Fifth Section.—Synopsis: The law, in its holy design, by the feeling of death, to lead to the new life in grace. The development of the law from externality to inwardness. The experience of Paul a sketch from life of the conflict under the law, as well as of the transition from the old life in the law to the new life in the Spirit.
Rom_7:7-25
7What shall we say then? Is the law sin? God forbid. [Let it not be!] Nay, [but] I had not known [i. e., recognized] sin, but by [except through] the law: for I had not known lust [evil desire], except the law had [if the lawhad not] said, Thou shalt not covet. 8But sin, taking occasion [,] by the commandment, [omit comma] wrought in me all manner of concupiscence [evil desire]. 9For without the law sin was [is] dead. For [Now] I was alive without the law once: but when the commandment came, sin revived [sprang into life], andI died. 10And the commandment, which was ordained to [was unto] life, Ifound [the same, or, this, was found by me] to be unto death. 11For sin, taking occasion [,] by the commandment, [omit comma] deceived me, and by it slew me.12Wherefore [So that] the law is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good.
13Was [Did] then that which is good made [become] death unto me? God forbid. But sin, that it might appear sin, working death in [to] me by [through] that which is good; [,] that sin by [through] the commandment might become exceeding [exceedingly] sinful.
14For we know that the law is spiritual: but I am carnal, sold under sin.15For that which I do [perform], I allow [know] not: for what I would, that do I not [not what I wish, that I practise]; but what I hate, that do I.16If then I do that which I would not [But if what I wish not, that I do], Iconsent unto [I agree with] the law that it is good. 17Now then it is no more18[longer] I that do [perform] it, but sin that dwelleth [dwelling] in me. For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh), dwelleth no good thing [good doth not dwell]: for to will [wish] is present with me; but how [omithow] to performthat which is good I find not [or, is not].19For the good that I would [wish],20I do not: but the evil which. I would [wish] not, that I do [practise]. Now [But] if I do that I would [wish] not, it is no more [longer] I that do21[perform] it, but sin that dwelleth [dwelling] in me. I find then a [the] law,that, when I would [wish to] do good, evil is present with me. 22For I delightin the law of God after the inward man: 23But I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members.
24O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of thisdeath [or, this body of death]?25I thank God [or, Thanks to God] through Jesus Christ our Lord. So then with the mind I myself [I myself with the mind] serve the law of God; but with the flesh the law of sin.
A.—The development of life under the law as development of the knowledge of sin.
Summary.—1. The law in relation to sin; Rom_7:12-13. a. The holiness of the law in its relation to the sinfulness of man; Rom_7:7-12. b. The effect of the law in harmony with its design: Disclosure of the deadly effect of sin, in causing it to complete itself as well in facts as in the consciousness; Rom_7:13.–2. The sinner in relation to the law; Rom_7:14-23. a. The revelation of man’s carnal nature or tendency in general under the spirituality of the law; Rom_7:14. b. The disclosure of the sinful obscuration of the understanding; or the dispute of knowledge; Rom_7:15-16. c. The disclosure of the sinful obscuration of the will; or the dispute of the will; Rom_7:17-18. d. Disclosure of the sinful obscuration of feeling; or of the unconscious ground of life; Rom_7:19-20. e. Disclosure of the darkening of the whole human consciousness by the opposition of God’s law and a mere seeming law; or the deadly rent in the whole man; Rom_7:21—23.—3. The unhappy premonition of death, in the sense of the entanglement by the (seeming) body of death, and the release from it; Rom_7:24. 4. The transition from death to life; Rom_7:25. a. The redemption, in the former half of the verse. b. Conclusion in relation to the starting-point of the new life; second half of Rom_7:25.
B.—The same development as transition from the law to the Gospel, from ruin to salvation.
(Eph_5:13 : “But all things that are reproved are made manifest by the light: for whatsoever doth make manifest is light.”) a. The holy design of the law to discover the root of sin, and with the sense of guilt to awaken the sense of death; Rom_7:7-12.—b. The wholesomeness of this complete unmasking of sin in its absolute sinfulness; Rom_7:13.—c. View of the conflict between the spiritual and divine character of the law, and the carnal character of the sinner; Rom_7:14.—d. Consciousness of the want of clearness and supremacy of understanding; Rom_7:15-16.—e. Consciousness of the want of firmness and energy of will; Rom_7:17-18.—f. Consciousness of the weakness of the nobler sentiments, and the superior power of the lower; Rom_7:19-20.—g. The consciousness of the chasm between the inner man and the outward life; of the rent between the two reciprocally contradictory laws; Rom_7:21-23.—h. The fruit of this development: the consummated consciousness of the necessity of deliverance; Rom_7:24—i. Deliverance and the new law of life: clear distinction between knowledge and flesh; Rom_7:25. The I is distinguished, first from sin in knowledge, then in the will, then in the, feeling then in the whole consciousness of the inward nature, but finally in the inquiring cry for the Redeemer.
General Preliminary Remarks.—We come first of all to the question, In what sense does the Apostle speak in the first person singular? what does the
ἐãþ
mean? Different views: The expression is a
ìåôáóêçìáôéóìüò
, see 1Co_4:6—that is, the representation of one figure in another. Thus the Greek fathers applied the passage to the fall of Adam, or of the human race (Tholuck: “By way of example, the introduction of man into the paradisaical condition”).—Others believed the Jewish people before and under the law denoted (Chrysostom, Turretin, Wetstein, Reiche). The view of the Socinians and Arminians (Grotius, and others) was a modification of this one, that the homines plerique are meant, who, under the legal economy, have surrendered themselves to a gross life of sin. But the Apostle evidently speaks of a human condition of soul, in which the inward conflict of life is very earnest and great; and the language of his own experience is unmistakable. Even if he spoke of the human race in general, or of the Israelitish people in particular, he could not speak of a mere
ìåôáó÷çìáôéóìüò
, which would be excluded from the organic connection by the Apostle’s theological view. But since the Apostle uses the most forcible language of his own experience, his expression is
ἰäßùóéò
(
÷ïéíïðïéééῒá
); that is, he expresses in his experience a universal human experience of the relation of man to the law (Meyer, and others). For it is self-evident that the Apostle could have no occasion to describe a special experience concerning himself alone.
But now the second question arises: What state of the soul has the Apostle portrayed? Does this passage refer to the condition of the unregenerate, or of the regenerate?
Views.—1. The unregenerate: The Greek fathers, Augustine before his controversy with the Pelagians (prop. 44 in Ep. ad Rom.); also Jerome, Abelard (to a certain extent), and Thomas Aquinas; then Erasmus, Bucer, Musculus, Ochino, Faustus Socinus, Arminius (on Affelman, see Tholuck, p. 328); the Spener school (according to the suggestions of Spener); and later exegetical writers. [Among these, Julius Müller, Neander, Nitzsch, Hahn, Tholuck, Krehl, Hengstenberg, Rückert, De Wette, Ewald, Stier, Stuart, Ernesti, Messner, Schmid, Lechler, Kahnis, and Meyer (most decidedly). Some of these, however, really support the modified view upheld below (4).—R.].
2. The regenerate: Methodius in the Origenianis (see Tholuck, p. 336); Augustine in the controversy with the Pelagians (on account of Rom_7:17-18; Rom_7:22; Rom_7:25 : Retract. i. 23, &c.); Jerome, Luther, Calvin, Beza, the orthodox school; recently Kohlbrügge, Das 7te Kapitel des Briefes an die Römer (1839).
3. The first section, from Rom_7:7-13, treats of the unregenerate;Rom_7:14-25, of the regenerate: Philippi [whose careful and thorough discussion (Comm., pp. 249–258) is one of the ablest in favor of this reference.—R.]. The identity of the subject is against this view. Hofmann, Schriftbeweis, i. p. Rom 469: “The Apostle does, indeed, speak of his present condition, but apart from the moral ability to which he had grown in Christ.” According to Meyer, this is the earlier Augustinian view (of the unregenerate); but it seems to be scarcely an intelligible one. [This view (referring only Rom_7:14-25 to the regenerate) is that of most Scotch expositors (latterly Brown, Haldane, Forbes); of Delitzsch (Bibl. Psychol., pp. 368 ff., 2d ed.), and is ably defended by Dr: Hodge. As the current Calvinistic interpretation, it requires further consideration. Mention must be made also of the modified form of it held by Alford. The arguments in favor of making the sharp transition at Rom_7:14, are as follows, as urged by Hodge: (1) The onus probandi is on the other side (on account of the first person and present tense). (2) There is not an expression, from the beginning to the end of the section, Rom_7:14-25, which the holiest man may not and must not adopt. (3) There is much which cannot be asserted by any unrenewed man. (4) The context is in favor of this interpretation. The positions (2) and (3) must be discussed in the exegesis of the verses as they occur (especially Rom_7:14-15; Rom_7:22). It will be found that there is very great difficulty in applying all the terms in their literal sense exclusively to either class. Philippi is most earnest in upholding the 3d position of Hodge. In regard to (1), it may be observed, that the first person is used in Rom_7:7-13, so that the change from the past to the present tense alone enters into the discussion. Is this change of tense sufficient to justify so marked a change in the subject? A consistent attempt to define the subject throughout on this theory, leads to the “confusion,” which Alford admits in the view he supports.—The context, it may readily be granted, admits of this view; for in chaps. 5. and 6. the result of justification, the actual deliverance from sin, has been brought into view, and Rom_7:6 says: we serve, &c. But, on the other hand, it must be admitted that Rom_7:7-13 recur to the ante-Christian, legal position. Not until Rom_7:25 is there a distinct Christian utterance, while chap. 8 sounds like a new song of triumph. If the Apostle is holding the distinctively Christian aspect of the conflict in abeyance, though describing the experience of a Christian, in order that he may give it more force in chap. 8., he is doing what is not usual with him as a writer, still less with a struggling believer in his daily experience. The context, we hold, points most plainly to the view given next, and adopted by Dr. Lange.—R.]
4. The Apostle is not describing a quiescent state, but the process in which man is driven from the law to Christ, and an unregenerate person becomes a regenerate one. So Olshausen: “The state under the law cannot coëxist with regeneration, and without question, therefore—as Rom_7:24 is to express the awakened need of redemption, and Rom_7:25 the experience of redemption itself
Rom_7:14-24 are to be referred to a position before regeneration, and to be understood as a description of the conflict within an awakened person. Since, however, the Apostle makes use of the present for this section, while before and afterwards he applies the aorist, we are led to the idea that he does not intend to have this state of conflict regarded as concluded with the experience of redemption. In the description (Rom_7:14-24) itself, also, as will afterwards be more particularly shown, an advance in the conflict with sin is clearly observable; the better I stand out in the man, more and more the pleasure in God’s law gradually increases. This is the case in a still higher degree, as Rom_7:25 expresses, after the experience of the redeeming power of Christ, where the conflict with sin is described as for the most part victorious on the side of the better part in man. But a battle still continues, even after the experience of regeneration,” &c.—In all this, the antithesis, under the law and being free from the law, does not bear being confounded. It only admits of the condition, that the Christian must again feel that he is weak, so far as he falls momentarily under the law of the flesh, and thereby under the law of death. Even Bengel finds in this section a progress, but he does not correctly describe it: Sensim suspirat, connititur, enititur ad libertatem. Inde paulatim serenior fit oratio. But after the combatant experiences deep conviction, he declines, rather, into despair; but then this is the way to complete deliverance.
Tholuck properly remarks: “As the question is usually raised, whether the regenerate or the unregenerate person is spoken of, it produces misunderstanding so far as the status irregenitorum comprehends in itself the very different states of soul of the status exlex carnalis and of the status legalis; then, how far the relation of Old Testament believers to law and regeneration is regarded differently; and finally, how far the idea of regeneration has been a self-consciously variable one.”
[This view is, on the whole, the most satisfactory. It admits the conflict after regeneration, but guards against the thought that this is a description of distinctively Christian experience. It is rather that of one under the pedagogy of the law “unto Christ,” whether for the first time or the hundredth time. It is the most hopeful state of the unregenerate man; the least desirable state of the regenerate man. Of course, it cannot be admitted that there is a third class, a tertium quid, the awakened. This view seems to be the one which will harmonize the polemics of the past. Jowett adopts it, Schaff also, while Delitzsch, after advocating (3), says: “He speaks of himself the regenerate—i. e., of experiences still continuing, and not absolutely passed away—but he does not speak of himself quà regenerate—i. e., not of experiences which he has received by the specifically New Testament grace of regeneration.” He further admits that such experiences might occur in the heathen world, according to Rom_2:15. The advantages of this view are very numerous. It relieves the exegesis of a constant constraint, viz., the attempt to press the words into harmony with certain preconceived anthropological positions. It agrees best with the context. Its practical value is beyond that of any other. See Doctr. Notes.—R.]
On the literature, see the Introduction. Also Tholuck, p. 339, where the explanations of Hunnius and Aretius may also be found. Winzer, Programm, 1832. A treatise in Knapp, Scripta varii argumenti.
EXEGETICAL AND CRITICAL
First Paragraph, Rom_7:7-12
Rom_7:7. What shall we say then? [
Ôßïὖí ἐñïῦìåí
; see the note on this expression, Rom_3:5, p. 118. Comp. also Rom_9:30, where the use is different.—R.] Intimation that another false conclusion must be prevented. Though the Christian be dead to the law, it does not follow that the law is not holy. But it belongs to a preceding stage of development.
Is the law sin [
ὁ íüìïò ἁìáñôßá
]? Origen [Jerome]: the lex naturalis. Tholuck: the Mosaic law. Certainly the question is respecting the justification of the latter. [Jowett paraphrases: Is conscience sin?—which seems almost an exegetical caprice. His reason for it, that the consciousness of sin, rather than a question of new moons and Sabbaths, is under consideration, betrays an entire misapprehension of the ethical purpose of the law of Moses. It may be admitted that an inferential reference to all law can be found here, but the passage is an account of an historical experience, which took place under the Mosaic law.—R.]
Sin. The usual interpretation: cause of sin. Metonymically, the operation named, instead of the cause, as 2Ki_4:40; Mic_5:1 : Samaria is sin for Jacob. On the other hand, De Wette and Meyer say: Is the law sinful, immoral? After what precedes, it may well mean: Is it the real cause of sin, and, as such, itself sinful? [Bengel: “causa peccati peccaminosa.” “
Ὁ íüìïò
itself being abstract, that which is predicated of it is abstract also” (Alford).—R.] Even this conclusion is repelled by the Apostle with abhorrence,
ìὴ ãÝíïéôï
.
Nay, but. The
ἀëëÜ
is taken by some in the sense of
ἀëëÜãå
: but certainly. He repels the thought that the law is sin, but yet he firmly holds that it brought injury (Stuart, Köllner, and others; Meyer, Hofmann). Tholuck, on the other hand (with Theodore of Mopsvestia, Abelard, and others), sees, in what is here said, the expression of the opposite, viz., that the law first brought sin to consciousness. It may be asked whether this alternative is a real one. If the law be really holy, because it has driven sin from its concealment and brought it fully to manifestation, then there is no alternative here. [This seems decisive against Stuart’s view. Meyer (4th ed.) renders
ἀëëὰ
, sondern. The law is not sin, but its actual relation to sin is that of discoverer of sin. This is much simpler than Alford’s view: I say not that, but what I mean is that. The objection that this implies a praise of the law (De Wette) is without force. He might well praise it as leading toward Rom_7:25; Rom_8:1.—R.]
But it may be asked, in connection with this view, How are the words, I had not known sin [
ôὴí ἁìáñôßáí ïὑê ἔãíùã
], to be explained? According to Cyril, Winzer, De Wette, Philippi, and Tholuck, this refers to the knowledge of sin alone; but, according to Meyer, and others, it refers to the becoming acquainted with sin by experience. Meyer: “The principle of sin in man, with which we first become experimentally acquainted by the law, and which would have remained unknown to us without the law, because then it would not have become active by the excitement of desires for what is forbidden, in opposition to the law.” This explanation lays too much stress upon the second point of view. According to Rom_5:20; Rom_6:15, and Rom_7:8 of this chapter, it is, however, not doubtful that the Apostle has here in mind not only the knowledge of sin, but also the excitement of sin. But he does not have it in mind as the increase of sin in itself, but as the promotion of its manifestation and form for the judgment.
Except through the law [
åἰ ìὴ äéὰ íüìïõ
]. Olshausen: “The law in all the forms of its revelation.” Meyer properly rejects this. Although the law further appears as immanent in man, yet, ever since the Mosaic law, by which it was awakened, it has the character of the second, threatening, and deadly law. The moral law of nature, ideally conceived, is one with human nature. [The citation from the Decalogue, immediately following, shows what the reference is.—R.]
For I had not known evil desire [
ôÞí ôåãὰñ ἐðéèõìßáí ïὐê ᾔäåéí
. See Textual Note1.
ÃÜñ
confirmatory, not = for example. On
ôå
, see Tholuck, Stuart, Winer, p. 404. It is untranslatable in English; here a sign of close logical connection. On the distinction between the verbs, Bengel says:
ἕãíùí
majus est,
ïἶäá
minus. Hinc posterius, cum etiam minor gradus negatur, est in incremento. The verb is strengthened also, in this conditional clause, by the absence of
ἄí
, which would usually be inserted.—R] We cannot translate this, with Meyer: “For I would not have known desire,” &c. This would make the law the producer of lust, which is not the Apostle’s meaning. That lust was present without the law, he had sufficiently asserted in chaps.1. and 5. But now he has become acquainted with the corrupting and condemnatory character of wicked lust, under the prohibition:
Thou shalt not covet (Exo_20:17), [
Ïὐê ἐðéèõìÞóåéò
. On the prohibitory future of the law, as quoted in the New Testament, see Winer, p. 296; Buttmann, N. T. Gramm., p. 221.—R.] As this was to him the principal thing in the law, he thus first understood the inner character of the law and the inward nature of sin; but thus also was the propensity to evil first excited, in the most manifold way, by the contradiction in him. The desire was now to him universally and decisively the principal and decisive thing. The first view of the inner life, or of the interior of life, had now occurred. Tholuck remarks, that Augustine and Thomas Aquinas regarded the concupiscentia as the generale peccatum from which all the others proceeded; but he observes, on the contrary, that the
ôÝ
in the sentence suggests rather a subordinate relation. But is the
ᾔäåéí
subordinated or separated in relation to the whole sentence? For I never once understood the meaning of wicked lust without the law.
To what period of Paul’s life does this belong? To the time of his childhood (Origen); or of his Pharisaical blindness (“the elder Lutheran and Reformed exegesis down to Carpzov”)? Tholuck gives reasons for the latter. According to Matt. v., Pharisaism was narrowed to the act. He cites pertinent expressions of Kimchi, and other Jewish writers (see also the note, p. 352). In Jarchi, the explanation of the Tenth Commandment is wanting; in Aben Ezra there is a dwarfish construction. But then he raises the objection, that a person like Paul must have earlier come to a knowledge of the sinfulness of the
ἐðéèõìßá
. But the knowledge of the sinfulness of the
ἐðéèõìßá
has its first awakening significance, when wicked lust is recognized as the root of supposed good works, and thereby leads to a revolution of the old views on good works themselves. Even the fanatic rejects not only wicked works in themselves, but also their root—wicked desires. But he defines wicked desires and good affections according to evil and good works, while the awakened one begins to proceed from the judgment on inward affections, and afterwards to define the works. Therefore we cannot say, that
ïὐê ἔãíùí
and
ïὐê ᾔ äåéí
stand here merely hypothetically; the question as to the subject of this declaration must be raised first in Rom_7:9 (Tholuck). Rom_7:7; Rom_7:9 denote the same experience through which Paul, as the representative of all true contestants, passed under the law: Rom_7:7 on the side of the perception of sin, Rom_7:9 on the side of the excitement of sin.
Rom_7:8. But sin. The
äÝ
is, indeed, “continuative” (Meyer), [not adversative (Webster and Wilkinson).—R.], yet not in reference to the history of the development of the sinful experience, but so far as its second stage is given.—Sin,
ἡ ἁìáñôßá
; that is, sin inwardly present as peccability; the
ἐðéèõìßá
, as it was just shown to be sin. [The principle of sin in man, as in Rom_7:7. To admit a personification, as held by Fritzsche and Stuart, is unnecessary; to refer it to actual sin (Reiche), is contrary to the context. Comp. Olshausen, Koppe, Philippi, Hodge.—R.]
Taking occasion [
ἀöïñìὴí äÝ ëáâïῦóá
]. The
ἀöïñìÞ
denotes the external impulse or occasion, in opposition to the inner. [Not merely opportunity; “it indicates the furnishing the material and ground of attack, the wherewith and whence to attack” (Alford). Its position is emphatic, though the whole phrase is probably thus rendered prominent.—R.] The
ëáìâÜíåéí
in
ëáâïῦóá
, as free, moral activity, must be made emphatic here. Therefore Reiche says, incorrectly: it received occasion.
By the commandment wrought in me [
äéὰ ôῆò ἐíôïëῆò êáôçñãÜóáôï ἐí ἐìïß
]. The
äéὰ ôῆò ἐíôïë
. must be connected with
÷áôçñã
. (Rückert, Tholuck, Meyer), and not with
ἀöïñì
. (Luther, Olshausen, Tholuck). The sentence contains the declaration how sin took an occasion for itself. It operated just by the commandment [the single precept referred to Rom_7:7], since it regarded the categorical commandment as a hostile power, and struggled and rebelled against it.
The immediate design of the commandment in itself was the subjection of the sinner; but the prospective result was the rising of sin, and this result should bring sin clearly to the light in order to capacitate the sinner for deliverance. Meyer says ambiguously: “Concupiscence is also without law in man, but yet it is not concupiscence for what is forbidden.” Certainly the positive prohibition first appears with the law; but the variance of the sinner with the inner law of life is already perfectly present. But now refractoriness toward the positive command makes its appearance, and enhances and consummates sin.
All manner of evil desire [
ðᾶóáí ἐðéèýìéáí
]. The
ἐðéèõìßá
was already present; but it now first unfolded and extended itself to the contrast. Zwingli, and others, interpret this as the knowledge of lust; Luther, Calovius, Philippi, and others, interpret it properly as the excitement of lust. Tholuck: “According to Rom_7:11, sin deceives, as is exhibited in the history of the fall of man; to man every thing forbidden appears as a desirable blessing; but yet, as it is forbidden, he feels that his freedom is limited, and now his lust rages more violently, like the waves against the dyke;” see 1Co_15:46. [Philippi well says of this: “An immovably certain psychological fact, which man can more easily reason away and dispute away, than do away.”—R.]
For without the law sin is dead [
÷ùñὶò ãὰñ íüìïõ ἁìáñôßá íå÷ñÜ
. A general proposition, hence, with the verb omitted. Beza and Reiche incorrectly supply
ἦí
; so E. V., was. It will readily be understood that
íåêñÜ
is not used in an absolute, but relative sense, = inoperative (or unobserved, if the reference be limited to the knowledge of sin). Against this the antithesis of the following verse may be urged.—R.] Meyer, incorrectly: “not actively, because that is wanting whereby it can take occasion to be active.” Rather, sin cannot mature in its root; it cannot come to
ðáñÜâáóõò
. Man has, to a certain extent, laid himself to rest with it upon a lower bestial stage, which is apparently nature; the commandment first manifests the demoniacal contradiction of this stage, the actual as well as the formal contradiction to God and what is divine (see Rom_8:3). It is incorrect to limit the statement, with Chrysostom, Calvin, and others, to knowledge—it was not known; or, with Calovius, to the conscience (terrores conscientiœ); or, finally, to limit the idea to the sphere of desire (Tholuck). It has not yet acquired its most real, false life, in the
ðáñÜâáóéò
. Reference must here be made to the antithesis: Sin was dead, and I was alive. [The clauses, however, are not strictly antithetical.—R.]
Rom_7:9. Now I was alive without the law once [
ἐãὼ äὲ ἔæùí ÷ùñὶò íüìïõ ðïôÝ
. For (E. V.) is incorrect;
äÝ
must then be rendered but or now (i. e., moreover), as it is taken to be adversative or continuative. The latter is to be preferred, on the ground that this clause continues a description of the state without the law, while the real antithesis occurs in the following clause, for which the particle but should be reserved.—R.] In order to define the sense, we must apply the twofold antithesis. Paul could only have lived first in the sense in which sin was dead in him, and also be dead in the sense in which sin was alive in him.
I was alive. The I must be emphasized: “the whole expression is pregnant (Reiche, on the contrary, merely
ἦí
)”.
Explanations: 1. Videbar mihi vivere (Augustine, Erasmus [Barnes], and others).
2. Securus eram (Melanchthon, Calvin, Bengel [Hodge], and others), I lived securely as a Pharisee.
3. Meyer says, to the contrary: “Paul means the life of childlike innocence which is free from death (Rom_7:10), (comp. Winzer, p. 11; Umbreit in the Studien und Kritiken, 1851, p. 637 f.), where (as this condition of life, analogous to the paradisaical state of our first parents, was the cheerful ray of his earliest recollection) the law had not yet come to knowledge, the moral spontaneity had not yet occurred, and therefore the principle of sin was still in the slumber of death. This is certainly a status securitatis, but not an immoral one.” Tholuck reminds us of the fact, that the Jewish child was not subject to the law until his thirteenth year; but he accedes (and properly so) to the views of the elder expositors. Paul first perceived the deadly sting of the law when he was forbidden to lust. The child, as a child, has childish devices; 1 Corinthians 13; but it can here come into consideration only so far as its religious and moral consciousness began to develop. But the status securitatis of which the Apostle here speaks, first begins where the innocent child’s status securitatis ceases. It consists in the sinful life being taken, after the course of the world, as naturalness instead of unnaturalness. And this can also continue under the law, so long as the law is regarded as something external, and is referred to mere action. The Apostle first dates the true existence of the law for man from the understanding of the Thou shalt not covet. As, therefore, Meyer has above given too Augustinian a view of original sinfulness, so he here construes it too much on the opposite side.
In a historical reference, this text, according to Rom_5:13, has especially in view the period from Adam to Moses. It has, therefore, even been said that Paul here speaks, in the name of his people, of the more innocent and pure life of the patriarchs and Israelites before the gift of the law (Grotius, Lachmann, Fritzsche, and others). Undoubtedly, that historical stage is included; yet here the psychological point of view predominates: the life of the individual up to the understanding of the Mosaic expression, Thou shalt not covet. The law also points, by the
ïὐê ἐðéè
., beyond itself; as the sacrificial offering, &c.
Now I was alive. This means, according to Meyer, “Man, during the state of death (Todtsein) of the principle of sin, was not yet subject to eternal death. Certainly he became subject to physical death by the sin of Adam.” We have already refuted this distinction. The condemned are first actually subject to death at the final judgment; in principle, the children of Adam are subject to it; but the living man, of whom Paul here speaks, had not yet fallen into it, in the personal consciousness of guilt and the personal entanglement in the
ðáñÜâáóéò
.
But when the commandment came [
ἐëèïýóçò äå
Ì
ôῆò ἐ íôïëῆò
. The specific command, not the whole law. Came—i. e., was brought home to me.—At this point the older Lutheran and Calvinistic expositors found a reference to the conviction of sin immediately preceding conversion. But the use of
ἐíôïëÞ
is against this, as well as the drift of the whole passage. A writer, so loving in his repetition of the name of Christ, and in direct reference to the work of Christ, would not have left such a meaning obscure. Comp. Philippi on the psychological objections.—R.] When its inward character became known. This certainly has an historical application to the gift of the Mosaic law (Reiche, Fritzsche), but a psychological application to the designated moments of introspection.
Sin sprang into life [
ἡ ἁìáñôßá ἀíÝæçóåí
]. The explanation of the
ἀíÝæçóåí
, revived (in Rückert, De Wette, and others. Tholuck: “The
ἀíÜ
stands, as elsewhere in compound words, in the strengthened meaning of sursum; comp.
ἀíáâëÝðù
, in Joh_9:11,” &c), is opposed by Meyer, in accordance with the elder expositors, and by Bengel and Philippi. Bengel makes this explanation: sicut vixerat, cum per Adamum intrasset in mundum. Certainly the
ἁ ìáñôßá
became perfectly alive first in Adam as
ðáñÜâáóéò
, and then as such
íåêñÜ
, until the gift of the Mosaic law again brought it to life. But this is also repeated psychologically in the individual so far as the Adamic
ðáñÜâáóéò
is psychologically reflected more or less strongly in his first offences; thus an individual
ëáìâ
. of the fall takes place, but then, until the awakening light, of the law penetrates the conscience, a false state of nature enters, connected with an active sense of life. [Here, too, must be included both the knowledge of and excitement to sin.—R.]—Some Codd. read
ἔæçóå
, because the expression
ἀíáæῇí
did not occur in the classical Greek and in the Septuagint. Origen thought there was here a reminder of a pre-terrestrial fall. Cocceius: evidentius apparuit.
And I died [
ἐãὼ äὲ ἀðÝèáíïí
]. In the same sense as sin became alive, did the sinner die. That is, with the sense of conscious [and increasing] guilt, the sense of the penalty of death has made its appearance. Meyer makes an inadequate distinction here: “We must understand neither physical nor spiritual death (Semler, Böhme, Rückert, and others), but eternal death, as the antithesis,
åἰò æùÞí
, requires.” The sense of the penalty of death makes no distinction of this kind. [The aorist points to a definite occurrence. He entered into a certain spiritual state, which he calls death. Calvin: Mors peccati vita est hominis; sursum vita peccati mors hominis.—R.]
Rom_7:10. And the commandment, which was unto life, the same was found by me to be unto death [
êáὶ åὑñÝèç ìïé ἡ ἐíôïëὴ ἡ åἰò æùÞí
,
áὕôç åἰò èÜíáôïí
.
Êáß
introduces the verse as an epexegesis of died, with the addition of a new circumstance (Stuart).—R.] Supply
ïὖóá
before unto life. In what sense was the commandment thus found? The commandment has certainly promised life to the one observing the law; Lev_18:5; Deu_5:33; Mat_19:17. It is, however, easily misunderstood when there is such a general explanation as this: “the promise of life was connected with the observance of the Mosaic commandments” (Meyer). The sense is rather from the beginning, that the kind of promise is conditional on the kind of observance. External obedience has also only an external promise, or a promise of what is external (Exo_20:12). But this is, for the pious, only the figure of a higher obedience and promise. The self-righteous man, on the other hand, made a snare for himself out of that promise. Now, in the highest sense, life according to the law of the Spirit—that is, in faith (which is the end of the law)—results in the
æùὴ áἰþíéïò
. Only the transition from death to life lies between the two. It is just the most intense effort to fulfil the law that results in death. This is a circumstance which seems to contradict the
åἰò æþÞí
, and yet it does not contradict it, but is quite in harmony with it.
The same. We hold that, according to the sense, we must read
áὐôÞ
(with Lachmann, De Wette, Philippi), and not
áὕôç
with Meyer and Tischendorf [Alford, Tregelles]. For the law has only temporarily become transformed, as the same law of life, into a law of death; it has not permanently become a law of death.
Rom_7:11. For sin, &c. [
ἡ ãὰñ ἁìáñôßá
,
ê
.
ô
.
ë
. The
ãÜñ
introduces an explanation of Rom_7:10. The first words are similar to Rom_7:8, but
ἁìáñôßá
here stands emphatically first. The position of
äéὰ ôῆò ἐíôïëῆò
is also slightly emphatic.—R.] Not the commandment in itself has become a commandment unto death; sin has rather made it thus. How far? Sin took occasion, or made itself an occasion. That it took it of the commandment, is assumed, and is explained by what follows. The following
êáὶ äé
̓
áὐôῆò
, &c., favors the connection of the
äéὰ ôῆò ἐíôïëῆò
with
ἐîçðÜôçóὲ
́
ìå
, deceived me. It first made the commandment a provocation, and then a means of condemnation. Thus what applies to Satan, that he was first man’s tempter, and then his accuser, applies likewise to sin. This passage calls to mind the serpent in Paradise, as 2Co_11:3. But in what did the deception of sin consist? Philippi: “Since sin made me pervert the law, in which I thought that I had a guide to righteousness, into a means for the promotion of unrighteousness.” Not clear. It deceived me, in that it represented the law to me as a limit which seemed to separate me from my happiness. Behind that limit it charmed me to transgression by a phantom of happiness. Accordingly, it is not satisfactory to explain the following clause: And by it slew me [
êáὶ äé
’
áὐôῆò ἀðÝêôåéíåí
], thus: sin gave me over to the law, so that it slew me. In this respect sin rather falsified the law, since it represented to me my well-merited death as irremediable, or my judge as my enemy (see Genesis 3; Heb_2:15; 1Jn_3:20). [“Brought me into the state of sin and misery,” already referred to in Rom_7:10. The allusion to the temptation is to be admitted here also.—R.] Tholuck: “Decision of Simeon Ben Lachish: The wicked nature of man rises every day against him, and seeks to slay him (Vitringa, Observ. Sacr., 2:599); also by the
éֵöֶø äָøָò
is denoted the angel of death.”
Rom_7:12. So that the law is holy, &c. [
ὥóôå ὁ ìὲí íüìïò ἄãéïò
. The
ὤóôå
introduces the result of the whole discussion, Rom_7:7-11. It is not = ergo, yet of a more general conclusive character. To
ìÝí
, the corresponding
äÝ
is wanting. The antithesis we should expect, according to Meyer, is: but sin brought me to death through the law, which was good in itself. This is the thought of Rom_7:13; but as the form is changed,
äÝ
does not appear.—R.] Not only innocent (Tholuck), but also absolutely separated from, and opposed to, sin. And this applies not only to the law in general, but also to its explanation in the single commandment.
[And the commandment holy and just and good,
êáὶ ἡ ἐíôïëὴ ἁãßá êáὶ äéêáßá êáὶ ἀãáèÞ
.] The commandment is first holy in its origin as God’s commandment; secondly, just, as the individual determination of the law of the system of righteousness (Meyer: “rightly constituted, just as it should be”); and good—that is, not in the vague sense of excellent (Meyer, Philippi, and others), but according to the idea of what is good: beneficial promotion of life in itself, in spite of its working of death in me; indeed, even by its working of death. The term good refers to the blessed result of divine sorrow, and to the gospel. The elaborate apology for the commandment is certainly (according to Meyer) occasioned by the fact that the
ἐíôïëÞ
has been described as precisely the object of sin, in Rom_7:7.
Second Paragraph (Rom_7:13)
The Law in relation to the Sinner
Rom_7:13. Did then that which was good become death unto me? [
Ôὸ ïὖí ἀãáèὸí ἐõïὶ ἐãÝíåôï èÜíáôïò
; See Textual Note3.] Tholuck: “The
ìÝí
in Rom_7:12 prepared for the antithesis
ἡ äÝ ἁìáñôßá ÷
.
ô
.
ë
. Yet the Apostle again presents his thoughts in the form of a refutation of an antagonistic consequence. The
ἀãáèüí
should lead us to expect only wholesome fruits.” Undoubtedly, the expression
ἀãáèÞ
(Rom_7:12
) is the new problem now to be s
ï
lved. It was not so much to be w
ondered at that the commandment, as holy and just, brought death; but it was an enigma that it, as
ἀãáèÞ
, should bring forth death. The explanation of this enigma will also show how the law has brought about the great change: Through Death to Life! Was that which is good, of itself and immediately, made death unto me? This conclusion, again, is to be repelled by Let it not be!
ìὴ ãÝíïéôï
.
But sin [
ἀëëὰ ἡ ἁìáñôßá
(supply
ἐìï
ͅ
ὶἐãÝíåôï èÜíáôïò
). So all modern commentators.—R.] Namely, that was made death unto me. “The construction of Luther, Heumann, Carpzov, &c., is totally wrong:
ἀëëὰ ἡ ἁìáñôßá äéὰ ôïῦὰãáèïῦ ìïé êáôåñãáæïìÝíç
(
ἦí
)
èÜíáôïí ἵíáöáíῇ ἁìáñôßá
” (Meyer); so also the Vulgate.
That it might appear sin [
ἵíá öáíῇ ἁìáñôßá
The
ἵíá
is telic;
öáíῇ
, be shown to be (Alford). This second
ἁìáò ôßá
is a predicate; anarthrous, therefore, and also as denoting character.—R.] This was therefore the most immediate design of the law: Sin should appear as sin (Eph_5:13; Genesis 3 : Adam, where art thou?).
[Working death to me, by that which is good,
äéὰ ôïῦ ἀãáèïῦ ìïé êáôåñãáæïìÝíç èÜíáôïí
.] The idea of perfectly disclosed sin is just this: that it works death by the misconstruction and abuse of what is good. Thus the law is first made to serve as a provocation to sin unto death; second, the gospel is made a savor of death; and third, the truth is made a mighty anti-christian lie (2Th_2:11). Tholuck: “The nature of sin should thereby become manifest, that it should appear as something which makes use of what is even good as a means of ruin, and in this manner the commandment should become a means of exhibiting sin in all the more hideous light.” Scholium of Matthæus: “
ἵíá áὐôὴ ἑáíôῆí ἐëÝãîç
,
ἵíá ὅëç ôὴí ἑáíôῆò ðé÷ñßáí ἐêêáëýøç
.” In addition to this, these pertinent words: “In fact, as it is the sovereign right of good to overrule evil results for good, so is it the curse of sin to pervert the effects of what is good to evil.” Thus an emphasis rests on the
äéὰ ôïῦ ὰãáèïῦ
, for which reason it comes first.
Meyer correctly urges, against Reiche, that this
ἵíá
is telic, in opposition to the ecbatie view. Death was already present before the law, but sin completed it by the law;
êáôåñãáæïìÝíç
. The law is not sin; sin disclosed itself completely as sin in making what is good a means of evil.
That sin through the commandment might become exceedingly sinful [
ἵíá ãÝíçôáé êáè
̓
ὑðåñâïëὴí ἁìáñôùëὸò ἡ ἁìáñôßá äéὰ ôῆò ἐíôïëῆò
. Parallel clause to the last, of increased force: “Observe the pithy, sharp, vividly compressed sketch of the dark figure” (Meyer).—R.]
Êáè
’
ὑðåñâïëÞí
. Frequently used by Paul; 2Co_1:8; 2Co_4:17; Gal_1:13. The
Üìáñôùëüò
appears to be an intimation that sin, as an imaginary man, should be driven from real human nature to destruction. [The telic force of these clauses is thus expanded by Dr. Hodge: “Such is the design of the law, so far as the salvation of sinners. It does not prescribe the conditions of salvation. Neither is the law the means of sanctification. It cannot make us holy. On the contrary, its operation is to excite and exasperate sin—to render its power more dreadful and destructive.”—R.]
[Excursus on Biblico-Psychological Terms.—The exact significance of the terms
óÜñî
and
ðíåῦìá
, as used so frequently by the Apostle in this and the eighth chapters, requires careful consideration at this point. But such a discussion must necessarily be preceded by some remarks on the words,
óῶìá
,
øõ÷Þ
,
ðíåῦìá
, body, soul, and spirit, as used by Paul in a strictly anthropological sense.
I.
Óῶìá
, Body. This term is readily understood as generally used in the New Testament. Still it refers, strictly speaking, to the bodily organism, and has a psychological meaning almost = sense, the sensational part of man’s nature. As distinguished from
óÜñî
(in its physiological sense), it means the organism, of which
óÜñî
is the material substance. (
ÊñÝáò
differs from
óÜñî
, in not including the idea of an organism.) That
óῶìá
must not be restricted to the material body, irrespective of its organism and vital union with the immaterial part of man’s nature, is evident from the numerous passages (Rom_12:5; 1Co_7:27; Eph_1:23; Col_1:18, &c.), where the Church is called the body of Christ. This expression would convey little meaning, if
óῶìá
had not this psychological sense. No difficulty arises in regard to this term, except in the interpretation of a few passages which seem to imply an ethical sense; e. g., Rom_6:6 (q. v.); Rom_7:24; Rom_8:10; Rom_8:13; Col_2:11. It must be remarked, that in most of these the ethical force really belongs to some attributive word,
óῶìá
being in itself indifferent. We may explain most of these cases by giving the word a figurative sense, the organism of sin (Rom_6:6; Rom_7:24; Col_2:11), analogous to the old man; or by admitting a reference to the body as the chief organ of the manifestation of sin. The term
ìÝëç
, members (which is usually associated with
óῶìá
, rather than with
óÜñî
, because the idea of an organism is more prominent in the former term), must be interpreted accordingly (see
