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Commentary Index | Return to PrayerRequest.comVincent Word Studies - 1 Peter 3:16 - 3:16
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Having a good conscience (συνείδησιν ἔχοντες ἀγαθήν)
The position of the adjective shows that it is used predicatively: having a conscience good or unimpaired. Compare Heb 13:18, “We have a good conscience (καλὴν συνείδησιν).” Συνείδησις, conscience, does not occur in the gospels, unless Joh 8:1-11 be admitted into the text. Nor is it a word familiar to classical Greek. It is compounded of σύν, together with, and εἰδέναι, to know; and its fundamental idea is knowing together with one's self. Hence it denotes the consciousness which one has within himself of his own conduct as related to moral obligation; which consciousness exercises a judicial function, determining what is right or wrong, approving or condemning, urging to performance or abstinence. Hence it is not merely intellectual consciousness directed at conduct, but moral consciousness contemplating duty, testifying to moral obligation, even where God is not known; and, where there is knowledge of God and acquaintance with him, inspired and directed by that fact. A man cannot be conscious of himself without knowing himself as a moral creature. Cremer accordingly defines the word as “the consciousness man has of himself in his relation to God, manifesting itself in the form of a self-testimony, the result of the action of the spirit in the heart.” And further, “conscience is, essentially, determining of the self-consciousness by the spirit as the essential principle of life. In conscience man stands face to face with himself.” Conscience is, therefore, a law. Thus Bishop Butler: “Conscience does not only offer itself to show us the way we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own authority with it, that it is our natural guide, the guide assigned us by the Author of our nature; it therefore belongs to our condition of being; it is our duty to walk in that path and follow this guide.” And again, “That principle by which we survey, and either approve or disapprove our own heart, temper, and actions, is not only to be considered as what is, in its turn, to have some influence, which may be said of every passion, of the lowest appetites; but likewise as being superior; as from its very nature claiming superiority over all others; insomuch that you cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency. This is a constituent part of the idea, that is, of the faculty itself; and to preside and govern, from the very economy and constitution of man, belongs to it. Had it strength as it had right; had it power as it had manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world” (Sermons II. and III., “On Human Nature”).
Conscience is a faculty. The mind may “possess reason and distinguish between the true and the false, and yet be incapable of distinguishing between virtue and vice. We are entitled, therefore, to hold that the drawing of moral distinctions is not comprehended in the simple exercise of the reason. The conscience, in short, is a different faculty of the mind from the mere understanding. We must hold it to be simple and unresolvable till we fall in with a successful decomposition of it into its elements. In the absence of any such decomposition we hold that there are no simpler elements in the human mind which will yield us the ideas of the morally good and evil, of moral obligation and guilt, of merit and demerit. Compound and decompound all other ideas as you please, associate them together as you may, they will never give us the ideas referred to, so peculiar and full of meaning, without a faculty implanted in the mind for this very purpose” (McCosh, “Divine Government, Physical and Moral”).
Conscience is a sentiment: i.e., it contains and implies conscious emotions which arise on the discernment of an object as good or bad. The judgment formed by conscience awakens sensibility. When the judicial faculty pronounces a thing to be lovable, it awakens love. When it pronounces it to be noble or honorable, it awakens respect and admiration. When it pronounces it to be cruel or vile, it awakens disgust and abhorrence.
In scripture we are to view conscience, as Bishop Ellicott remarks, not in its abstract nature, but in its practical manifestations. Hence it may be weak (1Co 8:7, 1Co 8:12), unauthoritative, and awakening only the feeblest emotion. It may be evil or defiled (Heb 10:22; Tit 1:15), through consciousness of evil practice. It may be seared (1Ti 4:2), branded by its own testimony to evil practice, hardened and insensible to the appeal of good. On the other hand, it may be pure (2Ti 1:3), unveiled, and giving honest and clear moral testimony. It may be void of offence (Act 24:16), unconscious of evil intent or act; good, as here, or honorable (Heb 13:18). The expression and the idea, in the full Christian sense, are foreign to the Old Testament, where the testimony to the character of moral action and character is borne by external revelation rather than by the inward moral consciousness.
Falsely accuse (ἐπηρεάζοντες)
Compare Luk 6:28; the only other passage where the word occurs, Mat 5:44, being rejected from the best texts. The word means to threaten abusively; to act despitefully. Rev., revile.