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Footnotes:
Gal_3:15—[ ÊåêõñùìÝíçí , simply “confirmed.” If anything be supplied, it need not be in the conditional form of the E. V.—R.]
Gal_3:15.—[“Disannulleth” is now obsolete, the simple form being of precisely the same signification. “Addeth thereto” i. e. new conditions.—R.]
Gal_3:16.—[The change in order is necessary to emphasize “and to his seed.” ’̓ Åñ ̀ ῥ Ý èçóáí , à . A. et al. Lachmann, Tischendorf Meyer, et al., instead of” ̓ Åῤῥ Þ èçóáí , Rec.—R.]
Gal_3:17.—[The structure of this verse is cumbrous, but the insertion of “that” renders it still more so.—R.]
Gal_3:17.— Åἰò ×ñéóôüí is lacking in several MSS. including à . The connection however favors the belief in its genuineness, since otherwise the argument in Gal_3:16 would hardly be turned to practical account. [Omitted in à . A. B. C. many versions, by Lachmann, Tischendorf, Meyer, Alford, Lightfoot. Retained by Griesbach, Wordsworth, bracketted by Ellicott. If retained, may be rendered “to Christ,” or “for Christ.” See Exeg. Notes.—R]
Gal_3:17.—[ Ïýê ἀêõñïῖ —“cannot” may be implied, but is not expressed. “Invalidate” is preferable to “annul,” as the Greek word differs from that rendered “annul” (Gal_3:15).—R.]
Gal_3:18.—[ Êå÷Üñéóôáé , “has given freely,” “given of grace.” We have no single word to express it—R.]
(Gal_3:25-29.)
EXEGETICAL AND CRITICAL
The direct answer is not given immediately, but is introduced with: “It was added because of the transgressions.—This means, simply, on account of transgressions was the law added. “Transgressions,” multiplying and becoming aggravated, gave, in the first place, occasion for adding the law, necessarily brought it to pass that God came with respect to His people into an entirely different, more distant relation than existed, in the covenant of promise, between Him and the patriarchs. Instead of the more fatherly relation existing hitherto, God was constrained to place Himself in a relation involving the exercise of severe discipline, involving rigorous requirements and commands, nay, sharp threatenings, as it is afterwards expressed: “We were kept in ward, shut up under the law.” And as this relation so different from the former had been occasioned by “transgressions,” it was of course precisely in its right place where the “transgressions” of men prevailed, and it was designed, with reference to this, not so much in order to prevent them, as rather, by its commandments and prohibitions, and the threatenings annexed, to bring them under a more stringent accountability (which now first became possible), and a plainly expressed curse. Comp. Ewald: In order, because offences had come into the world, to punish them the more severely. (At first the judgment of death had kept the sense of sin alive. As men now were too accustomed to this, the law then came, and therewith the stricter imputation of sin, the curse more severely denounced, the obedience more rigorously required. Rieger.) At the most this is as far as we are to go in the explanation of ðáñáóÜóåùí ÷Üñéí . A more precise declaration as to the positive purpose of the law in relation to “transgressions” is not yet given here; and cannot therefore be deduced from the general expression; for then the second objection (Gal_3:21) would no longer be possible; it is in the refutation of this that Paul first expresses himself more particularly. The common explanation therefore: “For the sake of transgressions” = to induce them (agreeably to what Paul elsewhere says of the effect of the law to promote sin), is at least in no way indicated. The question whether Paul had it in mind would not arise before Gal_3:22-24. That the word ÷Üñéí does not necessitate this explanation, is shown by such passages as Luk_7:47; Luk_3:12. [The view here suggested seems to be in the main that of Ellicott and Wordsworth [Milton. Paradise Lost, 7:285). The purpose of the law as here set forth was, not (1) to prevent transgression, nor (2) to create, multiply transgressions, though elsewhere this is mentioned as its effect, but (3) to bring to light “the transgressions” of it already occurring and to occur, to make them “palpable, to awaken a conviction of sin in the heart, and make man feel his need of a Saviour” (Ellicott). Thus “the law had a supplementary, parenthetical, provisional and manductory character, and came in, as it were, incidentally” (Wordsworth).—R.] To this purpose of the law there then agree also:
1. The limited duration of its binding force, continuing only till the seed should come, for with that its purpose in reference to “transgressions” was fulfilled. (Why? is answered Gal_3:23, sq.) “The seed” to whom the promise has been made (see on Gal_3:16) is Christ, for He is the universal Heir; those who are Christ’s are then, it is true, included also in this seed, and become therefore joint-heirs with Him (Gal_3:29). 2. The manner of its origin: ordained by means of angels in the hand of a mediator. As agents in giving the law (not as its authors), Paul designates the angels, agreeably to the ancient tradition, which appears first LXX. Deu_33:2 (not in the original); and also Heb_2:2; Act_7:53; Josephus, Antiq. 15, 5, 3, and in the Rabbins. “In the hand of a mediator”—Moses. Moses received the tables of the law from God, and brought them down to the people. “In the hand” is therefore to be taken strictly. The explanation of most of the Fathers [so Barnes.—R.] referring it to Christ is incorrect. [Lightfoot remarks: “It will be seen that St. Paul’s argument here rests in effect on our Lord’s Divinity as its foundation, otherwise He would have been a mediator in the same sense in which Moses was a mediator. In another and a higher sense St. Paul himself so speaks of our Lord (1Ti_2:5).”—R.] Schneider refers it to the angel of the law, who, according to Jewish theology, had the special commission to teach Moses the law. Unquestionably the Rabbins speak of an angel of the law, but it is no more possible to prove this Theolo-gumenon to have existed in Paul’s time, than it is to establish it from the Bible (Meyer). The purpose of this reference to the origin of the law is not to demonstrate its inferior dignity, and still less, indeed, is it, as even Meyer and Wieseler strangely assume, to bring the glory of the law, in the magnificence and solemnity of its institution, before the reader. The dignity of the law itself is not under consideration, but its design, as compared with the covenant of promise. We are not, in reading this verse, to pause without reason at ðñïóåôÝèç , as though this were a complete idea, but should read the whole verse together. It is true, we first read: on account of transgressions it was added, but the complete statement is: on account of transgressions it was added in the definite way which is described, 1. by “till the seed,” etc., 2. by “ordained by,” etc. In this way did it originate, that Isaiah , 1. in an entirely different way from the covenant of promise; it was not an immediate giving of a promise, not a fatherly provision and agreement on the part of God, but was introduced by a mediation, and a double one, first of angels, and then, and not before, of a human mediator expressly chosen; the former mediation being on the side of God, the latter being given at the desire of the people themselves. (“How strangely does this appear in contrast with the former manifestations of God, in which the promises were given.” Reiger.) This is meant to point out how much more of strangeness God used towards the people in the law, how much more distant a relation it established than the covenant of promise; how could it then have had the same purpose as the covenant?—But this manner of origin 2. corresponded entirely with the purpose of the law as it has been stated: “because of the transgressions.” As these made the law in general necessary, so, moreover, they were the reasons why God came, only through angels, into relation to His people, and that the people on their side had need of a mediator, to hold intercourse with God. The difference indicated in the latter circumstance between the law and the covenant of promise, is then moreover expressly dwelt upon in the following verse.
Gal_3:20. Now a mediator is not a mediator of one.—The first words are simple and plain: A mediator ( ὁ ìåóßôçò , the Art. generic) can never be mediator of a single party, the very idea presupposes more than one, two at least, between whom he is ìÝóïò . The question can then only by, whether the design of the remark is, primarily, to express something respecting the mediator himself, personally, or something respecting his function. In the first case the sense would be: He belongs not merely to one, but to the two, the two parties between whom he mediates. So now here in concreto: the mediator of the law belonged to the two parties whose mediator he was, viz.: God and men; and the sense more particularly would be: therefore not merely to God, but also to men. The remark would then be intended as an affirmation respecting the nature of the law, that is, has not only a Divine, but also a human character.—Yet this explanation by no means commends itself. If we join ἑíüò with ïὐê ἔóôéí , the interpretation: He belongs not merely to one, is much less obvious than the other: He has to do not merely with one, but with two, mediates between two. Still simpler is the construction of Ewald, who joins ἑíüò immediately with ìåóὶôçò =the mediator of one is not, does not exist, is an impossibility. [So Wordsworth.—R.]
But God is one.—The words can mean nothing else: åἶò has a numerical signification, i.e., it can have no other meaning than that of the preceding åἶò , hence not=the same, One with Himself, etc. It is these words especially that have given rise to such an enormous number of attempts at explanation. As regards these the reader is referred to the monographs of C. F. Bonitz, C. F. Anton Reil, Koppe, or the ordinary commentaries, such as those of Meyer and Wieseler, where the more important modern explanations are arranged in order. A detailed examination may be spared here, especially as the passage of itself is not doctrinally important. [Meyer thus remarks on the course of exegesis: “The many different explanations of the passage, and there must be more than 250 of them, have been thus multiplied especially in more modern times; for the Fathers pass lightly over the words, which are plain in themselves, without regarding their pragmatic difficulties, for the most part applying the first clause, which is generally taken correctly, to Christ, who is the Mediator between God and men, some however casting a side glance at the opponents of the Divinity of Christ. Although there was no special dogmatic interest connected with the passage, the variety of interpretations in the 16th and 17th centuries’ (see Poole’s Synopsis) was such, that every expositor of importance took his own separate course, yet without polemical spirit, since no dogmatical question was at issue. The variety has become still greater since the middle of the 18th century, especially since the rise of grammatico-historical exegesis (the phi-logical errors of which exegesis it has however fully experienced), and is still increasing. How often too the absurdest fancies and crudest attempts have availed themselves of our text, the explanation of which seems to be regarded as an exegetical work of art!” He then answers fifteen of the later opinions, besides alluding to others. Jowett reckons 430 interpretations! What a testimony to the amount of exegetical labor bestowed on the Scriptures! That too on a passage which is at best but a general statement in support of a single point in a long argument, which seeks not so much to set forth the gospel, as to remove mistaken views respecting the law! How thankful we should be that the! gospel texts are so pellucid; had they been less so, we should doubtless have 250 interpretations of [ them also. As the exegesis now stands, it is perhaps better to admit that the Verse is äõóíüçôüíôé (2Pe_3:16). The passage is undoubtedly genuine, and does not refer to Christ. Thus much seems clear. Schmoller gives below an exposition, to which he has added in the second edition another (on which comment is made in the proper place). To this the reader will find added the views of Ellicott and Lightfoot, which have been chosen on account of their clearness, a quality especially desirable, when the explanation has so often been lucus a non lucendo.—R.]
The question is mainly this: Is äÝ (of the second clause) simply metabatic, or adversative? A decision in favor of the one view, gives an entirely different sense from that arrived at by adopting the other.—In the first case we have simply the minor premise of a syllogism, ὁ èåüò is with åἴò subsumed under the åἴò denied with ìåóßôçò . The mediator is not a mediator of one, now God is one, therefore, &c. The conclusion now may be various. Wieseler gives it: Therefore the mediator has reference not merely to God, but also to men. But the thought that there is found in ὁ äὲ èåὸò åἰò ἐóôßí , namely, God is only one party, appears to have too little force. Ewald gives it: Therefore the Mediator has not reference to God, for God is only one, consists not, for instance, of two internally distinct Gods, or of an earlier and later God; it is clear therefore that Moses as mediator, did not mediate, say between the God of the promise and the God of the law, and thereby confound the law with the promise, and so annul the former by what was latter and later, but that he only mediated between God and the people of that time. Ingenious, but far-fetched. The chief objection, however, to this whole view of äÝ as metabatic is, that the following sentence in Gal_3:21 points too evidently in íüìïò and èåüò to a previous antithesis, from which then ïὔí deduces an inference. The above mentioned explanations are wanting in the recognition of the inner connection of the two verses (Meyer); the thought breaks off, and an entirely new one begins. Besides, according to Ewald’s explanation the question as to a êáôÜ would not have been in place here, as this êáôÜ is precisely what the foregoing thought would have denied. ÄÝ is therefore doubtless to be taken adversatively, and the äÝ of the first member is the metabatic äÝ of a minor premise. Paul had said : The law was given through a mediator. Now with one there is no mediator, while on the other hand God is One. therefore it might be inferred that the law is against the promises. Meyer: Gal_3:20 contains two loci communes, from which a possible inference (Gal_3:21) with respect to the two concretes which are under consideration, is drawn. Sense: A mediator presupposes two, therefore also the law does; in the case of that, there were two parties, between which the mediator intervened;—on the other hand God is One, not a plurality, if the promise therefore, of which God is author (comp. Gal_3:18; Gal_3:21), had its origin through Him alone, there was only a single personage active thereby, it was a purely Divine act, not resting upon a contract of two parties. How entirely different in origin, therefore, was God’s covenant of promise, from the law! (Was it not thereby clearly indicated, that the purpose of the law was not to be the same and therefore is not the same, as that of the covenant of promise, that therefore its purpose in specie cannot have been, to secure—directly—the êëçñïíïìßá for men?) But can it not be inferred from this, that the law is against the promises of God? that it stands in conflict with them? so that,-because the law has come, the promises are no longer to be regarded as valid, and a fulfilment of them is not to be looked for; as at the giving of a constitution by compact between prince and people the qestion may arise whether previous promises given on one side are still to be fulfilled? The main point is to understand êáôÜ (Gal_3:21) rightly (even Meter does not explain this correctly). One objection, that the law is then purposeless, if “the inheritance is not of the law,” Paul has refuted in Gal_3:19-20, by pointing to the fact that it was given for an entirely different purpose, as appears from the very manner of its origin. But out of this refutation of the first objection arises a second, whether by this superadding of the law ( ðñïóåôÝèç ) the purpose of the covenant of promise be not hindered; first a free promise on the part of God (without regard to ðáñáâÜóåéò ), and then a law, coming through a mediator, who intervened between God and the people, originating therefore by a compact of God and the people (with definite reference to ðáñáâÜóåéò ); does not this then hinder the first, and so far do it away?—This abrogation however is not to be taken in the sense of Gal_3:17, that the law came in the place of the promise, so that the inheritance would now come “of the law,” for this is already refuted, first by the very course of the argument Gal_3:15 sq. from the idea of a äéáèἡêç , then also by the refutation of the objection that then the law is purposeless, Gal_3:19-20. The question in Gal_3:21 is to be understood as implying an apprehension that by the law the attainment of the inheritance (which, it is presupposed, according to the proof already given, can only be attained “by promise”) may be hindered, maybe made, comparatively speaking; impossible. It is not, therefore, the form of the “promise” which is here meant, but the substance; on which account we have here again the plural ἐðáããåëéῶí ; the question being, whether the law does not render the fulfilment of the promises of God impossible. This alone gives a progress of thought, and this alone is entirely congruous with what follows. Paul now refutes this second objection also. The law in no wise interposes an obstacle to the promises of God, but rather, in itself, agrees fully therewith, nay, although it had not itself the ability or function of bringing—the promises immediately into fulfilment, it was meant nevertheless to serve the purpose of rendering men partakers of this fulfilment by faith in Christ (Gal_3:23-24), and with this the law itself then attained its end (Gal_3:25 sq.).
I allow this explanation, given in the first edition, to remain. It was grounded on that of Meyer, and has at all events this in its favor, in distinction from other explanations, that it puts Gal_3:21 in immediate connection with Gal_3:20, and understands the question in Gal_3:21 as seemingly resulting from Gal_3:20, while the other explanations, though otherwise having much in their favor, assume that the thought breaks off with Gal_3:20, and that in Gal_3:21 Paul merely turns back to Gal_3:17 or 19.—However a new explanation of Gal_3:20 has been given by Dr. Vogel in the Studien und Kritiken, 1865, Heft 3, which, it is true, also fails to give a connection between Gal_3:20 and Gal_3:21, but which, on the other hand, points out the connection between Gal_3:19-20 with better success than usual, and which, in particular, gives due weight to the statement, the law was “ordained by means of angels.” In the other explanations full justice has not been done to this statement, which though otherwise so abrupt, could not have been made without a purpose. Vogel starts from the usually neglected point of the signification of ìåóßôçò , and shows that ìåóßôçò by no means signifies merely, and not even predominantly—as is commonly assumed in advance—one who stands in the midst between two, but that it means most commonly one who acts instead of some one, and cares for his affairs.—A genitive joined with it signifies either the matter, which is accomplished by the mediation, or the person whom the ìåóßôçò represents, or (which however cannot be shown of Paul’s use of it) the several parties between whom he discharges his function (as in 1Ti_2:5). When now it is said of the ìåóßôçò : ἑíὸò ïὑê ἔóôéí ; this of course involves the positive affirmition: a mediator can only be the mediator of more than one. And here Vogel admits that it would be most obvious to understand this plurality of a plurality of parties, between whom the mediator stands in the midst, but decides nevertheless in favor of the other interpretation of ìåóἰôçò : representative—of several persons, for the discharge of their affairs. It is true a representative may very well represent one person only; but then we must understand a representation for the purpose of mediation. In that case it is most natural, only one having to conclude a compact, that he should do it in his own person. But if several have it to do, and that in such a way that the transaction cannot be completed by all, a mediation by one person acting instead of many becomes necessary, and such a person is a ìåóßôçò . The sense would then be: where a mediator appears, we are obliged to understand him as representing a number of persons. Vogel is led to this interpretation, in the first place by the sentence immediately following: ὁ äὲ èåὸò åἰ ἐóôßí =but (adversative) Go l is one. He therefore is not that plurality, which the mediator as such implies. Therefore—the strict logical inference—the mediator is not God’s mediator, does not appertain as mediator to God. But whose mediator is this mediator? who is this plurality?
The answer, given Gal_3:19 is: ἄããåëïé —in these we have the plurality we were looking for. The law is, according to Paul, äéáôáãåὶò äἰ ἀããÝëùí . (Comp. Gal_3:15, ἐðéäéáô .: the law is not an ἐðéäéáôáãÞ in the sense that the covenant of promise was thereby prejudiced, or destroyed; it is, however, a ðñïóäéáôáãÞ —comp. ðñïóåôÝèç —which, however, was not intended to annul the covenant of promise, for it was only meant to be in force “till the seed should come,” etc., that is, only for a time, only till the fulfilment of the covenant of promise should take place. The covenant, therefore, neither could nor should be in any way infringed upon.) The author of the law is not mentioned here, as He had not been at ðñïóåôÝèç . Of course God is to be understood. But Paul is not specially engaged, in making this authorship prominent. He stops with declaring that the law was ordained—promulgated—through angels, having in mind thereby to place it on a lower level than the covenant of promise. With “in the hand of a mediator” (by which of course no one else than Moses is to be understood) Paul now proceeds to name the signs by which the inferior dignity of the law may be known. The disposition of it committed to the angels, took effect through a ìåóßôçò , who, it is manifest, is to be regarded then as their delegate. The angels, the sense might be, did not even themselves promulgate the law in their own person, but this was done through a (human) mediator. The sense therefore would be: ordained for men, that is, the people of Israel, through angels, who, moreover, availed themselves of a mediator.—Yet Paul, by “in the hand of a mediator,” is not so much giving a fresh sign of the inferior rank of the law, as strengthening the previous affirmation, “ordained by angels.” The circumstance that a mediator was engaged in the work, was not meant so much to explain the manner of the angelic ministration, as to establish the fact of it. The presence of a mediator was in Paul’s mind closely connected with this, but by no means so closely connected in the current doctrine. How far this circumstance, that a mediator (namely, Moses) had a joint agency in the giving of the law, is a proof of this ministry of angels, is explained in Gal_3:20. “In the hand of a mediator” Paul has said and had to say: but where a ìåóßôçò is present, a plurality of parties represented by him is to be assumed; God however is not a plurality, but One: The law, therefore, at whose promulgation a plurality intervened, did not proceed from God, but from the angels (these being the only two parties conceivable)—and therefore form a plurality. The clause would not then be properly a proof (as indeed it is not introduced by ãÜñ ), but the fact of the “being ordained in the hand of a mediator” would be simply alluded to for confirmation of the “by means of angels.” It would then in fact be best to include the clause in a parenthesis. This interpretation is not disproved by the fact that in many other passages Moses is explicitly named as dealing with the people by commission from God Himself. Paul could still have the right to say that if in a single passage, as here, the giving of the law is represented as the work of angels, Moses must necessarily be regarded as their delegate; comp. Act_7:38.—It might also deserve attention, that in Gal_3:21 the ἐðáããåëßáé are expressly distinguished by the epithet ôïῦ èåïῦ . Is not this connected with the fact that previously at the mention of the law, its Divine origin was entirely passed over and the giving of the law represented as the work of angels?
The question in Gal_3:21 would not then express a conclusion apparently resulting from the immediately preceding statement. It would rather express amazement, as to how any one could even imagine that the law, which is proximately to be referred to the angels, could invalidate the promises of God. It is too weak for that. And what would thus be improbable on account of the mode of the law’s origin, would then be further refuted by the truth, that the law is incapable of giving life.
Even on this interpretation of Gal_3:20, however,—independently of the explanation of ïὖí —the sense given by us to the êáôὰ ôῶí ἐðáããåëéῶí (see above) and to åß ãὰñ ἐäüèç (see below) might be preserved.
[The above view to which such prominence is given on account of its novelty and originality, is in all essential features the same as that of Gfrörer [Geschichte des Urchristenthums, das Jahrhundert des Heils; Erste Abtheilung, pp. 228, 229, Stuttgart, 1838). So that, although thirty years old, it has met with less consideration from commentators than is here given to it in its revived form. As Gfrörer himself intimates that this interpretation is “easy to be perceived by the eye which has been sharpened by accurate acquaintance with the Jewish mode of thought,” it may be allowable to suggest that were this Paul’s meaning, his Rabbinical training would be more apparent than in Gal_3:16. Besides this view would make Paul apparently disingenuous in his attempt to lower the claims of the law, which is God’s law,—“through angels, by the hand of a mediator.” And yet the chief peculiarity of this novel interpretation is its ignoring that fact. This vitiates the whole, in our view. As Schmoller remarks Gal_3:19, “the purpose of this reference to the origin of the law is not to demonstrate its inferior dignity.”
Subjoined is the view of Ellicott (2d ed.): “The context states briefly the four distinctive features of the law with tacit reference to the promise, 1) restricted and conditioned; 2) temporary and provisional; 3) mediately, not immediately, given by God; 4) mediately, but not immediately, received from God. Three of these are passed over; the last as the most important, is noticed; ‘the law was with, the promise was without a mediator.’ Gal_3:20 thus appears a syllogism of which the conclusion is omitted: ‘Now a mediator does not appertain to one (standing or acting alone); but (in the promise) God is one (does stand and act alone); therefore (in the promise) a mediator does not appertain to God. Is then the law (a dispensation which, besides other distinctions, involved a mediator) opposed to the promises which rested on God (and involved no mediator)? God forbid.’ According to this view the only real difficulty is narrowed to the minor proposition. How was God one? And the answer seems,—not because He is essentially unity, nor because He is one by Himself, and Abraham is one by himself, nor yet because He is both the Giver, the Father, and the Receiver, the Son, united (as held in ed. 1), but, with the aspect that the last clause of Gal_3:18 puts on the
whole reasoning,—because He dealt with Abraham singly and directly, stood alone, and used no mediator.” This has the merit of simplicity and is a safe view. Lightfoot is perhaps not so close in his explanation, but it may well be added: “The very idea of mediation. supposes two persons at least, between whom the mediation is carried on. The law then is of the nature of a contract between two parties, God on the one hand, and the Jewish people on the other. It is only valid so long as both parties fulfil the terms of the contract. It is therefore contingent and not absolute. But God (the Giver of the promise) is one. Unlike the law, the promise is absolute and unconditional. It depends on the sole decree of God. There are not two contracting parties, there is nothing of the nature of a stipulation. The Giver is every thing, the recipient nothing. Thus the primary sense of ‘one’ here is numerical. The further idea of unchangeableness may perhaps be suggested; but if so, it is rather accidental than inherent. On the other hand this proposition is quite unconnected with the fundamental statement of the Mosaic law, ‘the Lord thy God is one God,’ though resembling it in form.”—R.]
Gal_3:21. God forbid. For if there had been a law, etc.—That the law is not in the sense indicated “against the promises of God,” Paul proves first by the consideration, that if a law had been given which could make alive, äéêáéïóýíç would have proceeded from it, i. e., not as it is commonly and altogether erroneously explained, in connection with the erroneous view as to the force of the objection: if a law that could do this had been given, and äéêáéïóýíç came from it, then were the law actually” against the promises of God (a sense to which ãÜñ , rightly taken, is unsuitable); but Paul really wishes to show that the law accords with the promises, and cannot be intended to annul these; for if the law were able to make alive, äéêáéïóýíç would actually proceed from it, that is the same effect which is to be wrought through the promises. The law cannot, therefore, in itself, have any tendency hostile to “the promises.” But, he continues, “the Scripture has shut up all,” etc.=the power to “give life” ( æùïðïéåῖí ) was, as it were, denied the law, in order that “the promise might be given by faith in Jesus Christ.” It could not “give life,” and thereby bring “righteousness,” if only on account of the sins of men; but, in truth, it was not to do this, this was in no wise its design, for the promise was to come ἐê ðßóôåùò Ἰçó . ×ñ ’—Given life.— Æùïðïéåῖí = to make inwardly living, not == to give eternal life, for the sense is: if the law could awaken man from his death in sins, and give him spiritual life, “righteousness” (= äåäéêáéùìÝíïí åἶíáé ), would actually proceed from the law, for with the æùïðïéçèῆíáé , the condition of justification would be of course perfectly realized. The conclusion is therefore from cause to effect. Meyer incorrectly takes it “from effect to cause,” in connection with his explanation of æùïðïéåῖí as the bestowment of eternal life. The “making alive” is not indeed actually the cause of “justification,” but this is only because a making alive through the law is not possible. It is however precisely this unrealized case, viz., a making alive through the law, that is here spoken of. [The being dead in sins is hero taken for granted; what is meant by “life?” Wieseler’s view is given above. Meyer as usual restricts it to future eternal life; but Lightfoot well says, it includes “alike the spiritual life in the present and the glorified life in the future, for in the Apostle’s conception the two are blended together and inseparable.” This seems to accord better with New Testament usage. The reasoning then is not from the whole to its part (Alford), for the “justification” is not strictly a part, but a condition of “life,” nor from cause to effect, but from effect to cause. “Life” does not comefrom the law, it does not, was not designed to justify, it is not against the promise, but has another purpose afterwards set forth.—R.]
Verily.— Ὄíôùò = in fact, and not merely according to the fancy of the Judaizers, as is now the case, the hypothesis being denied.—Righteousness.— Äéêáéïóýíç is of course not immediately identical with “the inheritance,” but it is an essential element of it, and the one treated of throughout the Epistle, which to be attained by faith.
Gal_3:22. But on the contrary, the Scripture shut up all under sin.— Óõãêëåßåéí is the strengthened êëåßåéí , to shut up, (not to shut together): then more tropically with åἰò to deliver up as a prisoner to some one; and generally, to give up into the power of any one, to deliver over. ̔ Õðü in this verse and the next one expresses this state of subjection still more strongly. Ἡ ãñáöÞ : the Scripture, generally, the written word of God: not the law. ÔὰðÜíôá : collective whole=all men; as a fact, doubtless including Gentiles as well as Jews; although, as the context shows, the immediate reference is only to those who have the law, and of whom the Scripture speaks, that is, the Jews.—The sense of this somewhat peculiar expression is easily deduced from Gal_3:21. It is meant to explain, why the law (and generally, any law) could not make alive=impart spiritual life. “If the law had been able æùïðïéåῖí , then äéêáéïóýíç would have proceeded from it; an impossible thing, for the Scripture has placed all under the power of sin,” it was therefore not possible to fulfil the law and in this way to come to spiritual life; for the law certainly has not the power to destroy the dominion of sin, such a dominion as exists; it has not the power to break as it were the yoke of sin. But how far now can such a “shutting up under sin” be ascribed to the Scripture? Of course only in so far as it bears witness to this “being shut up.” The sense therefore is: according to the testimony of the Scripture all are subjected under the power of sin=sin exercises a dominion, and that over all. This was the fault of men, but the active expression: the Scripture has done it, points nevertheless to an activity, which, it is true, could not have been exercised by the Scripture (for this, in itself, could only be a witness), but which yet was exercised by the Author of the Scripture, God. He has placed all under the dominion of sin (and that, as appears afterwards, with the design that the promise might be given by faith, etc.). But this, of course, He could only do for the punishment of men, on account of their “trangressions;” it is a punishment ordained of God, that sin should exercise a formal dominion over men.—The connection stated with the previous verse excludes an explanation which otherwise would have a good deal for it, especially because then a function would be ascribed immediately to the Scripture. The explanation is this: the Scripture has, by its declaration, its portrayal, as it were, shut up=subjected all men without leaving any escape or exception, to the sentence: Thou art a sinner! and therewith has also shut them up under the curse which sin brings.—Still less is it meant to be said that the Scripture constrains all to acknowledge that they are sinners. Nor is there any allusion here to the truth, that the law, instead of restraining sin, has promoted it. Unquestionably, however, we are warranted by what Paul elsewhere says of the law, to bring in this thought, not in order to explain the words, but in order to gain a clearer conception of the fact.
The purpose of this “shutting up all under sin” was, that “the promise” should not be given “by the law” but “by faith of Jesus Christ” and therefore that matters should proceed according to the “covenant” of God, that is, that the promised good should be given, in a certain sense attained, not by merit of works, but of free grace. (This was the purpose of God of course with the foreknowledge that this end, on account of the sinfulness of men, cannot be reached through the law.) But more specially this “shutting up under sin” had as its aim, that the promise might be given ἐêðßóôåùò ̓ Éçóïῦ×ñéóôïῦ . For the law was given until the seed should come to whom it had been promised: this shutting up all under sin in consequence of which the law could not make alive, had therefore as its aim, that the promise should be given “by faith” on this Seed, that is, this Seed is Himself first made partaker of the promised good, since, according to Gal_3:16, the promises were given also to Him, and to others only through Him. Therefore also the duplicate expression by faith of Jesus Christ—to them that believe.—It no longer concerns the writer merely to show that the promise is given “by faith” or “to them that believe,” agreeably to its original nature, and therefore really “of promise,” or of grace. This has already been established in Gal_3:17-18, but now, after the new epoch of the history of redemption, the epoch of law, is expressly called an adventitious [hinzugekommene] period, and the sinful condition of men having been made prominent, the discourse is directed more definitely to the point that the promise is given by faith on Jesus Christ, as the Redeemer, of grace therefore, but of grace ministered in this way. [It is perhaps best, with Ellicott and Alford, to take the genitive “of Jesus Christ” as both objective and subjective; the Object and the Giver of faith. St. Paul’s opponents, as nominal Christians, might hold that the promise came to believers only, but he insists that it came not “by the law, but by faith of Jesus Christ.” Hence there is no tautology (Lightfoot)—R.]—“The promise:” here of course, in the objective sense, the object of promise. Taken generally this is=the inheritance; in a more special application that which is attainable for sinful men “by faith of Jesus Christ,” is the “being justified,” as is simply stated in Gal_3:24.—The promise, therefore, was to be given “by faith;” it was not possible “by the law” on account of sin: but before faith came, the law—and that on account of being shut up under sin—or more precisely, the peculiar position of men in respect to the law, was in its proper place, in order to open the way for the revelation of faith. This Paul says in Gal_3:23.
Gal_3:23. But before faith came.—Neither here nor anywhere else [in N. T.] does ðßóôéò mean the doctrina fidem postulans, the gospel, but subjective faith, which however is made objective. When men at the preaching of the gospel, believe on Christ, faith, which before was wanting, was now come, that is, it had entered, so to speak, the hearts of those who had become believers in Christ (Meyer).—We were kept in ward, shut up under the law.—“We”=the Christians from among the Jews. “Under the law” ( ὑðὸ íüìïí ) is to be joined with “shut up” ( óõãêåêë .)‚ and this is then more closely characterized by “kept in ward” ( ἐöñïõñ .), which marks the transition to “unto the faith‚” etc. Paul then says first: We were “shut up under the law” the law was the master to whose power, we were completely subjected, without any freedom of our own. And as such (shut up under the law), we were guarded, kept in ward ( ἐöñïõñïýìåèá )=that we might not become free, in substance: we were held in subjection to the law. What now does this mean? Plainly it. characterizes, briefly and strikingly, the nature of the law; it was a pressing yoke, a constraining power, to which men were subject. It was such by its continual holding up of commandments and prohibitions, and especially by what was connected therewith, the continual, terrifying denunciation of the curse in case of transgression in case of the non-fulfilment of the enjoined conditions. According to this, how can the condition of men under the law be more strikingly depicted than as a “being shut up under the law” [the perfect participle, which reading we retain, expressing this continued, permanent state.—R.], and because no manner of dispensation therefrom was bestowed in the whole epoch before faith was revealed as a óõãêåêë . öñïõñåῖóèáé ? [The meaning of ἐöñïõñïýìåèá is not “safely kept,” but “kept in ward.” We were shut up under the law and thus kept prisoners.—R.]
The purpose of this representation of the condition of law is no longer merely “to place in the light” still more clearly the great difference between the law and the covenant of promise in itself (as in Gal_3:19-20), but it is now to be shown how the design of the law, in its deeper significance, nevertheless coincided with that of the covenant, how the former was preparatory to the perfecting of the latter. For “we were kept in ward, shut up under the law,” says Paul, unto the faith which should afterwards be revealed. This is to be taken not merely as temporal, but also as telic=for faith=to the end that it might be possible for faith to be revealed, the same faith therefore, in reference to which it had just been said, that the Scripture shut up all under sin, in order that the promise might be given through it. The direct aim of the law, therefore, was the revelation of this faith, and through this we are made partakers of the promise; so absolutely untrue is it, that it stood in the way of the promise.—“Revealed:” for “so long as men had not yet believed on Christ, faith had not yet come into manifestation, it was still an element of life hidden in the counsel of God, which, as a historical manifestation, was unveiled, when the congregation of believers came into being.” Meyer. How far now was this being “kept in ward, shut up under the law” preparatory for faith, and pointing to it? This Paul does not state; we must fill out the statement for ourselves, which however is not difficult after the preceding remarks. The Scripture has shut up all under sin. But on the other hand these same were kept shut up under the law. What else was purposed thereby (since æùïðïéåῖí through it is already excluded), than to awaken and keep continually awake in the soul, the fearful consciousness of standing under the curse of the law (the curse comprehended in the law itself, against transgression of it, against sin), and by this very means, on the other hand, to ground more and more deeply in the soul the conviction of the impossibility of attaining to “righteousness” through this law. The first effect, the consciousness of deserving the curse is elsewhere (comp. Gal_2:19) designated by Paul as a “dying,” and this operation of the law as a “killing.” Comp. 2Co_3:6. In this way it led to the revelation of faith in men’s hearts, as to the only way of escape yet possible, or, it led to the longing for a redemption from sin, and thus made men willing for faith. on the Redeemer given by God in Christ. [This was the result, but the state “under the law” was still objectively real, whether this consciousness were awakened or not Ellicott remarks on the unusual order, that it “seems intended to give prominence to ìÝëëïõóáí , and to present more forcibly the contrast between former captivity and subsequent freedom.” Comp. Rom_8:18.—R.]
Gal_3:24. So that the law hath been.— Ὥóôå : an inference. The fact of this “being kept in ward,” etc., “unto the faith which should afterwards be revealed” made the law our schoolmaster.—This name it deserves, and that for a twofold reason: 1. The ðáéäáãùãüò approaches his charge with commands and prohibitions, nay, sometimes with threats of punishment, and in general, with limitations of his freedom, and lays upon him in this respect a stringent yoke; there takes place a keeping in ward, shut up under him. This limitation of freedom, and in general this whole relation of subjection, is not however an end in itself, but has place only as a means to an end, serves a higher purpose, namely, that the pupil may be trained for mature age, and for the assuming of that higher grade, for which he is destined; “kept in ward, shut up” only “unto” that, which is afterwards to be revealed. And, according to Gal_3:23, the function of the law also had precisely this twofold aspect.—This goal that was set for attainment, the second point, was the main thing with the pedagogy of the law; this, therefore, is expressly stated in the added phrase (hath been our schoolmaster) åἰò ×ñéóôüí , unto Christ.—This is unquestionably relic; this again is more precisely explained by that we might be justified by faith.—The goal was Christ=justification by faith in Him. Justification, which the law itself could not bring, because “shutting us up under sin,” it was yet to open the way for, to conduct to; because it could not itself bring it, was yet to impel to the seeking and attaining of it “by faith.”
Gal_3:25. But after that faith is come, etc.—The law was preparatory to faith in Christ (and so far, indeed, in agreement with the covenant of promise), but for the very reason that it was preparatory, it had only a temporary validity, it ceased with the coming of that for the coming of which it was meant to prepare. Freedom from the law had the way prepared for it by the law itself, leading as it did to faith (how, see on Gal_3:23); but actual freedom came in only with faith. How?
Gal_3:26 explains how (in connection with the aspect of the law as schoolmaster). By the fact that man through faith becomes a son of God. In this conception, however, we are not unduly to emphasize “son” as is commonly done, and to attribute to it the sense of free, son, come to majority, who therefore no longer stands, as a ðáῖò , under the ðáéäáãùãüò . No doubt the “son of God” is also the one of full age, and therefore free; but Paul, instead of the bare notion of majority, substitutes at once a higher, theological idea, that of the Child of God. Whoever now stands to God in the relation of child, can no longer remain under the law, that schoolmaster, whose threats of the wrath of God awaken slavish fear.— ÐÜíôåò =all without distinction. This word is meant to emphasize strongly the power of faith. Whoever he be that has it, becomes a son of God and free from the schoolmaster, therefore you also are free. “You” writes Paul of set purpose, having before (Gal_3:25) spoken only of the Jewish Christians as those who had previously been under the schoolmaster. But now: You all, even the Gentile Christians, all you who are become believers,—that it might come into no one’s mind, to place himself, of his own accord, under the schoolmaster, the law.—Paul says designedly in Christ Jesus instead of a genitive immediately depending on faith because he wishes to predicate of Christians that they are in Christ Jesus. For he proves that they are sons of God, from their putting on Christ, ver 27.
Gal_3:27. The de