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1Jn_2:16. Confirmation of the preceding thought that love to the world is inconsistent with love to God.
ὅτι πᾶν τὸ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ] Bede incorrectly explains the neuter here (as it certainly does appear elsewhere in John) as masculine: omnes mundi dilectores non habent nisi concupiscentiam; most commentators regard the expression as identical with the foregoing τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ; even Düsterdieck, who, in reference to the following ἡ ἐπιθυμία κ . τ . λ ., thinks that a “change occurs from the representation of the objects of the love of the world to the subjective desire itself and its actual manifestations.” But even apart from the fact that the assumption of such a change in the form is only a makeshift, the expression of the apostle himself is opposed to this; for had he not meant by πᾶν τὸ ἐν τ . κ . something else than by τὰ ἐν τῷ κ ., he would have put the neuter plural here also. Besides, it must not be overlooked why the following: ἡ ἐπιθυμία κ . τ . λ . could not be the apposition stating the sense of πᾶν τ . ἐν τ . κ . (Frommann, p. 269).[138] Accordingly, the apostle means by this expression: all that forms the contents, i.e. the substance of the κόσμος ; its inner life, which animates it (Braune); in what this consists, the following words state. ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκὸς κ . τ . λ .] Although the ideas ἐπιθυμία and ἀλαζονεία in themselves denote a subjective disposition of man, yet several commentators think that here not this, but the objective things are meant, to which that subjective disposition is directed (Bengel, Russmeyer, Lange, Ewald), or that the otherwise subjective idea disappears into the objective (de Wette), or at least that both the subjective and the objective are to be thought of together (Lorinus, Brückner). But with the correct conception of the ideas κόσμος and πᾶν τὸ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ there is no apparent reason for such an arbitrary explanation, by which violence is done to the words of the apostle.
ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκός ] The genitive is here not the genitive of the object, but, as is the case with ἐπιθυμία [139] always in the N. T. (except 2Pe_2:10; on Eph_4:22 comp. Meyer on this passage), the genitive of the subject, hence not: “the desire directed towards the flesh,” but: “the desire which the flesh, i.e. the corrupted sensual nature of man, cherishes, or which is peculiar to the flesh;” comp. Gal_5:17 : ἡ σὰρξ ἐπιθυμεῖ .
Ebrard interprets, describing the genitive as that “of quality and reference,” for which he wrongly appeals to Eph_4:22, 2Pe_2:10 : “the desire which occurs in the sphere of the flesh;” the apostle scarcely conceived the idea so indefinitely. The idea may be taken in a broader or in a narrower sense; the first view in Lücke (“fleshly, sensuous desire in general, in contrast to ΠΝΕΎΜΑΤΙ ΠΕΡΙΠΑΤΕῖΝ and ἌΓΕΣΘΑΙ ; comp. Eph_2:3; 1Pe_2:11”), de Wette, Neander, Düsterdieck; in the second, the desire of sensuality and drunkenness is specially understood; Augustine: desiderium earum rerum, quae pertinent ad carnem, sicut cibus et concubitus et caetera hujusmodi; similarly Grotius, Baumgarten-Crusius, Sander, Besser, etc.; Brückner limits the idea to “the lust of the flesh in the narrower sense;” Gerlach specially to every sort of pursuit of enjoyment;[140] and Ebrard to “sexual enjoyments.”[141] The right explanation can be found only on the consideration of the following expression.
καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ] i.e. “the desire that is inherent in the eyes, that is peculiar to them;” the expression is explained in this way, that the desire of seeing something is attributed to the sense of sight itself.[142] This idea also is understood in a broader and in a narrower sense. As Lücke calls the eyes “as it were the principal gates of sensual desire for the external world,” he identifies this idea with the preceding one; de Wette does the same, interpreting it (in objective aspect): “what the eyes see, and by what sensual desire is excited.” The connection by καί , however, which is further followed by a second καί , shows that the two ideas are to be definitely distinguished. Accordingly, most commentators justly regard ἐπιθ . τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν as the description of a special sort of ἐπιθυμία ; thus (against de Wette) Brückner in subjective and objective view: “the lust of the eyes, and, at the same time, that in which, as sensuous and earthly, the eyes delight.” Two different interpretations are found with a more exact definition. Very many commentators, as Luther, Socinus, Grotius, Hornejus, Estius, Lorinus, Wolf, Clarius, Paulus, Semler, Baumgarten-Crusius, Gerlach, etc.,[143] hold, though with some modifications, the expression to be substantially synonymous with πλεονεξία , avaritia. On behalf of this interpretation, appeal is made principally to several passages of the O. T., and especially to Ecc_4:8; Ecc_5:10, Pro_23:5; Pro_27:20; but erroneously, for even though the eye of the covetous or avaricious man looks with pleasure on his treasures, and eagerly looks out for new ones, still the possession or acquirement of wealth is to him the chief thing; the striving for it, however, is not expressed by the phrase: ἐπιθυμία τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν . Still less justifiable is the explanation of Ebrard, who partly agrees with those commentators, but regards the idea of “avarice” as too narrow; and, with an appeal to passages such as Psa_17:11; Psa_54:6; Psa_91:8; Psa_92:12 Pro_6:17, etc., maintains that by ἡ ἐπιθ . τ . ὀφθ . is meant “the whole sphere of the desires of selfishness, envy, and avarice, of hatred and revenge (!).” Other commentators, on the contrary, retain the reference to the pleasure of mere sight, but limit this too much to dramatic performances, etc.; thus Augustine: omnis curiositas in spectaculis, in theatris; similarly Neander and others. Such a limitation, however, is arbitrary; accordingly, others refer the expression to other objects of sight, thus Calvin: tam libidinosos conspectus comprehendit, quam vanitatem, quae in pompis et inani splendore vagatur; but it is more correct to take the reference to these things in a quite general way, and, with Spener, to interpret: “all sinful desire by which we seek delight in the seeing itself” (so also Braune); besides, it is to be observed that ἡ ἐπιθυμία τ . ὀφθ . is not the desire for wealth, etc., which is excited by the sight (Rickli and others[144]), but the desire of seeing unseemly things, and the sinful pleasure which the sight of them affords.[145] Thus, this idea is quite exclusive of the ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκός ; if the latter is taken quite generally, then the lust of the eyes is a particular species of it, which the apostle specially mentions in order to meet the idea that the desire of seeing anything can have nothing sinful in it. But, having regard to the simple juxtaposition of the ideas by καί , it is more correct to suppose that John conceived the ἐπιθ . τῆς σαρκός not in that general sense, but in the particular sense of the “lust for wealth and immoderate enjoyment,” so that the two ideas stand to one another in the relation not of subordination, but of co-ordination, both being subordinate to the general idea of ἐπιθυμία .
καὶ ἡ ἀλαζονεία τοῦ βίου ] ἀλαζονεία is usually translated by superbia, ambitio (Socinus: ambitio in honoribus quaerendis ac sectandis), and by similar words, and thereby is understood ambition, together with the pride and haughty contempt for others which are frequently associated with it;[146] thus Cyril interprets (Homil. Pasch. xxvii.): ἀλαζονείαν τ . β . φησὶ τῶν ἀξιωμάτων ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὸ ἠρμένον ὕψος κατά γε τιμὴν καὶ δόξαν . Thereby, however, its peculiar meaning is not assigned to the word. In the N. T. ἀλαζονεία only appears in Jam_4:16 (in the plural); the adjective ἀλάζων in Rom_1:30 and 2Ti_3:2, in close connection with ὑπερήφανος , from which, however, it does not follow that the idea of ambition, thirst for glory, etc., is contained in it, but only that the ἀλαζ . is related to ὑπερηφανία ; in James is meant thereby—according to the context—the haughtiness which overlooks the uncertainty of earthly happiness, and ostentatiously relies on its permanence. In the same sense = ostentatious pride in the possession, whether real or pretended, of earthly good things, such as happiness, power, knowledge, etc., the word appears also in the Apocrypha of the O. T.; comp. Wis_5:8; Wis_17:7; 2Ma_9:8; 2Ma_15:6. In classical Greek ἀλαζονεία has almost always the collateral meaning of the unreality of proud ostentation (Theophr. Charact. 23: προσποίησίς τις ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ὄντων πρὸς δόξαν ; Plato, Phaedr.: ἕξις προσποιητικὴ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἀγαθῶν τῶν μὴ ὑπαρχόντων ; antithesis of εἰρωνεία ), which has obtained in Hellenistic usage only in so far that the idea here also always refers to something by its very nature worthless and trifling, and in this way certainly includes a delusion or unreality. This meaning is to be retained here also, as is rightly done by Lücke, Sander, Besser, Braune;[147] for examples in the Scriptures, comp. 1Ch_22:1 ff.; Ecc_2:1 ff.; Eze_28:16-17; Dan_4:27; Rev_17:4; Rev_18:7, etc. The genitive τοῦ βίου serves for the more particular definition of the idea; ΒΊΟς signifies in the N. T. either “temporal life” (1Ti_2:2; 1Pe_4:3, Rec.), or more commonly “the support of life, the means” (chap. 1Jn_3:17; Mar_12:44; Luk_8:43; Luk_15:12; Luk_15:30; Luk_21:4); it never has the meaning “conduct of life” (Ebrard). Following polyb. Hist. vi. 576: ἡ περὶ τοὺς βίους ἀλαζονεία καὶ πολυτέλεια , it is appropriate to take ΒΊΟς here in the second meaning, and the genitive as objective genitive (so Lücke); as, however, ΣΑΡΚΌς and ὈΦΘΑΛΜῶΝ are subjective genitives, it is much more correct to take ΒΊΟΥ also as subjective genitive, and accordingly to interpret: “the ἈΛΑΖΟΝΕΊΑ peculiar to the ΒΊΟς ;” in the expression ἩΔΟΝΑῚ ΤΟῦ ΒΊΟΥ , Luk_8:14, ΤΟῦ ΒΊΟΥ may also be the objective genitive, thus: “the pleasures which refer to the ΒΊΟς , the temporal good;” but more probably it is the subjective genitive here also, especially if it be connected with the preceding ideas (see Meyer on this passage), thus: “the pleasures peculiar to the present life.”[148]
[138] According to Ebrard, πᾶν τὸ ἐν τ . κ . is a resumption of τὰ ἐν τ . κ .; as, however, he understands by it various kinds of conduct, etc., that idea is rightly interpreted by him. Myrberg agrees with the interpretation given above.
[139] It is arbitrary for Ebrard to say: ἐπιθυμία is here—as in Joh_8:44; Rom_7:8; Gal_5:16, etc.—“that which one lusts after,” which indeed he again cancels by translating the word by “lust.”
[140] Even Bengel takes the expression (while, however, he understands it of the objective things) in a narrower sense: ea quibus pascuntur sensus, qui appellantur truitivi: gustus et tactus.
[141] This explanation results for Ebrard from the fact that he takes σάρξ here = σῶμα , and then describes the idea “sensual” as identical with “sexual” (!).
[142] Ebrard strangely thinks that in this view the genitive ὀφθαλμῶν is regarded as objective genitive = “the desire for eyes, i.e. for enjoyment of the eyes.”
[143] Sander also explains it of avarice, but would not exclude the curiositas in spectaculis, etc., regarding this, however, as merely collateral.
[144] Rickli interprets: “the low, sensual style of thought, in so far as this is excited and fostered by the sight.” Düsterdieck understands by it specially covetousness and avarice; but at the same time observes that every sort of desire may be excited by the eye.
[145] Bengel extends the idea beyond the limit which lies in the expression itself, when he explains: ea, quibus tenentur sensus investigativi: oculus, sive visus, auditus et olfactus.
[146] Calvin: fastus aut superbia, cui conjuncta est ambitio, jactautia, aliorum contemptus, coecus amor sui, praeceps confidentia.
[147] With this view Neander, Gerlach, and Düsterdieck substantially agree also; yet their paraphrases do not keep precisely enough within the definite limits of the extent of the idea, as they include ostentation, ambition, etc.; a definite distinction between this idea and ἐπιθυμία is requisite.—Augustine not inaccurately describes the ἀλάζων thus: jactare se vult in honoribus, magnus sibi videtur, sive de divitiis, sive de aliqua potentia. Ebrard wrongly denies that according to Hellenistic usage the element of pride is contained in the idea ἀλαζονεία ; neither in classical nor in Hellenistic usage has the word the meaning “luxury,” which he maintains for it.
[148] The commentators for the most part express themselves somewhat vaguely; de Wette explains: “the enjoyment, combined with pride of (earthly) life (not: of the good things of life);” Braune says that the genitive is to be taken as subjective genitive, and then interprets: “the genitive τ . βίου signifies the side on which ostentatious pride usually appears;” Ewald translates: “swindling in money,” which is not only indefinite, but even unjustifiable.
REMARK.
It has almost become traditional to find the modes of appearance of the evil fully stated in this threefold form, corresponding to the triplicity which appears in the Greek writers, as in Pythag. Clinias: φιληδονία μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀπολαύσεσι ταῖς διὰ σώματος , πλεονεξία δὲ ἐν τῷ κερδαίνειν , φιλοδοξία δὲ ἐν τῷ καθυπερέχειν τῶν ἴσων τε καὶ ὁμοίων ; for other expressions, see Wetstein.[149] This threefold form, it has been thought, is found both in the fall and again in the temptation of Christ; thus Bede, following Augustine, says: Per haec tria tantum cupiditas humana tentatur; per haec tria Adam tentatus est et victus; per haec tentatus est Christus et vicit; while a Lapide finds expressed in it even the contrast with the three Persons in the divine Trinity.[150]
Bengel opposes this view, and makes such a distinction between the ἐπιθ . τὴς σαρκός and the ἐπιθ . τ . ὀφθ ., that he refers the former to the sensus fruitivi, the latter to the sensus investigativi, but says of the ἀλαζονεία τ . β .: arrogantia vitae est, quae cupiditatem foras educit et longius in mundum diffundit, ut homo velit quam plurimus esse in victu, cultu, etc.; and then observes: non concidunt cum his tribus tria vitia cardinalia: voluptas, avaritia, superbia; sed tarnen in his continentur. By the last clause Bengel shows, however, “that there is a trace of that scheme to be found even in him” (Düsterdieck).
Lücke has more decidedly expressed himself against it, inasmuch as he finds in that threefold form only “the three chief points of worldly lust” (according to the first edition, only “as examples”); and, moreover, the points “in which it proceeds from the sensual desire to the climax of the ἀλαζονεία .” But Lücke’s own interpretation of the particular ideas is opposed to such a progress, as he makes the first two ideas to coincide in regard to their substance, and thus no progress takes place from the one ἐπιθυμία to the other, nor is it, besides, in any way hinted at by the apostle.
Lücke rightly contends that particular leading vices are the subject here; not individual vices, but the leading forms (Lücke[151]); or, as Brückner says, the leading tendencies of worldly sense are stated by the apostle in that threefold form. But in what relation do these stand to one another? According to Düsterdieck, the ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκός forms the superior idea, to which the two other ideas, as mutually co-ordinate, are in subordination: “The first-mentioned lust of the flesh, the most comprehensive and thorough description of the love of the world (1Jn_2:15), embraces both the lust of the eyes and the pride of life.” This is incorrect. For, on the one hand, the ἈΓΆΠΗ to the ΚΌΣΜΟς is not to be identified with the ἘΠΙΘΥΜΊΑ Τῆς ΣΑΡΚΌς , as the latter rather describes the inner nature of the ΚΌΣΜΟς ; the apostle warns against that love, because in the ΚΌΣΜΟς the ἘΠΙΘΥΜΊΑ which is not of God dominates; the thought that is to be supplied is this, that love to the ΚΌΣΜΟς necessarily implies an entrance into its nature; and, on the other hand, the apostle’s form of expression is utterly opposed to such a subordination; the two first-mentioned forms of worldly sense are by the same appellation: ἘΠΙΘΥΜΊΑ , closely connected with each other, and distinguished from the third, which is not called ἘΠΙΘΥΜΊΑ , but ἈΛΑΖΟΝΕΊΑ ;[152] it is unsuitable, however, to regard the latter as ἘΠΙΘΥΜΊΑ ; ἘΠΙΘΥΜΊΑ is the desire directed to the attainment of any good—the lust for something (not exactly: the lust or delight in anything), but the ἀλαζονεία is a definite behaviour in regard to the good which one possesses. The worldly man stands in a double relationship to the perishable good things; on the one hand, he aspires after them, whether he wants to possess and enjoy them or to delight himself with looking at them; on the other hand, he fancies himself great in them when he has them as his own.
That the whole sphere of sinful life is not here surveyed, Luther has noticed when he says: “The following three things are not of the Father, viz.: (1) hatred of the brethren; (2) the three idols of the world; (3) false and seductive teaching.”
Sander also brings out the same trichotomy of sinful corruption, appealing for it to chap. 1Jn_2:2-12, where the subject is the first, to 1Jn_2:15-17, where it is the second, and to 1Jn_2:19 ff., where it is the third. The apostle certainly mentions these different modes of the appearance of sin; but that the organism of the Epistle rests on this, is an assertion that goes too far.
[149] Ebrard justly denies that a division of sin as such is to be sought for here; but his own view, that in that threefold form there is given a distribution of worldly conduct in its entire extent, and in this way, that first the relation of man to his own bodily and sensual nature is expressed, then the egotistical opposition to his fellow-men, and finally, his relation to them and complication with them, is, as resting on a false interpretation of the particular ideas, just as little to be justified.
[150] The counterpart of these three forms of the sinful life is, according to a Lapide, the three primariae virtutes: continentia, charitas, humilitas, which coincide very exactly with the three monastic vows of chastity, poverty, and obedience.
[151] When Lücke calls those three not merely the leading forms, but also the principles and sources of the worldly sense, this is not correct, for the worldly sense does not spring from the ἐπιθυμία κ . τ . λ ., but the latter is the living motion of the former.
[152] Frommann (p. 270 ff.) justly remarks that the two leading forms are the ἐπιθυμία and the ἀλαζονεία ; that the ἐπιθυμία signifies the desire, and the ἀλαζονεία the action, which in the attainment of the object desired has already found its satisfaction.
The following words: οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς κ . τ . λ .] express the anti-divine character of the worldly nature of the ἐπιθυμία κ . τ . λ .
πατήρ , as in 1Jn_2:15; κόσμος here quite in the same sense as before.
εἶναι ἐκ is, according to Paulus, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, not the description of the origin, but only of the connection and similarity; by this view, however, the depth of John’s conception is ignored; the expression rather embraces both, but the second only as the result of the first (so also Ebrard); comp. Joh_8:44.
By the addition of ἀλλʼ ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου ἐστί the antagonism between God and the world, as the source of the ungodly disposition, is brought out with peculiar distinctness.