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1Jn_3:19-20. Blessed result of true love.
καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ] καί : simple copula.
ἐν τούτῳ does not refer here, as in chap. 1Jn_2:3, 1Jn_3:16; 1Jn_3:24, 1Jn_4:2, to the following thought, but to the foregoing ἀγαπᾷν ἐν ἔργῳ κ . ἀλ . The future γνωσόμεθα , which, according to the authorities, is to be read instead of γινώσκομεν (see the critical notes), “is used as in Joh_7:17; Joh_8:31-32; Joh_13:35, where the subject is the possibility of an event which may with justice be expected” (Braune): it is the more natural here, as the form of thought is the cohortative; the sense is: If we love ἐν ἔργῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ , we shall thereby know that, etc.
ὅτι ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐσμέν ] weakening and partly erroneous explanations of the phrase: ἐκ τῆς ἀλ . εἶναι , are those of Socinus: verc talem esse ut quis se esse profitetur; of Grotius: congruere evangelio; of Semler: ἀληθεύειν ἐν ἀγάπῃ ; of Baumgarten-Crusius: “to be as we ought to be;” of de Wette: “to belong to the truth; to live in it.” Bengel, on the other hand, rightly interprets the preposition ἐκ of the principium or ortus; so also Lücke, Düsterdieck, Braune, etc.; comp. Joh_18:37, and Meyer on this passage. The truth is the source of life in love. It is indeed in its deepest nature God Himself; but ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ must not I be put instead of ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας , for the apostle here, with reference to the preceding ἀληθείᾳ , arrives at the idea of truth. Love ἐν ἀληθείᾳ is the evidence of being born ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας .
καὶ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ πείσομεν τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν ] This sentence is not governed by ὅτι , but it is independently connected with the preceding, either depending or not depending on ἐν τούτῳ ; if the former is the case, “we must take ἐν τούτῳ combined with πείσομεν somewhat differently than when connected with γινώσκομεν ( γνωσόμεθα ); with the latter it would be more therein, with the former more thereby” (Lücke; so also Braune); if the latter be the case, the thought: ἐν τούτῳ γνωσόμεθα ὅτι κ . τ . λ ., serves as the presupposition of the following ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ κ . τ . λ . in this sense: if we truly love our brethren, we shall therein know, etc., and thus (in this consciousness of being of the truth) we shall assure our hearts, etc.[234] The idea that with ΚΑῚ ἜΜΠΡΟΣΘΕΝ an entirely new thought appears, which stands in no intimate connection with the preceding (Ebrard), is contradicted by the καί , which closely connects the two thoughts with one another. What, then, is the meaning of ΠΕΊΣΟΜΕΝ ΤᾺς ΚΑΡΔΊΑς ἩΜῶΝ ? Plainly ΠΕΊΣΟΜΕΝ expresses a truth which we (the subject contained in πείσομεν ) impress upon our hearts, so that they are thereby determined to something, which presupposes at least a relative contrast between us and our hearts. The verb πείθειν means either to persuade a person to something, so that he thinks or acts as we wish, or to convince him of something so that he agrees with our opinion. Some ancient commentators have interpreted in accordance with the first signification: suadebimus corda nostra, ut studeant proficere in melius; the more particular definition which is added is here clearly quite arbitrary; it is not much better with the explanation of Fritzsche (Comment. III. de nonnullis Pauli ad Gal. cp. locis): animos nostros flectemus, nempe ad amorem vita factisque ostendendum, or even with the more recent one: anim. n. flectemus sc. ut veram Christi doctrinam tueamur (see Erdmann, p. 129 ff.[235]). It is very common to explain πείθειν here by placare, to calm, to compose; this, it is true, is in so far inaccurate as πείθειν has not this meaning in itself, but certainly the verb is sometimes used in such a connection that the purpose of the persuasion is the calming of anger or of a similar passion;[236] hence the original meaning of the word passes into the above. This may be the case here also, for the following καταγινώσκῃ shows that the apostle regards our heart as affected with a passion directed against us; then the following ὅτι , 1Jn_3:20 (at least the second, for the first may also be the pronoun ὅ τι ), is the causal particle = “because, since.” Taking this view, the sense is: In the consciousness that we are of the truth, we shall silence the accusation which our heart makes against us, because God is greater than our heart.
If, on the other hand, we take πείθειν in the meaning of to convince, ὅτι (at least the second) is = “that;” and the sentence μείζων ἐστὶν ὁ Θεὸς τῆς καρδίας ἡμῶν is the object belonging to πείσομεν ; so that the sense is: If our heart accuses us, we shall bring it to the conviction that God is greater than it.
The words ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ , i.e. τοῦ Θεοῦ , do not point to the “future judgment” (Lücke, de Wette), but to the representation of God in the devotion of the soul, which is peculiar to the Christian. By putting them first, it is brought out that the πείσομεν only occurs in this representation of God (Düsterdieck, Ewald, Brückner, Braune).—1Jn_3:20. By far the most of the commentators take the ὅτι with which this verse begins as the particle, either = “because” or “that,” and explain the second ὅτι as epanalepsis of the first. The supposition of the epanalepsis of a particle has, considered in itself, nothing against it, although it very seldom appears in the N. T., but it is only suitable if ὅτι is the objective particle (comp. Eph_2:11-12);[237] from this it follows that if πείθομεν has the meaning “to calm,” the first ὅτι is not to be regarded as the particle. Sander, it is true, translates: “we can calm our heart, that
God is greater,” etc., but this has only sense if before “that” is supplied “with this,” or “inasmuch as we reflect;” such a supplement, however, is arbitrary. Several commentators (Hoogewen, Bengel, Morus, Baumgarten-Crusius, Ewald) regard the first ὅτι as the pronoun, as also Lachmann (in his large ed.) reads ὅ τι ἐάν . Düsterdieck erroneously asserts (as even Bertheau in the 3d ed. of Lücke’s Comm. p. 339, Ebrard, and now even Brückner and Braune, have acknowledged) that this form is never found in the N. T.; it is true that in Col_3:23 it is probably not ὅ , τι ἐάν , but ὃ ἐάν that is to be read, although D*** E J K have the former, but in Act_3:23 Tisch. reads ἥτις ἐάν (so also à ), and in Col_3:17, according to the overwhelming authorities, it is not ὅ τι ἄν , but ὅ τι ἐάν , that must be read (which is admitted by Lachm. Tisch. and Buttm.), and similarly in Gal_5:10, not ὅστις ἄν , but ὅστις ἐάν (also accepted by Lachm. Tisch. 7, and Buttm.); moreover, there is nothing syntactically against reading here ὅ , τι ἐάν , for καταγινώσκειν is frequently construed with the accusative of the thing. Ebrard, however, thinks that this view is “improbable,” nay, “absolutely impossible;” “improbable,” because in 1Jn_3:22 ὃ ἐάν is used, but in the 1st ed. of this comm. it was shown that ὃ ἐάν is by no means the constant form with John, but that in the Gospel, Joh_2:5, Joh_14:13, Joh_15:16, ὅ , τι ἄν also appears,[238] and that the sudden change of forms is found elsewhere also in the N. T., as in Mat_5:19, first Ὃς ἘΆΝ , and afterwards Ὃς Δʼ ἌΝ is used, and. in Mat_16:19, in some codd. (Lachm.), first Ὃ ἌΝ , and then Ὃ ἘΆΝ is read; “absolutely impossible,” “on account of the mutual relationship of the two conditional clauses, 1Jn_3:20 and 1Jn_3:21;” certainly the ἘΆΝ in 1Jn_3:21 seems to form a sharp antithesis to the ἐάν in 1Jn_3:20, but it must not be unnoticed that, similar though the two clauses are to one another, they nevertheless have not the pure form of antithesis, inasmuch as in 1Jn_3:21 there is no antithetical particle, in the clauses the succession of the particular words is different, and the first conditional clause only forms an inserted intermediate clause.[239] In favour of the explanation: “before Him shall we calm our heart, whatever it may accuse us of, because,” etc. (or convince … that, etc.), is the fact that not only is the idea καταγινώσκῃ thereby more closely connected with πείσομεν , but also the certainly strange epanalepsis of the ὅτι is avoided.[240]
The verb ΚΑΤΑΓΙΝΏΣΚΕΙΝ , according to Lücke, does not signify condemnation, but only accusation; in the inner life of the heart, however, the two are not distinctly separated from one another, but the accusation of conscience rather includes the condemnation; the special ΚΑΤΆΚΡΙΣΙς is certainly the work of God.[241] The object of the ΚΑΤΑΓΙΝΏΣΚΕΙΝ of the heart is variously defined by the commentators, some understanding by it, with reference to the preceding thought, the “want of love,” others more generally the sinfulness which still adheres to believers even with all the consciousness of loving the brethren (chap. 1Jn_1:8). The decision as to which is the correct interpretation depends on the explanation of the following sentence: ὍΤΙ ΜΕΊΖΩΝ ἘΣΤῚΝ Ὁ ΘΕῸς Τῆς ΚΑΡΔΊΑς ἩΜῶΝ ΚΑῚ ΓΙΝΏΣΚΕΙ ΠΆΝΤΑ .
The old controversy is, whether God is called greater than our heart as forgiving or as judging; the former is the view of Thomas Angl., Luther, Bengel, Morus, Russmeyer, Spener, Noesselt, Steinhofer, Rickli, Baumgarten-Crusius, Sander, Besser, Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Myrberg, Ewald, Brückner, Braune, etc.; the latter is the view of Calvin, Beza, Socinus, Grotius, a Lapide, Castalio, Hornejus, Estius, Calovius, Semler, Lücke, Neander, Gerlach, de Wette, Ebrard, etc.
If πείθειν is = “to calm,” then μείζων must refer to the forgiving love of God; Lücke, indeed, gives the following explanation: “after John has said that only if we are, in active brotherly love, conscious that we are of the truth, shall we calm our hearts in the judgment he adds: for if the contrary is the case, if our conscience accuses us of the want of genuine love, then God is greater than our heart, and before His holiness and omniscience there is no calm for the accusing conscience.” But the assumption of such a declaratio e contrario, which is in no way hinted at, is only an artificial expedient for reconciling contraries. μείζων can only be referred to God as judging, if ΠΕΊΘΕΙΝ has the meaning “to persuade.” As Ebrard regards this as the right view, and would begin “a perfectly independent new sentence” with καὶ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ , he states the meaning as follows: “In the sight of God we shall convince our hearts of this, that if (even) our heart (so prone to self-deception and self-excuse, and therefore small) accuses us (namely, of not practising love), God, the all-knowing, is greater than our heart, and we shall therefore so much the less be able to stand before Him.” This interpretation is contradicted, in the first place, by the fact that it separates the second part of the 19th verse from the first, nay, even places it in antithesis to it,[242] whereas such an independence is not only not suggested as belonging to it, but is refuted by the connecting ΚΑΊ , and in the second place, by the fact that the thought is in itself inadmissible. According to the representation of the apostle, we and our heart are regarded as contrasted with one another, inasmuch as our heart brings a condemning accusation against us, which plainly refers to the fact that we by our sins have made ourselves liable to the judgment of God; it is not we therefore that hold out to our heart, but our heart that holds out to us, the judgment of God; how, then, shall we after this bring our heart to the conviction that God will condemn us, nay, will condemn us even more than our heart does already? From this it follows that—whatever be the meaning of πείθειν
μείζων cannot refer to the judicial activity of God. As God is called ΜΕΊΖΩΝ in comparison with our heart that condemns us, the comparison expresses an opposition; Erdmann: Notioni cordis condemnantis magnitudo Dei comparatur et opponitur; the heart, inasmuch as it condemns us, is like the “hostis, qui nos aggreditur, sed Deus ΜΕΊΖΩΝ h. e. fortior est, ut hostem illum devincere possit” (comp. 1Jn_4:4). As this greatness of God, which surpasses the heart, proves itself in this, that in those who are ἘΚ Τῆς ἈΛΗΘΕΊΑς it overcomes the accusations of the heart, those commentators are right who assign to this verse a comforting tendency, and therefore refer ΜΕΊΖΩΝ to the forgiving love; no doubt, it is objected that the thought of God’s omniscience ( γινώσκει πάντα [243]) is not able to comfort the man whom conscience accuses, but this can only hold good in reference to those who are not yet ἘΚ Τῆς ἈΛΗΘΕΊΑς , and not in reference to those of whom John is here speaking, namely, those who in their sincere love to the brethren have the evidence that they are ἘΚ Τῆς ἈΛΗΘΕΊΑς .[244] If this is the right interpretation, then it is clear that ΚΑΤΑΓΙΝΏΣΚΕΙΝ does not refer to the want of love, but to sin in general, from which even the ΤΈΚΝΟΝ ΤΟῦ ΘΕΟῦ is not yet free (1Jn_1:8 ff.); and this is also indicated by the apostle’s very form of expression, if ΠΕΊΣΟΜΕΝ is directly connected with ΚΑΤΑΓΙΝΏΣΚΕΙ , and if, accordingly, Ὅ , ΤΙ ἘΆΝ is to be read (see above), in which case ὍΤΙ ΜΕΊΖΩΝ ἘΣΤΙ Κ . Τ . Λ . states the objective ground of the πείθειν : “because God is greater than our heart, we therefore (in the consciousness that we are of the truth) shall calm our hearts before God, however much our heart may accuse us.” This interpretation deserves the preference before that, according to which πείσομεν is = “to convince,” and ὅτι μείζων κ . τ . λ . the object governed by it, because not only does the purpose of the verse thereby appear, more clearly, but it is not easy to perceive how the conviction of the greatness of God which overcomes the heart should result from the consciousness ὍΤΙ ἘΚ Τῆς ἈΛΗΘΕΊΑς ἘΣΜΈΝ .[245]
It is further to be observed that de Wette makes the first ὅτι as causal particle dependent on ΠΕΊΣΟΜΕΝ (= to calm), the second, on the other hand, on καταγινώσκῃ : “for, if our heart accuses us because God is greater than our heart, He also knows all things;” but this construction is opposed not only by the fact that the ΚΑΊ is more naturally taken as copula (Baumgarten-Crusius), but also by the fact that the thought, that our heart condemns us because God is greater than our heart, is incorrect.[246]
Without adequate ground, Erdmann thinks that καρδία in 1Jn_3:19 is used in a wider sense than in 1Jn_3:20 (“vertimus ΠΕΊΣΟΜΕΝ ΤᾺς ΚΑΡΔΊΑς : nobis ipsis persuadebimus”), because there the plural, and here the singular, is used; this change of the number has no influence on the meaning of the word, but the apostle speaks of the ΚΑΡΔΊΑ as the object of ΠΕΊΘΕΙΝ , and as the subject of ΚΑΤΑΓΙΝΏΣΚΕΙΝ , inasmuch as the heart is the seat or the union of the affections; the Greek commentators explain ΚΑΡΔΊΑ here as synonymous with ΣΥΝΕΊΔΗΣΙς .
[234] Lücke: “Even if it be unadvisable to connect καὶ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ κ . τ . λ . directly with ἐν τούτῳ , so that it appears better, with Lachmann and the old commentators, to put a comma after ἐσμέν , every one must at least admit the connection in the direct succession of the sentences. But then it must also be permitted to take the logical connection thus: In this (vv. 16–18) do we know that we are of the truth. And thus (if we in living love have the assurance that we are of the truth) we shall, etc.”
[235] This interpretation is based on the erroneous view that εἶναι ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας is = veram doctrinam tenere; the former interpretation is contradicted by the fact that if we already know from our love to the brethren that we are of the truth, we do not need for the first time to move our hearts to love.
[236] In favour of this we may appeal to the passages cited by Lücke, Mat_28:14; Joseph. Arch. vi. 5, 6 (Samuel), ὑπισχνεῖται καὶ παρακαλέσειν τὸν Θεὸν συγγνῶναι περὶ τούτων αὐτοῖς , καὶ πείσειν , and the passage in Plutarch, where to ἀπολοίμην , εἰ μή σε τιμωρησαίμην the reply runs: ἀπολοίμην , εἰ μή σε πείσαιμι , although πείθειν has not in them exactly the meaning of “to calm.”
[237] Lücke himself admits that the passages adduced by him in favour of the epanalepsis “have only value for those who take ὅτι both times not as causal particle, but as conjunction, belonging to πείσομεν ;” but thinks that the context makes it necessary to assume the epanalepsis here even for the causal particle; similarly Braune, although without even showing the grammatical justification in any way. Besides, in this construction it is quite overlooked that if the intermediate clause ἐὰν καταγινώσκῃ κ . τ . λ . is connected with the preceding, the first ὅτι comes in disturbingly; and if it is connected with the following, the second ὅτι does so. As in accordance with the thought only the former connection can be the correct one, it is incomprehensible how John should have here interrupted it by ὅτι .
[238] à has in chap. 1Jn_2:5 : ὃ ἄν ; Joh_14:13 : ὅ τι ἄν ; Joh_15:16 : ὅ τι ἐάν .
[239] If it was the apostle’s intention to contrast sharply two different cases, he could do this more definitely if he constructed the first period thus: ἐὰν καταγ . ἡμῶν ἡ καρδία , ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ πείσομεν τ . κ ., ὅτι μείζων κ . τ . λ ., and the second: ἐὰν δὲ μὴ καταγ . ἡμῶν ἡ καρδία . From the fact that he did not do so, it may be concluded that such a sharp contrast was not in his purpose.
[240] That the supposition of an epanalepsis for the causal particle is improper, has been already noticed above; and for the passage before us it is further clear from the fact that if ὅτι is the causal particle, the clause μείζων ἐστὶν κ . τ . λ . forms, according to the thought, the conclusion of ἐὰν καταγινώσκῃ , as plainly appears in Lücke when he explains: “Then, if … our conscience accuses us, God is greater than our heart,” etc.—But even the epanalepsis of ὅτι as objective particle may be doubted; for as the thought ἐὰν καταγινώσκῃ does not form the presupposition for μείζων ἐστὶν κ . τ . λ ., but for πείσομεν , it is unsuitable to place it in the objective clause dependent on πείσομεν , instead of connecting it with πείσομεν .
[241] Düsterdieck, with whom also Braune agrees, appropriately remarks that καταγινώσκειν occupies a middle place between κατηγορεῖν , along with which an ἀπολογεῖν further occurs, and κατακρίνειν , which includes the judicial decree of punishment; comp. Deu_25:1-2.—Düsterdieck suitably quotes on this passage, Sir_14:2, comp. Sir_19:5, and Test. Gad. 5; J. A. Fabricius, Cod. pseudep. V. T. p. 681.
καταγινώσκειν means: to pronounce against a person that he is guilty; κατακρίνειν , on the other hand: to pronounce the merited punishment on a person.
[242] The conviction, namely, that we cannot stand before God, plainly forms an antithesis to the conviction that we are of the truth.
[243] Several commentators find in the words καὶ γινώσκει πάντα the explanation of the idea μείζων , so Oecumenius, Augustine, Bede, Socinus, a Lapide, Lorinus, Hornejus, Paulus, de Wette, etc.; even Ebrard says that God is called μείζων , “because He cannot be deceived,” but its position gives no justification for that; we can at the most say that the apostle by those words brings specially out one element which is included in μείζων .
[244] Luther rightly says: “Though our conscience makes us despondent, and represents God to us as angry, yet God is greater than our heart. Conscience is a single drop, but the reconciled God is a sea full of comfort.… When conscience punishes and condemns a man, he becomes alarmed; but against this darkness of the heart it is said: God knows all things. Conscience is always in fear and closes its eyes; but God is deeper and higher than thy heart, and more exactly searches the innermost parts of it.”—Besser: “Our heart knows some things, and decides against us; God knows all things, and does not decide against us, but for us, because before His eyes the seed of truth, of which we have been born, is not concealed.”
[245] Ewald construes correctly, but in his explanation: “If we earnestly seek in His sight whether we really love … we shall be able, even if we must sometimes accuse ourselves before God, nevertheless by the penitent (?) acknowledgment of the truth, to convince our conscience that we are men and God is God, that we may therefore sometimes fail and must be admonished by Him,”—he introduces references into the thought which are not contained in it.
[246] Brückner, it is true, defends de Wette’s interpretation, but he substantially perverts it; for whilst de Wette refers the whole verse to the accusation of God (therein agreeing with Lücke), Brückner takes the ὅτι γινώσκει πάντα in comforting sense; but it then becomes still more untenable, for it is plainly unjustifiable to refer the omniscience of God in the subordinate clause to condemnation (for both explain μείζων by: “looking more deeply, examining all the recesses of the heart”), but in the principal clause to forgiveness.