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Gal_3:19.[140] After Paul has shown in Gal_3:15-18 that the law does not abolish the far earlier covenant of promise, he might very naturally be met by the inquiry, “According to this view, then, what sort of end is left to be served by the law in connection with the history of salvation?” Hence he himself raises this question and answers it.
τί οὖν ὁ νόμος ] sc. ἐστι : how does it stand therefore (if it is the case that the law does not abolish the covenant of promise) with the law? A general question, in which, to judge from the answer that follows, the apostle had in view the purpose for which God gave the law. On the neuter τί , with a nominative following, comp. 1Co_3:5 (in the correct reading): τί οὖν ἐστιν Ἀπολλώς ; and see Stallbaum, ad Gorg. p. 501 E; Bernhardy, p. 336 f. Following J. Cappellus, Schott (also Matthies, though undecidedly, Jatho and Wieseler) takes τί for διὰ τί ; very unnecessarily, however, and in opposition to the constant use of the τί οὖν so frequently recurring in Paul’s writings (Rom_3:1; Rom_4:1, et al.; comp. Gal_4:15).
τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν προσετέθη ] for the sake of transgressions it was added; that is, in order that the transgressions of the law might be brought out as real, it was, after the covenant of promise was already in existence, superadded to the latter ( παρεισῆλθεν , Rom_5:20). The law namely, because it gives occasion to the potency of sin in man to bring about in him all evil desire (Rom_7:5; Rom_7:8), and nevertheless is too weak as a counter-power to oppose this sinful development (Rom_8:3), is the δύναμις τῆς ἁμαρτίας (1Co_15:56; and see Rom_7:7 ff.); but sin—which, although existing since Adam (Rom_5:13), is yet increased by that provocation of the law—has only come to assume the definite character of παράβασις in virtue of the existence of the law and its relation thereto (Rom_4:15). The same purpose of the law is expressed in Rom_5:20, but without the stricter definition of sin as παράβασις . Accordingly, τῶν παραβ . χάριν is not (with Wetstein) to be rationalized to this effect: “Lex sine dubio eo consilio lata est, ut servaretur, ὑπακοῆς χάριν ; vitio tamen hominum evenit, ut peccata multiplicarentur.” This is in itself correct (comp. Rom_7:12), but is irrelevant here, where the point in question is the position of the law in connection with the divine plan of salvation, the final aim of which is redemption. The real idea of the apostle is, that the emergence of sins—namely, in the penal, wrath-deserving (Rom_4:15), moral form of transgressions—which the law brought about, was designed by God (who must indeed have foreseen this effect) when He gave the law, and designed in fact as a mediate end in reference to the future redemption; for the evil was to become truly great, that it might nevertheless be outdone by grace (Rom_5:20). The result, which the law, according to experience, has on the whole effected, and by which it has proved itself the δύναμις τῆς ἁμαρτίας (comp. also 2Co_3:6), could not be otherwise than the aim of God. Comp. Ritschl, p. 74 f.; Baur, neutest. Theol. p. 140 f.; Hilgenfeld, Wieseler, Holsten, Hofmann, Reithmayr, Matthias (who, however, assumes the intentional appearance of an ambiguity), Stölting, and others; also Lipsius, Rechtfertigungsl. p. 75; Lechler, apost. Zeit. p. 110. Luther (1519) strikingly remarks: “Ut remissio propter salutem, ita praevaricatio propter remissionem, ita lex propter transgressionem.” Observe, further, the article before παραβ ., which summarily comprehends, as having really that character, the transgressions arising and existing since the giving of the law; comp. Holsten, z. Ev. d. Paul, u. Petr. p. 297. Others[141] consider that by τῶν παραβ . χάριν the recognition of sins is expressed as the aim of the law. So Augustine, Calvin, Beza, Piscator, Calovius, Wolf, Schoettgen, Michaelis, Windischmann, and others; also Winer (“ut manifestam redderet atque ita argueret illam, quam Judaei peccando sibi contrahebant, culpam”). But (1) this idea could not have been expressed by the mere τῶν παραβ . χάριν ; for although χάριν is not always exclusively used in its original sense, for the sake of, in favour of, but may also be taken simply as on account of,[142] still, in order to be intelligible, Paul must have written τῆς ἐπιγνώσεως τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν as signifying: in order to bring sins to recognition as transgressions. And (2) the point of the recognition of sin was entirely foreign to this passage; for in τῶν παραβ . χάριν Paul desires to call attention to the fact that the law, according to the divine plan, was intended to produce exactly the objective, actual (not merely the subjective) opposite of the ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΎΝΗ (comp. Gal_3:21-22). On account of this connection also the interpretation of many expositors, ad coercendas transgressiones, is wholly to be rejected, because opposed to the context. So Jerome, Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact, Erasmus, Grotius, Zachariae, Semler, Morus, Koppe, Rosenmüller, Paulus, Rückert, Olshausen, Neander, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Baur, Ewald (“in order to punish them more strictly”); also Messner, Lehre d. Ap. p. 222, and Hauck, comp. Buhl; several, such as Grotius and Rückert, think that the inclination to Egyptian idolatry is chiefly referred to. This view is decidedly disposed of by the expression παραβάσεων , since ΠΑΡΑΒΆΣΕΙς as such could only come into existence with the law (Rom_4:15); previously there were sins, but no transgressions,—a view with which Rom_5:14 does not conflict, because the matter in question there is the transgression of a quite definite, positive command of God. The two last interpretations are combined by Flatt and Schott, as also by Reiche, following older expositors (comp. also Matthies),—a course inconsistent with hermeneutical principles in general, and here in fact involving an amalgamation of two erroneous views.
προσετέθη ] it was added, is not inconsistent with what was said in Gal_3:15, οὐδεὶς … ἐπιδιατάσσεται , because in the latter general proposition under ΟὐΔΕΊς third persons are thought of. The law, moreover, was not given as ἐπιδιαθήκη (see on Gal_3:15), but as another institution, which, far from being a novella to the διαθήκη , was only to be a temporary intermediate measure in the divine plan of salvation, to minister to the final fulfilment of the promise. See the sequel, and comp. Rom_5:20; Rom_10:4.
ἌΧΡΙς ΟὟ ἜΛΘΗ ΤῸ ΣΠΈΡΜΑ Κ . Τ . Λ .] terminus ad quem of the merely provisional duration of this added institute. But these words are neither to be connected, in disregard of their position, with διαταγείς (Hofmann), nor to be placed in a parenthesis; for the construction is not interrupted. As to ἌΧΡΙς ΟὟ ἜΛΘῌ , usque dum venerit, comp. on Rom_11:25. According to the general usage of the N.T. (Buttmann, neut. Gr. p. 198), the subjunctive, and not the optative (Matthiae, p. 1158), is used. Paul has not put ἄν , because there was no idea in his mind of any circumstances which could have hindered the event. See Stallbaum, ad Phaed. p. 62 C; Hermann, de part. ἄν , p. 110 ff.; Hartung, Partikell. II. p. 291 ff. Comp. on 1Co_11:26.
τὸ σπέρμα ᾧ ἐπήγγ .] that is, Christ, whose advent, according to Gal_3:16, necessarily brought with it the fulfilment of the promise. The dative, however, does not stand for εἰς ὅν (Winer, Usteri), but just as in Gal_3:16 : to whom the promise was made.
ἐπήγγελται ] not promiserat (Vulgate, Bengel, Flatt, Hofmann), comp. Rom_4:21, Heb_12:26; but promissio facta est (2Ma_4:27), because thus it is not requisite to supply Θεός , and the expression corresponds very naturally with ἘῤῬΈΘΗΣΑΝ ΑἹ ἘΠΑΓΓΕΛΊΑΙ in Gal_3:16. Hence also it is superfluous to supply Ἡ ΚΛΗΡΟΝΟΜΊΑ (Ewald).
ΔΙΑΤΑΓΕῚς ΔΙʼ ἈΓΓΈΛΩΝ ἘΝ Χ . ΜΕΣ .] the mode in which ὁ νόμος προσετέθη , or the form of this act: having been ordained through angels, etc. On διατάσσειν νόμον , comp. Hesiod, ἜΡΓ . 274. The simple ΤΆΣΣΕΙΝ ΝΌΜΟΝ is more frequently used, as in Plat. Legg. p. 863 D. It means to ordain a law, that is, to issue it for obedience, not to arrange it for publication (Stölting), so that the angels would be described here as the diaskeuastai of the law,—an idea which has no support anywhere, and would run counter to the view of the directly divine origin of the law (Exo_31:18; Exo_32:16; Deu_9:10). As to the use of the aorist participle in the language of narration, see Hermann, ad Viger. p. 774; Bernhardy, p. 383. The tradition that the divine promulgation of the law took place amidst the ministry of angels, is first found in the LXX., Deu_33:2 (not in the original text); then in Heb_2:2, Act_7:38; Act_7:53, Joseph. Antt. xv. 5. 3, and in the Rabbins, and also in the Samaritan theology. Comp. on Act_7:53; Delitzsch, on Heb_2:2. Because the tradition itself and its antiquity are thus beyond doubt, and there is no warrant for supposing that Paul did not know it or was not likely to adopt it (as, indeed, he adopted other traditional teachings, 1Co_10:4, 2Co_12:2), it is a mere mistaken evasion to explain διά as inter or coram (Calovius, Loesner, Morus), which would have ultimately to be referred to the idea “by the mediation of” (as 2Ti_2:2). The same remark applies to the view which looks upon the ἀγγέλων even as men, like Moses and Aaron (Zeger, and revived by Cassel, d. Mittler e. exeg. Versuch, 1855); Chrysostom left it optional to understand it either of priests or of angels. As to the monstrous amplifications which this tradition of the agency of the angels underwent at the hands of the later Rabbins, see Eisenmenger, entdecktes Judenth. I. p. 309 f. Paul does not look upon the angels as authors of the law (as held by Schulthess, Voigtländer in Keil and Tzschirner’s Anal. IV. p. 139 ff., and Huth, Commentat. Altenb. 1854),—a point which is certain from the whole view taken in biblical history of the law generally as divine (see the apostle’s own designation of the law as νόμος Θεοῦ , Rom_7:22; Rom_7:25), and as ΓΡΑΦΉ (vers. 10, 13, Gal_4:21 f., et al.), and here especially is all the more decidedly indicated by the use of the διά (and not ὙΠΌ ), for every reader in fact conceived of the angels as ministering spirits of God (comp. LXX. Deu_33:2 : ἐκ δεξιῶν αὐτοῦ ἄγγελοι μετʼ αὐτοῦ ), who accompanied the Lord appearing in majesty; and consequently no one could attach any other sense to ΔΙΆ than “ministerio angelorum,” which is clear as the meaning in Heb_2:2 from διὰ τοῦ κυρίου in Gal_3:3.
ἘΝ ΧΕΙΡῚ ΜΕΣΊΤΟΥ [143]] For Moses received the tables of the law from God, and carried them down to the people. Thus in the legislation he was the middle person between the Giver of the law and its recipients; with the tables in his hand, he was God’s envoy to Israel, acting between the two parties. On account of this historical circumstance (Exo_31:18; Exo_32:15), ἐν χειρί is to be understood not merely as a vivid mode of designating the mediation ( áÌÀéÇã ), but quite literally: comp. Exo_32:15; Lev_26:46. In the N.T. the designation of Moses as μεσίτης forms the basis of the expression in Heb_8:6; Heb_9:15; Heb_12:24; and on the subject itself, comp. Act_7:38. This designation does not occur in the O.T. or in the Apocrypha; but by the Rabbins Moses is called mediator ñøñåø , àîöòé , also ùìéç . See Schoettgen, Hor. p. 738 f.; Wetstein, p. 224. Comp. Philo, de vita Mos. II. p. 678 f. A; and on the matter itself, Deu_5:5; also Joseph. Antt. iii. 5. 3. The better known and the more celebrated Moses was as mediator of the law (comp. Aboth R. Nath. i. 1, “Legem, quam Deus Israelitis dedit, non nisi per manus Mosis dedit”), the more decidedly must we reject every interpretation in which the ΜΕΣΊΤΗς —not more precisely defined by Paul, but presumed to have its historical reference universally familiar—is not referred to Moses. This applies not only to the view of most of the Fathers (Origen, Athanasius, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, Chrysostom, Oecumenius, Theophylact; so also Beza, Lyra, Erasmus, Calvin, Pareus, Calovius, and others), who, following 1Ti_2:5, Heb_8:6; Heb_9:15; Heb_12:24, take the Mediator to be Christ,[144] but also to Schmieder’s view (nova interpr. Gal_3:19-20, Numburg. 1826), that an angel is intended—the angel of the law, who, according to Jewish theology, had the special duty of teaching Moses the law. Certainly the Rabbins speak of an angel of the law (he was called Jefifia; see Jalkut Rubeni, f. 107. 3); but this part of their teaching cannot be shown to have existed in the time of the apostles, nor can it find a biblical basis in the passages quoted by Schmieder (Exo_19:19 f., Exo_20:18, Exo_33:11; Num_12:5-8; Deu_5:4 f.; also Exo_33:18-23; Exo_40:35; Deu_33:2; Psa_68:18; Act_7:53; Mal_3:1). See also, in opposition to Schmieder,[145] especially Lücke in the Stud. u. Krit. p. 97 f.
The object for which Paul has added διαταγεὶς … μεσίτου , is not to convey the impression of an inferior, subordinate position held by the law in comparison with that of the gospel or that of the promise, inasmuch as the former was ordained not directly by God, but through angels and a mediator[146] (Luther, Elsner, Wolf, Estius, Semler, Rosenmüller, Tychsen, Flatt, Rückert, Usteri, de Wette, Baur, Ewald, Hofmann, Reithmayr, Hauck, and others; comp. also Olshausen, and Lipsius, Rechtfertigungsl. p. 77; Vogel in the Stud. u. Krit. 1865, p. 530), but to enable the reader to realize the glory of the law in the dignity and formal solemnity of its ordination. So Calvin and others, including Winer, Schott, Baumgarten-Crusius, Wieseler, Matthias; comp. Weiss, bibl. Theol p. 284. It may be decisively urged in favour of the latter view, (1) that, if the mention of the angels was intended to suggest a lower relation in comparison with a higher, this higher relation must have been distinctly expressed (as in Heb_2:2), or at least must have been quite definitely discoverable from the immediate context (by the addition of a μόνον perhaps, or the like). Regarded in themselves, the appearance of angels and the agency of angels (comp. also Gal_1:8) are always conceived as something majestic and glorifying,[147] even in respect to Christ (Mat_24:31; Mat_25:31; Joh_1:25; 1Ti_3:16, et al.), and especially in respect to the law (LXX. Deu_33:2; Act_7:38; Act_7:53), the bestowal of which was one of the high divine distinctions of Israel (Rom_9:4). Just as little can it be said (2) that ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου is a depreciatory statement, for in fact the gospel also is given ἘΝ ΧΕΙΡῚ ΜΕΣΊΤΟΥ ; to which argument the objection cannot be made, that the Mediator of the gospel, as the Son of God, is far more exalted than the mediator of the law: for ἘΝ ΧΕΙΡῚ ΜΕΣΊΤΟΥ does not state at all what kind of mediator it was who intervened in the promulgation of the law, but leaves the dignity or lowliness of his person entirely out of view, and asserts only that a mediator was employed in the giving of the law; so that in respect of this relation regarded by itself there was no qualitative difference between the law and the gospel: both were mediated, given through the hand of a mediator. By way of comparison and contrast with the gospel, ἐν χειρὶ ἀνθρώπου or some such expression must have been used, whereby the mediation of the law would be characterized as inferior to that of the gospel. Lastly, (3) it by no means formed a part of the plan and object of the apostle to depreciate the law as a less divine institution,—a course which, besides being inconsistent with his recognition of the law elsewhere (Rom_7:12-25), would have been even unwise in dealing with zealots for the law; whereas it was in the highest degree appropriate to acknowledge the high dignity of the law as evinced in the majesty and solemn formality of its promulgation, and then to show that it had by no means cancelled the promises. Thus the glory of the law glorified the covenant of promise, while the apostle’s opponents could not find any antagonism to that law. In opposition to these arguments, the appeal to ὁ Θεός , Gal_3:20 (Usteri, Schneckenburger, de Wette), has the less weight, because in ΠΡΟΣΕΤΈΘΗ and ΔΙΑΤΑΓΕΊς (Gal_3:19) God in fact is obviously the acting subject, and the promise also was expressed passively by ἐπήγγελται (without ΘΕΌς ). According to Holsten, z. Evang. d. Paul. u. Petr. p. 299 ff., Paul intends to express “the pneumatic truth,” that, in the purpose of God, the significance of the law in the economy of salvation was to be that of a mediator, viz. between promise and fulfilment. But if this were so, how wonderfully would Paul have concealed his thoughts! He must have said that this mediatorial position of the law exhibited itself in the form of its bestowal; for this in itself, and apart from any other intimation, could in no way be known to the reader, to whom angelic and mediatorial agency presented themselves only as historically familiar attributes of the majesty and divinity of the law. The law itself would not be placed by these attributes in the category of the μεσίτης . Nor is Stölting’s view more worthy of acceptance, who, in ΔΙΑΤΑΓ . ΔΙʼ ἈΓΓΈΛΩΝ , detects the idea: “in order that the Jews might obtain the blessing of Abraham” (Heb_1:14), and explains ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου to mean that the law served as an instrument to the mediator for reconciling discordant parties with one another (and these parties are alleged to have been the Jews and Gentiles). These two ideas, which are only in a very indirect way compatible with the scope of the Pauline teaching as to the relation of the law to the gospel, or with history itself, could not have been found out by the readers, especially after Gal_3:18, and after τῶν παραβάσ . χάριν , and would have needed a more precise explanation in what reference they were to be taken. In unison with the history of the giving of the law, which was familiar to every reader, the two points could only be understood as reminiscences of the historical circumstances in question; and μεσίτης in particular could not be conceived as a reconciling mediator, but only in the sense conveyed in Act_7:38.
[140] On ver. 19, see Stölting, Beiträge z. Exegese d. Paul. Br. 1869, p. 50 ff.
[141] Some unexegetically combine the two explanations, as Bengel: “ut agnoscerentur et invalerescerent.”
[142] Ellendt, Lex. Soph. II. p. 947, appropriately remarks: “ χάριν cum genitivo dictum: in gratiam alicuius, inde alicuius aut hominis aut rei causa significans, quamquam minime semper gratia adsignificatur, quae Ammonii doctrina est, p. 53.” Comp. 1Jn_3:12.
[143] μεσίτης is a word that belongs to the later Greek (Polyb., Lucian, et al.). Comp. Lobeck, ad Phryn. p. 121. It occurs in the LXX only in Job_9:33.
[144] So also very recently Culmann, sum Verständn. der Worte Gal_3:20, Strassb. 1864.
[145] With whom Schneckenburger agrees. See on ver. 20.
[146] Luther, 1538: “Lex est servorum vox, evangelium Domini.” Hofmann: Paul gives his readers to understand that the event of the giving of the law was no fulfilment of the promise (see, however, on ver. 20). Bengel: God committed the law to angels “quasi alienius quiddam et severius.” Buhl confines himself to saying that Paul wished to represent the difference between the mode of revelation in the case of the law and that of the covenant of promise. But the question regarding the purpose of this representation as bearing on the apostle’s argument thus remains unanswered. According to Hilgenfeld, Paul’s intention was to detach as far as possible the origin of the law from the supreme God; and in this respect also he was the precursor of Gnosticism.
[147] Hence we must not say with Schmid, bibl. Theol. II. p. 280, that the intention was to intimate that the giving of the law was not “the absolute normal act” of the divine economy.