrawal of light While then we abide in the natural state we abide in virtue, but when we deviate from the natural state, that is from virtue, we come into an unnatural state and dwell in wickednesshyperlink .
Repentance is the returning from the unnatural into the natural state, from the devil to God, through discipline and effort.
Man then the Creator made male, giving him to share in His own divine grace, and bringing him thus into communion with Himself: and thus it was that he gave in the manner of a prophet the names to living flyings, with authority as though they were given to be his slaves. For having been endowed with reason and mind, and free-will after the image of God, he was filly entrusted with dominion over earthly things by the common Creator and Master of all.
But since God in His presciencehyperlink knew that man would transgress and become liable to destruction, He made from him a female to be a help to him like himself; a help, indeed, for the conservation of the race after the transgression from age to age by generation. For the earliest formation is called `making' and not `generation.' For `making' is the original formation at God's hands, while `generation' is the succession from each Other made necessary by the sentence of death imposed on us on account of the transgression.
This man Hehyperlink placed in Paradise, a home that was alike spiritual and sensible. For he lived in the body on the earth in the realm of sense, while he dwelt in the spirit among the angels, cultivating divine thoughts, and being supported by them: living in naked simplicity a life free from artificiality, and being led up through His creations to the one and only Creator, in Whose contemplation he found joy and gladnesshyperlink .
When therefore He had furnished his nature with free-will, He imposed a law on him, not to taste of the tree of knowledge. Concerning this tree, we have said as much as is necessary in the chapter about Paradise, at least as much as it was in our power to say. And with this command He gave the promise that, if he should preserve the dignity of the soul by giving the victory to reason, and acknowledging his Creator and observing His command, he should share eternal blessedness and live to all eternity, proving mightier than death: but if forsooth he should subject the soul to the body, and prefer the delights of the body, comparing himself in ignorance of his true dignity to the senseless beastshyperlink , and shaking off Iris Creator's yoke, and neglecting His divine injunction, he will be liable to death and corruption, and will be compelled to labour throughout a miserable life. For it was no profit to man to obtain incorruption while still untried and unproved, lest he should fall into pride and under the judgment of the devil. For through his incorruption the devil, when he had fallen as the result of his own free choice, was firmly established in wickedness, so that there was no room for repentance and no hope of change: just as, moreover, the angels also, when they had made free choice of virtue became through grace immoveably rooted in goodness.
It was necessary, therefore, that man should first be put to the test (for man untried and unprovedhyperlink would be worth nothinghyperlink ), and being made perfect by the trial through the observance of the command should thus receive incorruption as the prize of his virtue. For being intermediate between God and matter he was destined, if he kept the command, to be delivered from his natural relation to existing things and to be made one with God's estate, and to be immoveably established in goodness, but, if he transgressed and inclined the rather to what was material, and tore his mind from the Author of his being, I mean God, his fate was to be corruption, and he was to become subject to passion instead of passionless, and mortal instead of immortal, and dependent on connection and unsettled generation. And in his desire for life he would cling to pleasures as though they were necessary to maintain it, and would fearlessly abhor those who sought to deprive him of these, and transfer his desire from God to matter, and his anger from the real enemy of his salvation to his own brethren. The envy of thehyperlink devil then was the reason of man's fall. For that same demon, so full of envy and with such a hatred of good, would not suffer us to enjoy the pleasures of heaven, when he himself was kept below on account of his arrogance, and hence the false one tempts miserable man with the hope of Godhead, and leading him up to as great a height of arrogance as himself, he hurls him down into a pit of destruction just as deep.
Footnotes
221 Or, acting by opinion, or disposition.
222 Anast. Sin. in Odhg., from Greg. Nyss., p. 44; Clem. Alex. ap. Max., p. 151
223 The Greek e0nergei/a being a term with a large connotation is explained as meaning in different cases operation (operatio), action (actio), and act (actus). Nemesius defines actio a operatio rationalis, actus as perfectio potentiae.
224 Cf. Anast. Sin. in !Odhgo/j, p 43; John of Dam., Dialect. c. 30; Greg. Nyss., in Maximus, II., p. 155.
225 pra/ceij. So pra=cij is defined as e0nergeia logikh/ in the following chapter.
226 ta\ pa/qh. Cf. Instit. Elem., c. 9; Greg. Nyss., Cont. Eunom., v. p. 170.
227 Max., Dial. cum Pyrrh.
228 Greg. Nyss. ap. Max., p. 155.
229 Cf. Greg. Nyss., in Maxim.; Nemes., ch. 29.
230 Nemes., ch. 30.
231 Ibid., ch. 31.
232 Ibid., ch. 32.
233 Ibid., ch. 30.
234 Nemes., ch. 33.
235 rou= au0tecousi/ou. See also III. 34.
236 Nemes., ch. 39.
237 Text, tafron. Variant, ra/fon.
238 Text, pra/cewj. mss. pra/cewn, as in Nemesius.
239 peri\ tw=n ginome/nwn.
240 Nemes., ch. 40.
241 ta\yuxika\ pa/nta.
242 Nemes., ch. 37.
243 This is supplied by Combefis from Nemesius.
244 Nemes., ch. 41.
245 This sentence is omitted in Basil and some mss.
246 Nemesius speaks of this at greater length.
247 Wisd. i. 13.
248 Nemes., ch. 43.
249 Ibid., ch. 42.
250 Ps. cxxxv. 6.
251 Rom. ix. 19.
252 Nemes., ch. 44.
253 The words pa/nta e0painei=n are wanting in Cod. R. 2 and in Nemes., ch. 44.
254 kat 9 eu0doki/an.
255 kata\ sugxw/rhsin.
256 There is a hiatus here in Edit. Vernon. and in Cod. R. 2927. Various readings are found in other mss., some with no ssense and ohters evidently supplied by librarians. It is best supplied from Nemesius, ch. 44, th=j de\ sugxwrh\sew= polla\ ei!dh, "but there are many forms of concession."
257 Nemes, ch. 44.
258 Job i. II.
259 2 Cor. ii. 7.
260 Nemes., ch. 44.
261 St. Luke xvi. 19.
262 St. John ix. I.
263 Nemes., ch. 37.
264 Cf. Nemes., c. 27; also Cicero's statement on Providence in the Academ. Quest.
265 See the reference in Migne.
266 St. Matt. xxvi. 24.
267 See Chrysostom, Hom. I, in Epist. ad. Ephes., and Hom. 18, in Epist. ad Hebraeos.
268 I Tim. ii. 4.
269 These words are wanting in two mss.
270 This last sentence is absent in one Codex.
271 St. Matt. viii. 30 seqq.
272 Chrys., Hom. 12 in Epist. ad. Ephes.
273 Cf. Maximus, Vita, n. 8; Just. Martyr, Apol. I; Tatian, Or. ad. ad Graecos; Prigen, Ep. ad Rom. I; Jerome, on Exek. c. xxiv., &c.
274 Act. S. Max.
275 Cf. Clem. Alex., Strom., bk. vi.; Jerome, on Ep. ad Gal., ch. I; Greg. Naz, Carmen de virt. hum.
276 Cf. Clem. Alex., Quis dives salvetar; Greg. Naz., Orat. 31; Chrysost., Hom. 45 in Joann., Hom. in Ep. ad Hebr. xii. 2, Hom. 15 in Ep. ad Rom.; Cyril, De ador. in Spir. et ver., p. 25; Petavius, Dogm., vol. i., bk. ix. c. 4, &c.
277 Cf. ingra,bk. iii. ch. 14.
278 o0 prognw/sthj Qeo/j. See Athanas., in Psalm I; Chrysost. in Hom. 18 in Gen.; Greg. Nyss., De opif. hom.; Athanas., Minor, Quest. 50 ad Antioch.; Thomas Aquinas I., Quaest. 98, Art. 2.
279 Greg. Nyss., De opif., ch. 20.
280 Text, eu0fraino/menoj. Variant , semnuno/menoj.
281 Ps. xlix. 12.
282 a0dokimoj; in Cod. R.2 a0doki/maston.
283 This paranthesis is absent in almost all codices and in the translations of Faber, &c.
284 Cf. Greg. Naz., Orat. 38 and 42; Cyril Alex., Cont. Anthrop., I. 8; Anast. II Antioch., Hexaem. vi; Chrysost., Hom. 10 in Ep. ad Rom., Hom. 5 in Ep. ad Epes., &c.BOOK III.