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X.—FURTHER ASSERTION OF THE PURITY OF HIS CONDUCT AND OF ITS PROFOUNDER REASONS. THESE DEPEND UPON HIS RELATION TO CHRIST AND HIS SPECIAL WORK TO MAKE KNOWN GOD’S METHOD OF RECONCILIATION BY CHRIST
2Co_5:13-15. For whether we have been beside ourselves it is for God.—He now shows them that they had good reason for boasting of him rather than of those who depreciated him, for if he was to be judged by what he had done among them, they could not doubt his sincerity. Two different judgments might be passed upon him, and are pointed out in åἴôå ἐîÝóôçìåí and åἴôå óùöñïíïῦìåí . [They referred to his former ( ἐîÝóôçìåí ) and to his present ( óùöñïíïῦìåí ) state of mind. In his former course (either when ho was at Corinth, or when in some part of his epistles he had commended himself), he might have seemed to some beside himself with zeal and earnestness, but more recently he might have seemed to the same persons unduly reserved and sober. In both cases he may have been charged with acting an interested and artful part; whereas he maintains that he was governed by higher motives, which prompted him to adapt himself to varying circumstances]. The first, however, may have been more especially the judgment of his opponents, and showed the low estimate they had formed of him. It was not that he had overacted his part (Luther: done too much, dealt sharply with the people), nor merely that he had been foolish or had acted foolishly. Nor do we understand by the word here used that he was charged with going beyond the limits either of ordinary intelligence (mysterious contemplations), or of intelligent consciousness (ecstasy); for neither of these things are hinted at in the context. Nor does the extravagance alluded to seem to have been a transgression of propriety by an excessive self-glorification (Schott), nor an immodesty of deportment (R. Cath.). The idea intended is rather that of losing one’s senses, an insanity in contrast with being of good mind, reasonable ( óùöñïíåῖí ). In like manner ἐîÝóôç is used in Mar_3:21, and ìáßíåóèáé in Act_26:25. The objection to him was not that he had commended himself, as in 2Co_11:17 f.), in which case óùöñïíåῖí would signify, to be diffident in this respect; to God would then signify, for the honor of God; and for your sake would mean simply as a salutary example or as an instance of condescension for you. Such a sentiment would not have been needful after what he had said in 2Co_5:12. He probably had before his mind the whole course of his action, for this had probably seemed to his opponents as madness. In contrast with the Judaizers especially, he had shown a burning zeal for the advancement of the pure Gospel, for the conversion of souls and for the perseverance and progress of those who had been converted. Did he then have reference to his personal experiences, such as his sudden conversion or his ecstatic state? The contrast as well as the following sentence seem to favor the allusion rather to his whole conduct, his general activity. But even on the supposition that his opponents were right, he suggests that the madness they imputed to him was an extreme devotion to God, in the service of his Lord, and therefore worthy of esteem. But he adds—whether we are now sober minded, it is for you.—If any one saw his conduct in an opposite light, or thought he acted in a reasonable and wise manner, he assured them it was all for their welfare. This explanation, according to which the Apostle speaks of his conduct as it appeared to others and was judged by them, seems to us much more simple and more eligible than that which Osiander defends; according to which he speaks on the one hand of his actual deportment, of his transcendant style of doctrine and practice, and of his highly exalted spiritual life, which he however contends actually redounded to the glory of God; and on the other hand of his more tranquil and judicious manner of action, which was better understood and more generally useful. Had such been the Apostle’s meaning he makes use in the first clause of an ambiguous expression, an amphiboly, in which he refers ironically to his opponents’ insinuation, that he had been enthusiastically extravagant. The signification of ἐîÝóôç , adopted by Hofmann (Schrigtbew, II. p. 323): “to be in an exalted state of inspiration” is not favored by the common usage of the words.—For the love of Christ constraineth us (2Co_5:14).—He here gives a reason not for what he had said in the first half of 2Co_5:13, but for his assertion that his course of action had been sincere, and that whatever might be its appearance before men, it was for the service of God and for the welfare of his brethren. In this sentence the words ôïῦ ×ñéóôïῦ are in the genitive of the subject according to the prevalent usage of Paul with respect to this phrase; comp. 2Co_8:24; 2Co_13:13; Rom_5:5; Rom_5:8; Rom_8:35; Rom_8:39; Eph_2:4; Eph_3:19; Php_1:9 et al. (The personal object of the ἀãÜðç is introduced by åἰò in Col_1:4 and 1Th_3:12). In what follows also it is evident that the object is to point out the highest manifestation of Christ’s love. Although this love of Christ is a power which produces love to Christ, we are not to suppose both points embraced in the expression here. The verb óõíÝ÷åé means either, it presses, it drives, or, it holds together. The pronoun ἡìᾶò , however, cannot mean here, you and me (to hold us together in friendship), but, as the context shows, only me. This holding together must be the opposite of those separations which selfishness is apt to produce or occasion. Calvin says: constrains our hearts or affections; Meyer: holds us that we may not pass beyond the limits which are required by a regard for God’s honor and your welfare ( èåῷ and ὑìῖí ). The former interpretation seems indeed contrary to usage, since everywhere else the word has the meaning of, to press hard, or to afflict; but never, to urge or to impel; only in the passive is it used of the affections by which one is ruled. But why can not the active be used according to the analogy of the passive, of an affection which directly and thoroughly controls a man? With such a meaning the idea becomes more expressive. When the Apostle adds—we having formed this judgment—he introduces the subjective cause of that influence which the love of Christ had over him. That love had led him to form this judgment, i. e., had brought him to this conclusion, to this conviction. Whether this judgment was reached at the time of his conversion (Meyer), or whether the whole meaning of the death of Christ became thus clear to his apprehension at some later period of his life (Osiander), may be left undetermined. Neander remarks that “the aorist was here used because Paul intended to speak of something which happened once upon a time. He means, that ever since he became conscious of the saving love of Christ, a new principle of conduct had entered his heart.” The substance of this conviction, or rather of the judgment then formed was:—that one died for all, and so all died.—If we accept of the reading of the Receptus, which gives us åἰ after ὅôé , we must regard ὅôé ἄñá — ἀðÝèáíïí as belonging together: that (if one died for all) then all died. The hypothetical sentence, however, could have been only formally problematical, since what is there expressed must have been really certain to the Apostle. But if åἰ be left out, ὅôé is either equivalent to: because, and so introduces the antecedent of a proposition (Meyer); or, it is in this instance equivalent to: that, and both clauses depend upon it, i. e., we have judged that one died for all and that all died. (Osiander). Ôïῦôï appears to favor this latter supposition (we judged this that, etc.). One thing, however, which would go far to determine us in favor of the causal signification is, that it brings out more prominently the ïἱ ðÜíôåò ἀðÝèáíïí as the proper substance of the judgment to which the Apostle says in the context he had come (we judged this, that one died for all and so all died). And yet the whole force of the sentence seems to require that ὅôé in the sense of that should be made to govern both clauses of it. This logical relation, however, would be destroyed if we thus bring in an independent conclusion by means of ἄñá . The inference which the Apostle makes from the proposition that one died for all, argues strongly in favor of its judicially vicarious signification. One was in the place of all, therefore all must be looked upon as dead; one has made expiation, for the offence of all, therefore all are to be looked upon as having suffered punishment. This usage, by which ὑðÝñ indicates that something was done or suffered in the name of some one, in consequence of which the latter is regarded as doing or suffering the same thing, prevailed even among classic writers; but among later authors the usage was extended until the word was introduced in connections in which a purer style would have required ἀíôß . (Passow s. v. ὑðÝñ , A. II. 1. p. 2064 a. b.), [Stanley contends that although ὑðὲñ ðÜíôùí has the same ambiguity as the English “for,” ‘in behalf of,’ the idea of service and protection always predominates. Wherever, in speaking of the death of Christ, the idea of substitution is intended, it is under the figure of a ransom, in which case it is expressed by ἀíôß . (Mat_20:28; Mar_10:45). Wherever the idea of covering or forgiving sins is intended, it is under the figure of a sin-offering, in which case the word used is ðåñὶ ἁìáñôßáò or ἁìáñôéῶí , as in Rom_8:3; 1Pe_3:18; 1Jn_2:2; 1Jn_4:10. The preposition ðåñß , as thus used, has partly the sense of “on account of,” but chiefly the sense of “covering,” as if it were, he threw his death “over” or “around our sins.” Such generalizations contain a truth deserving notice, but we may doubt whether the usage was so strictly conformed to the etymological law. In the actual interpretation of our passage Stanley is compelled to confess that there would be no force to the Apostle’s inference that all were dead because Christ died, except on the idea of Christ’s representing or standing in the place of those who died with Him. See some excellent remarks of Trench (Synn. 2 Series, pp. 163–166) and Tischendorf, Doctr. Pauli de vi mor. Chr.]. But as in the final sentence (2Co_5:15) ὑðὲñ ðÜíôùí would belong also to ἐãåñèÝíôé , such a meaning would not seem appropriate to the connection, for we should be compelled to understand the resurrection for all in a sense like that which is expressed in Eph_2:5 (comp. Col_2:11; Col_3:1), i. e., Christ’s resurrection would be regarded as the resurrection of all. Not only the final sentence (2Co_5:15) but that from which the whole reflection is derived (“the love of Christ constrains us”) would probably bring us to the conclusion that the main idea of the passage is, Love is for love, i. e., corresponding to the love which sacrifices itself for the salvation of all, is a love which renounces all selfish motives and devotes itself to the great purpose of the other love. In such a connection the phrase all died would denote a moral death. The Apostle implies that an essential object aimed at in the sacrifice of one for the redemption of all, was that the latter might forsake the fleshly life of sin which was opposed to this work of love, and which by its very nature was a life of selfishness, having self for its central aim, and in direct contradiction to this self-sacrificing and diffusive love. Olshausen says: that death of Christ for all is the principle or reason for the death of all for Him. But when any have fellowship with Christ this is effected by a faith in which His death for their sakes becomes actually beneficial to them, and they cease to live for themselves. This is what the Apostle means in other places, when he says, we are crucified with Christ, Gal_2:19; comp. Col_3:3; Col_2:12; Rom_6:4. The Apostle speaks of believers who in the very act of faith have entered into the fellowship of Christ’s death, and hence are dead with Him, and are in the sphere of His death, because they have the essential principle of that death in a love which surrenders its personal life of selfishness. (comp. Meyer). We would not be understood as defending that interpretation, which combines and mingles together the subjective ethical and the objective judicial signification of Christ’s atoning death, or which makes out that all are both morally and legally dead by virtue and in consequence of Christ’s death. (Osiander). The only explanation which seems to us correct, and to which the whole connection (2Co_5:13-15) conducts us, is that which represents the death of Christ, which brings salvation to all, as set forth in this passage, according to its ethical meaning, but as a result of love in Him and as a reason for love in men. Neander says: The article before ðÜíôåò implies that precisely the all for whom Christ died must have died in Him. That which had been assumed as a principle in 2Co_5:14 (the all died), is presented in 2Co_5:15 as a purpose or aim. [It should, however, be remarked that the purpose is limited to those who live ( ïἱ æῶíôåò ), whereas no limitation is put to the all ( ïἱ ðÜíôåò ) for whom Christ died, and who died in Him. See below]. The Apostle speaks of this living of some as a moral result flowing from the death of Christ for all:—that they who live should no longer live for themselves.—He here resumes the thought involved in the being dead. In that dying the fleshly life of sin had ceased, the man no more lived to himself, the object of all his action was no longer a life of sense in the service of self alone. The positive side in contrast with this is given when the Apostle adds—but to him who died and rose again for them—i. e., Christ who had died and risen again for their salvation (Rom_4:25) should now become the object of all their efforts. But the subjects of what is here spoken of are said to be ïß æῶíôåò . These are such as have entered into the fellowship of Christ’s death; but, as the invariable consequence, are also in the fellowship of his new life: ἐê íåêñῶí æῶíôåò . Comp. Rom_6:4 ff. Rom_6:13. We regard as defective not only the interpretation which renders ὁé æῶíôåò as long as they live (for the article forbids such a rendering), but also that which regards it as meaning those who are alive i. e., those who are conceived of as a part of the same general multitude who had been redeemed and were dead. [It is precisely on account of the article before æῶíôåò that we think the Apostle intended to emphasize and distinguish the living here from the more general mass for whom Christ died. Those who make the living in Christ as extensive and the same as those for whom He died, are obliged to take the word died ( ἀðïèáíåῖí ) in 2Co_5:15 in two different significations, one judicial or literal, and the other moral. If on the other hand we make the death in 2Co_5:15 in each case to mean a legal death, then the living signifies the opposite justification; or if we make it signify a physical death, then the living must be such as partake in His resurrection and are alive in Him who rose again ( ἀðïèáí . ê . ἐãåñèÝíôé ). We may also ask, how it follows from Christ’s dying in any sense, that all or any would die in a moral sense ? Is not this making the Apostle assert a mere assumption? Our English A. V. makes the Apostle to have judged, that if one died for all, then all must have been dead. This is contrary to the aorist tense of ἀðÝèáíïí which signifies literally they died. Even with the sense that His death proved that all were dying creatures, we cannot see how such an argument was pertinent to the Apostle’s line of thought. His object was not to refer to the original state of man without redemption, but to the obligations which that redemption imposed on him. Even those who deny that the dying of all men in consequence of Christ’s death was merely by imputation (Webster and Wilkinson), acknowledge that His death indicated what was due to them, and condemned them unto death; and that the interest of the ὁé æῶíôåò extended to the resurrection, as well as to the death of Christ. Comp. Stanley].
2Co_5:16-17.—So that we from this time know no man according to the flesh.—An inference is here drawn from what had just been said. Inasmuch as Christ has died for all, and so their selfish life of sense, with its exclusiveness, narrowness, etc., has been abolished; and inasmuch as believers are dead with Him who has died for them, and their new life should be entirely devoted to Him and His cause; henceforth we must be expected to know no one, whoever he may be, according to the flesh ( êáôὰ óÜñêá ). The óÜñî is precisely that in relation to which believers were said in 2Co_5:14 to be dead. To know according to the flesh, may be taken either subjectively, as defining the knowledge of those here spoken of (as a knowledge merely human without spiritual enlightenment, comp. 2Co_1:17; 1Co_1:26, as things appear to the sinful natural man); or objectively (as in 2Co_11:18; Php_3:4; Joh_8:15), the object itself supplying the rule for the knowledge; in this case the merely human, the natural in all its narrowness and exclusiveness as it is found in those who are known; hence any natural qualities which have no connection with Christ, such as advantages of Jewish birth, wealth, refinement or outward circumstances, comp. Gal_3:28. Neander says: “If we confine our thoughts to those things which Paul had in his mind, and was opposing, we shall probably find that he meant to say: it is nothing henceforth to me whether a man is by birth a Jew or a Gentile; whether he observes the Mosaic law or not; whether he is connected externally with those Apostles who were appointed by Christ during His life on earth or not.” The knowing ( åἰäÝíáé ) here spoken of must, however, include a critical discernment. Before deciding how much it thus involves, we must refer to what the Apostle further says respecting the knowing of Christ—even if we have known Christ according to the flesh, nevertheless now know we Him (according to the flesh) no longer.—In the protasis åἰ êáß is used by way of concession, and in the apodosis ἀëëÜ has the sense of nevertheless, as in 2Co_4:16. He acknowledges he had once had a knowledge of Christ according to the flesh (the emphasis should be placed upon the praeterite ἐãíþêáìåí , which on this account is placed first in the sentence); but he asserts that for the present, now íῦí , comp. ἀðὸ ôïῦ íῦí in the preceding clause), he knew Christ thus (i.e., êáôὰ óÜñêá ) no longer. The emphasis cannot be laid upon ×ñéóôüí on account of its position and the relation between the protasis and the apodosis in the sentence. [In such a case ÷ñéóôüí should have stood before êáôὰ óÜñêá ]. But êáôὰ óÜñêá , taken objectively, refers to the merely human personality, that which made its appearance on earth. This defines what kind of knowledge he referred to, and consequently also the judgment regarding Christ which was included in it, viz., that which had preceded his conversion and enlightenment when he first learned to recognize Christ ( ×ñéóôüí here used as a proper noun, and not as an appellative) as the risen Messiah and the Son of God (Gal_1:16; Rom_1:4). Gerlach: “That he might say the more forcibly that he knew no man after the flesh, he applies what he had said to Christ Himself. He says that he had known Christ after the flesh, i. e., as a natural earthly man, just as the inhabitants of Nazareth (Mat_13:55) knew him only too well, viz., as his enemies and judges.” To the same result would also the subjective acceptation of êáôὰ óÜñêá bring us. [Although the word ἐãíùêÝíáé signifies to know by a personal experience] it does not necessarily imply that Paul had seen Christ with his bodily eyes. [It may simply mean here a personal acquaintance with the outward relations of Christ, or that Paul had contemplated Christ only in his outward condition. A different word and one much more comprehensive of all kinds of knowing ( ïἴäáìåí ) had been used when he spoke of knowing no man after the flesh. It is, however, difficult to see any important difference in the moaning of the two words here]. Íῦí describes his present position as a Christian, commencing with his conversion: ἀðὸ ôïῦ íῦí signifies from that time onwards. With respect to the objective or subjective acceptation of êáôὰ óÜñêá , the want of the article (2Co_11:18) is by no means decisive against the former. Though both agree together very well in sense, or come essentially to the same thing, they cannot be made to harmonize exegetically. If in the second half we should suppose a reference to a false apprehension of Christ, it could be only in a low Ebionite sense. Comp. the Introd. to the Epp. to the Corr. § 2. With that which he had inferred in 2Co_5:16 from the preceding argument principally with respect to himself and his way of viewing and judging, the Apostle now connects in 2Co_5:17 another general conclusion: So that if any man be in Christ he is a new creature ( ἕé ôéò ἐí ×ñéóôῷ , êáéíὴ êôßóéò ). Since the flesh is no more to determine the nature of a believer’s knowledge or judgments, it follows that if any man is in Christ, i.e., is in the sphere of Christ’s life, a new creation must have taken place; or such a man must be a new creature (for the sense of these expressions is the same). In other words, the man is altogether a different person from what he was before, and we need have no reference to what he was before he became a Christian (subjectively or objectively). The phrase, a new creature, occurs again in Gal_6:15. In relation to the thing itself comp. Eph_2:10; Eph_4:21; Col_3:9 f.; Rom_6:6. The new birth is spoken of in Tit_3:5; Joh_3:3; Jam_1:18. K ôßóéò designates not only a Divine act (creation), but also the product of such an act (creature). The latter is the ordinary meaning in the New Testament (comp. Rom_1:25; Rom_8:19 ff Rom_8:39 et al). The expression was also used by the Rabbins with respect to a conversion to Judaism. The idea of a new creature is carried out in an antithetic form in the following sentence—Old things have passed away—that is, with respect to those who are in Christ. The old things refer to the disposition and (theoretically) the way of thinking which one had before he became a Christian. Both constitute the whole mental state of the man, and are comprised in all things, [ ôὰ ἀñ÷áῖá are the things which belonged to us from the beginning. Trench, Synn., 2d Ser., pp. 81 ff.]. Osiander comprehensively observes: “All that the man had and purposed before he knew Christ, while he was out of Christ, and when he was not born of the Spirit, all that seemed valuable to him in his natural state completely lost its influence and authority over him as soon as he believed on Christ, and gave way to the overpowering energy of a new, better and permanent spirit.” Bengel expresses this passing away by likening it to the vanishing of the snow in the early spring; a comparison like that used in Isa_43:18. [The Vulgate and some ancient expositors include êáéíὴ êôßóéò in the antecedent portion of this sentence (si qua ergo in Christo nova creatura, i.e., if any man be a new creature in Christ), but such a construction makes the whole sentence tautological [inasmuch as the second or concluding member (vetera transierunt, i. e., old things have passed away) assert the same thing with the first]. The interjection ( ἰäïý ) gives great animation to the discourse as in 1Co_15:51; Rev_21:5. [“It transfers the reader as into the sudden sight of a picture. The moment a man is a Christian, a new creation rises up; the ancient world passes away as in the final dissolution of all things, and behold! a new scene is discovered, the whole world has in that instant become new.” Stanley]. If ôὰ ðÜíôá should be left out of the text, ãÝãïíåí êáéíÜ must have its subject in ôὰ ἀñ÷ᾶéá (old things have passed away, they have become new); unless we translate it: a new thing has taken place. The expression: it (the old) has become new, implying a complete change of the previous state, is certainly a bold one. [The aorist ( ðáñῆëèåí ) indicates that the old things passed away at a particular time, while the perfect ãÝãïíå describes the state which succeeded and still continues. Calvin has attempted to render the first member of the verse with a verb supplied in the imperative mood: if any man would be in Christ, let him become a new creature. He supposes that the Apostle is rebuking the ambition of false teachers and telling them that if they would be what they aspire to be, they must be much changed. The context, which has nothing of an ironical or hortatory character, is entirely opposed to this view. Comp. Hodge]. This great change the Apostle now proceeds to refer to its original principle. [Osiander: “he mounts from this idea of the new creation to God the source of all life, and traces the mental change of which he had been speaking to the great fundamental improvement of all human relations by the atonement of Christ”].
2Co_5:18-19. And all things [are] of God.—The “all things” of which he had just spoken, the whole state in which the old nature and life had passed away and every thing had become new, comes to us from God. The way, however, in which this occurs, is immediately described more definitely by directing our minds to the manner in which God effects such a change—who reconciled us to Himself by Christ— ÊáôáëëÜóóåéí , according to one class of interpreters is simply the accomplishment in man’s disposition toward God, of a change in which he gives up his dislike and his distrust of God; but according to another class, it is a change in God’s treatment of men, in which He no longer regards them with disfavor, and causes His wrath ( ὀñãÞ ) towards them to cease, and they become His beloved ones instead of enemies (comp. Rom_5:10; Col_1:20 f.). According to this latter view, it includes what is meant by showing favor to them ( ÷áñßæåóèáé ) and forgiveness of sins ( ἀöéÝíáé ôὰò ἁìáñôßáò ); and the result is that man on his side returns to a state of friendship with God (comp. Rom_5:1 ff; Rom_6:1 ff; Rom_8:3 f.). Both of these views might, however, be embraced in the êáôáëëÜîáé , so that the idea should be: the restoration of a state of friendship between God and men, but with the understanding that the manifestation of grace is first on the part of God. Thus Neander remarks: “Paul never speaks of God as man’s enemy, but only of man as God’s enemy. God is everlasting love and from Him can proceed nothing like enmity. That which separates man from God has its root entirely within himself, and must be taken away before he can receive the communications of Divine love in his heart. And yet this reconciliation of man to God is by no means confined to a subjective alteration of man’s disposition, for even this must be the result of an objective change in his relations to God. When Paul uses the word reconciliation he includes a reference to every thing which has taken place objectively in consequence of Christ’s work of redemption. The wrath of God ( ὀñãÞ èåïῦ ) the check which has been given to man’s moral development in consequence of sin, cannot cease until it is removed by the redemption through Christ’s death.” [It may perhaps be conceded that in this whole passage (2Co_5:18-21) “not a word is given about God reconciling Himself to us, appeasing His anger, satisfying His justice, or expiating our sins.” (J. Young). And yet 2Co_5:21 involves an idea very similar, and implies that the ground on which this whole passage is based (for whether ãὰñ is genuine or not, the verse itself is unquestionably a reason for the preceding argument) is that Christ has been made sin for us. The original meaning of êáôáëëÜóóù was doubtless that of a mutual exchange, and hence a mutual reconciliation of hostile parties. Some passages in the New Testament (Rom_5:11, and all those which speak of this reconciliation as effected by the death of Christ) seem to hint also at this idea. And yet we see no injury but rather a great benefit to theological exegesis if êáôáëëáãÞ ) could be uniformly distinguished from ἱëáóìüò and its kindred words, and confined to that part of the redeeming work by which man is reconciled (whatever may be the means, objective or subjective) to God. Olshausen on Rom_3:24; Stanley’s Obss. on the result of our passage; C. F. Schmid’s Bibl. Theol. Vol. II. p. 316 ff. Ebrard’s Chr. Dogm. § 406]. But the phrase by Christ refers to something which becomes more distinctly prominent in 2Co_5:21 (not by means of his doctrine or his example. Pelag). The pronoun us ( ἡìᾶò ) signifies not the Apostles exclusively, but believers generally; for there is no limitation implied until the nature of the subject calls for a limitation in the next sentence—and hath given to us the ministration of the reconciliation.—This ministration of the reconciliation is analogous to the ministration of righteousness, in 2Co_3:9. It is a ministry entirely devoted to the work of reconciliation, whose business it is to make known that reconciliation, and in consequence of which men believe in Christ. To define this ministry so as to make it include all believers (Olshausen) is contrary to the whole analogy of Paul’s representation. One might much rather take ἡìᾶò in a yet more limited sense (comp. 1Co_15:10; 1Ti_1:12 ff.); but such a construction is not necessary, nor would it be consistent with 2Co_5:19.—Because God was reconciling a world unto himself in Christ (2Co_5:19).—We have here an explanation and a reason for what had just been said. The word God ( èåüò ) stands so emphatically at the head of the sentence as to indicate a Divine agency in all this preparatory work, and a special prominence of it. Shall we now take the words God was in Christ, as if they constituted a sentence by itself, and regard the whole verse as asserting that the work of atonement was accomplished by the Divine being in Christ, or by the Godhead of Christ (comp. Col_1:19 ff.) in opposition to a lower Christological view? In this case God would signify the Father (others make it mean the ëüãïò , and still others the Triune God), and åῖ ̓ íáé ἐí would designate an habitual and substantial presence, and not merely a transient dynamic fellowship (Osiander). Or is ἦí êáôáëëÜóóùí an emphatic periphrastic imperfect (as in Gal_1:23), by which Paul wished to imform us in what things God was acting; viz., that God was when Christ died, reconciling the world unto Himself; i. e. God was in the work of Christ, in that series of acts by which the world was reconciled to God, and especially in that great event in which Christ died to atone for the world (the êáôáëëÜîáé of 2Co_5:18, Meyer)? Our decision upon these questions must depend very much upon what we find in the succeeding context. According to Meyer, Paul is in that context assigning the reasons which had induced him to say that God was reconciling the world. These are given when it is said that God was not imputing to men their trespasses, and had committed to him and his fellow laborers the word of reconciliation; from both which it was evident that God was in Christ’s work engaged in a scheme to reconcile the whole world unto Himself. The words ìὴ ëïãéæüìåíïò have the force of a verb in the present tense, for they assert that God is not reckoning unto men their trespasses. On the other hand the committing to us the work of reconciliation was what God did in applying that work to men, after it had been accomplished by Christ. Even Osiander concedes that these sentences are not to be coördinated with but subordinated to êáôáëëÜóóùí , etc., and that ìἡ ëïãéæüìåíïò describes a result which is intimately connected and nearly coincident with the reconciliation. This is the remission of guilt, a benefit which individuals may receive through faith, and to communicate which is the object of the Divine institution of the ministry ( êáὶ èÝìåíïò , etc.); and yet this result of the reconciling act, and the organ so indispensable to its realization in individuals, is not, according to him, an elementary part of it. It must, however, be conceded, that the way in which Meyer connects the participial sentence with ῆ ̔ í êáôáëëÜóó . (“it is evident that God is reconciling the world unto Himself, inasmuch as He does not impute,” etc.), has something rather artificial about it. Such a connection of the words would have been proper only if the Apostle had said, God is reconciling the world, or if he had continued by saying, God did not impute (imperfect) to men their trespasses. On the whole we think it best with Meyer to take ῆ ̓ í — êáôáëëÜóóùí together, but to regard the participial sentence as a more particular description of the way in which God was reconciling the world to Himself in Christ, “God was in Christ, (a phrase equivalent to by ( äéὰ ) Jesus Christ in 2Co_5:18, but with the understanding that Christ and what He has done are the only basis on which the reconciliation is founded), bringing back the world to a state of friendship with Himself; for He imputed not men’s sins to them, and He has committed unto us the word of reconciliation.” Not imputing men’s trespasses to them is equivalent to the bestowal of forgiveness upon men, and implies that God was applying the benefits of salvation by Christ to individuals ( áὐôïῖò ). This is set forth by means of a present participle (imperf. Winer, § 46), because the act was continuously to be repeated, while the word describing the institution of the ministerial office ( èÝìåíïò ), is an aorist participle, because the act was accomplished at a certain time. But the reconciliation, or the restoration of the happy relation, which was the consequence of this proceeding, is mentioned as a process commenced in Chr