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This Chapter Verse Commentaries:
Exo_21:1 to Exo_23:33
a. Right of Personal Freedom (according to Bertheau, ten in number)
Chap. Exo_22:1 If [When] a man shall steal [stealeth] an ox, or a sheep, and kill [killeth] it, or sell [selleth] it; he shall restore [pay] fiveoxen for an ox, and four sheep 2for a sheep. If a [the] thief be found breaking up [in], and be smitten that he die 3[so that he dieth], there shall no blood be shed [no blood-guiltiness] for him. If the sun be risen upon him, there shall be blood shed [blood-guiltiness] for him; for he [him; he] should make full restitution; if he have nothing, then he shall be sold for his theft. 4If the theft be certainly found in his hand alive, whether it be ox, 5or ass, or sheep; he shall restore [pay] double. If [When] a man shall cause [causeth] a field or vineyard to be eaten [fed upon], and shall put in his beast [letteth his beast loose], and shall feed [and it feedeth] in another man’s field; of the best 6of his own field, and of the best of his own vineyard, shall he make restitution. If [When] fire break [breaketh] out, and catch [catcheth] in thorns, so that the stacks of corn [grain], or the standing corn [grain], or the field, be [is] consumed therewith; he [consumed; he] that kindled the fire shall surely make [make full] restitution.
f. Judicial Proceedings
Exo_23:1(1) Thou shalt raise [carry] a false report: (2) put not thine [thy] hand with the wicked to be an unrighteous witness. (3) 2Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil; neither shalt thou speak in a cause to decline [turn aside] after many [a multitude] to wrest judgment: (4) 3Neither shalt thou countenance [be4partial to] a poor man in his cause. (5) If [When] thou meet [meetest] thine enemy’s ox or his ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again 5[to him]. (6) If [When] thou see [seest] the ass of him that hateth thee lying under his burden, and wouldest forbear to help him [thou shalt forbear to leavehim], thou shalt surely help [release it] with him. (7) 6Thou shalt not wrest the judgment of thy poor in his cause. (8) 7Keep thee far from a false matter; and the innocent and righteous slay them not: for I will not justify the wicked. (9) 8And thou shalt take no gift [bribe]: for the gift [a bribe] blindeth the wise [theseeing], and perverteth the words of the righteous. (10) 9Also thou shalt not oppress a stranger: for ye know the heart of a stranger, seeing ye were strangers in the land of Egypt.
[Exo_21:13. àִðָּä cannot mean “deliver,” and no object is expressed. It is therefore unwarrantable to render, with A. V., “deliver him,” or even with Lange, “let him accidentally fall into his hand.” The object to be supplied is the indefinite one suggested by the preceding sentence, viz. homicide.—Tr.]
[Exo_21:17. ÷ִìֵּì , though generally rendered “curse” in A. V., yet differs unmistakably from àָøַø in being used not merely of cursing, but of evil speaking in general, e.g. Jdg_9:27 and 2Sa_16:9. The LXX. render it correctly by êáêïëïãÝù . And this word, where the passage is quoted in the New Testament, is rendered by the same Greek word, viz. Mat_15:4.—Tr.]
[Exo_21:23. The Heb. reads áִּôְìִìִéí , lit. “with judges” or “among judges.” Some render “unto the judges;” others “before the judges;” but the preposition does not naturally convey either of these senses. The A. V. probably expresses the true meaning: “with judges,” i.e. the line being judicially imposed.—Tr.]
[Exo_22:29. Literally: “thy fullness and thy tear.” The phrase “ripe fruits” is objectionable as including too much; “liquors” as suggesting a wrong conception. The first refers to the crops generally, exclusive of the olive and the grape, from which oil and wine, the liquid products (“tear”), were derived. Cranmer’s Bible renders, not inaptly: “thy fruits, whether they be dry or moist.”—Tr.]
[Exo_23:5. The rendering of A. V.: “and wouldest forbear,” is utterly untenable. Not less so is the rendering of òֲæֹá by “help.” The simplest explanation assumes a double meaning of òָæַá , viz. to “loose,” and to “leave.” We might borrow a vulgar phrase, and read: “Thou shalt forbear to cut loose from him, thou shalt cut loose with him.” De Wette and Murphy attempt to avoid the double meaning by emphasizing “with.” Thus: “Thou shalt forbear to leave it to him: thou shalt leave it with him.” But this is a nicety quite alien from the Hebrew.—Tr.]
Here must be noticed one more circumstance. When regulations of similar import are found in different sections of the law, this is not to be regarded as mere repetition, still less as confusion. The moral law of the Sabbath, e.g., comes here (Exo_23:12) under consideration again, from a social point of view; in Leviticus still again as connected with the ceremonial law. For the Sabbath, there are moral and ritual reasons, and likewise social or civil reasons, the latter uniting the two former. In like manner the great festivals of the Israelites are here regarded from a national, or civil, point of view: in Leviticus they are associated with the idea of worship. The occasional precepts concerning purification and sacrifice in the book of Numbers relate to the keeping pure of the social commonwealth of Jehovah, and are therefore not primarily ceremonial. The tabernacle is found in Exodus, not in Leviticus, because it is primarily the house of the theocratic lawgiver, and is the repository of the decalogue; only secondarily the place of worship, the place where the lawgiver meets his people.
Exo_21:7-11 : The Israelitish daughter as servant and concubine. Knobel makes no distinction between concubinage as it is found among the patriarchs, and the usual custom of the Jews. But in reply see the Commentary on Genesis, p. 80. She shall not go out as the men-servants do.—It follows from the nature of her position that it is a benefit to her if she can remain in the house of her master, provided that the rights of the concubine are respected. It is therefore presupposed either that he takes her for himself, or gives her to his son, or maintains her honor by the side of his son’s wife. In the first case, he must let her be redeemed; in the second case, he must accord to her the domestic rights of an associate wife. If he is not willing to give her this protection, he must let her go free for nothing. In this connection the precepts of Deu_15:12 are also to be considered. Exo_21:8-9. Who hath betrothed her to himself.—“The ìֹà before éְòָãָäּ belongs to the 15 passages designated by the Massorah in which ìֹà stands for ìåֹ ” (Keil; compare Knobel). To sell her unto a strange people.—Knobel: “The Greek, too, did not sell a Greek slave to go beyond the boundary of the land.” Seeing he hath dealt deceitfully with her.—It would certainly create a difficulty to translate, “on account of his infidelity towards her,” as if this unfaithfulness were the only reason why an Israelitess might not be sold to heathen. Therefore the emphasis probably lies on the thought that his injustice would be doubly great if even in this case, in which he has gone so far as to send her away, he should also in his treachery to her violate the theocratic law. That the word áָּâַã has a specially important meaning, is seen from Psa_73:15. Comp. Deu_21:14, and the account of the Arabian customs in Knobel, p. 216. If he betroth her unto his son.—Comp. Knobel also on a Persian or Arabian custom of a similar sort. As his son’s concubine she is to be regarded by him as a daughter. Exo_21:9. If he take him another wife.—That is, the father for his son. So Keil; but Knobel understands it to mean: If he takes another for himself. Keil well disposes of the views, according to which either the son is the subject, or the father takes for himself. Her food, etc.—All of her domestic rights are to remain secure. ùְׁàֵø , meat, as the chief article of food, “because the lawgiver has men of wealth in mind.” (Keil). To understand òåֹðָä , which properly means lying, of cohabitation, yields no tolerable sense. How could the father in this thing control the son? Or how could the son be obliged to conduct himself towards several wives in the same way as towards one. Either, therefore, the expression has in it something figurative, meaning: She must not as wife be neglected; or it refers to a seat, a resting-place (see the meaning of òåּï ), which would well harmonize with the reference to food and raiment. It is therefore assumed that under the conditions imposed she has in the house of her servitude a much better position than if she should be dismissed, especially if she has borne children who belong to the permanent members of the household.
Exo_21:12. He that smiteth a man.—Says Keil: “Higher than personal freedom stands life.” It may then be asked, why is capital punishment prescribed (Exo_21:16) for the violent taking away of freedom? The slavery treated of in the preceding section was no innovation, but as a traditional custom it was restricted, and moreover in great part was based on guilt or voluntary assent; it had besides an educational end. It is true, the law of retaliation, as instituted in Gen_9:6, underlies all this section; but it is noticeable that this law is expressly prescribed just where the protection of a pregnant woman is involved. It is repeated (Lev_24:17) in connection with the ordinance that the blasphemer shall be stoned. The reason for the repetition is the principle that in respect to these points perfect equality of rights should be accorded to the stranger and the Israelite; and it was occasioned by the fact that the blasphemer was a Jew on his mother’s side, but an Egyptian on his father’s side. So that he dieth.—Three cases are specified: first, the severe blow which in fact, but not in intention, proves mortal; secondly, the unfortunate killing through mistake, a providential homicide; thirdly, intentional, and hence criminal and guileful, murder.
Exo_21:13. And if a man lie not in wait.—When, therefore not only the murderous blow, but any blow, was unintentional, so that the case is one of severe divine dispensation. I will appoint thee a place.—A place of refuge, with reference to the avengers of blood who pursue him. A check, therefore, upon the custom, prevalent in the East, of avenging murder. It is worthy of notice, from a critical point of view, that no place is now fixed; this was done later, vid. Num_35:11; Deu_19:1-10. Here too the innocent homicide is expressly distinguished from the violent one, Num_35:22 sqq. Together with the prescribed place of refuge for the one who kills by mistake is found the stern provision that a real murderer, who has committed his murder with criminal and guileful intent, cannot be protected even by fleeing to the altar of the sanctuary, as it was customary in ancient times for those to do whom vengeance rightly or wrongly pursued, because, as some would say, the altar was a place of expiation. Even from the altar of God he is to be torn away. The expression éָæִã is not adequately represented by “behave viciously, or arrogantly.” It denotes the act of breaking through, in ebullient rage, the sacred restraints which protect one’s neighbor as God’s image. Particular cases, Num_35:16, Deu_19:11. Murder could be expiated only with death, Num_35:31. Examples of fleeing to the altar, 1Ki_1:50; 1Ki_2:28. This was also customary among the Greeks.
Exo_21:15. Smiteth his father.—The simple act of smiting, committed on a father or mother, is made equivalent to man-slaughter committed on one’s neighbor. “Parricide, as not occurring and not conceivable, is not at all mentioned” (Keil). Similar ordinances among the Greeks, Romans, and Egyptians are mentioned by Knobel, p. 217. The two following provisions rest on the same ground. The parents are God’s vicegerents for the children; the neighbor is God’s image; hence a violent abuse of his person is equivalent to murder, vid. Deu_24:7. We explain the insertion of the prohibition of man-stealing between verses 15 and 17 by the fact that in cursing his parents the curser morally destroys himself, vid. Lev_20:9, Deu_27:16. The order is: undutifulness, man-stealing, self-destruction. See various views of Exo_21:16 in Keil, p. 133.
Exo_21:18 sq. And when men strive.—The section concerning bodily injuries as such is distiuguished from the section beginning with Exo_21:12 in that there injuries are spoken of which result in death. The injuries here mentioned would accordingly also be punished with death if they resulted in death. This is shown especially by Exo_21:20. Here, then, an injury is contemplated which only confines the injured one to his bed. The penalty is twofold: First, the offender must make good his sitting still, i.e. what he might have earned during this time; secondly, he must pay the expenses of his cure, Exo_21:19. In the case of a man-servant or maidservant a different custom prevailed. If manslaughter took place, the manhood of the slain one is fully recognized, i.e. the penal retribution takes place. Probably sentence was to be rendered by the court, which was to decide according to the circumstances. According to Jewish interpretations capital punishment was to be inflicted with the sword; but vid. Knobel for a different view. On the one hand, the danger of a fatal blow was greater than in other relations, for it was lawful for a master to smite his slave (vid. Pro_10:13; the rod was also used on children); but on the other hand an intention to kill could not easily be assumed, because the slave had a pecuniary value. Furthermore, the owner is exempted from punishment, if the beaten one survives a day or two; and the punishment then consists in the fact that the slave was his money, i.e. that in injuring the slave he has lost his own money. The Rabbins hold that this applied only to slaves of a foreign race, according to Lev_25:44. This is not likely, if at the same time, in case of death, execution by the sword was to be prescribed; also according to this view there would have been a great gap in the law as regards Hebrew slaves. It is true, reference is here had only to injuries inflicted by the rod. When one was killed with an iron instrument, an intention to kill was assumed, and then capital punishment was inflicted unconditionally, Num_35:16, Lev_24:17; Lev_24:21, Deu_19:11 sqq. On the Egyptian, Greek, and Roman legislation, see Knobel, p. 219.
Exo_21:22-25. Special legal protection of pregnant women. It might often happen that in quarrelling men would injure a pregnant woman, since wives on such occasions instinctively interpose, Deu_25:11. In the latter passage the rudenesses which the woman, protected by law, might indulge in are guarded against.—So that her fruit depart. Literally: so that her children come out; i.e., so that abortion takes place. According to Keil, the expression designates only the case of her bearing real children, not a fetus imperfectly developed; i.e., a premature birth, not an abortion, is meant. “The expression éְìָãֶéäָ is used for the sake of indefiniteness, since possibly there might be more than one child in her body.” Strange interpretation of the precept, according to which the plural in individual cases denotes indefiniteness! According to this view, the most, and perhaps the worst cases, would not be provided for, since women far advanced in pregnancy are most apt to guard against the danger of such injuries. The plural may also indicate that the capacity for bearing was injured. “If no other injury results from the quarrel, reparation is to be made, according as the husband of the woman imposes it on the perpetrator, and the latter is to give it ‘with judges,’ i.e., in company with, on application to them, in order that excessive demands may be suitably reduced. The amount of indemnity demanded doubtless was determined by the consideration, whether the injured man had many or few children, was poor or rich, etc. The law stands appropriately at the end of the cases which relate to life and the inviolability of the person. The unborn child is reckoned as belonging to, and, as it were, a part of, the mother” (Knobel).
Exo_21:23. And if any mischief follow. It is to the credit of the legislation that the law of retaliation (vid. Lev_24:19, Deu_19:21) is here so particularly laid down. In its connection it reads: The injury of such a woman must be most sternly expiated according to the degree of it. But even this explication of the law of retaliation must be guarded from a lifeless literalism, as is shown by the provisions in Exo_21:26-27. It would surely have been contrary to nature to put out the eye of a master who had put out his servant’s eye, or to make him lose tooth for tooth. Keil says, “ The principle of retaliation, however, is good only for the free Israelite, not for the slave.” In the latter case, he adds, emancipation takes place. Emancipation, even on account of a tooth knocked out, has nevertheless the force of retaliation, which, even in the relations of free Israelites, could not have been everywhere literally applied, e.g., in the case of burns. On the jus talionis in the ancient heathen world, and generally in the Orient, vid. Knobel, p. 220.
Exo_21:28. First case. And if an ox.—The instinct of oxen to hook is so general that every accident of this sort could not be foreseen and prevented. Therefore when an ox has not been described to the owner as properly a goring ox, the owner is essentially innocent. Yet for a possible want of carefulness he is punished by the loss of his animal. But the ox is stoned to death. Legally it would involve physical un-cleanness to eat of the flesh. But the stoning of the ox does not mean that the ox is “tainted with capital crime” (Keil), but that he has become the symbol of a homicide, and so the victim of a curse ( çֶøֶí ). It is therefore an application of Gen_9:6 in a symbolical sense, on account of the connection of cattle with men. Comp. also Lev_20:15. Similar provisions among the Persians and Greeks vid. in Knobel, p. 220.
Exo_21:29. Second case. The owner has been cautioned that his ox is given to hooking. In this case he himself is put to death as well as his ox. This is the rule. But as there may be mitigating considerations, especially in the case of the injured family; as in general the guilt was only that of carelessness, not of evil intention, the owner might save his life by means of a ransom imposed on him by the relatives of the man that had been killed. Probably with the mediation of the judges, as in Exo_21:22. Reference to the Salic law made by Knobel. Ransom.— ëֹּôֶø , covering, expiation.
Exo_21:31. Third case. The son or the daughter of a freeman are treated in the same manner as, according to the foregoing, he himself is treated.
Exo_21:32. Fourth case. The ox gores a manservant or a maid-servant to death. The stoning of the ox is still enjoined, but the owner in this case is not doomed to death. He must pay the master of the slave 30 shekels of silver. “Probably the usual market price of a slave, since the ransom money of a free Israelite amounted to 50 shekels, Lev_27:3.” (Keil). On the value of the shekel ( ùֶּׁ÷ֶì óßêëïò ) vid. Winer, Realwörterbuch, p. 433 sqq. The result of the perplexing investigation is that its value Isaiah 25 or 26 silver groschen. The shekel afterwards used for the revenue of the temple and of the king was different from that used in common life. This legal inequality [between the slave and the freeman] is to be explained by the consideration that the capital punishment inflicted on the owner formed an offset, to the revenge to which otherwise the relatives of the murdered man might resort. But this revenge for bloodshed was in no danger of being exercised in the case of a murdered slave, since he was removed from the circle of his relations. The seemingly great difference in the penalty amounts finally to this, that the ransom money for a free man was 50 shekels, and that for a slave 30 shekels. On the estimate of the Attic slave, vid. Knobel; but the great difference in the period of time must be taken into account. “In the legal codes of other ancient nations also are found laws concerning the punishment of beasts that have killed or injured a man. Coop. Clericus and Knobel on this passage. But no nation had a law which made the owner of such a beast responsible, because none of them had recognized the divine image in human life” (Keil). The responsibility of the owner could certainly be grounded only on the mysterious solidarity of the Hebrew household (“thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy cattle”), a unity which was not taken into account where a more atomistic view of liberty prevailed.
Exo_21:33-34. Fifth case. And when a man shall open a pit (cistern). This is connected with the foregoing cases as coming under the head of punishable carelessness. The ox or ass are named as examples of domestic animals in general. In this case only property is destroyed; and the careless man has to pay for it, but receives the dead beast, of which he could only use the skin and other such parts, since the flesh was unclean.
Exo_21:35. Sixth case. A specially fine provision. In the ox that has killed another ox there is nothing abominable, but yet a stain; the sight of him is obnoxious. He is therefore sold and comes into another place where his fault is not known. But the two owners share the price of sale and the dead animal. This is an alleviation of a misfortune that is common to both parties. Without doubt the dead ox also must have hooked.
Exo_21:36. Seventh case. But here too is to be considered the special circumstance that the ox may have been a notorious hooker. In this case the owner must make full compensation for the loss with a live ox, in return for which he receives the dead beast.
Exo_22:1-4. Eighth case. The cattle-thief. Five-fold indemnity for the stolen ox; four-fold for the stolen sheep or goat. In the case of the five-fold indemnity any kind of large animal may be delivered over. The difference of five-fold and four-fold points to the greater guilt of the greater theft. “The four-fold restitution is also mentioned in 2Sa_12:6 : the seven-fold, Pro_6:31, is not to be understood literally, but only in a general way as manifold” (Knobel). From the five-fold and four-fold restitution is distinguished the two-fold, which is prescribed in case the thief has not yet slaughtered or sold the animal, but is able to return it alive. The reasons for this distinction are differently given; vid. Keil; also his note, II. p. 137. In the latter case the thief had not carried out his purpose to the full extent, especially as he has not put the object of his theft out of the way. The case differed therefore materially from the other. Vid. Knobel on the Roman laws. Others indicating the value set on ploughing oxen, Knobel. p. 222.
Exo_22:2-3. If the thief be found breaking in.—This is obviously an incidental interpolation, which properly belongs to the class (b). There shall be no blood to him; i.e. no blood-guiltiness is incurred by the homicide; vid. Num_35:27; Deu_19:10; Job_24:16. One might understand this chiefly of an attack on the fold, since the topic is the stealing of cattle; at all events a nocturnal irruption is meant, vid. Exo_22:3. Accordingly the watchman, or the one who is awaked, is in a condition of defense. He must protect his property, and therefore fight; and the thief is liable to become a robber and murderer. If the sun be risen upon him.—It might be thought that this refers to the early dawn or early day, when he might recognize the thief, or frighten him away unrecognized, or with the help of others capture him. But inasmuch as further on it is assumed that the thief has really accomplished his theft, the expression probably means: If some time has elapsed. If in this case the owner kills the thief, he incurs blood-guiltiness; but on account of the great variety in the cases the sentence of death is not here immediately pronounced upon him. Since the life of the thief is under the protection of the law, the case comes before the criminal court, vid. Exo_21:20. For Calvin on the “ratio disparitatis inter furem nocturnum et diurnum,” vid. Keil, p. 137. The real punishment for the thief is determined by the law concerning restitution, Exo_22:1; Exo_22:3. But in case the thief can restore nothing, he is sold for the theft, for that which is stolen, i.e. for the value of it. “This can mean only a sale for a period of time. The buyer reckoned the restitution which the thief was to render, and used the thief as a slave until the whole loss was made good” (Knobel). Similar arrangements among the Romans vid. in Knobel, p. 223. Likewise laws concerning theft, p. 224. The thief could not be sold to a foreigner, according to Josephus, Ant. XVI. 1, 1.
Exo_22:5. Ninth case. A field or a vineyard to be fed upon.—There are various views of this. (1) Si læserit quispiam agrum vel vineam, etc. (Vulg.). Luther: “When any one injures a field or vineyard, so that he lets his cattle do damage.” (2) Knobel: “When one pastures a field or a vineyard by sending his cattle to it.” (3) Keil: “When any one pastures a field or a vineyard, and lets his cattle loose.” ùָׁìַç bears either meaning, to send away, or to let go free; but according to the connection only the latter can be meant here. The sense given to it by the Vulgate might accordingly be accepted: he injures the field or vineyard of his neighbor so that, (in that) etc. But it is more obvious to assume an incidental carelessness to be meant. The beast feeds on his field (perhaps also on the grass between the grape-vines); from this pasture ground he lets him pass over so that he does damage to his neighbor. Knobel even affirms that an intentional damage is meant. And yet only a simple, though ample, indemnity is to be rendered from the best of his field and of his vineyard. Keil rightly contends against Knobel’s theory. Talmudic provisions on this point are found in Saalschütz, Mosaisches Recht, p. 875 sq.
Exo_22:6. Tenth case. This is about, a fire in a field, which might the more readily sweep over into the neighbor’s field, inasmuch as it was likely to be kindled at the edge of the field, in the thorn-hedge. Clearly an act of carelessness is meant; comp. Isa_5:5. He that hath kindled the fire.—The carelessness is imputed to him as a virtual incendiary, because he did not guard the fire.
Exo_22:8. Second case. The thief is not discovered. In this case suspicion falls on the keeper; he may have embezzled the property entrusted to him. Therefore such a case must come before the court, which was esteemed a divine court, hence the expression, àֶìÎäָàֱìäִéí . The penalty is paid according to the decision of the case. The man under suspicion must approach unto God. Such an approach produced an excitement of conscience. The true high-priest is the one who may approach unto God. In case the keeper is adjudged guilty, he has to pay double.
Exo_22:9. The foregoing provision is designated as an example for a general rule. The cleansing of the suspected man was probably often effected by an oath of purification. The LXX. and Vulgate interpolate êáὶ ὸìåῖôáé , et jurabit. In all cases in which the concealer made a confession, an oath was unnecessary. Also dishonesty respecting objects found is placed under this rule. On the oath among the Arabs and Egyptians, see Knobel, p. 225. Knobel seems to assume without reason that the plaintiff also is meant in the words, “whom God shall condemn,” etc.
Exo_22:10-11. Third case. This is about beasts put in others’ care, which die in their possession, or are mutilated in the pasture, or injure themselves, or are driven away by robbers. Here the oath is positively required, in case the guardian alone has seen the thing; but it is also decisive. On a similar Indian law vid. Knobel.
Exo_22:12. Fourth case. Stolen from him.—It is assumed that the thief is not found. “Here,” says Knobel, “restitution is prescribed, but not in Exo_22:8, because he who has an animal in charge is the guardian of it, whereas he who has things in charge cannot be regarded as exactly a watchman.” But according to Exo_22:9 the judges could even adjudge a double restitution, while here only simple restitution is spoken of. There a complication was referred to, in which the approach of the master of the household to God and the attitude of his conscience formed the main ground for the judicial sentence. In the case described in Exo_22:10-11 the oath determines the main decision; in the present case the simple restitution is prescribed upon the simple declaration: “stolen.”
Exo_22:13. Fifth case. The production of the animal torn by a beast of prey (not, “or a part of it,” as Keil says) proved not only the fact itself, but also that the guardian had watched, and had driven off the beast of prey by a violent exertion. From this we see the severity of Laban who, according to Gen_31:39, required his son-in-law in such cases to make the loss good. Comp. 1Sa_17:34, Amo_3:12. On the Indian law, vid. Knobel, p. 227.
Exo_22:14. Sixth case. A hired beast is injured, or dies, when the owner is not present. The sentence requires restitution, because neglect may be presumed.
Exo_22:15. Seventh case. The owner is present when the accident occurs. In that case it belonged especially to himself to prevent the accident, if prevention was possible.
Eighth case. The borrower is in the hired service of the owner of the beast. In this case he gets the dead beast instead of his pay; it is subtracted from his pay. For the owner as a hired laborer would have had to do only with himself; and a hired servant with a hired beast cannot be meant. It is therefore a day-laborer to whom the animal of the owner has been entrusted. ùָׂëִéø can hardly (with Stier and Keil) be referred to the hired beast. Knobel has a forced explanation, in which the hired servant becomes the one who lets the beast.
Exo_22:16. Ninth case. The seducer of an unbetrothed virgin (the case is different with the seduction of a betrothed one (Deu_22:23), who has entrusted to him the wealth of her virginity, valuable not only in a moral, but in a civil point of view, must make restitution to her by marrying her, and to her father by giving a dowry.
Exo_22:17. Tenth case. The seducer himself cannot refuse the settlement; but the father of the seduced maiden may have reasons for refusing it. In this case the seducer must pay him the dowry (vid. Gen_34:12), with which she is, in a sort, reinstated as a virgin, and as afterwards a legally divorced woman. The case is not differently provided for in Deu_22:28, as Knobel affirms. There only the price of sale is fixed, viz., at 50 shekels; the right of the father to refuse his daughter to the seducer is simply not repeated. The dowry was not properly a price of sale.
“The precepts in Exo_22:18 and onwards,” says Keil, “differ in form and contents from the foregoing laws; in form, by the omission of ëִּé [when], with which the foregoing are almost without exception introduced; in substance, by the fact that they impose on the Israelites, on the ground of their election to be the holy people of Jehovah, requirements which transcend the sphere of natural law.” Yet the two divisions are not to be distinguished as natural and supernatural. But Keil has correctly found a new section here, whilst Knobel begins a new section, poorly defined, with Exo_22:16.
Exo_22:19. Second offence. Sexual intercourse with a beast. Comp. Lev_18:23; Lev_20:15; Deu_27:21. This unnatural thing also was punished with death, like the kindred one of sodomy, a prominent vice of the Canaanites, Lev_20:13.
Exo_22:20. Third offence. Idolatry. Keil’s explanation, “Israel must not sacrifice to foreign gods, but must not only tolerate foreigners in the midst of them,” etc., almost seems intended to intimate that the heathen in Israel had an edict of tolerance for their offerings. Opposed to this conception is the Sabbath law, and the ordinance in Exo_23:24. In both cases, however, the explanation is that a public worship of strange gods was not tolerated in Israel; but an inquisition to ferret out such worship secretly carried on is not countenanced by the Mosaic law. The words are: “whosoever sacrificeth unto any god.” The addition, “save unto Jehovah only” (as likewise Exo_20:24), is a mild expression also as regards the theocratic offerings, and also secures a right understanding of the word “Elohim.”—He is to be devoted, i.e., to the judgment of Jehovah sentencing him to death. Here the notion of çֶøֶí (hherem, ban) comes out distinctly. Every capital punishment was essentially a hherem; but here is found the root of the notion: an idolater by his offering has withdrawn from Jehovah the offering due to Him alone; he has, so to speak, removed the offering away from the true divine idea, and perverted it into its opposite. “He is to be devoted by death to the Lord, to whom in life he would not devote himself” (Keil). It may be that a sort of irony lies in the notion of the hherem; as being consecration reversed, it secures to God the glory belonging to Him alone; but it does this also as being consecration to the judging God in His judgment. “No living thing,” says Knobel, “devoted to Jehovah could be redeemed, but had to be destroyed. Lev_27:28 sq.; 1Sa_15:3.” But only when it was a case of hherem, vid. Deu_13:12 sqq.
Exo_22:21. Fourth offence. A beautiful contrast to the foregoing is formed by the statement, of offences against humanity. Maltreatment of the foreigner is put first of all. He must not be wronged, “for ye were strangers,” etc. A moral principle which re-appears in the N. T. (Mat_7:12). as also in Kant. The particular rules concerning the treatment of aliens are given by Knobel. p. 228, who also gives the appropriate references to Michaelis and Saalschütz. Vid. Exo_3:9, Deu_26:7. Knobel says, “The persons meant are the Canaanitish and non-Canaanitish strangers who staid as individuals among the Israelites; the Canaanites as a whole are