1Jn_3:4. The believer is so much the more bound to holiness, as all sin is
ἀνομία
.
πᾶς
ὁ
ποιῶν
κ
.
τ
.
λ
.] corresponding to the beginning of 1Jn_3:3,
πᾶς
ὁ
ἔχων
κ
.
τ
.
λ
. The apostle is anxious to emphasize the truth of the thought as being without exception.
ποιεῖν
τὴν
ἁμαρτίαν
, as the antithesis of
ποιεῖν
τὴν
δικαιοσύνην
, chap. 1Jn_2:29, is contrasted with
ἁγνίζειν
ἑαυτόν
, 1Jn_3:3; as the apostle “wants to contrast with the positive sentence 1Jn_3:3 its negative counterpart,” “he begins with the antithesis of that idea which formed the predicate in 1Jn_3:3, and makes it the subject” (Ebrard). The definite article shows that the idea, according to its complete extent, is intended as definite, as forming the concrete antithesis to
ἡ
δικαιοσύνη
;[199] both the interpretation of Socinus: “to remain in sin,” and that of Baumgarten-Crusius: “to receive sin into oneself, to let it exist in oneself,” are alike arbitrary; even the very common definition: “to sin knowingly and wilfully,” is out of place here, as the subject here is not the way in which sin is done, but the actual doing of sin itself. According to Brückner,[200] by
ποιεῖν
τὴν
ἁμαρτίαν
“an actual moral tendency of life” is indicated; this explanation is apparently justified by 1Jn_3:6; 1Jn_3:8-9, but even in these passages the apostle’s meaning goes beyond the restricted idea of “tendency of life,” inasmuch as he certainly has sinning in view.
καὶ
τὴν
ἁμαρτίαν
ποιεῖ
] “
καί
accentuates the idea that the very doing of
ἁμαρτία
is as such equally the doing of
ἀνομία
” (Düsterdieck); by
ἀνομία
we are to understand, according to the constant usus loquendi, never the mere non-possession of the law (differently
ἄνομος
, 1Co_9:21), but always the violation of the law, namely, of the divine law, of the divine order according to which man should regulate his life,—lawlessness (Lücke).[201] The sense therefore is: he who practises sin (in whatever way it may be) thereby makes himself guilty of the violation of divine order, he acts contrary to the
θέλημα
τοῦ
Θεοῦ
, chap. 1Jn_2:17. According to Ebrard,
τὴν
ἀνομίαν
ποιεῖν
expresses the antithesis of
ἔχειν
τὴν
ἐλπίδα
ταύτην
, 1Jn_3:3; but it is more correct to perceive in that sentence—instead of a conclusion—the introduction of a new element, by which the sharp contrast with
τὴν
δικαιοσύνην
(1Jn_2:29) is indicated.
The following words:
καὶ
ἡ
ἁμαρτία
ἐστὶν
ἡ
ἀνομία
, are added, partly to confirm the previous thought, partly to mark emphatically the identity of
ἁμαρτία
and
ἀνομία
which is expressed in it. The apostle does not want to give an exact definition of the idea
ἁμαρτία
(contrary to Sander), but to indicate its nature from the side “on which its absolute antagonism to any fellowship with God appears most unrestrictedly” (Brückner). The apostle could not more sharply express the antithesis between the character of the believer, who is a
τέκνον
Θεοῦ
, and will be
ὅμοιος
Θεῷ
, and the
ἁμαρτία
, than by showing
ἁμαρτία
to be
ἀνομία
, whereby he most distinctly opposes the moral indifferentism, against which the first section of the Epistle is also directed. Violence is done to the thought, both by limiting the idea
ἁμαρτία
to a particular kind of sin (a Lapide: loquitur proprie de peccato perfecto, puta mortifero), and by making
ἀνομία
the subject and
ἁμαρτία
, the predicate;[202] so also by mixing up references which are foreign to the context.[203] The
καί
by which the two sentences are connected with one another, Bengel translates and explains by: immo (so also Brückner by “nay”), with the remark: non solum conjuncta est notio peccati et iniquitatis, sed eadem; this is incorrect, for even the first sentence expresses, not a mere connection, but identity. The apostle could have written instead of
καί
the confirmatory particle
ὍΤΙ
, or the like, but by means of
ΚΑΊ
the thought of the second clause obtains a more independent position (so also Braune).
[199] Braune, however, rightly observes that too strong an emphasis is not to be laid here, either upon the article or on
ποιεῖν
, for in ver. 9 it is put
ἁμαρτίαν
ποιεῖν
, and then, as synonymous with it, simply
ἁμαρτάνειν
; nevertheless, it is to be noticed that “the fuller idea
ποιεῖν
τὴν
ἁμ
. at the beginning includes and determines the others,
ποιεῖν
ἁμ
. and
ἁμαρτάνειν
” (Ebrard).
[200] Brückner rightly rejects the interpretation of de Wette:
ἁμαρτία
appears to be the broader idea,
ἀνομία
the narrower, more definite and stronger, including particular offences, vices, etc.
[201]
ἀνομία
is distinguished from
ἀδικία
(1Jn_1:9, 1Jn_5:17) in this way, that the former idea is contrasted with abstract right (
δίκη
), the latter with the concrete form of right (
νόμος
) (Brückner).
[202] Köstlin (p. 246) appeals in behalf of this construction to Joh_1:1 :
καὶ
Θεὸς
ἦν
ὁ
λόγος
, assuming that
καὶ
ἁμαρτία
κ
.
τ
.
λ
. is to be read; see, however, the critical notes. Against this construction there is, besides, the fact that
ἁμαρτία
would have to be taken in a different sense here from that in which it is previously used, namely, as Köstlin says: “The first time
ἁμαρτία
means sinful action, the second time guilt in the sight of God.”
[203] This is the case, for example, in Hilgenfeld’s explanation: “Not every one who deviates from the ceremonial laws, but only the sinner, falls under the category of
ἀνομία
;” not less in the remark of Calvin: “the sum of the thought is that the life of those who give themselves to sin is hateful to God, and cannot be tolerated by God.”