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Commentary Index | Return to PrayerRequest.comKeil and Delitzsch Commentary - Ecclesiastes 2:13 - 2:13
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“And I saw that wisdom has the advantage over folly, as light has the advantage over darkness. The wise man has eyes in his head; but the fool walketh in darkness.” In the sacred Scriptures, “light” is generally the symbol of grace, Psa 43:3, but also the contrast of an intellectually and morally darkened state, Isa 51:4. To know a thing is equivalent to having light on it, and seeing it in its true light (Psa 36:10); wisdom is thus compared to light; folly is once, Job 38:19, directly called “darkness.” Thus wisdom stands so much higher than folly, as light stands above darkness.יִתְרוֹן, which hitherto denoted actual result, enduring gain, signifies here preference; along with כִּיתֲרוֹן
(Note: Thus written, according to J and other authorities.)
there is also found the form כְּיִתְרוֹן
(Note: Thus Ven. 1515, 1521; vid., Comm. under Gen 27:28-29; Psa 45:10.)
(vid., Pro 30:17). The fool walks in darkness: he is blind although he has eyes (Isa 43:8), and thus has as good as none, - he wants the spiritual eye of understanding (Job 10:3); the wise man, on the other hand, his eyes are in his head, or, as we also say: he has eyes in his head, - eyes truly seeing, looking at and examining persons and things. That is the one side of the relation of wisdom to folly as put to the test.
The other side of the relation is the sameness of the result in which the elevation of wisdom above folly terminates.
“And I myself perceived that one experience happeneth to them all. And I said in my heart, As it will happen to the fool, it will happen also to me; and why have I then been specially wise? Thus I spake then in my heart, that this also is vain.” Zöckler gives to גַּם an adversative sense; but this gam (= ὃμως, similiter) stands always at the beginning of the clause, Ewald, §354a. Gam-ani corresponds to the Lat. ego idem, which gives two predicates to one subject; while et ipse predicates the same of the one of two subjects as it does of the other (Zumpt, §697). The second gam-ani serves for the giving of prominence to the object, and here precedes, after the manner of a substantival clause (cf. Isa 45:12; Eze 33:17; 2Ch 28:10), as at Gen 24:27; cf. Gesen. §121. 3. Miqrěh (from קָרָה, to happen, to befall) is quiquid alicui accidit (in the later philosoph. terminol. accidens; Venet. συμβεβεεκός); but here, as the connection shows, that which finally puts an end to life, the final event of death. By the word יָדַ the author expresses what he had observed on reflection; by בְּלִ...אָםַ, what he said inwardly to himself regarding it; and by דִּבַּ דְלִ, what sentence he passed thereon with himself. Lammah asks for the design, as maddu'a for the reason. אָז is either understood temporally: then when it is finally not better with me than with the fool (Hitz. from the standpoint of the dying hour), or logically: if yet one and the same event happeneth to the wise man and to the fool (Eslt.); in the consciousness of the author both are taken together.The זֶה of the conclusion refers, not, as at Ecc 1:17, to the endeavouring after and the possession of wisdom, but to this final result making no difference between wise men and fools. This fate, happening to all alike, is הֶבֶל, a vanity rendering all vain, a nullity levelling down all to nothing, something full of contradictions, irrational. Paul also (Rom 8:20) speaks of this destruction, which at last comes upon all, as a ματαιότης.
The author now assigns the reason for this discouraging result.