2Co_3:5. Now comes the caveat, for which 2Co_3:4 has prepared the way,—the guarding against the possible objection, that Paul considered himself (and Timothy) as originator of the ability for apostolic working.
οὐχ
ὅτι
is therefore not to be taken as equivalent to on
ὅτι
οὐχ
(Mosheim, Schulz, Emmerling), nor is
πέποιθα
to be supplied again after
οὐχ
(Emmerling); but we have here the quite common use of
οὐχ
ὅτι
for
οὐκ
ἐρῶ
,
ὅτι
. See on 2Co_1:24. Rückert finds in
οὐχ
ὅτι
κ
.
τ
.
λ
. a reason assigned for the
πρὸς
τὸν
θεόν
, or an explanation of it: “In thus speaking, I would not have it thought that,” etc. But if in
πρὸς
τ
.
θεόν
there was meant to be conveyed the same idea as was further explained in 2Co_3:5, Paul would have expressed himself quite illogically, and in explaining or assigning a reason for it he must have written
ὅτι
οὐχ
. No; the course of thought is: “With this
πεποίθησις
, however, I do not wish to be misunderstood or misconstrued: I do not mean by it, that we are of ourselves sufficient,” etc. With this connection
πρὸς
τὸν
θεόν
is not at variance; for by it God was not yet meant as author of the adequate ability (2Co_3:5 shows this very point), but as producer of the result.
λογίσασθαί
τι
] to judge anything (censere). The context furnishes the more precise definition which Paul had in view. 2Co_3:2-4; 2Co_3:6. He denies, namely, that of himself he possesses the ability to settle in his judgment the means and ways, and, in general, the mode of discharging his apostolic duties. If he has just been speaking in 2Co_3:2-4 with so much confidence of his prosperous and successful labour in Corinth, yet it is by no means his own ability, but the divine empowering, which enables him to determine by his own judgment anything regarding the discharge of his vocation. Accordingly, we can neither approve the meaning arbitrarily given to
τί
, aliquid praeclari (Emmerling; van Hengel, Annot. p. 219), nor agree with Hofmann, who, in consistency with his reference of
πεποίθησις
to 2Co_2:14-17, makes the apostle guard against the misconstruction that this, his
πεποίθησις
, rests on ideas which he forms for himself—on an estimate of his official working, according to a standard elaborated by his own mind. Even apart from that erroneous reference of the
πεποίθησις
, the very expression
ἱκανοί
would be unsuitable to the meaning adopted by Hofmann, and instead of it a notion of presumption would rather have been in place; the prominence given to
ἱκανοτής
by its being used thrice can only concern the ability which regulates the official labour itself. The dogmatic exposition, disregarding the context, finds here the entire inability of the natural man for all good. See Augustine, de dono persev. 13, contra Pelag. 8; Calvin: “non poterat magis hominem nudare omni bono.” Comp. Beza, Calovius, and others, including Olshausen. The reference also of the words to the doctrinal contents of the preaching, which was not derived from his own reflection (Theodoret, Grotius, de Wette, Neander, and others), is not suggested by the connection, and is forbidden by the fact that
ἀφʼ
ἑαυτῶν
does not belong to
λογίσασθε
at all (see below). This also in opposition to Osiander, who finds the meaning. “not human, but divine thoughts lie at the root of the whole of my official work.”
ἀφʼ
ἑαυτῶν
] has its assured place after
λογίσ
.
τι
(see the critical remarks). The contrast that follows (
ἐκ
τοῦ
θεοῦ
) decides what it belongs to in sense,—namely, not to
λογίσασθαί
τι
, but to
ἱκανοί
ἐσμεν
,—so that
ἱκανοί
ἐσμεν
λογίσασθαί
τι
is to be considered as going together, as one idea. Mistaking this, Rückert thinks that either Paul has placed the words wrongly, or the order given by B C
à
(see the critical remarks) must be preferred.
On
ἀφʼ
ἑαυτοῦ
, from one’s own means, nemine suppeditante, see Wetstei.
ὡς
ἐξ
ἑαυτῶν
] sc.
ἱκανοὶ
ὄντες
λογίσ
.
τι
, a more precise definition of the
ἀφʼ
ἑαντ
. inserted on purpose (making the notice thoroughly exhaustive). The proceeding from (
ἀπό
) is still more definitely marked as causal procession (
ἐκ
): as from ourselves, i.e. as if our ability to judge anything had its origin from ourselves. Wolf arbitrarily refers
ἀπό
to the will, and
ἐξ
to the power; and Rückert wrongly connects
ἐξ
ἑαυτ
. with
λογίσ
.
τί
; it is in fact parallel to
ἀφʼ
ἑαυτ
. Paul is conscious of the
ἱκανὸν
εἶναι
λογίσασθαί
τι
, and ascribes it to himself; but he denies that he has this
ἱκανότης
of himself, or from himsel.
ἡ
ἱκανότης
ἡμῶν
] sc.
λογίσασθαί
τι
.
Rückert finds in our passage, especially in
ἀφʼ
ἑαυτῶν
, an allusion to some utterances, unknown to us, of opponents, which, however, cannot be proved from 2Co_10:7, and is quite a superfluous hypothesis.