1Jn_1:8. Purification from sin presupposes the existence of sin even in believers; the denial of this is self-deception.
ἐὰν
εἴπωμεν
] as in 1Jn_1:6; thereby is meant not merely “the speech of the heart” (Spener), but the actual expression and assertion.
ὅτι
ἁμαρτίαν
οὐκ
ἔχομεν
] The view of Grotius,[59] that this refers to sinning before conversion, and that
ἁμαρτία
therefore means the guilt of sin, is rightly rejected by Lücke, Sander, etc.
The question, especially of earlier commentators, whether
ἉΜΑΡΤΊΑ
is here original sin (or sinfulness, as Weiss still thinks) or actual sin (pecc. actuale), desire (concupiscentia) or deed, is solved by the fact that the idea is considered quite generally by the apostle (so also Braune)—only, of course, with the exception of the sin spoken of in chap. 1Jn_5:16. The 1st person plural
ἜΧΟΜΕΝ
is to be noticed in so far as the having sin is thereby represented as something that is true of all Christians. The expression
ἁμαρτίαν
ἔχειν
describes in a quite general way the taint of sin; only of the absolutely pure, in whom no trace of sin exists, is it true that he
ἉΜΑΡΤΊΑΝ
ΟὐΚ
ἜΧΕΙ
; the relation of this
ἉΜΑΡΤΊΑΝ
ἜΧΕΙΝ
to
ΠΕΡΙΠΑΤΕῖΝ
ἘΜ
Τῷ
ΣΚΌΤΕΙ
(1Jn_1:6), in which the will of man serves sin (or in which sin is the dominating principle of life), is therefore not that of contrast (say in this way, that
ἉΜΑΡΤΊΑΝ
ἜΧΕΙΝ
is a being tainted with sin, where no act of will takes place),[60] but is to be defined thus, that the latter (
ΠΕΡΙΠΑΤΕῖΝ
ἘΝ
Τῷ
ΣΚΌΤΕΙ
) is a particular species of
ἉΜΑΡΤΊΑΝ
ἜΧΕΙΝ
. Even though as Christians, who are born of God, we have no longer sin in the sense that
ΠΕΡΙΠ
.
ἘΝ
Τῷ
ΣΚΌΤΕΙ
is true of us, nevertheless we do not yet cease to have sin; if we deny this, if we maintain that we have no sin at all, then what John says in the following words is the case with us.
ἙΑΥΤΟῪς
ΠΛΑΝῶΜΕΝ
] not = “we are mistaken,” which
ΠΛΑΝΏΜΕΘΑ
would mean;[61] but, as Sander explains: “we mislead ourselves, take ourselves astray from salvation (or better: from truth);” by that assertion, which is a lie (not an unconscious mistake), the Christian (for the apostle is not here speaking of non-Christians) deceives himself about the truth, for which he leaves no room in himself. Braune rightly observes that
ἑαυτὸν
πλανᾶν
emphasizes the self-activity, which the middle with its passive form leaves in the background.
καὶ
ἡ
ἀλήθεια
ἐν
ἡμῖν
οὐκ
ἔστιν
] is not a mere repetition of
ἑαυτοὺς
πλανῶμεν
, but adds to this another new element.
ἡ
ἀλήθεια
, as in 1Jn_1:6, is neither = studium veri (Grotius), nor = castior cognitio (Semler), nor even = uprightness, or truthfulness (Lücke in his 2d ed.), or, as de Wette explains: “the veracity of self-knowledge and self-examination;”[62] but truth in its objective character (Lücke in his 1st ed., Baumgarten-Crusius, Düsterdieck, Brückner, Braune). Baumgarten-Crusius rightly says: “
ἀλήθεια
does not need to be taken in subjective sense, the subjective lies in
οὐκ
ἔστιν
ἐν
ἡμῖν
.” The expressions used here:
ἑαυτ
.
πλανῶμεν
and
ἡ
ἀλ
.
οὐκ
ἔστιν
ἐν
ἡμῖν
, are not milder (Sander) than the corresponding expressions in 1Jn_1:6 :
ψευδόμεθα
and
οὐ
ποιοῦμεν
τὴν
ἀλήθειαν
, but stronger (Ebrard), since in
ἑαυτ
.
πλ
. the self-injury, and in
ἡ
ἀλήθ
.
οὐκ
ἔστιν
ἐν
ἡμῖν
the negation of possession of the truth, are more sharply marked.
[59] Habere peccatum, non est: nunc in peccato esse, sed ob peccatum reum posse fieri.
[60] Even Ebrard does not correctly state the relation of the two expressions to one another, when he says that “in
ἔχειν
ἁμαρτίαν
man is not in
ἁμαρτία
, but
ἁμαρτία
is in man,” for plainly he also who is in
ἁμαρτία
has this in himself.
[61] When Ebrard, in opposition to this, remarks that it cannot be asserted “that the middle
πλανᾶσθαι
means ‘to be mistaken,’ and
πλανᾶν
ἑαυτόν
, on the other hand, ‘to mislead oneself,’ ” this is not at all to the point, since it is not said that
πλανᾶσθαι
has always the meaning “to be mistaken,” but that the German “sich irren” [Engl. “to be mistaken”] is expressed in Greek not by
πλανᾶν
ἑαυτόν
, but by
πλανᾶσθαι
.
[62] Ewald’s explanation is also unsatisfactory: “truth about this relation of things, and therefore easily about every other also.”