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2Pe_1:20. τοῦτο πρῶτον γινώσκοντες ] τοῦτο refers not to anything said before, but to the clause following: ὅτι κ . τ . λ .; cf. chap. 2Pe_3:3.
πρῶτον , i. q. πρῶτον πάντων , 1Ti_2:1; erroneously Bengel: prius quam ego dico, anglicé: “before that.”
γινώσκοντες : “whilst ye recognise, bring yourselves to the conscious knowledge that” (de Wette); cf. Jam_1:3; Heb_10:34. Without any warrant Pott supplies δέ , and takes the participle as equivalent to “ δεῖ γινώσκειν ὑμᾶς ;” the participle, as such, is rather to be joined closely to καλ . ποιεῖτε προσέχ . By τοῦτο πρ . γιν . the author directs the attention of his readers to the point to which they in their προσέχειν (2Pe_1:19) should pay special attention; what that is the words following say: ὅτι πᾶσα προφητεία … γίνεται ; πᾶσα … οὐ is a Hebraism for οὐδεμία , cf. Rom_3:20; 1Co_1:29, etc. προφητεία γραφῆς is undoubtedly to be understood of the prediction of the Old Testament, either the prophecy contained in Scripture, or that to which the Scripture gives expression. For the construction of γίνεται c. gen., cf. Winer, p. 184 [E. T. 244]; Buttm. p. 142; according to Buttmann, the genitive definition of the thing with εἶναι or γίνεσθαι frequently denotes a permanent attribute; thus here: prophecy is of such a kind that it, etc.; the more precise definition depends on the meaning of the words: ἰδίας ἐπιλύσεως . Instead of ἐπιλύσεως , Grotius would read: ἐπηλύσεως , and Heinsius: ἐπελεύσεως , so that the sense would be: the προφητεία non est res proprii impetus s. instinctus; but these changes have been justly rejected by Wolf already as arbitrary. Not less unwarranted is it to understand, with Hammond, ἐπίλυσις originally de emissione cursorum e carceribus, deducing therefrom the thought: that the prophets non a se, sed a Deo missi currerent; or, with Clericus: de solutione oris; or, with Lakemacher, to derive ἐπίλυσις from ἐπιλεύθω ( ἐπέρχομαι ), instead of from ἐπιλύειν , thus obtaining the idea: that prophecy is not accessus proprie aut talis, quae virtute quadam mentis humanae propria et naturali proveniat et ad hominem quasi accedat (cf. Wolf in loc.). The notion that ἐπίλυσις is equal to dissolutio (Hardt: omnis promissio non est dissolutionis sed indissolubilis, immutabilis, etc.; similarly Storr, Opp. II. 391 ff.) has been refuted already by Wolf.
ἐπίλυσις means: solution, explanation, interpretation; thus Mar_4:34 : ἐπιλύειν ; Gen_40:8, Aquila: ἐπιλυόμενος ( ëÌÉúÅø ), ἐπίλυσις ( ôÌÄúÀúåÉï ); Gen_41:12, LXX., according to some codd.: τὰ ἐνύπνια ἡμῶν , ἀνδρὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐνύπνιον αὐτοῦ ἐπέλυσεν , Phil. de vita contempl. p. 901 A.
Almost all expositors understand ἐπίλυσις as the interpretation of the προφητεία made aforetime; but ἰδίας , however, has been variously applied—(1) It has been taken to refer to the προφητεία itself; Werenfels (cf. Wolf): προφητεία οὐκ ἔχει τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἐπίλυσιν , that is, οὐκ ἐπιλύει ἑαυτήν ; thus also Wahl, Dietlein, Brückner. The positive idea here to be supplied is: but “the interpretation is to be looked for only from God” (Brückner; Dietlein arbitrarily finds the further idea contained here, that prophecy must not be treated as allegory). (2) To the prophets themselves; Oecumenius: ᾔδεσαν ( οἱ προφῆται ) μὲν καὶ συνίεσαν τὸν καταπεμπόμενον αὐτοῖς προφητικὸν λόγον , οὐ μέντοι καὶ τὴν ἐπίλυσιν αὐτοῦ ἐποιοῦντο (similarly Knapp, de Wette); and the thought to be supplied here is: the interpretation is then not an easy, but a difficult matter (de Wette: “the author makes this remark in order to excuse the difficulty of the interpretation, and to take away the pretext for unbelief or scoffing”). (3) To the readers or to man generally. This is the view most generally adopted; it is that of Beda, Erasmus, Luther, Aretius, Gerhard, Pott, Steiger, Schmid, Besser, Wiesinger, Schott, Hofmann, etc.; and the positive thought to be supplied is: only the Holy Spirit can expound the prediction (Luther: “act accordingly, and do not think that you can interpret Scripture according to your own reason or cunning; Peter has forbidden it, you are not to interpret, the Holy Spirit must interpret, or it must remain uninterpreted”). But opposed to all these interpretations is—(1) The necessity of supplying the positive thought which really contains the point of the remark, but to which the apostle does not give expression; (2) The connection of thought, according to which 2Pe_1:20 is subjoined as a confirmation of the ᾧ καλῶς ποιεῖτε προσέχοντες . If the thought here expressed were intended to give a caution with respect to the προσέχειν , or to form, as Wiesinger says, a condition preliminary and necessary to it, this must in some way have been referred to. Besides, it must be noted that εἶναι or γίνεσθαι , c. gen., implies a relation of dependence, and in such a way that the genitive denotes that on which something else depends.[55] Now it may, indeed, be said that the “understanding” of prophecy, but not that prophecy itself, depends on the interpretation of it. The rendering: “prophecy is not a matter of private interpretation” (or even: “it does not permit of private interpretation,” Hofmann), takes too little account of the force of the genitive.[56] For these reasons ἘΠΊΛΥΣΙς must necessarily be understood rather of an “interpretation” on which the ΠΡΟΦΗΤΕΊΑ is based, on which it depends. But this is the explanation of the problematic future itself, or of the figure under which it presented itself to the prophets (thus, too, Gerlach and Fronmüller).[57] The passage above cited makes the matter clear. Gen_40:8 : the words, in which Joseph predicted to the prisoners what lay before them, form the προφητεία ; this presupposes an ἐπίλυσις , interpretation, of the dream by Joseph, and of this Joseph says that it belongs to God. Thus, too, he speaks to Pharaoh: the interpretation is not in me, Gen_41:15-16; cf. Dan. chap. 2
The thought accordingly is this: no prophecy of Scripture arises out of, or depends on, private (of him who utters the prophecy) interpretation of the future. Taken thus, the verse stands in close and correct connection both with what precedes, for it states why the λόγ . προφ . is βέβαιος whereunto it is right to take heed, as unto a light in a dark place (namely, because it is based on no human interpretation); and at the same time with what follows, which serves to explain and confirm the thought (inasmuch as it more precisely defines the idea, and by the positive statement confirms the negation).[58] Brückner incorrectly, therefore, objects to this interpretation, that although it may be in harmony with 2Pe_1:21, it cannot with propriety be connected with 2Pe_1:19; and if Brückner and Wiesinger further urge against it that it arbitrarily supplies the object of ἐπίλυσις , it must be replied, that object is rather supplied of itself out of the connection with προφητεία . The present γίνεται alone seems to be inappropriate, but this may be explained by supposing that the thought is conceived in the form of a general statement; this Brückner has recognised, whilst Wiesinger leaves it unnoticed.[59]
[55] Certainly, also, the above construction can merely express the relation of belonging to, as in Heb_12:11; but in that passage the ideas παιδεία and χαρᾶς ( λύπης ) stand in an altogether different relation to each other, from that in which προφητεία here stands to ἐπίλυσις .
[56] Hofmann’s remark is indeed very apodictic, that “the first of these counter reasons is null, and that accordingly the second is so too, because τοῦτο πρῶτον γινώσκοντες means a perception, which must be combined with the attending to the word of prophecy … but a perception, the substance of which could only be expressed negatively, because meant only to guard the prophecy against an interpretation brought about by the conclusions of the individual intellect;” but the objection to this is the same as that to the second counter reason above. If the author wished the τοῦτο … γινώσκοντες to be understood in the sense of guarding against, he would at least have added a δέ .—It is not easy to understand why the author, if he had wished to express the thought which his words are supposed to contain, did not write: ὅτι ἐπίλυσις προφητείας οὐ γίνεται ἐξ ἀνθρώπων , or something similar.
[57] Bengel’s interpretation is similar: ἐπίλυσις dicitur interpretation, qua ipsi prophetae res antea plane clausas aperuere mortalibus, only that here no definite distinction is drawn between προφ . and ἐπίλυσις .
[58] On the other hand, in the usual way of understanding this passage, ver. 21 is most inappropriately connected with ver. 20, since no explanation is given of the idea that the interpretation of the prophecy, because it is not the work of man, can only be expected from the Holy Spirit.
[59] Steinfass thinks that the author refers to Daniel, chap. 12., and that ἐπίλυσις means the answer given in ver. 12 to Daniel’s question in ver. 8, by which the indefinite statement of time is definitely fixed. This singular opinion is, however, contradicted by the single expression πᾶσα .