Third Section.—Christian universalism (Roman Catholicism in Paul’s sense) in proper conduct toward the civil Government (the heathen State), which has a diaconal and liturgical service in the household of God. The office of civil Government defined
Rom_13:1-6
1Let every soul be subject [submit himself] unto the higher powers [to the authorities which are over him]. For there is no power [authority] but of [except from] God: the powers that be are [those which exist have been]ordained of [by] God. 2Whosoever therefore resisteth the power [So that he who setteth himself against the authority], resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that [those who] resist shall receive to themselves damnation [condemnation].3For rulers are not a terror to good works [the good work], but to the evil, Wilt thou then not [Dost thou then wish not to] be afraid of the power [authority]? do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of [from]the same: 4For he is the minister of God [God’s minister] to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth [weareth] not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God [God’s minister], a revenger to5execute wrath upon [an avenger for wrath to] him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject [submit yourselves], not only for [because of the]6wrath, but also for conscience’ sake. For, for this cause pay ye [ye pay] tribute also: for they are God’s ministers [the ministers of God], attending continually upon this very thing.
EXEGETICAL AND CRITICAL
General Remarks.—As, in chap. 12, ecclesiastical duties are supplemented by personal duties, so here, in chap. 13, civil duties are supplemented by duties toward the world in general.—According to Tholuck, the passive conduct in relation to private injuries, in Rom_12:19-21, has led to this exhortation. Yet this would be too accidental an occasion. The thought of the transition is, that, even in the heathen State, evil must be overcome with good. But the possibility of this conquest lies in the necessity of the Christian’s recognizing something good even in the large State, as well as in the personal opponent. Chrysostom held that this section has the apologetical design of showing that Christianity does not lead to the dissolution of the State, and of the social legal relations (comp. 1Ti_2:1; Tit_3:1; 1Pe_2:13-14). According to Calvin, and others, the occasion lay in the fact that the Jews were inclined to resistance to heathen government, and that also the Jewish Christians often became subject, with them, to suspicions of the same disposition. As might be expected, Baur finds the key for the solution of this question also in the Clementines. On these and other hypotheses, particularly those of Neander and Baumgarten-Crusius, see further details in Tholuck, pp. 678 ff. The same author says: “If the Epistle was written in the year 58, then it follows that Nero’s five mild years terminated in the following year.” In view of the universal character of this Epistle, even on its practical side, the Apostle must have felt the necessity of defining, from his principle, the relation of duty in which Christians stood to the State, without his having been led to it by this or that circumstance.
Rom_13:1. Let every soul,
ðᾶóá øõ÷Þ
. Every man; yet with reference to the life of the soul, whose emotions in relation to the government come into special consideration (Act_2:43; Act_3:23; Rev_16:3).—Submit himself,
ὑðïôáóóÝóèù
. Voluntarily subjecting himself to authority. [The reflexive form describes the obedience as of a rational, voluntary, principled character, in distinction from blind, servile subjection.—P. S.]—To the authorities which are over him [
ἐîïõóßáéò ὑðåñå÷ïýóáéò
]. In
ἐîïõóßá
are comprised both the magistracy and their power (potestas).
ὙðåñÝ÷ïõóáé
, Vulgate: sublimiores. Tholuck: The high, those high in authority, with a reference to 1Ti_2:2. [Philippi and Meyer refer to the German phrase: Die hohe Obrigkeit, but there seems to be no reference to the higher grade of rulers. The rendering given above is sufficiently explicit.—It must be noticed how general the injunction is—every soul, and whatever powers are set over him. Wordsworth: He does not say obey, but submit. On the limitations, see below, and Doctr. Notes.—R.]
Except from God [
åἰ ìὴ ἀðὸ Èåïῦ
. See Textual Note2. The proposition is universal, its application follows. Wordsworth remarks that
äýíáìéò
, force, does not occur throughout.—R.] God’s sovereignty is, in the general sense (
ἀðï Èåïῦ
), the causality of magisterial power.
Those which exist [
áἱ äὲ ïὖóáé
. See Textual Note3.] According to Erasmus and Schmidt, the Apostle understands by the
áἱ äὲ ïὖóáé
, the rightful powers; with reference to Joh_10:12,
ὁ ὤíðïéìÞí
, qui verus pastor est. According to Meyer, and Tholuck, there is no difference whatever. [The words mean simply this: all existing civil authorities, de facto governments. This doubtless includes temporary and revolutionary governments, although nothing is said on this point. Of course, there has been much casuistry in the discussions as to what constitutes the existence,
ïὖóá
, of the authority.—R.]
The general definition,
ἀðὸ Èåïῦ
, for which Codd. A. B.2, and others, would read
ὑðὸ È
., is “more specifically defined by the
ὑôðὸ Èåïῦ ôåôáãìÝíáé åἰóß
,” have been ordained by God, which denotes Divine appointment. The Apostle, however, seems desirous of making a distinction, yet not between the rightful and illegal authorities, but between the actual appearance of the authorities and their ideal and essential ground of life, whose validity should also undoubtedly be recognized in the actual authorities, because of their permanent destination. In harmony with this distinction, Chrysostom, and others, have distinguished between the magisterial office itself and its accidental incumbents. Yet we must hold that the Apostle not only enjoins obedience toward the ideal institution of the authorities, but also toward their empirical appearance. But he will establish the requirement of this obedience by reference to the ideal institution and design of the authorities. This arises clearly from what follows.
Rom_13:2. So that he who setteth himself against, &c. [
ὣóôå ὁ ἀíôéôáóóüìåíïò
,
ê
.
ô
.
ë
. Notice the recurrence of
ôÜóóù
in various forms and combinations.—R.] Whoever becomes
ἀíôéôáóóüìåíïò
against the actual authorities, becomes also the resister of the ordinance of God. The
ἀíôéôÜóóåóèáé
denotes, primarily, military
ï
pposition, the array of a hostile order of battle; but it has also a more general sense. Its meaning,
over against the authorities, in every case must be that of resistance; and Tholuck makes an arbitrary limitation when he says: “Neither the armed opposition of the individual, nor of many, as in insurrection, is meant here; it rather appears, from Rom_13:7, what kind of opposition is meant, namely, that of refusal to pay taxes.” Besides, Rom_13:7 is the beginning of another section. [The more general sense is usually accepted, as in the above rendering: He who setteth himself against, which is adopted to bring out the reflexive force of the original.—R.] As related to the Divine appointment (
äéáôáãÞ
, here =
äéÜôáãìá
), this resistance becomes a spiritual resistance. This is the rule; and, according to this rule, it is said of those who resist the Divine ordinance:
Those who resist shall receive to themselves condemnation [
ïἱ äὲ ἁíèåóôçêüôåòἑáõôïῖò êñῖìá ëÞìøïíôáé
]. Meyer properly remarks, that “a condemnation by God is meant, as it is produced by their resistance of God’s ordinance, but that the
ἂñ÷ïíôåò
are regarded as executing this sentence; therefore Paul does not mean eternal (according to Reiche, and most commentators), but temporal punishment.” Yet these executioners are not always the
ἂñîïíôåò
; for it is well known that revolution very often “devours its own children,” and that the sorest punishments come from anarchy. [The next verse seems to point to the rulers as the instruments in inflicting the Divine punishment (Tholuck, Alford), yet there is no necessity for this limitation, in the face of the fact that punishment often comes by other hands. Though the punishment comes from God, condemnation is preferable to damnation, since the latter refers now to eternal punishment alone, which is not the meaning here.—On Rom_13:1-2, Dr. Hodge remarks: “The extent of this obedience is to be determined from the nature of the case. They are to be obeyed as magistrates, in the exercise of their lawful authority. This passage, therefore, affords a very slight foundation for the doctrine of passive obedience.”—R.]
Rom_13:3. For rulers are not [
ïἱ ãáñ ἂñ÷ïíôåò ïὐê åἰóßí
]. It may be asked here, what the
ãÜñ
is designed to establish? According to Meyer, it explains the modality of the condemnation: they shall receive condemnation in so far as the civil authority is its executioner. But Tholuck and Philippi very properly suggest, that the
êáêὰ ἒñãá
in Rom_13:3 cannot mean merely resistance to civil authority. If the civil authority exists merely for the quelling of resistance, the whole State would be a mere circle, or the civil authority would be an absolute despotism. According to Calvin and Bucer, Rom_13:3 should connect with Rom_13:1, and prove the utilitas of the Divine ordinance of civil authority. But the
ãÜñ
refers simply to the idea of absolute punishment in the condemnation in Rom_13:2. In Tholuck there is a similar, and perhaps somewhat more general, reference to Rom_13:2. God punishes insurrection, because it is designed to shake a legal ordinance, existing for the protection of the good and the punishment of the bad. All those are guilty of this misconception of all the moral powers of existing order, who, in their abstract worship of a pure fancy, oppose the best form of government, and therefore finish their labors by perverting existing order to a moral chaos. Now, the limitation of the strict requirements of the Apostle lies in the definition of the civil authority, which he gives in this and the following verses.
A terror,
öüâïò
. For terror, formidandi. Princes are not formidable to the good work, but to the evil.—[To the good work, but to the evil,
ôῶ ἀãáèῶ ἒñãᾳ
,
ἀëëὰ ôῷ êáêῷ
. See Textual Note4.—R.]
Dost thou then wish not to be afraid of the authority? [
èÝëåéò äὲ ìὴ öïâåῖóèáéôὴí ἐîïõóßáí
; Although it is not necessary to retain the interrogative form, yet it will express sufficiently the hypothetical force, which most commentators find here.—R.] These words are a hypothetical premise, and not a question, as Griesbach, and others, would construe them.—Thou shalt have praise [
ἒîåéò ἒðáéíïí
]. Commendations by the magistrates, in opposition to punishments, were common even in ancient times. Origen, on the contrary, says, that it is not the custom of rulers to praise the non peccantes. To this, Pelagius says: Damnatio malorum laus est bonorum. Meyer says: “Grotius, moreover, properly says: ‘Cum hœc scriberet Paulus, non sœviebatur Romœ in Christianos?’ It was still the better period of Nero’s government.” Tholuck’s view is similar. Yet the written words of the Apostle have been of perfect application subsequently, even down to the present day. The Apostle sets up an ideal, by which the ruler also can and shall be judged. We must hold:
1. That he portrays obedience to authority as an obedience for the Lord’s sake (comp. Eph_6:5-6). This secures the sphere: “Render to God the things that are God’s;” bondage under religious and conscientious despotism is excluded.
2. The definition of what is good works and what are evil works, abides by the decision of God’s word, of Christian faith, and of conscience, but is not dependent on the ruler.
3. This also indicates that every power shall become weakness, when the poles of sword-bearing shall be so absolutely transposed that the sword becomes a terror to good works; but that it is a matter of the Divine government to prove that weakness, which lies in the fact that an actual government has absolutely dropped off from the idea of its design.
Rom_13:4. For he is God’s minister [
Èåïῦãὰñ äéÜêïíüò ἐóôéí
]. The
ãÜñ
of Rom_13:4 brings out the ground of the declaration in Rom_13:3. The rule of the magistracy as a terror to the evil, and for the praise and encouragement of those who do good, is explained by its character, its essential design, to be God’s servant.—[To thee for good,
óïὶ åἰò ôὸ ἀãáèüí
.] But he is God’s minister for the good of man; see Book of Wis_6:4. [While rulers are of God, it is for the benefit of the ruled. A repetition of what precedes, and suggesting the same limitations.—R.]
He weareth not the sword in vain [
ïὐãὰñ åἰêῆ ôὴí ìÜ÷áéñáí öïñåῖ
]. He weareth it (
öüñåé
is stronger than
öåñåῖ
) as the symbolical token, insignia, of his governing and judicial sovereignty; but he does not wear it merely as a symbol, without reason, and for show. He makes use of it because he is God’s minister, as the punitive executioner of His wrath. The addition: for wrath,
åἰò ὀñãÞí
, expresses the fact that even in the State and municipal court there is the authority of something higher than merely human justice, namely, the Divine retribution of wrath upon offenders.
On the different antiquarian interpretations of the
ìÜ÷áéñá
, particularly as the dagger which the Emperor carried at his side, see Tholuck, p. 690. Tholuck and Meyer decide for the sword, because
ìÜ÷
. in the New Testament always means this, and because everywhere in the provinces it was borne by the highest officers of military and criminal affairs, as the sign of the jus gladii. Nevertheless, the dagger of the Emperor, and of his representative, the Prœfectus Prœtorii, belongs under the symbolical description. After all, in an abstract and real direction, we would otherwise have to think only of the executioner’s sword. [It requires some ingenuity to escape the conviction that this passage implies a New Testament sanction of the right of capital punishment. At all events, the theory of civil penalties here set forth is in direct opposition to that so constantly upheld nowadays, that the end is simply the reformation of the offender. See Doctr. Note 6.—R.]
Rom_13:5. Wherefore ye must needs, &c. [
äéὸἀíÜãêç
,
ê
.
ô
.
ë
.] For the reason stated, it was not merely the duty of prudence, but also a religious and moral duty of conscience, to be subject. When the Apostle says, not only because of the wrath, but also for conscience’ sake, he denotes thereby the antithesis of the servile fear of the external infliction of punishment, and of inward and free obedience, in the knowledge and reverence of the Divine order in the civil affairs of men. Comp. 1Pe_2:13.
Rom_13:6. For, for this cause ye pay tribute also [
äéὰ ôïῦôï ãὰñ êáὶ öüñïõò ôåëåῖôå
. The question of connection has been much discussed. Calvin, De Wette, Alford, and many others, make
äéὰ ôïῦôï
parallel with
äéü
(Rom_13:5), as another inference from Rom_13:1-4. Meyer, however, connects immediately with Rom_13:5, finding here an inference from the necessity there described, as well as a confirmation of it. He thinks the other construction passes over Rom_13:5 arbitrarily. But if the verses are taken as parallel, this difficulty is not of much weight. See his notes for other views; Stuart takes
äéὰ ôïῦôï ãÜñ
as a strengthened causal particle, and the verb as imperative.—R.] The
ôåëåῖôå
must not be read as imperative (Heumann, Morus [Stuart, Hodge], and others); but the
ãÜñ
[
ïὖí
with the imperative would have been more natural] and the imperative in Rom_13:7 are against this. The payment of tribute declares a recognition of the State, also according to our Lord’s own declaration (Mat_22:21). But by means of paying tribute, the subject himself takes part in the government of the magistracy. He actually takes part in the support of the administration, which, consciously or unconsciously, is, in the highest sense, a servant of the kingdom, and, in the widest sense, is a servant [Liturg] of God, analogously to the servant of the temple. Olshausen, and others, erroneously construe
ðñïóêáñôåñïῦíôåò
as subject.
[For they are the ministers of God,
ëåéôïõñãïὶ ãὰñ Èåïῦ åἰóéí
. See Textual Note6. The subject is
ἂñ÷ïíôåò
(supplied in thought);
ëåéôïõñãïß
is predicate (Meyer, Philippi, and most). See Philippi on the distinction between
ëåéôïõñãïò
and
äéÜêóóïíïò
. He bases upon the former, which, he claims, applies to one engaged in a practical, external service, as well as on the concrete plural (instead of the abstract
ἐîïõóßá
), the reference to the collection of tribute in
åἰò áὐôὸ ôïῦôï
. But it is better, with Tholuck, Wordsworth, and others, to find here the idea of servants ministering to God in representation of the people.—R.]
Attending continually upon this very thing [
åἰò áὐôὸ ôïῦôï ðñïæêáñôåñïῦíôåò
]. Philippi explains
åἰò áὖôὸ ôïῦôï
: for this very purpose, viz., the payment of tribute. But then that would mean: they receive taxes in order that they may exact more taxes. The purpose is the fundamental thought of the whole section: The State is the State of the police, of rectitude, and of civilization. Therefore the
ëåéôïõñãåῖí ôῶ Èåῶ
is undoubtedly meant (Tholuck, and others) in the very sense in which the section has described it.
DOCTRINAL AND ETHICAL
1. As chap. 12. has defined the conduct of Christians toward the Church and the personal departments of life, so does chap. 13 define their conduct toward the State and the world. The Apostle has therefore very forcibly regarded the sphere of personal life as the atmosphere of the Church, and then the sphere of the world as the atmosphere of the State.
2. In reference to the civil authority, the Apostle evidently makes the following distinctions: (1) The actual existence of the civil powers, which are in every case an ordinance of God’s providence [not of a social contract, nor simply by the will of the people.—R.]; and the ideal and real existence of the civil power, which is not merely providentially
ἀðὸ Èåïῦ
, but is also, by creation and institution, fundamentally an ordinance
ὑðὸ ôïῦ Èåïῦ ôåôáãìÝíáé
. (2) He distinguishes between social opposition to the civil power, and the spiritual opposition to God’s institution which is comprised therein. (3) He also distinguishes between the power of the State itself and its incumbents, the rulers, by which designation he expresses the possibility of different political forms. (4) He finally distinguishes between the actual appearance and its ideal destination, according to which the
ἐîïõóὶá
should be a
äéáêïíßá
and administrator of Divine right, and the
ἂñ÷ï
̇
íôåò
should prove themselves as
ëåéôïõñãïὶ Èåïῦ
.
3. The following distinctions with reference to duty toward the State clearly appear:
A. The submission is of necessity (
ἀíÜãêç
), Rom_13:5; (1) Because of the wrath. Since Divine providence has its wise purposes even in raising up, and permitting to exist, severe and despotic powers, so long as they are really State powers,
ὑðåñÝ÷ïõóáé
, so, in this relation, is the
ἀíôéôÜóóåóèáé
a sin against wisdom; the revolter draws upon himself the
êñῖìá
for his want of judgment, his presumption, and his wicked encroachment and invasion. The same
ὀñãÞ
which makes the State pass over from an institution of Divine mercy to a phenomenon of Divine wrath, and which makes use of the despotic tool as an axe to be cast aside in due season (Isa_10:15), and which oppresses a people to its own chastisement, crushes, first of all, the individual anarchical despots of revolution, who, in excessive self-estimation, would cure the relative evil of despotism by the absolute evil of anarchy. (2) Although this folly itself must be avoided for conscience’ sake, there is added a specific obedience for conscience’ sake, which is unfettered respect for the ideal splendor of the Divine institution, joy at an existence protected by the laws and civilization of the State, gratitude for the moral blessings which humanity possesses in civil life; but, in one word, the knowledge of the Divine, which shines clearly enough even through the imperfect phenomenon of civil life.
B. The “submitting,”
ὑðïôÜóóåóèáé
, excludes the resisting,
ἀíôéôÜóóåóèáé
; but it by no means excludes it from God’s word and from conscience, nor from judgment (dependent on an existing power) on what is good and what is evil, and what is just and what is unjust; for it is only in consequence of this judgment that there can be a candid conviction that the higher powers, really as God’s servant, exercise the right of the sword for a terror to evil works and protection to good works. Consequently, judgment on the actions of the State within the purely ethical department, and the limits and legality of wisdom, is also unfettered.
C. According to the Apostle, the mark of voluntary obedience consists in not fearing the civil powers, in assuming their existence according to the idea in Rom_13:3-4, and not according to their accidental errors. This fearlessness may not only be united with the respect required by Rom_13:7, but is inseparably connected with it (see Tholuck, p. 692). As one has the right and duty to expect of the Christian that he will act in a Christian way, so has one the right and duty to expect of the State that it be clothed with the ideal principles of the State.
D. The Apostle says: “Render therefore to all their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due;” as if he would say that, by this voluntary act, you participate in the civil government, and pledge your obedience to it. But, in Rom_13:7, he characterizes the same act as indebtedness. The solution of this apparent antinomy has been given by our Lord himself, Mat_22:21 (see the Commentary on Matthew, pp. 396, 397). The individual has the right to emigrate when an extraneous power arises. But if, with the use of the coin of the country, he enjoys the profit, protection, and authority of the country, there arises the duty of paying the tribute required by the united life and necessities of the State. And he who pays tribute—that is, renders allegiance—with one hand, but with the other rises in revolution, is not only guilty of resistance, but also of self-delusion and self-contradiction.—These are the principal features; they may also be found in Eph_6:5; 1Ti_2:2; 1Pe_2:13. The application of them to the individual cases and questions arising here, has been committed by God’s word to the development of the Christian spirit. We are convinced that this spirit, and its foundation, can be misapplied by impure minds, when, on the one hand, Byzantine adulterers make the gospel of truth a gospel of absolute despotism, and, on the other, fanatical and hierarchical mutineers make it a gospel of revolutionary terrorism, as was the case with the Jewish Zealots, and appears now as secret political justice [Vehmjustiz] (practised in Westphalia in early times), now as brigandage, and now as Fenianism. In both respects the Old Testament is a commentary, rich in illustrations, on the sense of the New, Neither Pharaoh nor Korah’s company, neither Rehoboam nor Jeroboam, neither Nebuchadnezzar nor the adversaries of Jeremiah, escaped the condemnatory judgment of the Spirit recorded on the pages of Holy Writ. But in the Jewish war, when the fanaticism of power and the fanaticism of an enthusiastic fancy for freedom contended together for the Holy City, the Christians emigrated to Pella. The light and right of the Christian consist in the incapacity of any earthly power to intervene between his heavenly King and his conscience. When it is therefore imputed to him that his conscience is stained by falsehood, injustice, cowardice, or partiality, and that he has become faithless to his heavenly King, he knows—for he must know—that his inward life stands or falls with his fidelity to his Lord, it matters not from what side the imputation may come. He must likewise refute the imputation that he employs his whole life in political law questions; for there are other things to be attended to in religious, ecclesiastical, moral, and social life, than contending for the most perfect political and social forms. The same fanatical externalization, which in the Middle Ages took pleasure in absolute ecclesiasticism, can become absolute politicalism in modern society. But if conditions arise in the life of nations in which the Apostle’s definition is not of absolute application to the civil power, when the sword is a terror to the good, then does the definition cease to be of application at its time to
ὑðåñÝ÷ïõóá
. But even in such a case God could make a Russian winter do more for Germany, than man, alienated from God, could do for France by a series of revolutions. Of course, freedom never takes place without enthusiastic liberators, who know how to distinguish God’s fiery sign from human incendiarism. But every one must know for himself what his duty is in his particular calling. [The positions of Dr. Lange are justly taken, but may require some modification for a region where the civil power is more directly formed and sustained by the individual members of the State. In that case, the personal responsibility in political affairs is, of course, largely augmented; to the duty of obedience and tribute, that of political knowledge and prudence is added. The ideal must be formed by Christian reflection, and by Christian effort we must seek to make it a reality. The abstract right of revolution, which Dr. Lange himself does not deny, will be the more an abstraction as lawful means are at hand to alter the organic law of the State. Thus popular government, when, and only when, the people are permeated by Christian principle, contains in itself the preventive of revolutionary excess. How insupportable it can become when this condition is wanting, history tells plainly enough.—R.]
4. From the experience through which the Apostle had previously passed, he had been often protected by the sword of the Roman authorities against the mutinies of Jewish fanaticism. Learned people have observed, that he has written these exhortations to Rome although Nero was Emperor there. Other scholars have remarked, on the other hand, that the five good years of Nero’s reign had not yet come to an end. But it is certain that, in the ordinance of the State for posterity, as well as in the institution of the Church, the Apostle perceives the historical opposition to the germinating antichristianity in the world, according to 2 Thessalonians 2. But he did not regard his liberty of judgment thereby bound (see 2Ti_4:17).
5. To what extent is the State a Divine institution? Elaborate discussions on this question are summed up and deliberated upon by Tholuck, pp. 681–689. According to the principles of Romanism, the State is merely a human ordinance (see Tholuck, p. 684; Gieseler, Kirchengesch., ii. 2, pp. 7, 108).—The germ of the Divine institution of the State lies in the Divine institution of the family, in the authority of the head of the family in particular, as well as in the substantial relations of humanity. But as the Old Testament gift of the law is the institution of a theocracy, which still embraces in common the twin-offspring of State and Church, so is there contained also in the Old Testament a Divine sanction of the State—a sanction which pledges the future sanctified State to reciprocity with the future Church. And this presages that it is just as destructive to make the State the servant of the Church, as to make the Church the bondwoman of the State.
[The Scylla and Charybdis of European Christianity, as related to the State, are: Romanism, which subordinates the State to the Church, and Erastianism, which subordinates the Church to the State. The American theory is: that both are coördinate, the State protecting the Church in civil rights, the Church sustaining the State by its moral influence. Yet even here it is questioned whether this is the correct theory. It is an experiment, fraught with great blessings indeed, but, as yet, only an experiment. The dangers here are similar: (1) Romanism, which would make its Church the State; in a popular government, as really as in a despotism, and even more fatally, since the genius of the Church must then become that of the State—what that is, is obvious. (2) On the other hand, we find the theocratic tendency of Puritanism manifesting itself continually. This would identify Church and State, rather by making the State the Church, pressing upon it the duty of legislating men into morality, and even holiness. Here we must class the politico-religionism, which has become so common during the last ten years.—Still, the constant tendency of Christendom to make a practical synthesis of Church and State, is an unconscious prophecy of an era when both shall be united in a christocracy.—R.]
6. On the right of the death-penalty with reference to the sword of authority, sec Tholuck, p. 691. We must, of course, distinguish between the right of using the sword and the duty of its use. [Admitting that the Apostle is describing an ideal of civil government, we still find here the right of capital punishment. Of course, just in so far as the actual government has been below this ideal, has this right been abused. Still, the right remains justified by the theory of punishment here advanced, by the necessities of self-preservation on the part of society represented by the punishing power. The right to punish also implies the right to pardon; and the measure of the right (i. e., the conformity to the ideal here presented) will be also the measure of the sense of responsibility, both as to the punishing and pardoning power. The usual objections to capital punishment misapprehend (a.) the nature of punishment in general; (b.) the Divine authority in civil government.—R.]
HOMILETICAL AND PRACTICAL
Obedience toward the powers that be is every Christian’s duty. 1. Without difference of possessions; 2. Of position; 3. Of culture; 4. And of confession (Rom_13:1).—In how far are there no powers that are not ordained by God? 1. So far as God himself is a God of order, who will therefore have order in civil affairs; 2. So far as God is also a God of love, who designs to do good for us by the powers which He has ordained (Rom_13:1-4).—Resistance to the powers that be, regarded as resistance to God’s ordinance (Rom_13:2).—To do good is the best protection against all fear of civil authority (Rom_13:3).—Praise from the civil magistrates. 1. Who shall obtain it? Every one who does good—that is, every one who, a. does not submit slavishly; but, b. obeys the laws of the country by voluntary obedience. 2. In what should it consist? a. Not so much in showy medals and ribbons, for which many are so eager, as, b. in the simple recognition of the faithfully discharged duty of the citizen (Rom_13:3).—The civil authorities should likewise serve: 1. God; 2. Men (Rom_13:4).—The holy judicial office of the magistracy. 1. From whom is it derived? From God, who is a righteous God, and to whom no wicked person is pleasing (Psa_5:4). 2. What belongs to it? The exercise of penal judgment, and, above all, the right of life and death. 3. How should they exercise it? In the ennobling, but also humiliating, consciousness that they are God’s ministers (Rom_13:4).
Luther: Worldly power is for the sake of temporal peace; therefore the conscience is bound, by dutiful love, to be subject to it (Rom_13:5).—See how good it is to pay taxes and be obedient; for you thereby help to protect the pious and punish the wicked. Therefore do not be provoked at it (Rom_13:6).
Starke: If persons in authority would attract their subjects to obedience, they should administer their office well, and, to that end, should remember: 1. That they are by nature no better than other men; 2. That they will therefore die, just as all others; 3. That they will have to give a far greater account than their subjects before God’s judgment-bar, because of their official prerogatives and government (Rom_13:1).—Lange: When those in authority read and hear that their station is from God, they should examine themselves as to whether they are to their subjects what the head is to the body and its members (Rom_13:1).—Hedinger: The powers that be, God’s minister! How much is expressed by this! Therefore there are no masters above God. He will hereafter hold to account, and throw aside, all titles of honor (Rom_13:4).—Ye subjects, give freely your possessions and blood, but not your conscience (Rom_13:6).
Gerlach: Though the office be divine, the incumbent may possess it illegally, and abuse it (Rom_13:1).—“Needs” here means not external compulsion, but the inward necessity of being obedient to God (Rom_13:5).
Lisco: The believer’s holy love is the fulfilment of the law; first of all, in relation to the powers that be (Rom_13:1 ff.).—Obedience is a matter of conscience with the Christian; it is an inward and sincere obedience (Rom_13:5).
Heubner: The Christian attitude toward the authorities (Rom_13:1 ff.).—The limits of obedience toward the powers that be are defined by conscience, faith, and God’s commandment; Act_5:29 (Rom_13:1).—The Christian mode of obedience is free, pure, conscientious, and not from compulsion or fear (Rom_13:5).
Schleiermacher: On the proper relation of the Christian to his ruler. 1. How utterly improper it is for the Christian to be subject merely to avoid punishment; 2. How natural and necessary it is for him to be subject for conscience’ sake (preached in January, 1809); Rom_13:1-5.
[Henry: Magistrates act as God’s ministers: 1. In the administration of public justice; 2. The determining of quarrels; 3. The protecting of the innocent; 4. The righting of the wronged; 5. The punishing of offenders; 6. And the preserving of national peace and order, that every man may not do right in his own eyes.—Waterland: It is the duty of those in authority: 1. To correct those that needlessly and causelessly disturb the public tranquillity; 2. To remove those that libel the established religion, without offering any better, or an equivalent; 3. To curb the insolence and humble the pride of such as fly in the face of authority, and pretend, without commission or qualifications, to instruct, and, under that color, to insult their superiors.—Scott: As to the efforts which are anywhere made by those on whom trusts constitutionally devolve, to preserve, increase, or assist the real liberty of mankind, personal, civil, or religious, or to check the career of despotism or oppression over men of any climate, complexion, or religion: let us zealously forward them with our prayers, and by every mean consistent with the peace and good order of the community; and, if we would enjoy the blessing of good government, we should pray earnestly and constantly for our rulers, and all in authority; else we have no just cause to complain of any real or supposed grievances to which we may be subjected by them.—Clarke: When a ruler governs according to the constitution of his country, and has his heart and life governed by the laws of God, he is a double blessing to his people; while he is ruling carefully according to the laws, his pious example is a great means of extending and confirming the reign of pure morality among those whom he governs.—J. F. H.]
Footnotes:
Rom_13:1.—[The word
ἐîïõóßá
, rendered power in the E. V., has, as its German equivalent: Obrigkeit. Dr. Lange expands
ἐîïõóßáéò ὑðåñå÷ïýóáéò
into: den Obrigkeiten, den ihn überragenden Mächten. The rendering above is partly from Noyes, partly from the revision of Five Ang. Clergymen. Both of these versions substitute throughout, authority for power (E. V., Amer. Bible Union). The change is a happy one, since authority has both an abstract and a personal force, corresponding to that of
ἑîïõóßá
. Civil authority is, of course, intended.
Rom_13:1.—[
à
. A. B. D3. L., some fathers, read
ὑðü
; adopted by Lachmann. D1. E1. F., Origen,
ἀðü
; which is adopted by modern editors (except Tregelles), since it might readily be changed on account of the
ὑðü
immediately following, and also because the other reading would be tautological.
Rom_13:1.—[The Rec. inserts
ἐîïõóßáé
after
ïὖóáé
, with D3. L., some versions and fathers. It is omitted in
à
. A. B. D1. F., most versions and fathers. Later editors reject it. It would easily be written as an explanation. The Rec., also inserts
ôïῦ
before
èåïῦ
, on very insufficient authority.
Rom_13:3.—[Instead of
ôῶí ἀãáèῶí ἔñãùí
,
ἀëëὰ ôῶí êáêῶí
(Rec., D3. L., some fathers, Scholz), the reading:
ôῷἀãáèῷ ἒñãῳ
,
ἀëëὰ ôῷ êáêῷ
is supported by
à
. A. B. D1. F., many versions and fathers, Lachmann, Tischendorf, De Wette, Meyer, Philippi, Alford, Tregelles. Stuart and Hodge do not notice the correct reading, which was doubtless altered into that of the Rec., for the sake of supposed grammatical accuracy.
Rom_13:5.—[In D. F., and a few minor authorities,
ἀíÜãêç
is omitted, and the infinitive
ὑðïôÜóóåóèáé
altered into the imperative
ὑðïôÜóóåóèå
. The Vulgate follows the reading
ἀíÜãêῃ ὑðïôÜóóåóèå
. So Luther.
Rom_13:6.—[The E. V. has here, God’s ministers, and in Rom_13:4, the minister of God. The expressions are altered in both verses in the version of Five Ang. Clergymen, which I have followed, for this reason, that, in Rom_13:4, the idea of serving on behalf of God is implied in
äéÜêïíïò
; while here, that of serving or ministering to God, on behalf of the people (
ëåéôïõñãïὶ èåïῦ
) seems to be included also. It were perhaps still better to render
äéÜêïíïò
, servant, and reserve the word minister for this verse, as Noyes has done. “We could not vary the English rendering of
äéÜêïíïò
and
ëåéôïõñãüò
, except by introducing some word like ‘officer,’ which would have had an awkward sound” (Five Ang. Clergymen).—R.]
[This exhortation was probably occasioned by the turbulent spirit of the Jews in Rome, who had been on this account banished from the city for a time by the Emperor Claudius (A. D. 51). Their messianic expectations assumed a carnal and political character, and were directed chiefly toward the external emancipation from the odious yoke of the heathen Romans. A few years after the date of the Epistle to the Romans, the spirit of revolt burst forth in open war, which ended in the destruction of Jerusalem (A. D. 70). The Jewish, and even the Gentile Christians, might readily be led away by this fanaticism, since the gospel proffered liberty, and they might not understand that it was mainly spiritual—moral freedom from the slavery of sin, out of which, by degrees, in the appointed way, a reformation and transformation of civil relations should proceed. Such mistakes have been common; e.g., the Peasant’s war, the Anabaptist tumults in the time of the Reformation, and many revolutions since the latter part of the last century. The attitude of Christ, His Apostles, and His Church down to the time of Constantine, toward the civil government, is truly sublime. They recognized in it an ordinance of God, despite its degeneracy, yielding to it, in all legitimate affairs, a ready obedience, despite the fact that they were persecuted by it with fire and sword. It should be remembered that this exhortation was addressed to the Romans, when the cruelties and crimes of a Tiberius, Caligula, and Claudius were in yet fresh remembrance, and when the monster Nero sat on the imperial throne—the same Nero who, a few years later, wantonly and mercilessly persecuted the Christians, condemning the Apostles Paul and Peter to a martyr’s death. It was, however, by just such Christian conduct, in contrast with such cruelty, that Christ’s Church won the moral victory over the Roman Empire and heathendom. Under the influence of such precepts, the early Church was “great in deeds, greater in sufferings, greatest in death, for the honor of Christ and the benefit of generations to come;” thus she was enabled to “overcome evil with good.”—P. S.]
[Without anticipating the discussion in the Doctrinal Notes, it may be well to remark here, that while this phrase has been used very frequently in the interest of the divine right of kings, such an application is rather an accident than a necessary inference from the Apostle’s proposition. The theologians of Germany are apt to turn this against the revolutionary tendencies of Europe, &c.; but should the government under which they live in any way become republican, or ultra-democratic, then consistency must lead them to concede to such authorities also the jus divinum. The simple, pellucid meaning of the Apostle is, that civil government is necessary, and of Divine appointment. We infer that anarchy is as godless as it is inhuman; that magistrates are not “the servants of the people,” nor do they derive their authority from the people, but from God, even though chosen by the people; that republican officials, no less than the hereditary monarchs, can subscribe themselves, “by the grace of God.” Unless the principle be of universal implication, anarchy will be justified somewhere. This principle, moreover, respects the office, not the character of the magistrate; not the abstract authority, indeed, but the concrete rulers, whatever their character. If it be deemed too sweeping, then its self-imposed limitation has been overlooked. For as the obedience is demanded because of God’s appointment, then it is not demanded in matters contrary to God’s appointment. When the civil power contradicts God’s Word and His voice in our conscience, then it contradicts and subverts its own authority. Herein the superior wisdom of Christian ethics is manifest. Human self-will leads to anarchy, human power to despotism; but obedience to de facto rulers as a Christian duty has led, and must lead, to true civil freedom, since it alone makes the individual truly free, and, by asserting the higher law as the basis of the lower authority, ever elevates the lower authority nearer the Divine Law. For, as Alford observes of the duty here laid down: “To obtain, by lawful means, the removal or alteration of an unjust or unreasonable law, is another part of this duty; for all powers among men must be in accord with the highest power, the moral sense.” And the elevation of the moral sense of individuals will accomplish more than revolutions, however justifiable and necessary.—R.]
[The view of Calvin, Philippi, Hodge, Alford, and others, that this verse gives an additional ground for obedience, viz., that magistrates, besides being ordained of God, are appointed for a useful and beneficent purpose, has much to commend it. Dr. Lange seems to be led toward such exclusive references as bear against revolution.—R.]
[In thus presenting an ideal of civil government (as most commentators suppose), the Apostle gives both the reason for obedience to rightful authority, and makes room for resistance to rulers who utterly and entirely depart from this ideal. Wordsworth, however, takes decided ground against any right of insurrection, and adds: “But even suppose a Nero, and a Nero persecuting the Church; yet even then you may have praise therefrom. You may overcome his evil by your good; you may be more than conqueror—you may derive glory from it. For though it is unjust and condemns you, yet God is just and will reward you. He will crown you for acting justly, and for suffering unjustly. Therefore hold fast your justice, and whether the power acquits or condemns you, you will reap praise from it. If you die for the faith from its hand, you will reap glory from its fury. Augustine (Serm. 13:302).” Yet even this author admits that the Apostle “charitably presumes rulers to be what, being God’s ministers, they ought to be.” This is virtually the presentation of an ideal, the non-realization of which implies certain limitations to absolute submission.—R.]
[Melanchthon thus strongly puts the case: Nulla potentia humana, nulli exercitus magis muriunt imperia, quam hæc severissima lex Dei: necesse est obedire propter conscientiam.”—R.]
[The original says Meyer, but gives the very words of Philippi; while Meyer (4th ed., without any indication of change of view) defends the wider reference, among other reasons, because the verb, which includes a moral idea, would be inapplicable to the mere collection of taxes. The great thought, ministers of God, seems to be the controlling one. Stuart, Hodge, and the older commentators, prefer the other reference, which, perhaps, to a certain extent, implies this.—R.]
[Jowett escapes all the difficulties of this section, by intimating that the Apostle’s exhortation has a reference only to the Roman Christians in their then circumstances. He thinks many a scriptural precept is abused because not thus limited, and adds, respecting the Apostle: “It never occurred to him that the hidden life, which he thought of only as to be absorbed in the glory of the sons of God, was one day to be the governing principle of the civilized world.” It is not likely to be so long, if all its professed possessors pare down the scriptural precepts in this fashion.—R.]
[From the expression, “God’s minister to thee for good,” the relative excellence of the different forms of government must be determined, since this is the only rule laid down, and an empirical one at best. So long as a popular government best fulfils this Divine purpose, so long will men gladly lay down their lives, that “the government of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth” (Pres. Lincoln at Gettysburg Cemetery.—R.]
