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2Co_8:10 After the parenthesis in 2Co_8:9, a continuation of the ἀλλὰ … δοκιμάζων , 2Co_8:8 : and an opinion I give in this affair. Γνώμην , opinion, has the emphasis, as contrasting with ἐπιταγήν in 2Co_8:8. Comp. on 1Co_7:25.
τοῦτο γὰρ ὑμῖν συμφέρει ] συμφέρει does not mean decet (Vorstius, Emmerling, who appeals to LXX. Pro_19:10, where, however, the translation is inaccurate), but: it profits. And τοῦτο is not, with most, including Rückert, de Wette, Ewald, Neander, to be referred to the supplying of charitable gifts, in which case συμφέρει is either left without more precise definition (Rückert: “like every good deed, bringing advantage”), or is interpreted as pointing to the advantage of good repute (Grotius, comp. also Hofmann), of the divine recompense (Calovius) and the moral advantage (Flatt), or as useful for salvation (Bisping), and so on. Τοῦτο γὰρ ὑμ . συμφ . contains, in fact, the ground why Paul proceeds in this matter merely by way of advising; hence, with Billroth, Osiander, and Kling, τοῦτο is to be referred to the previous γνώμην … δίδωμι . It is no objection to this, that in ἐν τούτῳ immediately before the pronoun referred to the distribution. For in the previous clause γνώμην δίδωμι contained the whole thought, and ἐν τούτῳ had no stress laid on it, not even needing to be inserted. Accordingly: for this—that I do not command you, but only give my opinion in the matter—is serviceable to you, is fitted to operate in the way of moral improvement on you, as being persons who have already shown yourselves to be such as need not command, but only counsel. The emphasis lies primarily on τοῦτο and next on ὑμῖν . According to Hofmann, who does not take 2Co_8:9 parenthetically, in καὶ γνώμην κ . τ . λ . there is meant to follow something new and further, so that both ἐν τούτῳ and subsequently τοῦτο point to the advice, which Paul intends to give (with the following … what follows), and this advice is expressed in the imperative clause 2Co_8:11, to which οἵτινες κ . τ . λ . belongs as a protasis. Against this confusion it may be decisively urged, first, that the ἐν τούτῳ emphatically pointing forward must have been placed first; secondly, that after δίδωμι there would come not at all the announced γνώμη , but in the first instance an argumentative parenthetic clause, which would again begin with “what follows,”—a course which could only lead the reader astray; thirdly, that if τοῦτο γ . ὑμῖν συμφέρει does not go with οἵτινες κ . τ . λ ., and find its more precise explanation therein, it would interpolate a thought altogether indefinite and isolated; fourthly, that δέ after νυνί in 2Co_8:11 most naturally introduces a new sentence; lastly, that 2Co_8:11 has not in the least the form of a γνώμη , of an expression of opinion, but a form purely praeceptive, as, indeed, that which the apostle has put under the considerate point of view of a testing and a γνώμη in contrast to an ἐπιταγή , was already contained in 2Co_8:7 and has nothing more to do with the direct precept of 2Co_8:11.
οἵτινες ] ut qui, includes the specifying of the reason. See on Eph_3:13. οὐ μόνον τὸ ποιῆσαι , ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ θέλειν ] Grotius, following the Peshito and Arabic of Erpenius, assumes here a loquendi genus inversum; but this is an irrational violence,[274] to which also the view of Emmerling (comp. Castalio in the Adnot.) ultimately comes: “vos haud mora, uno momento facere et velle coepistis.” The explanation of others (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Gregory, Erasmus, Calvin, Beza, Cornelius a Lapide, Clericus, Heumann, Bauer, Log. Paul. p. 334; Zachariae, Storr, Rosenmüller, Flatt, Billroth, Schrader, Olshausen, Rückert, Osiander, Ewald, and several others) is at least rational: not only the doing, but also the being willing, i.e. the doing willingly. But that θέλειν is not used in the sense of ΘΈΛΟΝΤΑς ΠΟΙΕῖΝ (see regarding this use of ΘΈΛΩΝ , Markl. ad Lys. Reisk. p. 616), or even θέλειν ποιῆσαι (Bremi, ad Dem. hil. 2Co_1:13, p. 121), is plain from 2Co_8:11, where Paul, if that meaning had been in his mind, must have continued: νυνὶ δὲ καὶ ἐπιτελέσατε τὸ π . But, in the form in which he has written 2Co_8:11, the emphasis lies not on ἘΠΙΤΕΛΈΣΑΤΕ , but on ΤῸ ΠΟΙῆΣΑΙ , which is thereby shown to be something not contemporaneous with the ΘΈΛΕΙΝ , but following upon it, something which is still to happen after that ΘΈΛΕΙΝ is already present, so that we have an advance (1) from the ΠΟΙῆΣΑΙ to the ΘΈΛΕΙΝ in 2Co_8:10; and (2) from the ΘΈΛΕΙΝ to the further ΠΟΙῆΣΑΙ in 2Co_8:11. Moreover, in opposition to the former interpretation, we may urge the change of tenses in 2Co_8:10; for, if the ΘΈΛΕΙΝ in 2Co_8:10 were to be something inherent in the previous ΠΟΙῆΣΑΙ (willingness), the aorist infinitive must likewise have been used. Lastly, there is opposed to this interpretation the ὅπως καθάπερ κ . τ . λ . in 2Co_8:11, where evidently the (future) actual accomplishment is compared with the inclination of the (present) willing; hence, in 2Co_8:10 also ΘΈΛΕΙΝ must be conceived of as something which subsists for itself, and not simply as a willingly doing. Others conceive that τὸ ποιῆσαι denotes the collection-gathering which had already actually taken place, and τὸ θέλειν the continuing wish to do still more. This is in the main the view of Hunnius, Hammond, Wetstein,[275] Mosheim, Bengel, Michaelis, Fritzsche. The latter says (Dissert. II. p. 9): “hoc modo non solum τὸ θέλειν tanquam gravius τῷ ποιεῖν oppositum est (nam qui nova beneficia veteribus addere vult, plus illo agit, qui in eo quod praestitit, subsistit) sed etiam v. προενάρξασθαι utrique bene congruit, illi ( τῷ ποιῆσαι ), quoniam nondum tantum pecuniae erogaverant, quantum ad justam λογίαν sufficere videretur, huic ( τῷ θέλειν ) quoniam in hac nova, voluntate huc usque acquieverant.” In this way the change of tenses in ποιῆσαι and ΘΈΛΕΙΝ would be quite appropriate; both would apply (this in opposition to Billroth’s objection) to the same fact, to the work of collecting begun in pursuance of 1 Corinthians 16, which, however, would be viewed not according to two different sides (Billroth), objective ( ποιῆσαι ) and subjective ( ΘΈΛΕΙΝ ), but according to two different stages, in respect of the first activity and of the further willing, so that now also the third stage, the execution of this further willing, must be added to complete the whole matter, 2Co_8:11. But since there is no indication whatever of the reference of τὸ θέλειν to a further willing (following on the ποιῆσαι ), and that a willing arrested as to its realization; and since, on the other hand, the ΠΡΟ in ΠΡΟΕΝΉΡΞ . permits for the climactic relation Οὐ ΜΌΝΟΝ ΤῸ ΠΟΙῆΣΑΙ , ἈΛΛᾺ ΚΑῚ ΤῸ ΘΈΛΕΙΝ only the temporal reference, that the θέλειν must have been earlier than the ποιῆσαι , and consequently Οὐ ΜΌΝΟΝ … ἈΛΛᾺ ΚΑΊ is a climax of time pointing not forward, but backward: the view of Fritzsche is to be given up as not accordant with the context. There remains as the only correct view, that of Cajetanus and Estius, which de Wette (and after him Winer, p. 521 [E. T. 701 f.], also Wieseler, Chronol. d. apost. Zeitalt. p. 364) has defended, that προενήρξ . places the readers in comparison as to time with the Macedonians (2Co_8:1 ff.): not only the doing (the carrying out of the action of collecting), but also already the willing has begun earlier among you than among the Macedonians; you have anticipated them in both respects. With this view it is obvious that Paul could not but logically place ποιῆσαι before ΘΈΛΕΙΝ . The offence, which this arrangement would otherwise occasion, cannot be got over by the pregnant meaning, which Hofmann puts into the present θέλειν , viz. that it denotes the steady attitude of mind sustained up to the execution (comp. Billroth). This would, in fact, be a modal definition of the willing, which Paul would doubtless have known how to designate, but could not put into the bare present.[276] And such an attitude of mind would withal have already existed before the ποιῆσαι , and would not simply have come afterward.
ἈΠῸ ΠΈΡΥΣΙ ] More precise definition of the ΠΡΟ in ΠΡΟΕΝΉΡΞ .: since the previous year. On πέρυσι , superiore anno, see Plato, Protag. p. 327 C; Gorg. p. 473 E; Aristoph. Vesp. 1044; Acharn. 348; Lucian, Tim. 59; Soloec. 7, al. Comp. ix. 2. Whether did Paul date the beginning of the year after the Greek (rather Attic and Olympic) reckoning (so Credner, Einl. I. 2, p. 372), i.e. about the time of the summer solstice, or after the Macedonian fashion (so, on account of 2Co_9:2, Wieseler, Chronol. d. apost. Zeitalt. p. 364), i.e. at the autumnal equinox, or from the month Nisan (Hofmann; see Grimm on 1Ma_10:21), or from the usual national standpoint of the Jewish reckoning, according to which the beginning of the civil year was the month Tisri (in Sept.)? The last is in itself the most natural, and also the most probable, considering the great variety as to the times of beginning the year, to which he would have had to accommodate himself in the various provinces, and considering not less the acquaintance with the Jewish calendar which he could take for granted in all his churches. Consequently there lies between the composition of our first and second Epistles the time from Easter till at least after the beginning of the new year in Tisri.
[274] This inversion is followed also by Luther, not in the translation, but in the gloss: “You have been the first, who willed it and also did it.”
[275] Who says: “ ποιῆσαι est dare; θέλειν ποιῆσαι , i.e. ποιήσειν vel δώσειν , daturum esse.”
[276] The present denotes simply the being disposed as the habitus of readiness prevailing in the case, by way of distinction from the historical doing ( ποιῆσαι ), through which the θέλειν became active.