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2Co_1:17. Wishing this therefore (according to what has just been said), did I then behave thoughtlessly? Was this proposal of mine made without duly taking thought for its execution? μήτι supposes a negative answer, as always, in which case ἄρα (meaning: as the matter stands) makes no alteration, such as the suggesting, perhaps, a thought of possible affirmation. Such a sense, as it were, of a mere tentative nature feeling its way, which is foreign here, could only be suggested by the context, and would have nothing to do with ἄρα (in opposition to Hartung, whom Hofmann follows). See Klotz, ad Devar. p. 176 f.
τῇ ἐλαφρίᾳ ] The article marks the thoughtlessness not as that with which the apostle was reproached by the Corinthians (Billroth, Olshausen, Rückert, de Wette), which he must have indicated more precisely, in order that it might be so understood, but thoughtlessness as such in general, in abstracto: have I then made myself guilty of thoughtlessness? ἐλαφρία belongs to the substantives in - ρια formed late from adjectives in - ρος . See Lobeck, ad Phryn. p. 343. For the ethical sense (wantonness), comp. Schol. Aristoph. Av. 195, and ἐλαφρός in Polyb. vi. 56. 11; ἐλαφρόνοος , Phocylides in Stob. Flor. app. iii. 7.
ἢ ἃ βουλεύομαι , κατὰ σάρκα βουλεύομαι ] ἤ is not aut (Billroth, Rückert, Osiander, Hofmann, after the Vulgate and most expositors), but an; for without any interrogation the relation of the two sentences is: My proposal was not thoughtless, unless it should be the case that I form my resolves κατὰ σάρκα . See Hartung, II. p. 61.
Mark the difference between ἐχρησάμην as aorist (historical event) and βουλεύομαι as present (behaviour generally).
κατὰ σάρκα ] according to the flesh, after the standard of the σάρξ , i.e. so that I let myself be guided by the impulses of human nature sinfully determined, Gal_5:16 ff.
ἵνα ᾖ παρʼ ἐμοὶ τὸ ναὶ ναὶ καὶ τὸ οὒ οὔ ] By ἵνα is expressed simply the immoral purpose, which would be connected with the βουλεύεσθαι κατὰ σάρκα ; in order that with me there may be the Yea, yea, and Nay, nay, i.e. in order that with me affirmation and denial may exist together; that I, according as the case stands, may assent to the fleshly impulse, and in turn renounce it; to-day yea, and to-morrow nay, or yea and nay as it were in one breath. Billroth errs in thinking that in this explanation καί must be taken as also. That it means and, is proved by 2Co_1:18-19. The duplication of the ναί and οὔ strengthens the picture of the untrustworthy man who affirms just as fervently as he afterwards denies. Failing to discern this, Grotius and Estius wished to prefer the reading of the Vulgate, τὸ ναὶ καὶ τὸ οὔ , which has very weak attestation. The article marks the ναὶ ναί and the οὒ οὔ as well-known and solemn formulae of affirmative and negative asseveration (as they were also in Jewish usage; see Wetstein, ad Mat_5:37). Comp. on ναὶ ναί , Soph. O. C. 1743. As to the main point, namely, that the ναὶ ναί and the οὒ οὔ are taken as the subject of ᾖ , this explanation has the support of Erasmus, Beza, Calvin, Estius (though conjecturing ἵνα μή instead of ἵνα ), Cornelius a Lapide, Grotius, Mill, Wolf, and others; also of Rosenmüller, Emmerling, Flatt, Schrader, Rückert, de Wette, Osiander, Neander, Maier, and others; even Olshausen, who, however, sets up for ναί and οὔ the “peculiar” signification (assumed without any instance of its being so used) of “truth” and “falsehood.” The diplasiasmus ναὶ ναί and οὒ οὔ is not without reason (as Billroth and Hofmann object), but quite accords with the passionate excitement of the moral consciousness; whereas afterwards, in 2Co_1:18, where his words go on quietly with a glance towards the faithful God, the bare ναὶ καὶ οὔ is quite in its place. Note, further, that the simple expression of the coexistence of the yea and nay (to which Hofmann objects) is more striking, than if Paul had given a more precise explanation of the maxims of yea and nay. The readers knew him, and even his evil-wishers could not but know that he was no yea-and-nay man. Others consider the second ναί and the second οὔ as predicates, so that a wholly opposite sense is made out of the words: in order that with me the Yea may be yea, and the Nay be nay, i.e. in order that I may stubbornly carry through what I have proposed to myself. Comp. Jam_5:12. So Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Oecumenius, Erasmus, Castalio, Bengel, and others, and recently Billroth; Winer, p. 429 [E. T. 481], gives no decision. The context, however, before (“levitatis et inconstantiae, non autem pertinaciae crimen hic a se depellere studet,” Estius) and after (2Co_1:18-19), is decisive against this view. Hofmann imports into παρʼ ἐμοί a contrast to παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ , so that the idea would be: to assent to or refuse anything on grounds taken from one’s own self, without reservation, because purely as an expression of self-will, with which Jam_4:13 is compared.[132] Such a contrast could not but be based upon what went before, in itself as well as in the sense assumed. Besides, to this pretended emphasis on παρʼ ἐμοί the order ἵνα παρʼ ἐμοὶ ᾖ would have been suitable; and the idea of speaking no absolute yea or nay, would have demanded not καί but ἤ between the ναί and the οὔ . And was Paul, then, the man in whose resolves “the yea is always meant with the reservation of a nay”? Luther’s translation (comp. Ambrosiaster and Erasmus) comes back to the result, that the mark of interrogation is placed after κατὰ σ . βουλ ., and in that case there is supplied nequaquam, of which negation ἵνα κ . τ . λ . specifies the purpose. This is intolerably arbitrary. Regarding the erroneous translation of the Peshito (Grotius agrees with it), which distorts the meaning from misconception, see Fritzsche, Diss. II. p. 2.
[132] Similarly Ewald, but he takes παρʼ ἐμοί (with Camerarius) as penes me (“merely after my own pleasure to say and to do the one or the other”), as if, therefore, it were ἐν ἐμοί . Ewald compares Psa_12:5.