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Gal_3:20 down to μὴ γένοιτο , Gal_3:21. “But from the fact that the law was ordained through a mediator, it must not at all be concluded that it is opposed to the promises of God.” The expression just used, ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου , might possibly be turned to the advantage of the law and to the prejudice of the promises, in this way, that it might be said: “Since the idea of a mediator supposes not one subject, to whom his business relates, but more than one, who have to be mutually dealt with, and yet God (who gave the law through a mediator) is one, so that there could not be one God who gave the law and another who gave the promises (for there are not more Gods than one); it might possibly be concluded that, because the law was ordained by God in a different way from the promises,—namely, by the calling in of a mediator acting between the two parties,—the earlier divine mode of justification (that of faith) opened up in the promises was abolished by the law, and instead of it, another and opposite mode of justification (that of the works of the law) was opened up by God.” Paul conceives the possibility of this inference, and therefore brings it forward, not, however, as an objection on the part of opponents, but as his own reflection; hence he expresses the concluding inference, ὁ οὖν νόμος κ . τ . λ ., in an interrogative form, to which he thereupon replies by the disclaimer, μὴ γένοιτο . The explanation of the words, which in themselves are simple enough, is accordingly as follows: “But the mediator—not to leave unnoticed an inference which might possibly be drawn to the prejudice of the promises from the ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου just said—but the mediator, that is, any mediator, does not belong to a single person, but intervenes between two or more; God, on the other hand, is a single person, and not a plurality. Is it now—when these two propositions are applied in concreto to the law and the promises—is it now to be thence inferred that the law, which was given through a mediator, and in which therefore there took part more subjects than one, in point of fact two (namely, God and Israel), between whom the mediator had to deal, is opposed to the divine promises, in which the same one God, who in the case of the law acted through a mediator and so implied two parties, acted directly? God forbid! From this point of difference in the divine bestowal of the law and the promises, by no means is any such conclusion to be arrived at to the prejudice of the latter, as if now, through the law mediatorially given by the one God, another divine mode of justification were to be made valid.” In this view, Gal_3:20 contains two loci communes, from the mutual relation of which in reference to the two concreta under discussion (the law and the promises) in Gal_3:21 a possible inference is supposed to be drawn, and proposed by way of question for a reply. The δέ is in both cases adversative: the first introducing a supposed objection, and the second an incidental point belonging to this objection, the relation of which incidental point to the first proposition strengthens the doubt excited; ὁ μεσίτης denotes the mediator absolutely as genus (“quae multa sunt cunctis in unum colligendis,” Hermann, ad Iph. Aul. p. 15, pref.): ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔστιν is predicate, negativing the ἑνὸς εἶναι as regards the mediator, with emphatic stress laid on the prefixed ἑνός (not on the οὐκ , as Hofmann thinks), and ἑνός is masculine,[148] without requiring anything to be supplied: εἷς ἐστιν is predicate, and ΕἿς , in conformity with the axiom of monotheism here expressed, is used quite in the same purely numerical sense as ἑνός previously. Lastly, in the interrogative inference, Gal_3:21, Ὁ ΝΌΜΟς is used, as the close annexation by ΟὖΝ sufficiently indicates, in precise correlation to Ὁ ΜΕΣΊΤΗς in Gal_3:20 (for the law was given through a mediator, Gal_3:19), and τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ to ᾯ ἘΠΉΓΓΕΛΤΑΙ , Gal_3:19; but the emphasis in this question of Gal_3:21 is laid upon ΚΑΤΆ , for Paul will not allow it to be inferred from the two propositions expressed in Gal_3:20 ( ΜῊ ΓΈΝΟΙΤΟ ), that the law stood in a relation to the promises which was antagonistic to them and opposed to their further validity as regards justification.
The numerous different interpretations of this passage—and it has had to undergo above 250 of them—have specially multiplied in modern times: for the Fathers of the Church pass but lightly over the words which in themselves are clear, without taking into consideration their difficulties in relation to the general scope of the passage,—mostly applying the ὁ δὲ μεσίτης ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔστιν , taken correctly and generally, to Christ,[149] who is the Mediator between God and man, and partly casting side-glances at the opponents of Christ’s divinity (see Chrysostom); although a diversity of interpretation (some referring μεσίτης to Moses, and others to Christ) is expressly mentioned by Oecumenius. Although no special dogmatic interest attached to the passage, nevertheless in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (see Poole’s Synopsis) the variety of interpretations was already such that almost every interpreter of importance (yet, as a rule, without polemical controversy, because the dogmatic element did not come into play) took a way of his own. It became, however, still greater after the middle of the eighteenth century (especially after grammatico-historical exegesis gained ground, but with an abundant intermixture of its philological aberrations), and is even now continually increasing. How often have the most mistaken fancies and the crudest conjectures sought to gain acceptance in connection with our passage, the explanation of which was regarded as a feat of exegetical skill! For a general view of the mass of interpretations, the following works are of service:
Koppe, Exc. VII. p. 128 ff. ed. Galatians 3 : Bonitz, Plurimor. de I. Gal_3:20 sententiae examinatae novaque ejus interpr. tentata, Lips. 1800; also his Spicileg. observatt. ad Gal_3:20, Lips. 1802: Anton, Diss. I. Gal_3:20 critice, historice, et exeg. tract. in Pott’s Sylloge, V. p. 141 ff.: Keil (seven programmes), in his Opusc. I. p. 211 ff.: Winer, Exc. III.: Schott, p. 455 ff.: Wieseler, and de Wette ed. Möller, in loc. It is enough that out of the multitude of various interpretations—omitting the criticism in detail of the earlier views down to Keil[150]—we specify the more recent literature, and adduce the following: 1. Keil, who comes nearest to our view, explains thus (see Opusc. I. p. 365 ff.): “Mediatorem quidem non unius sed duarum certe partium esse, Deum autem, qui Abrahamo beneficii aliquid promiserit, unum modo fuisse; hincque apostolum id a lectoribus suis colligi voluisse, in lege ista Mos. pactum mutuum Deum inter atque populum Israelit. mediatoris opera intercedente initum fuisse, contra vero in promissione rem ab unius tantum (Dei sc., qui solus eam dederit) voluntate pendentem transactam, hincque legi isti nihil plane cum hac rei fuisse, adeoque nec potuisse ea novam illius promissionis implendae conditionem constitui, eoque ipso promissionem hanc omnino tolli.” But (a) to take the second half of the verse not generally, like the first, but historically, as if ἦν was written, is an arbitrary deviation from the parallelism; and (b) the conclusion professedly to be drawn by the reader, hincque legi isti nihil, etc., is quite without warrant, for Paul himself puts as a question in Gal_3:21 the inference which he conceives may be possibly drawn from Gal_3:20. 2. Schleiermacher’s explanation is essentially similar (in Usteri, Lehrbegr. p. 186 ff.): “The mediator of an agreement does not exist where there is only one person, but always presupposes two persons; these were God and the Jewish nation. But God is One in reference to His promises; that is, God therein acts quite freely, unconditionally, independently, and for Himself alone, as One numerically, because it is no agreement between two, but His free gift ( χάρις ). Does the law therefore conflict, etc.?”[151] But in this view (a) the application of Gal_3:20 to the concreta of the law and the promises, which is in fact not made until Gal_3:21, is imported into and anticipated in Gal_3:20. Moreover, (b) εἷς imperceptibly changes from its numerical sense into the idea of aloneness and independence; and (c) the idea of free grace is arbitrarily introduced, and is not expressed by Paul. Nearest to this interpretation of Schleiermacher and Usteri comes Hilgenfeld, whose interpretation,[152] accompanied essentially by the same difficulties, ultimately amounts to the non-Pauline idea, that the position of God as a party in regard to the law is not in harmony with the divine unity (that is, with the divine monarchy). Comp. also Lipsius, Rechtfertigungsl. p. 77, according to whom Paul negatively “strikes the law to the ground as incompatible with the sole agency of God.” But how could Paul desire to strike to the ground the law, which to him was ἅγιος , ἀγαθός , and πνευματικός (Rom_7:12; Rom_7:14)? No, all he desires to show is, that, notwithstanding the diversity of its divine bestowal from the mode of giving the promise, it is not opposed to the promise. 3. Winer: “Non potest μεσίτης cogitari aut fingi, qui sit ἑνός , unius h. e. unius partis: ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἷς ἐστι , Deus est unus, una (altera) tantummodo pars; ita quaenam est altera? gens Israel. Jam si hoc, sponte efficitur, legem Mos. pertinere etiam ad Judaeos, hosque legi isti observandae adstrictos fuisse.”[153] Thus Gal_3:20 contains only a parenthetical idea, Paul having in view to re-establish the dignity of the law, which appeared weakened by τῶν παραβ . χάριν προσετέθη : “Lex Mos. data fuit peccatorum gratia; propterea vero non est, quod quis eam tanquam ista ἐπαγγελίᾳ longe inferiorem contemnat; data enim et ipsa est auctoritate divina
διαταγ . διʼ ἀγγέλων —gentique Hebr. tanquam agendi norma proposita ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτ . ὃς οὐκ ἔστιν ἑνός .” It cannot be urged against Winer, that Paul must necessarily have written ὁ εἷς (see Winer, Gramm. p. 110 [E. T. 144]). But (a) in the logically exact chain of argument there is no indication at all that Gal_3:20 is to be taken as a parenthesis. (b) Since ὁ μεσίτης is subject, ὁ Θεός , which likewise is placed at the beginning of the sentence, may not be arbitrarily understood as predicate. (c) It must have been more precisely indicated by Paul, if it were intended that the first ἐστίν should be understood as the copula of a general judgment, and the second as historical (appears in the giving of the law); for every reader, if he had understood the first half of the verse as a general judgment, would naturally understand the second in like manner. (d) It would not occur to any reader to refer εἷς to a suppressed ὁ ἕτερος : for ἑνός had just been used absolutely in a numerical sense, in which therefore εἷς at once presents itself; and this the more, because the first sentence, by its negative form, has prepared the way for an antithesis to follow. (e) The idea which ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἷς ἐστιν is supposed to indicate: therefore the law is obligatory on the Israelites, conveys something which is so entirely a matter of course, that it could not be made use of at all as an element of the dignity of the law; for the law was, in fact, given to the Israelites, and even to think of that obligation as non-existent would have been incongruous. And (f) even assuming such a superfluous idea, in what a strangely mysterious way would Paul have intimated it! That which he meant to say, he would wholly without reason have concealed, and have given out as it were a riddle. Apart from the unsuitableness of the idea generally, and from the inappropriate εἷς , he must have said: ὁ δὲ Ἰσραὴλ εἷς ἐστιν . 4. Schulthess has sought to vindicate his interpretation (proposed in Keil and Tzschirner’s Anal. II. 3, p. 133 ff.) in his Engelwelt, Engelgesetz und Engeldienst, Zürich 1833, and in de G. Hermanno, enodatore ep. P. ad Gal., Zürich 1835, viz.: “Hic mediator (Moses) non est mediator unius, i.e. communis illius Dei, qui olim Abrahamo spopondit, per eum aliquando gentes beatum iri, et qui est unus, s. communis omnium parens, sed est potius mediator angelorum.”[154] But (a) how erroneous it is to assume that the anarthrous ἑνός should denote the universal God of men, and how alien this reference is to the context! (b) How opposed is the διʼ ἀγγέλων to the notion, that Moses was “mediator angelorum”! (c) How at variance is the idea of the law as the work of angels with the conception throughout the Bible (comp. on Gal_3:19) of the law as the work of God! In how wholly different a way must Paul have spoken of and proved such a paradox, and how frequently would he have reverted to it (especially in the Epistle to the Romans) in his antinomistic discussions! 5. Akin to this, as far as the idea is concerned, is the interpretation of Schmieder (Nova interpr. I. Paul. Gal_3:19 f., Numb. 1826, and in Tholuck’s literar. Anz. 1830, No. 54): “Quivis minister vel multorum est vel unius: atqui mediator non est unius: ergo est multorum minister. Qui multorum est minister, ad quod genus mediator pertinet, non est unius: atqui Deus (absolute) unus est: ergo cum multorum sit mediator, non est Dei minister.” The connection is supposed to be: “Concedo legem per angelos datam esse a Deo, non humana arte inventam, sed eo ipso, quod per angelos ministros, non per Deum aut Dei filium promulgata est, inferior est evangelio.”[155] This interpretation is objectionable, (a) in a general point of view, because it rests wholly on the erroneous view that μεσίτου in Gal_3:19 applies not to Moses, but to the angelus mediator; (b) because Paul could not have expressed so peculiar an antinomistic argument more obscurely or more enigmatically than by thus omitting the essential points; (c) because the idea of μεσίτης by no means implies that the ΜΕΣΊΤΗς is the “minister multorum:” he may be commissioned as well by one as by many, as, in fact, Christ was commissioned as a μεσίτης by One, viz. by God. See also, in opposition to Schmieder, Lücke in the Stud. u. Krit. 1828, p. 95 ff.; Winer, Exc. III. p. 171 ff. 6. Steudel, in Bengel’s Archiv I. p. 124 ff., supposes that Gal_3:19 is an opponent’s question: “To what purpose then serves the law? Was it bestowed merely somehow as an additional gift on account of transgressions (in order to be transgressed), until the seed should come to whom the promise applied? And yet was it made known through angels, and by the ministry of a mediator?” To which Paul answers, “Certainly through the ministry of a mediator; only he was not the mediator of an united seed (of the σπέρματος τῶν πιστεύοντων , Gal_3:16), but God is one (not another for the Gentiles).” But (a) there is nothing that indicates any such division of the passage into dialogue; and (b) how strange it would be that Paul should have grasped, and furnished a reply to, nothing but the last part of the opponent’s question, ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου , which, moreover, would be only a subordinate part of it! (c) The article must be added to ἑνός , if it is to apply to the ΣΠΈΡΜΑ already spoken of (as assumed also by Jatho); but no supplement whatever to ἑνός is suggested by the context;[156] and if τοῦ ἑνὸς σπέρματος were read, then, according to Gal_3:16, it would mean not the body of Christians, but Christ Himself.[157] (d) ἑνός and εἷς would be taken in different senses: united and one.[158] 7. Sack (in the Tüb. Zeitschr. 1831, I. p. 106 f.) supposes that Paul avails himself of the idea of a mediator to limit the recognition of the law, which perhaps some Jewish Christians were disposed to assert to an exaggerated extent, and says: “The mediator, however, is not of one kind, but God is One and the same. For us Christians there is certainly another mediator than Moses; but God, the God in both Testaments, is nevertheless One and the same.” But it is obvious that ἑνός ἐστιν cannot mean unius generis est, and it is equally evident that the clause, “for us Christians there is certainly,” etc., is arbitrarily brought in. See also Schneckenburger, Beitr. p. 187 f., and (in opposition to Steudel, Kern, and Sack) Winer, Zeitschr. f. wissensch. Theol. II. 1, p. 31 ff. 8. Hermann: “Interventor non est unius (i. e. interventor ubi est, duos minimum esse oportet, inter quos ille interveniat); Deus autem unus est: ergo apud Deum non cogitari potest interventor; esset enim is, qui intercederet inter Deum et Deum, quod absurdum est.” And the connection is: “Id agebat P. ut ostenderet, legem Mosis, quae nihil neque cum promissione Abrahamo data neque cum praesente effectione promissionis commune haberet, dumtaxat interim valuisse, jam autem non amplius valere. Rationem reddit hanc, quod superaddita sit (ideo προσετέθη dixit), eoque non pertineat ad testamentum, cui non liceat quidquam addi; deinde quod non, sicut testamentum illud, ab ipso Deo condita et data, sed disposita per angelos allataque sit manu interventoris: atqui interventori, quod interventor non sit unius, non esse locum apud Deum, qui unus sit, utpote testator, cujus unius ex voluntate nemine intercedente haereditatem capiat haeres.” But (a) it could not be expected that the reader should derive from Gal_3:20 the idea that no mediator is conceivable in the case of God on account of His oneness; nor could it be so conceived by Paul himself, for, in fact, with the one God a mediator may certainly have a place,—not, however, “inter Deum et Deum,” into which absurdity no one could fall, unless Paul so expressed it, but inter Deum et homines, in which office the history of the theocracy showed so many mediators and at last Christ Himself. (b) The question in Gal_3:21 ( οὖν ), with the answer expressive of horror, ΜῊ ΓΈΝΟΙΤΟ , presupposes that the subject-matter of this question—consequently an antagonistic relation of the law to the promises—might possibly (although quite unduly) be derived from Gal_3:20. But according to Hermann, Paul in Gal_3:19-20 has already proved that an antagonism of the law to the promises does not exist, that the law was no longer valid, and had nothing at all in common with the promises. So, in a logical point of view, the question in Gal_3:21, ὁ οὖν νόμος κ . τ . λ ., could not be asked, nor could the answer ΜῊ ΓΈΝΟΙΤΟ be made. (c) It may, besides, be urged against Hermann, that not only is διʼ ἀγγ . ἐν χειρὶ μεσ . regarded as lowering the authority of the law, but a quite undue stress is also laid upon ΠΡΟΣΕΤΈΘΗ ; for in Gal_3:19 the emphasis lies on ΤῶΝ ΠΑΡΑΒ . ΧΆΡΙΝ . 9. Matthies (as in substance also Rinck, Lucubr. crit. p. 172 ff., and in the Stud. u. Krit. 1834, p. 309 ff.) interprets: “But the mediator … does not relate to one, for his nature is in fact divided or disunited, since he is placed between two sides or parties opposed to one another; and therefore in connection with him we cannot think of unity, but only of duality, or of the variance subsisting between two parties; but God is One, comprehends in Himself nothing but unity, so that His nature contains no variance or disunion.” Thus also, in the main, de Wette,[159] and among the older expositors Jac. Cappellus. But the simple numerical conception of unity is thus arbitrarily transformed into the philosophical idea, and the contrast of plurality is turned into the contrast of disunion. How could a reader discover in ὁ Θεὸς εἷς ἐστιν anything else than the popular doctrine of Monotheism? 10. Schott: “Mediator quidem non uni tantum (eidemque immutabili) addictus est homini s. parti, i. e. in quavis causa humana, quae mediatore indiget, duae certe adsunt partes, quibus μεσίτης inserviat, sive res inter duos tantum homines singulos transigatur, sive multitudo sit ingens eorum, qui alterutram vel utramque partem constituant (v. c. populus) … ubi plures imo multi ejusdem foederis participes sunt et fiunt (praesertim ubi maxima est singulorum vicissitudo, dum mortuis succedunt posteri), facile etiam mutatis animorum consiliis atque propositis, foedus mutatur aut tollitur, μεσίτη cujus ope constitutum fuerat haud impediente … proinde ex eo quidem, quod lex Sinaitica ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου promulgata est (Gal_3:19), non sequitur auctoritatem ei competere perpetuam [his verbis P. corrigere voluit perversam eorum opinionem, qui in defendenda legis auctoritate perpetua valitura ad personam Mosis mediatoris provocarent] … attamen Deus
est unus, qui semper idem manet Deus immutabilis, foedus legislationis Sinaiticae non fuit humanae, sed divinae auctoritatis, neque ab arbitrio hominum, sed a voluntate Dei pendebat immutabilis. His perpendendis quaestio excitabatur (Gal_3:21), an forte haec legislatio Sinait. auctoritate divina insignis ipso Deo jubente promissionem Abrahamo datam ejusmodi limitibus circumscribere (mutare) voluerit, ut non amplius esset promissio, cujus eventus liberae tantum Dei gratiae adnecteretur.” How much is supplied by the expositor in this interpretation so copiously provided with modifying clauses! But it is decidedly erroneous, on account of the sense of εἷς and ἙΝΌς being changed into the idea of immutabilis (for which Schott should not have appealed to Rom_3:30, Php_1:27); and also because the proposition ὁ δὲ μεσίτης ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔστιν is limited to causae humanae, and yet the inference is supposed to be therein conveyed that the Sinaitic legislation is not always valid. Paul assuredly could never have thus illogically corrected the zealots for the law, and then in the very same breath have set aside the inference by attamen Deus est unus. 11. Gurlitt (in the Stud. u. Krit. 1837, p. 805 ff.; 1843, p. 715 ff.) refers ἑνός to the Gentile Christians, as one of the two divisions of the σπέρμα Ἀβρ .: “The law was given through angels and through a mediator, and God indeed is throughout only One; what proceeds from Him, therefore, demands in every case equal recognition. It must nevertheless be taken into consideration, that the mediator is no mediator of those who were previously Gentiles, and that therefore the law was not destined for the latter by God Himself.” But, apart from the fact that in this view of ἑνός there must have been previous mention of a twofold posterity of Abraham and ΤΟῦ ἙΝΌς must have been here used, and not to mention that the ἙΝΌς and ΕἿς are not taken as alike in sense, the interpretation must be at once pronounced decidedly wrong, because it depends upon the erroneous view that the ΣΠΈΡΜΑ , Gal_3:16; Gal_3:19, means not merely Christ Himself, but also the corpus mysticum of Christ. 12. Olshausen, taking ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἷς ἐστιν as: God is one or a single one, and consequently only one party, explains it thus: “Mediation presupposes a state of separation, and there can be no mediation in the case of one; since God is the one party, there must also have been a second, viz. men, who were separated from God. In the gospel it is otherwise: in Christ, the representative of the Church, all are one; all separations and distinctions are done away in Him” (Gal_3:28). Thus Paul, in order to call attention to the inferiority of the law to the gospel, gives a cursory, parenthetic explanation as to the idea of a mediator. This is (1) unsuitable to the context; for in Gal_3:19, διαταγ . διʼ ἀγγέλων ἐν χειρὶ μεσ . has set forth the glory of the giving of the law. (2) The idea: and consequently also only one party, is quite arbitrarily added to ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἷς ἐστιν . (3) In like manner, all the rest which is supposed properly to constitute the sense of the words (“men, who were separated from God;” “in the gospel it is otherwise,” etc.) is the pure invention of the expositor. 13. Matthias,[160] correctly explaining the first half of the verse, sees in Ὁ ΔῈ ΘΕῸς ΕἿς ἘΣΤΙΝ the minor premiss of an enthymeme, which has to be completed by supplying the major premiss and conclusion: “If God is one of those two parties, the law, although ordained by angels, is nevertheless an ordinance of God; but God is this; and consequently the law, etc., is an ordinance, not of angels, but of God.” Against this interpretation we may urge that the special connection with the point διαταγεὶς διʼ ἀγγέλων is not conveyed by the text; that the explanation of εἷς by alter is contrary to the context; that Gal_3:21 would be unsuitably subjoined from a logical point of view (see on κατά , Gal_3:21); and lastly, that the idea of the law being an ordinance of God was one altogether undisputed and not needing any proof. 14. Ewald (comp. also his Jahrb. IV. p. 109) assumes that Paul with this “quick flash of thought” intended to say: “The idea of the mediator necessarily presupposes two different living beings between whom, as being at variance or separated, mediation has to take place; because the mediator of one is not, does not exist at all, is an impossibility. But since God is in strictness only One, and does not consist of two inwardly different Gods or of an earlier and later God, it is evident that Moses as mediator did not mediate between the God of the promise and the God of the law, and thereby mix up the law with the promise and cancel the promise by the later law; but he only mediated (as is well known) between God and the people of that time.” But even this interpretation, the thought of which would probably have been expressed most simply by Paul writing ὁ δὲ μεσίτης Θεοῦ ἐστιν , ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἷς ἐστιν , is liable to the objections urged above (under 8) against Hermann’s explanation. 15. According to Hofmann (compare also his Schrifitbew. II. 2, p. 55 ff.), the first half of the verse is intended to affirm that, where there is only one to whom something is to be given, there is no room for mediatorship; such an individual recipient may receive it directly. Now, as the promise ran to Abraham’s posterity as an unity, it is evident that the giving of the law, just because it was destined for a plurality of individuals, could be no fulfilment of the promise. The second half of the verse, which with δέ passes on to the divine side of the event, places the unity of God in contradistinction to the plurality of angels; that which comes to men through the latter must be of a different kind from the promised gift, which the One was to give to the One—the one God to the one Christ. Thus on this side also it is clear that the giving of the law was not the fulfilment of the promise, but was only ordained for the time, until Christ should come. But (a) all this artificial interpretation must at once fall to the ground, because it conceives ἑνός to be opposed to a plurality of recipient subjects; for it is not true that the bestowal through a mediator presupposes such a plurality, seeing that it may take place just as well with one as with, many recipients. (b) It is incorrect that the unity of God is placed in contrast with the plurality of angels (which is not even marked, by πολλῶν ἀγγ . or the like): it stands in contrast to the ἙΝῸς ΟὐΚ ἜΣΤΙΝ , and it is untrue that the “mediateness of the giving involved its taking place through many”—just as if the mediate giving could not with equal fitness take place through one, as in fact it has very often been given by God through one! (c) Paul’s intention is, not to show that the giving of the law was not the fulfilment of the promise, but, as is clearly evident from Gal_3:21, to show that the law was not opposed to the promise.—16. Wieseler: “Moses as mediator, however ( δέ being restrictive), has reference not merely to God (but also to men): for a mediator from his nature has not reference to one (but to two parties); but God is one. Consequently the failure of that mediatorial office of Moses was based on the fact, that he as mediator had to do not only with God, but also with men. The fault does not lie with the faithfulness of God, who appointed him as mediator,—an idea which cannot be entertained,—but rather with the action of men,’ etc. Against this interpretation it may be urged, not only that the words εἷς ἐστιν imperceptibly acquire the sense: is only one of the two parties, which Paul would certainly have been able to express otherwise than by the confession of monotheism (Deu_6:4; Jam_2:19; Rom_3:30; 1Co_8:4; 1Co_8:6, et al.), but also that the idea of a failure on the part of the law-giving, and of the blame due for it, was remote from the apostle’s mind, and would here be unsuitable to the divine purpose expressed in Gal_3:19. The law became to men the δύναμις τῆς ἁμαρτίας (1Co_15:56); but this falls to be regarded not as a failure on the part of the law-giving, but as a necessary stage in the development of the divine plan of salvation (Gal_3:22 ff.; Romans 7). 17. According to Stölting (Beiträge z. Exeg. d. Paul. Br. 1869, p. 86 ff.), ἑνός and ΕἿς are to be taken in the sense of absolute unity. Gal_3:20 is supposed to contain a syllogism with a suppressed conclusion: viz., A mediator does not belong to one; but God is one; consequently a mediator does not belong to God. Accordingly God is absolutely excluded from any mediation through the law: the objects of this mediation are on the one hand the Jews, and on the other hand their contrast, the Gentiles; and the law was to unite these two dissociated parts, which it effected by showing that the Jews were in need of redemption, and by making the Gentiles capable of redemption (Rom_3:22 f., 29 f.). The mediator, with the law in his hand, is supposed to have placed himself between Jews and Gentiles, and to have made both equal through the law,—an equalization which does not take place with God, as there is not one God of the Jews and another God of the Gentiles, between whom mediation might occur, but only a single God, who treats Jews and Gentiles with equal justice, being, as He is, a single Person without opponent, an absolute unity. Even this acutely carried out interpretation is not tenable: for (a) the reader finds no indication in the text that ἑνός and ΕἿς are to be taken in the pregnant sense of absoluteness; and Paul, in order to be understood, must at least have written, in the second half of the verse, something like ὁ δὲ Θεὸς ὁ ὄντως εἷς (or Ὁ ἉΠΛῶς ΕἿς ) ἘΣΤΙΝ . Nor (b) is it correct that absolute unity excludes the being an object of mediation; because the absolutely one God has allowed mediation to take place between Himself and man, not only through Christ, but also in the ancient history of salvation, through His ministers (the angels, Moses, and the prophets), (c) There is nothing in the words of the passage to make us think of the Jews and Gentiles as objects of the mediation; since the law is rather to be recognised as the μεσότοιχον (Eph_2:14) between the two, which had to be removed by Christ in order to their union. To the national consciousness, not only of the apostle, but also of his readers, God and Israel could alone occur as the parties reconciled with one another through the μεσίτης . (d) It is not correct that the conclusion drawn from Gal_3:20 is not expressed. It is expressed in Gal_3:21, and rejected as erroneous.
Lastly, Rückert confines himself to the correct translation of the words, “The mediator does not refer to one (but always to more than one); but God is one;” from which is to be concluded, “Therefore the mediator does not refer to God alone, but also to others.” He, however, at the same time confesses that he does not see any way, in which these propositions and this conclusion are to be connected with the foregoing passage, so as to yield any relevant and lucid thought. While Rückert has thus despaired of an explanation on his own part, he has not questioned the title of the passage to receive an explanation. But this course, to which Michaelis was already inclined,[161] has been actually adopted by Lücke (in the Stud. u. Krit. 1828, p. 83 ff.), who holds Gal_3:20 to be a gloss, which had originally served, on the one hand, to explain the conclusion of Gal_3:19 (the mediator was interpreted as applying to Christ, and it was desirable to point out that this mediator belonged not merely to the Jews, but also to the Gentiles), and, on the other, to give a reason for the beginning of Gal_3:21. But the witnesses in favour of its genuineness[162] are so decisively unanimous, that no other passage can appear better attested. Lücke only makes use of an argumentum a silentio,—namely, that Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Origen do not cite our verse (Clement of Alexandria has it at least once, in the Theodot. ed. Col. p. 797 A); but little stress can be laid on this, when we consider how lightly in general the Fathers were wont to pass over the words in question, without even discerning in them any special importance or difficulty.
[148] Not neuter, as Holsten takes it, although ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἷς ἐστιν which follows can only indicate the masculine. Holsten, notwithstanding all his subtle acuteness, errs also in making the law itself, in opposition to the tenor of the words, to be the μεσίτης (see on ver. 19), and in explaining the predicate εἷς attached to ὁ Θεός in the sense of the immutability of the divine will; holding that the law stands, not in unity with the promise, but between the two component parts of the latter (the giving of the promise and its fulfilment), and that God’s one saving will reveals itself in the promise and its two parts. See, in opposition to Holsten, Hilgenfeld in his Zeitschr. 1860, p. 230 ff.
[149] Jerome, however, explains the passage as referring to the two natures of Christ: “manu mediatoris potentiam et virtutem ejus debemus accipere, qui cum secundum Deum unum sit ipse cum Patre ( ὁ δὲ Θεός , as God), secundum mediatoris officium ( ὁ δὲ μεσίτης ) alius ab eo intelligitur” ( ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔστιν )! Theodoret understands ὁ δὲ μεσίτης definitely of Moses, who intervened between God and the people ( ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ), but holds that ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἷς ἐστιν affirms that it is one and the same God who first gave the promises to Abraham, then gave the law, and now has shown the goal ( τὸ πέρας ) of the promises. Μεσίτης is explained as referring to Moses by Gennadius in Oecumenius (p. 742 C); on the other hand, Chrysostom and Theophylact take as a basis the conclusion, ὥστε καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς δύο τινῶν ἐστι μεσίτης , Θεοῦ δηλαδὴ καὶ ἀνθρώπων (Theophylact).—Among modern Catholic expositors, Windischmann and Bisping have closely followed Jerome in the reference of the second half of the verse to the two natures of Christ. The meaning is supposed to amount to this, that the promise was directly addressed from God to God (i.e. to Christ), and the passage is thus a locus classicus in favour of the divinity of Christ. Not so Reithmayr, who in substance follows the interpretation of Theodoret.
[150] Luther, 1519: “Ex nomine mediatoris concludit, nos adeo esse peccatores, ut legis opera satis esse nequeant. Si, inquit, lege justi estis, jam mediatore non egetis, sed neque Deus, cum sit ipse unus, secum optime conveniens. Inter duos ergo quaeritur mediator, inter Deum et hominem, ac si dicat; impiissima sit ingratitudo si mediatorem rejicitis, et Deo, qui unus est, remittitis,” etc. Erasmus in his Paraphr., understanding Christ as referred to (in the Annotat. he says nothing at all about the passage): “Atqui conciliator, qui intercedit, inter plures intercedat oportet; nemo enim secum ipse dissidet. Deus autem unus est, quocum dissidium erat humano generi. Proinde tertio quopiam erat opus, qui naturae utriusque particeps utramque inter sese reconciliaret, Deum placans sua morte, et homines sua doctrina ad verum Dei cultum pelliciens.” Calvin also, explaining the passage of Christ, considers: “diversitatem hic notari inter Judaeos et gentiles. Non unius ergo mediator est Christus, quia diversa est conditio eorum, quibuscum Deus, ipsius auspiciis, paciscitur, quod ad externam personam. Verum P. inde aestimandum Dei foedus negat, quasi secum pugnet aut varium sit pro hominum diversitate.” Castalio gives the sense of the words correctly: “Sequester autem internuntius est duorum, qui inter sese aliquid paciscuntur: atqui Deus unus est, non duo,” but then draws therefrom the strange inference: “itaque necesse est Mosen Dei et Israelitarum internuntium fuisse, nec enim potest Dei et Dei internuntius fuisse, cum duo Dei non sint;” and from this again he infers that both parties had thus promised something, God promising life and the Israelites obedience; and lastly, with equal arbitrariness: “nunc quoniam legi parere nequeunt, supplicio sunt obnoxii.” Grotius (comp. Beza): “Non solet sequester se interponere inter eos, qui unum sunt ( ἑνός , neuter), i.e. bene conveniunt; Deus sibi constat,” from which he arbitrarily infers: “quare nisi homines se mutassent, nunquam opus fuisset mediatore neque tum neque nunc.” Comp. Schoettgen, who, however, assumes the first part of the verse to be an objection on the part of the Jews, and ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἷς ἐστιν to be Paul’s reply. Wolf, although referring μεσίτου in ver. 19 to Moses, yet in ver. 20 understands μεσίτης of Christ: “Ille vero mediator (qui imprimis hic respiciendus est) unius non est (sed duorum), quorum unus est Deus.” Clarke, who understands μεσίτ . in ver. 19 as referring to Christ: “Quilibet vero μεσίτης est duarum partium. Deus est una pars. Ergo quorum erit Christus mediator nisi Dei et hominum?” Bengel discovers the syllogism: “Unus non utitur mediatore illo (i. e. quisquis est unus, is non prius sine mediatore, deinde idem per mediatorem agit); atqui Deus est unus (non est alius Deus ante legem, alius deinceps, sed unus idemque Deus); ergo mediator Sinaiticus non est Dei, sed legis, Dei autem promissio.” Wetstein: “Sicut quando arbitrum vel medium vel sequestrum dicimus, intelligimus ad officium ejus pertinere, ut non uni tantum partium faveat, sed utrique sese aequum praebeat; ita etiam quando Deum dicimus, intelligimus non Judaorum solum, sed omnium hominum patrem. Unde statim colligitur, Mosen, qui inter Judaeos solum et Deum medius fuit, non veri nominis medium fuisse, sed a bonitate Dei expectari debere alium, totius humani generis negotium gerentem, i. e. Christum.” Michaelis (following Locke): “But this law cannot, in respect to the Gentiles, alter anything in the former covenant of God. For one of the parties who had a share in this covenant, namely the Gentiles, had not empowered Moses as a mediator and knew nothing of him; but God Himself is only one party, and cannot alter His covenant through a medi