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1Pe_2:13-14. The apostle now goes on to name the different relations of life ordained of God in which the Christian should show his holy walk. First of all, an exhortation to obey those in authority.
ὑποτάγητε ] the aor. pass. is used here, as it often is, with a middle, not a passive—as Wiesinger thinks—force. It is not: “be made subject,” but “make yourselves subject” (cf. ταπεινώθητε , chap. 1Pe_5:6).[135] The more liable liberty in Christ was to be misunderstood by the heathen, and even to be abused by the Christians themselves, the more important it was that the latter should have inculcated upon them as one of their principal duties this ὙΠΟΤΆΣΣΕΣΘΑΙ (1Pe_2:18, chap. 1Pe_3:1) in all circumstances of life.
ΠΆΣῌ ἈΝΘΡΩΠΊΝῌ ΚΤΊΣΕΙ ] ΚΤΊΣΙς is here, in accordance with the signification peculiar to the verb ΚΤΊΖΕΙΝ : “to establish, to set up,” the ordinance, or institution (“an ordinance resting on a particular arrangement,” Hofmann). In connection with the attribute ἀνθρωπίνη , this expression seems to denote an ordinance or institution established by men (so most expositors, and formerly in this commentary). But it must be noted that ΚΤΊΖΕΙΝ (and its derivatives) are never applied to human, but only to divine agency; besides, the demand that they should submit themselves to every human ordinance would be asking too much. It is therefore preferable to understand, with Hofmann, by the term, an ordinance (of God) applying to human relations (“regulating the social life of man”[136]). By the subsequent ΕἼΤΕ … ΕἼΤΕ , the expression is referred in the first instance to the magistracy; but this does not justify the interpretation of it as equal directly to: “authority,” or even: persons in authority (Gerhard: concretive et personaliter: homines, qui magistratum gerunt). That Peter’s exposition of the idea had direct reference to persons in authority, is to be explained from the circumstance that the institution possessed reality only in the existence of those individuals.[137] At variance with this view is de Wette’s (following Erasmus, Estius, Pott) interpretation of the expression: “to every human creature, i.e. to all men.” Not only, however, the singular circumlocution: κτίσις ἀνθρωπίνη for ἄνθρωπος ,—for which de Wette wrongly quotes Mar_16:15 and Col_1:23,—but the very idea that Christians should be subject to all men,—and in support of it no appeal can be made either to chap. 1Pe_5:5 or to the following exhortation: πάντας τιμήσατε ,—is decisive against this view.[138] The fact that Peter places the general term ΠᾶΣΑ ΚΤΊΣΙς first, is explained most naturally in this way: that it was his intention to speak not of the magistracy merely, but also of the other institutions of human life.
The motive for the submission here demanded is given by ΔΙᾺ ΚΎΡΙΟΝ , i.e. Χριστόν (not ΘΕΌΝ , as Schott thinks), which must be taken to mean: “because such is the will of the Lord,” or, with Hofmann: “out of consideration due to Christ, to whom the opposite would bring dishonour.” The latter, however, is the less likely interpretation. Still less natural is it to say, with Wiesinger, that this adjunct points to the ΘΕῖΟΝ in ordinances under which human life is passed. Incorrectly Huss: propter imitationem Dei i. e. Christi.
In the enumeration which follows, the apostle is guided by the historical conditions of his time. It must be remarked that ὙΠΟΤΆΣΣΕΣΘΑΙ is inculcated not only with regard to the institutions of the state, but to the persons in whom these are embodied, and this quite unconditionally. Even in cases where obedience, according to the principle laid down in Act_4:19, is to be refused, the duty of the ὙΠΟΤΆΣΣΕΣΘΑΙ must not be infringed upon.
ΕἼΤΕ ΒΑΣΙΛΕῖ ] ΒΑΣΙΛΕΎς is here the name given to the Roman emperor; cf. Joseph, de bello jud. v. 13, § 6. Bengel: Caesari, erant enim provinciae romanae, in quas mittebat Petrus.
ὡς ὑπερέχοντι ] Ὡς here also assigns the reason; ὙΠΕΡΈΧΕΙΝ expresses, as in Rom_13:1, simply the idea of sovereign power; non est comparatio cum aliis magistratibus (Calvin). In the Roman Empire the emperor was not merely the highest ruler, but properly speaking the only one, all the other authorities being simply the organs through which he exercised his sway.—1Pe_2:14. εἴτε ἡγεμόσιν ] ἩΓΕΜΌΝΕς praesides provinciarum, qui a Caesare mittebantur in provincias (Gerh.).
Ὡς ΔΙʼ ΑὐΤΟῦ , etc.] ΔΙʼ ΑὐΤΟῦ does not, as Gerh., Aretius, and others take it, refer to ΚΎΡΙΟΝ , but to ΒΑΣΙΛΕῖ . The ἩΓΕΜ ., although ὙΠΕΡΈΧΟΝΤΕς too, are so not in the same absolute sense as the ΒΑΣΙΛΕΎς . They are so in relation to their subordinates, but not to the ΒΑΣΙΛΕΎς .
ΕἸς ἘΚΔΊΚΗΣΙΝ ΚΑΚΟΠΟΙῶΝ , ἜΠΑΙΝΟΝ ΔῈ ἈΓΑΘΟΠΟΙῶΝ ] is joined grammatically to ΠΕΜΠΟΜΈΝΟΙς , not to ὙΠΕΡΈΧΟΝΤΙ also (Hofm., Schott); yet, from the fact that the ἩΓΕΜΌΝΕς are sent by the ΒΑΣΙΛΕῪς ΕἸς ἘΚΔΊΚΗΣΙΝ Κ . Τ . Λ ., it is implied that the latter, too, has an office with respect to ἘΚΔΊΚΗΣΙς Κ . Τ . Λ .[139]
Oecumenius arbitrarily narrows the thought when he says: ἜΔΕΙΞΕ ΚΑῚ ΑὐΤῸς Ὁ ΠΈΤΡΟς ΤΊΣΙ ΚΑῚ ΠΟΊΟΙς ἌΡΧΟΥΣΙΝ ὙΠΟΤΆΣΣΕΣΘΑΙ ΔΕῖ , ὍΤΙ ΤΟῖς ΤῸ ΔΊΚΑΙΟΝ ἘΚΔΙΚΟῦΣΙΝ . The apostle insists rather, without reserve, on submission to the ἡγεμόνες , because (not if) they are sent by the emperor to administer justice.[140]
ἘΚΔΊΚΗΣΙς , here as often: “punishment;” ἔπαινος , not precisely: “reward,” but: “laudatory recognition.”
ἀγαθοποιός is to be found only in later authors, in N. T. ἍΠ . ΛΕΓ . The subs. occurs chap. 1Pe_4:19.
[135] Winer is wrong in attributing (p. 245 [E. T. 327]) a passive signification to this ταπεινώθητε , as also to προσεκλίθη in Act_5:36 but is right in ascribing it to παρεδόθητε , Rom_6:17.
[136] This view avoids the certainly arbitrary interpretation given, for example, by Flavius, who applies the expression specially to life connected with the state. He says: dicitur humana ordinatio ideo quia politiae mundi non sunt speciali verbo Dei formatae, ut vera religio, sed magis ab hominibus ipsorumque industria ordinatae.
[137] It is arbitrary to regard κτίσις (with Luther, Osiander, etc.) as meaning the laws given by the magistrates.
[138] Brückner endeavours, indeed, to defend de Wette’s interpretation, yet he decides to understand the expression in question as: “every ordinance of human civil society,” and solves the difficulty presented by the adjective ἀνθρωπίνη (comp. with Rom_13:1) by remarking that “the ordinances of national life which have been developed historically and by human means possess a divine element in them.”
[139] Hofmann is consequently wrong in asserting that in this connection “the duty of submission to him who makes over the exercise of his power to others is derived from and based alone on his possession of that power, whilst submission to those to whom that power has been entrusted originated in, and is founded on, the moral purpose for which that is done.”
[140] Calvin very aptly puts it: Objici possit: reges et alios magistratus saepe sua potentia abuti; respondeo, tyrannos et similes non facere suo abusu, quia maneat semper firma Dei ordinatio.