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1Pe_3:18. First, mention of the death of Christ by way of giving the reason.
ὅτι καὶ Χριστὸς ἅπαξ περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν ἔπαθε [ ἀπέθανε ]] ὅτι is connected with the idea immediately preceding, and gives the ground of the κρεῖττον ; καὶ Χριστός (as in chap. 1Pe_2:21) places the sufferings which the Christians have to bear, as ἀγαθοποιοῦντες , side by side with the sufferings of Christ, περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν , so that καί must be taken as referring not to ἔπαθε [ ἀπέθανε ] only (as is done by most commentators, among them de Wette), but, as the position of the words ( περὶ ἁμαρτ . before ἔπαθε ) clearly shows, to περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν ἔπαθε [ ἀπέθανε ] (Wiesinger, Brückner, Schott). Hofmann’s application of it to the whole “statement here with respect to Christ” is open to objection, from the fact that in what follows there are elements introduced which go too far beyond the comparison here instituted. Christ’s sufferings were on account of sin, and such also should be the sufferings of the Christians.[193] This does not preclude the possibility of His sufferings having had a significance different from what theirs can have. This peculiar significance of Christ’s sufferings is marked by δίκαιος ὑπὲρ ἀδίκων , or, as Schott holds, by ἅπαξ . ἅπαξ gives prominence to the fact that in relation to His subsequent life ( θανατωθείς … ζωοποιηθείς ) Christ’s suffering took place but once, as in Heb_9:27-28 (Hofmann: “once it took place that He died the death He did die, and what followed thereon forms, as what is enduring, a contrast to what passed over but once”); doubtless not without implying the secondary idea, that the sufferings of Christians take place only once also, and come to an end with this life.[194]
περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν , which states yet more indefinitely the purpose of Christ’s sufferings: “on account of sin,” finds a more precise definition in what follows.
δίκαιος ὑπὲρ ἀδίκων , “as the just for the unjust;” comp. Rom_5:6 : ὑπέρ , equivalent to, in commodum, is not in itself, indeed, equal to ἀντί ; but the contrast here drawn between δίκαιος and ἀδίκων suggests that in the general relation, the more special one of substitution is implied (Weiss, p. 261); comp. chap. 1Pe_2:21. The omission of the article is due to the fact that the apostle holds it of importance to mark the character of the one as of the other.
ἵνα ἡμᾶς προσαγάγῃ τῷ Θεῷ ] gives the purpose of ἔπαθεν [ ἀπέθανε ], which latter is more closely defined by that which immediately precedes and follows; προσάγειν does not mean “to sacrifice;” (Luther, Vulg.: ut nos offerret Deo), neither “to reconcile;” but “to bring to,” i.e. “to bring into communion with God,” which goes still beyond the idea of reconciliation; the latter presupposes Christ’s death for us; the former, the life of Him who died for us. Weiss maintains, without sufficient reason (p. 260), that the word here points to the idea of the Christians’ priesthood (chap. 1Pe_2:5). The verb occurs here only; the substantive προσαγωγή , Rom_5:2; Eph_2:18; Eph_3:12.[195]
θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκί , ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ πνεύματι ] This adjunct does not belong to ἔπαθεν (de Wette), but to προσαγάγῃ (Wiesinger); it is subjoined, in order to show prominently how the προσάγειν can take place through Christ; the chief stress is laid on the second member. According to Schott, both participles are to be considered as “an exposition of ἅπαξ ;” this assumption is contradicted, on the one hand, by the distance between them and the latter word; and, on the other, that they must necessarily be attached to a verb.
The antithesis between the two members of this sentence is strongly marked by μὲν … δέ . The datives σαρκί , πνεύματι , state with reference to what the verbal conceptions θανατωθείς , ζωοποιηθείς holds good; “they serve to mark the sphere to which the general predicate is to be thought of as restricted” (Winer); comp. 1Co_7:34 : ἁγία καὶ σώματι καὶ πνεύματι ; Col_2:5 : τῇ σαρκὶ ἄπειμι , τῷ πνεύματι σὺν ὑμῖν εἰμι . Schott explains—somewhat ambiguously—the datives “as general more precise adverbial definitions,” which state “what is of determinative importance in both facts,” and “the nature of the actual condition produced by them.”
πνεύματι is by some understood instrumentally; incorrectly, for σαρκί cannot be taken thus; the two members of the clause correspond so exactly in form, that the dative in the one could not be explained differently from the dative in the other, as Wiesinger, Weiss, von Zezschwitz, Brückner, Schott, and Fronmüller justly acknowledge.
σαρκὶ … πνεύματι ; this antithesis occurs frequently in the N. T.; with reference to the person of Christ, besides in this passage, in Rom_1:3 : κατὰ σάρκα … κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης , and 1Ti_3:16 : ἐν σαρκὶ … ἐν πνεύματι (cf. also chap. 1Pe_4:6).
The antithesis of the two conceptions proves it to be erroneous to assign to the one term a sphere different from that of the other, and to suppose σάρξ to mean the body of Christ, and πνεῦμα the Spirit of God. Antithesis clare ostendit quod dicatur in alia quidem sui parte aut vitae ratione mortificatus, in alia autem vivificatus (Flacius). It must be observed that both are here used as general conceptions (Hofmann), without a pronoun to mark them as designations applicable only to Christ; for which reason σάρξ cannot relate exclusively to the human, and πνεῦμα to the divine nature of Christ.[196] As general conceptions (that is, as applicable not to Christ alone, but to human nature generally), σάρξ and πνεῦμα must, however, not be identified with σῶμα and ψυχή .[197] For σάρξ ; is that side of human nature in virtue of which man belongs to the earth, is therefore an earthly creature, and accordingly perishable like everything earthly; and πνεῦμα , on the other hand, is that side of his nature by which he belongs to a supernatural sphere of existence, is not a mere creature of earth, and is accordingly destined also to an imperishable existence.[198]
Wiesinger (with whom Zezschwitz agrees) deviates from this interpretation thus far only, that he understands ΠΝΕῦΜΑ , not as belonging to the nature of man, “but as that principle of union with God which is bestowed upon man at regeneration.” This deviation may arise from the reluctance to attribute a πνεῦμα to man as such (also in his sinful condition); as, however, according to Peter, the souls of the departed are ΠΝΕΎΜΑΤΑ (1Pe_3:19), it is thus presupposed that an unregenerate man also possesses a ΠΝΕῦΜΑ during his earthly existence. It must also be observed that ΣΆΡΞ and ΠΝΕῦΜΑ are here not ethical antitheses, but are contrasted with each other as natural distinctions.
θανατωθεὶς … ζωοποιηθείς ] ΘΑΝΑΤΌΩ incorrectly interpreted by Wahl here, as in other passages of the N. T., by capitis damno, morti addico; for although it may sometimes occur in this sense in the classics, still in the N. T. it means only to kill. By θανατωθεὶς σαρκί , then, the apostle says of Christ, that He was put to death in His earthly human nature (which He along with all the rest of mankind possessed[199]), i.e. at the hand of man by the crucifixion.
ζωοποιέω does not mean “to preserve alive,” as several commentators explain, e.g. Bellarmin (de Christo, lib. iv. cap. 13), Hottinger, Steiger, and Güder;—this idea, in the Old as in the New Testament, being expressed by ζωογονεῖν and other words (see Zezschwitz on this passage); but “to make alive” (de Wette, Wiesinger, Weiss, Zezschwitz, Schott, Köhler,[200] Hofmann, and others); it often applies to the raising up of the dead; cf. Joh_5:21; Rom_4:17; 1Co_15:22, etc. In this sense alone does ζωοποιηθείς answer the preceding ΘΑΝΑΤΩΘΕΊς . Bengel: vivificatio ex antitheto ad mortificationem resolvi debet. The latter idea assumes the anterior condition to have been one of death, whilst the former—in contradiction to θανατ .—would presuppose one of life. Christ then, according to the apostle, entered into the actual state of death, that is, in so far as the ΣἈΡΞ pertained to Him, so that His life in the flesh came to an end;[201] but from death He was brought back again to life, that is, was raised up, as far as the πνεῦμα pertained to Him, so that the new life was purely pneumatical. But the new life began by His reuniting Himself as πνεῦμα to His σῶμα , so that thus this σῶμα itself became pneumatical.[202]
According to Bengel, with whom Schmid (bibl. Theol.), Lechler, and Fronmüller agree (comp. also Hahn, neutest. Theol. I. 440), ζωοποιηθείς does not refer to the resurrection of Christ, but to His deliverance from the weakness of the flesh, effected by His death, and, based upon this, his transition to a higher life (which was followed by the resurrection).[203] Against this, however, is to be observed: (1) That the going of His πνεῦμα to the Father, connected with His death (Luk_23:46), is, as little as His ascension, spoken of in Scripture as “a becoming quickened;” (2) That as in θανατωθείς the whole man Christ is meant, the same must be the case in ζωοποιηθείς ; and (3) That this view is based on what follows, which, however, if rightly interpreted, by no means renders it necessary. Buddeus is therefore entirely right when he says: vivificatio animae corporisque conjunctionem denotat.[204]
[193] The subsequent δίκαιος proves that the sins for which Christ suffered were not His own sins; thus also the believer’s sufferings should not arise out of his own sins, he should not suffer as a κακοποιῶν , but as an ἀγαθοποιῶν . Rejecting this application, Hofmann finds the point of comparison in this, “that we should let the sins which those who do us wrong commit. be to us the cause of sufferings to us” (?).
[194] Oecumenius finds in ἅπαξ an allusion to: τὸ τοῦ παθόντος δραστήριόν τι καὶ δυνατόν , or to the brevity also of the sufferings. Gerhard unites all three elements by saying: ut ostendat (Ap.) passionis Christi brevitatem et perfeetionem sacrifieii et ut doceat Christum non amplius passioni fore obnoxium.—According to Pott, it is also meant to express the contrast to the frequent repetition of the O. T. sacrifices,—an application entirely foreign to the context. According to Schott, ἅπαξ indicates that Christ suffered once for all, so that any further suffering of the same kind is neither necessary nor possible. This is no doubt correct, but it does not follow that Peter—whose words combine the typical and specifically peculiar significance of the sufferings of Christ—should not have had in his mind the application of ἅπαξ to believers, as above stated. It is with ἅπαξ as with περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν ; it is impossible for believers to suffer περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν in the same sense that Christ suffered περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν .
[195] It is certainly very doubtful whether the purpose also of the death of Christ, here stated, “admits of application to us,” in that “it should likewise be our object, by the manner in which we endure undeserved sufferings, to bring those by whom we are wronged to bethink themselves, and to lead them to a knowledge of Christ” (Hofmann).
[196] Accordingly, interpretations like those of Calvin are incorrect: caro hic pro externo homine capitur, spiritus pro divina potentia, qua Christus victor a morte emersit; Beza: πνεύματι , i.e. per divinitatem in ipso corporaliter habitantem, equal to ἐκ δυνάμεως Θεοῦ , 2Co_13:4; Oecumenius: θανατωθεὶς μὲν τῇ φύσει τῆς σαρκός , τούτεστι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ , ἀναστὰς δὲ τῇ δυνάμει τῆς θεότητος . It is equally incorrect, with Weiss (p. 252), to understand σάρξ as meaning “the human nature of Christ” (instead of which he no doubt also says: “the earthly human nature of Christ”), and πνεῦμα as meaning “the pre-existent divine πνεῦμα communicated at baptism to the man Jesus”(which, as “Weiss maintains, constitutes, according to Peter, the divine nature of Christ). Weiss, for the sole purpose of representing the apostle’s doctrinal conception as still in a very undeveloped state, imputes to Peter a view of the person of Christ which—as he himself says—is possessed of “a duality which somewhat endangers the unity of His person.” Nor has Wichelhaus hit the true explanation when he says: “Peter here considers Christ as, on the one hand, a true man in body and soul liable to all suffering …; and, on the other hand, in so far as He was anointed by the Holy Ghost.”
[197] σάρξ and σῶμα are proved to be two distinct conceptions by the fact that after the resurrection man will have a σῶμα , but no σάρξ . The difference between πνεῦμα and ψυχή is clear from passages such as Mat_6:25. If in other passages πνεῦμα be used as synonymous with ψυχή (comp. e.g. Joh_12:27 with Joh_13:21), this is explained by the two-sidedness of the human soul.
[198] To Weiss’s remark, that Peter terms that side of human nature by which man is rendered capable of religious life ψυχή , it must be replied that the ψυχή possesses such capacity for this very reason, that even under the power of the σάρξ it has never ceased to be spiritual. In place of πνεύματι , ψυχῇ would not be at all appropriate here, in the first place, because ψυχή forms no antithesis to σάρξ , and then because the idea of what is celestial, peculiar to πνεῦμα , would not find expression in it.
[199] Schott is wrong in maintaining that the antithesis to what is here said should be, “that Christ was quickened according to His glorified human nature;” the antithesis to “earthly,” however, is not “glorified,” but “celestial.”
[200] “Zur Lehre Ton Christi Höllenfahrt,” in the Zeitschrift für luth. Theol. u. Kirche, by Delitzsch and Guericke, 1864, H. 4.
[201] Schott substantially agrees with this interpretation, but thinks that the above expression does not say decidedly enough that “this was an entire cessation of His life.” However, this “entire” is saying too much, since σαρκί evidently points to a limitation.
[202] Hofmann says, not quite accurately (Schriftbeweis, II. 1, p. 473): “the antithesis θανατ . κ . τ . λ . denotes the end of life in the flesh, and the commencement of life in the spirit.” For spiritual life was in Christ during His life in the flesh, and after it, before His resurrection. At His death He committed His πνεῦμα to His Father; it was therefore in Him before, and continued to lire after His death.—Hofmann remarks correctly, however: “As it was the Christ living in the flesh who, by being put to death, ceased to be any longer in that bodily life in which from His birth He had existed, so His quickening of that which was dead is a restoration of a spiritual nature to a bodily life.”
[203] Bengel: Simul atque per mortificationem involucro infrmitatis in carne solutus erat, statim vitae solvi nesciae virtus modis novis et multis expeditissimis sese exserere coepit. Hanc vivificationem necessario celeriter subsecuta est excitatio corporis ex morte et resurrectio e sepulcro.—Schmid: “The πνεῦμα is a principle which He possessed in a special manner, … this, in consequence of death, is set free from the trammels of sensuous bodily nature, it now enters upon its full rights, and developes in its fulness that ζωή which was in Him.”
[204] Schott explains, indeed, ζωοποιηθείς rightly in itself, but he objects to the identification of ζωοποίησις with ἀνάστασις , and thinks that the former is the fundamental condition of the latter, which is the “side of the resurrection concealed and as yet hidden in the depths”(?). But where does the apostle make any allusion to any such distinction between two sides in the resurrection of Christ?