2Co_13:8. Reason assigned for the relation just expressed as aimed at by
ἵνα
ὑμεῖς
τὸ
καλὸν
ποιῆτε
,
ἡμεῖς
δὲ
ὡς
ἀδόκιμοι
ὦμεν
. That we really have this design, is based on the fact that we are not in a position to do anything against the truth, but for the truth. The
ἀλήθεια
is to be taken in the habitual sense of the N. T.: the truth
κατʼ
ἐξοχήν
, the divine truth, i.e. the gospel; comp. 2Co_4:2, 2Co_6:7. If Paul, forsooth, had not had the design that the readers should do what is good, and he himself appear without punitive power and consequently as unattested, he would have counteracted the gospel, in so far as it aims at establishing Christian morality, requires penitence, announces forgiveness to the penitent, etc.; but he is not in a position to do so. To take
ἀλήθεια
, with Flatt and older expositors,[402] as moral truth (see on 1Co_5:8), uprightness, is a limitation of it, which the context all the less suggests, seeing that
ἀλήθεια
in the above sense embraces in it the moral element. The taking it in the judicial sense would be accordant with the context (
ἵνα
ἀληθῆ
φέρωμεν
τὴν
ψῆφον
, Theophylact, so Chrysostom, Theodoret, Grotius: “quod rectum justumque est;” Cornelius a Lapide, Bengel, de Wette: “the true state in which the matter finds itself;” so, too, Räbiger); yet, in that case, there would result an inappropriate contrast, since
ὑπὲρ
.
τ
.
ἀλ
. can only mean “for the benefit of the truth,” which presupposes a more comprehensive idea of
ἀλήθ
. (de Wette: “to further the truth”).
ἀλλʼ
ὑπὲρ
τ
.
ἀλ
.] sc.
δυνάμεθά
τι
, we are able to do something.
[402] So Photius in Oecumenius, p. 709 D:
ἀλήσθειαν
τὴν
εὐσέβειαν
καλεῖ
ὡς
νόθου
ὄντος
τοῦ
δυσσεβοῦς
βίου
, and previously Pelagius: “Innocentiae enim nostra sententia obesse non poterit;” as also Erasmus, Mosheim, and others.