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2Co_3:6. Ὃς καὶ ἱκάνωσεν ἡμᾶς ] ὅς , he who, in the sense of οὗτος γάρ . See Kühner, ad Xen. Mem. i. 2. 64; van Hengel, Annot. 220. And καί is the also of the corresponding relation (Baeumlein, Partik. p. 152), so that there is expressed the agreement between what is contained in the relative clause and what was said before: who also (qui idem, comp. Klotz, ad Devar. p. 636) has made us capable ( ἀρκοῦσαν ἐχωρήγησε δύναμιν , Theodoret) as ministers, etc. According to Bengel, Rückert (comp. also de Wette, Osiander, Hofmann), the sense is: “that God has bestowed on him not only the ability mentioned in 2Co_3:5 but also the more comprehensive one of a διάκονος κ . τ . λ .” But in that case the words must have stood thus: ὃς καὶ διακόνους καινῆς διαθήκης ἱκάνωσεν ἡμᾶς . The notion of ἱκανότης is thrice put in front with the same emphasis. Of ἱκανόω (Col_1:12) only the passive, in the sense of to have enough, occurs in the (later) Greek writers, such as Dion. Hal. ii. 74, and in the LX.
διακόνους καινῆς διαθήκ .] as ministers of a new covenant (comp. Eph_3:7; Col_1:23; 2Co_11:15; Luk_1:2), i.e. to be such as serve a new covenant, as devote to it their activity. Καιν . διαθ ., without the article, is conceived qualitatively. The new covenant (Heb_12:24) of God with men, which is meant, is—in contrast to the one founded by Moses—that established by Christ, in which the fulfilling of the law is no longer defined as the condition of salvation, but faith on the atonement in Christ, 1Co_11:25; Rom_10:5 ff.; Gal_4:24 ff.; Mat_26:28.
οὐ γράμματος , ἀλλὰ πνεύμ .] is since Heumann usually (also by Billroth, Rückert, Ewald) regarded as governed by καινῆς διαθήκης (Rückert, “of a covenant, which offers not γράμμα , but πνεῦμα ”), but without reason, since the sequel, by ἡ διακονία τοῦ θανάτου and ἡ διακ . τοῦ πνεύματος (2Co_3:7-8), rather points to the fact that Paul has conceived οὐ γρ . ἀλλὰ πν . as dependent on διακόνους (so also de Wette, Neander, Osiander, Hofmann), as an appositional more precise definition to the καινῆς διαθήκης : to be ministers not of letter (which we would be as ministers of the old covenant), but of spirit. Γράμμα characterizes the Mosaic covenant according to the specific manner in which it occurs and subsists, for it is established and fixed in writing (by means of the written letter), and thereby—although it is divine, yet without bringing with it and communicating any principle of inward vital efficacy—settled as obligatory. On the other hand, πνεῦμα characterizes the Christian covenant, in so far as its distinctive and essential mode of existence consists in this, that the divine living power of the Holy Spirit is at work in it; through this, and not through a written instrument, it subsists and fulfils itself. Comp. Rom_2:29; Rom_7:6; Heb_10:29; Heb_8:7 ff. Not letter therefore, but spirit, is that to which the teachers of the gospel minister, the power, whose influence is advanced by their labours;[159] οὐ γὰρ τὰ παλαιὰ τοῦ νόμου προσφέρομεν γράμματα , ἀλλὰ τὴν καινὴν τοῦ πνεύματος δωρεάν , Theodoret. It is true that the law also is in its nature ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙΚΌς (see on Rom_7:14), and its ΛΌΓΙΑ are ΖῶΝΤΑ (see on Act_7:38), but it is misused by the power of sin in man to his destruction, because it does not furnish the spirit which breaks this powe.
ΤῸ ΓᾺΡ ΓΡΆΜΜΑ ἈΠΟΚΤΕΊΝΕΙ , ΤῸ ΔῈ ΠΝΕῦΜΑ ΖΩΟΠΟΙΕῖ ] specifies quite simply the reason, why God has made them capable of ministering not to the letter, but to the spirit. It is therefore quite unnecessary to presuppose, with Fritzsche, Billroth, and Rückert, a suppressed intermediate thought (namely, that the new covenant is far more excellent). We may add that the γάρ does not extend also to what follows (2Co_3:7-8), so as to make the sentence ΤῸ ΓΡΆΜΜΑ Κ . Τ . Λ . merely introductory to the sequel, and the whole a vindication of the apostle’s referring his capacity of judgment to God. This view of Hofmann is connected with his interpretation of ΛΟΓΊΣ . ΤΙ , 2Co_3:5, and has besides against it the fact, that the weighty antithesis ΤῸ Γ . ΓΡΆΜΜΑ Κ . Τ . Λ . is neither adapted to be a mere introductory thought, nor betokened as being such, the more especially as it contains completely in itself the ground establishing what immediately precedes, and with 2Co_3:7 a new discussion begins, which runs on to the end of the chapter without a brea.
ἈΠΟΚΤΕΊΝΕΙ ] does not refer to the physical death (Käuffer; ζωὴ αἰών . p. 75), in so far as that is the consequence of sin (Rom_5:12), and sin is occasioned and furthered by the law (Rom_7:9 ff; Rom_6:23; 1Co_15:56, al.). Against this interpretation it is decisive that according to Rom_5:12 ff. (see in loc.) bodily death is the consequence, extending to all, of Adam’s sin, and has, since Adam, reigned over all even before the law. Nor yet are we to understand spiritual (Billroth), ethical (de Wette, Krummel), or spiritual and bodily death (Rückert), or the mere sensus mortis (Bengel, comp. Neander), but according to Rom_6:21; Rom_6:23; Rom_7:5; Rom_7:9-11; Rom_7:13; Rom_7:24, eternal death,[160] the opposite of the eternal life, which, by means of the Holy Spirit becoming operative in the heart through the gospel, is brought about for man who is liable to eternal death (Rom_8:2; Rom_8:6; Rom_8:10-11)—which here (comp. Joh_6:63) is expressed by τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζωοποιεῖ , comp. on 2Co_2:16. How far the law works eternal death, is shown from Rom_7:5; Rom_7:7 ff.; comp. 1Co_15:56. Through its prohibitions, namely, it becomes for the power of sin in man the occasion of awakening evil desire, and therewith transgression sets in and the imputing of it for condemnation, whereby man is liable to eternal death, and that by means of the curse of the law which heaps up sin and produces the divine anger, see on 2Co_3:9; Gal_3:10. Comp. Rom_4:15; Rom_5:20. After Chrysostom and his followers (also Ambrosiaster), Grotius explains it as. “morte violenta punit peccatores,” and Fritzsche: “lex supplicia sumit.” This is to be rejected, because in this way the law would not be the very thing that kills, but only that which determines death as a punishment; and consequently no corresponding contrast to ζωοποιεῖ would result. Finally, we can only consider as historically remarkable the interpretation of Origen regarding the literal and mystical sense of Scripture, the former of which is injurious, the latter conducive, to salvation. Something similar is still to be found in Krause and Royaards. Against the visionaries, who referred γράμμα to the outward and πνεῦμα to the inward word, see Calovius.
[159] Bengel acutely and justly remarks: “Paulus etiam dum haec scripsit, non literae, sed spiritus ministrum egit. Moses in proprio illo officio suo, etiam cum haud scripsit, tamen in litera versatus est.”
[160] With this is connected certainly moral death (the negation of the moral life), but only the eternal death is here meant, which is the consequence of the κατάκρισις , ver. 9. This in opposition to Osiander. Nor is the ἀποκτείνει meant of the letter conditionally (“so soon as we abide by it alone and deify it”), but the killing is the specific operation of the law; how? see Rom_7:9 f.; 1Co_15:56. This in opposition to Ewald.—Hofmann unites the various meanings of the death to which the sinner is liable, inasmuch as he defines the notion as “the existence of the whole man shut out from the life of God and for ever.” This collective definition of the notion, however, does not relieve us from the labour of showing from the various contexts in what special sense death and dying are conceived of in the several passages.