Heinrich Meyer Commentary - Hebrews 4:12 - 4:13

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Heinrich Meyer Commentary - Hebrews 4:12 - 4:13


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This Chapter Verse Commentaries:

Heb_4:12-13. Warning demonstration of the necessity for compliance with the exhortation uttered Heb_4:11.[67]

ΛΌΓΟς ΤΟῦ ΘΕΟῦ ] the word of God. By these words we have not, with many Fathers, Oecumenius, Theophylact, Thomas Aquinas, Lyra, Cajetan, Clarius, Justinian, Cornelius a Lapide, Jac. Cappellus, Gomar, Owen, Heinsius, Alting, Clericus, Cramer, Ewald, al., the hypostatic word of God, or Christ, as the second person of the Godhead. For although this mode of designating Christ in the case of the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, according to Heb_1:1-3, and on account of the points of contact he displays with Philo, can present nothing strange in itself, yet the expression was too unusual for it to be employed and understood without further indication, in this special sense, where the connection did not even lead up to it. Moreover, the predicates ἐνεργής , τομώτερος κ . τ . λ ., and ΚΡΙΤΙΚΌς (instead of ΚΡΙΤΉς ), seem better suited to an impersonal than a personal subject. The majority understand ΛΌΓΟς ΤΟῦ ΘΕΟῦ of the word of God, as proclaimed and as preserved in Scripture. They refer it then either to the gospel (Cameron, Grotius, Wittich, Akersloot, Ebrard, al.), or to the threatenings of God (Schlichting, Michaelis, Abresch, Böhme, Heinrichs, al.), or, finally, to the threatenings and promises of God taken together (Beza, Schulz, Bisping, al.). λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ is to be understood quite generally: “that which God speaks,” as, indeed, the whole proposition, Heb_4:12-13, contains a general sentence. But that “that which God speaks” was then, in its application to the case here specially coming under notice, the call to receptivity of heart repeatedly made by God through the psalmist, and the exclusion from His ΚΑΤΆΠΑΥΣΙς threatened in the event of obstinate disobedience and unbelief, was for the reader self-evident from the connection.

The word of God is characterized in progressive enhancement. It is called ΖῶΝ , living, on account of its inner vital power (not on account of its everlasting, intransitory continuance, Schlichting, Abresch; nor as “cibus ac nutrimentum, quod hominum animis vitam conservat,” Carpzov; nor, in opposition to the rigid lifeless law, Ebrard); ἐνεργής , effective, on account of its asserting itself, manifesting itself vigorously in the outer world. The latter is the consequence of the former, and both in this connection refer to the power of punishing its contemners, which is inherent in the word of God.

The penetrating sharpness of this power of punishment is described in ascending gradation in the sequel.

καὶ τομώτερος ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν μάχαιραν δίστομον ] and more trenchant than every (any) two-edged sword. ὑπέρ after a comparative (Luk_16:8; Jdg_11:25, LXX. Cod. Vaticanus), like ΠΑΡΆ , Heb_1:4. ΜΆΧΑΙΡΑ ΔΊΣΤΟΜΟς , a sword with twofold mouth, i.e. with an edge on both sides ( ἀμφοτέρωθεν ὀξεῖα ). The same expression in the LXX. Jdg_3:16; Pro_5:4. Comp. ῬΟΜΦΑΊΑ ΔΊΣΤΟΜΟς , Rev_1:16; Rev_2:12; LXX. Psa_149:6; Sir_21:3. Similarly, Eurip. Helen. 989: ἐμὸν πρὸς ἧπαρ ὦσαι δίστομον ξίφος τόδε ; Orest. 1309: δίπτυχα , δίστομα φάσγανα .

The proof for the statement: ΤΟΜΏΤΕΡΟς ὙΠῈΡ ΠᾶΣΑΝ ΜΆΧΑΙΡΑΝ ΔΊΣΤΟΜΟΝ , is contained in the words: ΚΑῚ ΔΙΪΚΝΟΎΜΕΝΟς ἌΧΡΙ ΜΕΡΙΣΜΟῦ ΨΥΧῆς ΚΑῚ ΠΝΕΎΜΑΤΟς , ἉΡΜῶΝ ΤΕ ΚΑῚ ΜΥΕΛῶΝ ] and piercing to the separating of soul and spirit, joints as well as marrow. μερισμός denotes the action of separating, and the separating subject is the word of God. Wrongly does Schlichting (comp. also Böhme) take it locally, or as reflexive: to the secret spot where soul and spirit separate. Such construction is to be rejected, as otherwise the clause following would have also to be explained in like manner: where joints and marrow separate. Joints and marrow, however, not being, in the human organization, things coming into direct contact, the thought would be inappropriate, whether we understand ἁρμῶν τε καὶ μυελῶν in the literal or non-literal sense. Schlichting, to be sure, will make ἉΡΜῶΝ ΤΕ ΚΑῚ ΜΥΕΛῶΝ no longer dependent upon ΜΕΡΙΣΜΟῦ , but take it as co-ordinate with ΜΕΡΙΣΜΟῦ (“… ut gladius iste penetrare dicatur ad loca in homine abditissima, etiam illuc, ubi anima cum spiritu connectitur et ab eo dividitur, itemque ubi sunt membrorum compages et medullae”). But for this distinction the repetition of ἌΧΡΙ before ἉΡΜῶΝ would have been necessary. An entire failure, finally, is also the method proposed by Hofmann (Schriftbew. I. 2 Aufl. p. 297, and likewise still in his Comm. p. 192), in order to preserve the local acceptation, in making ψυχῆς καὶ πνεύματος dependent on ἉΡΜῶΝ ΤΕ ΚΑῚ ΜΥΕΛῶΝ : “to the point at which it dissects and dissolves both joints and marrow of the inner life, the secret ligaments of its connection and the innermost marrow of its existence.” For then the readers would be required to understand an arrangement of the words which has not, as Hofmann thinks, perhaps “its parallel” in Heb_6:1-2, but which is, on the contrary, altogether impossible, on account of the addition of ΜΕΡΙΣΜΟῦ already to ΨΥΧῆς ΚΑῚ ΠΝΕΎΜΑΤΟς , and therefore nowhere finds its analogon in the N. T., not to say in the Epistle to the Hebrews. All four words: ΨΥΧῆς , ΠΝΕΎΜΑΤΟς , ἉΡΜῶΝ , and ΜΥΕΛῶΝ , depend upon ΜΕΡΙΣΜΟῦ , and not a dividing of the soul from the spirit, of joinings or joints from, the marrow, is intended, nor yet a dividing of the soul and spirit from joints and marrow (Böhme), but a dividing of the soul, the spirit, etc., each in itself is meant. The two last substantives, however, are not co-ordinate to the two first (Calvin, Beza, Cameron, Storr, Delitzsch, al.), but subordinate. For ψυχή and ΠΝΕῦΜΑ , which are distinguished from each other as characterizing respectively the lower sensuous life and the higher life of the spirit, here set forth without any more special limitation the inner side of human life generally, in opposition to the ΣῶΜΑ or body, which latter alone an earthly sword is able to pierce, and ἉΡΜΟΊ ΤΕ ΚΑῚ ΜΥΕΛΟΊ is not to be understood of the joints and marrow of the body,[68] but of the ligaments and marrow of the ψυχή and πνεῦμα , is thus a figurative expression to denote the innermost, most hidden depth of the rational life of man. In such transferred signification μυελός is used also with the classics. Comp. Themist. Orat. 32, p. 357: ( ὀδύνη ) εἰσδεδυκυῖα εἰς αὐτόν που τὸν μυελὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ; Eurip. Hippol. 255 f.: χρῆν γὰρ μετρίας εἰς ἀλλήλους φιλίας θνητοὺς ἀνακίρνασθαι καὶ μὴ πρὸς ἄκρον μυελὸν ψυχῆς . ἁρμός , however, a fastening together, uniting, joint, could likewise he employed metaphorically, inasmuch as it receives its signification as joint of the human body only from the addition of τοῦ σώματος or from the connection, but elsewhere occurs in the most varied combinations and relations. Comp. e.g. ἁρμὸς θύρας , Dionys. Hal. Heb_5:7; ἁρμοὶ λιθῶν , Sir_27:2, al.

It is, moreover, worthy of notice that Philo also ascribes to his divine Logos a like cutting and severing power. He calls the same τομεὺς τῶν συμπάντων , which God has whetted to the most piercing sharpness, which on that account not only separates all sensuous things and penetrates to the atoms, but even divides the supra-sensuous, separating the soul into the rational and irrational, the reason into the true and false, the perception into the clear and the obscure. Comp. especially, Quis rerum divinarum haeres. p. 499 (with Mangey, I. p. 491): Εἶτʼ ἐπιλέγει · Διεῖλεν αὐτὰ μέσα [Gen_15:10] τὸ τίς οὐ προσθείς , ἵνα τὸν ἀδίδακτον ἐννοῇς θεὸν τέμνοντα τάς τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ πραγμάτων ἑξῆς ἁπάσας ἡρμόσθαι καὶ ἡνῶσθαι δοκούσας φύσεις τῷ τομεῖ τῶν συμπάντων αὐτοῦ λόγῳ · ὄς , εἰς τὴν ὀξυτάτην ἀκονηθεὶς ἀκμήν , διαιρῶν οὐδέποτε λήγει τὰ αἰσθητὰ πάντα · ἐπειδὰν δὲ μέχρι τῶν ἀτόμων καὶ λεγομένων ἀμερῶν διεξέλθῃ , πάλιν ἀπὸ τούτων τὰ λόγῳ θεωρητὰ εἰς ἀμυθήτους καὶ ἀπεριγράφους μοίρας ἄρχεται διαιρεῖν οὗτος τομεύς Ἕκαστον οὖν τῶν τριῶν διεῖλε μέσον , τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν εἰς λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον , τὸν δὲ λόγον εἰς ἀληθές τε καὶ ψεῦδος , τὴν δὲ αἴσθησιν εἰς καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν καὶ ἀκατάληπτον .

Ibid. p. 500 (I. p. 492): Οὕτως θεὸς ἀκονησάμενος τὸν τομέα τῶν συμπάντων αὐτοῦ λόγον διαιρεῖ τήν τε ἄμορφον καὶ ἄποιον τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν , καὶ τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀποκριθέντα τέσσαρα τοῦ κόσμου στοιχεῖα , etc.

Comp. also de Cherubim, p. 112 f. (with Mangey, I. p. 144), where Philo finds in the φλογίνη ῥομφαία , Gen_3:24, a symbol of the Logos, and then observes with regard to Abraham: Οὐχ ὁρᾷς , ὅτι καὶ Ἀβραὰμ σοφός , ἡνίκα ἤρξατο κατὰ θεὸν μετρεῖν πάντα καὶ μηδὲν ἀπολείπειν τῷ γεννητῷ , λαμβάνει τῆς φλογίνης ῥομφαίας (i.e. of the divine Logos) μίμημα , πῦρ καὶ μάχαιραν [Gen_22:6] διελεῖν καὶ καταφλέξαι τὸ θνητὸν ἀφʼ ἑαυτοῦ γλιχόμενος , ἴνα γυμνῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ μετάρσιος πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀναπτῇ .

καὶ κριτικὸς ἐνθυμήσεων καὶ ἐννοιῶν καρδίας ] and qualified to take cognizance of, or to judge (wrongly Heinrichs, Kuinoel, al.: to condemn), the dispositions and thoughts of the heart.

ἐνθυμήσεων ] Mat_9:4; Mat_12:25; Act_17:29.

ἐννοιῶν ] 1Pe_4:1.

[67] Ebrard’s commentary here too abounds in quixotic caprice, such as disowns all linguistic basis. According to Ebrard, the preceding warning of ver. 11 is yet further enforced, ver. 12, by the reminder that in our case (!) that excuse (!) is removed, which, according to ver. 2 (!), still existed in the case of the contemporaries of Moses. For us nothing is wanting (!) on the part of the word of God; for (!) the word of God is living, powerful, penetrating into the soul; if we (!) should fall victims to unbelief, the guilt would rest upon ourselves alone (!). According to Ebrard, the genitive τοῦ θεοῦ forms an opposition to the first person plural σπουδάσωμεν (!), and ver. 12 a supplementary material opposition to ver. 2 (!). That “this profound and delicate connection has hitherto been overlooked by all expositors” is natural enough. Even after Ebrard has discovered it, it will still remain unnoticed.

[68] So Delitzsch still explains, who represents the author as giving expression to the grossly sensuous conception, regardless whether such conception is in harmony with the author’s refined mode of thought,—that the word of God points out “to man the antitheistic forces of his bodily nature, which has become wholly, and to all the joints and marrow (cerebral marrow, spinal marrow, etc.), a seat of sin and death!” The expression is supposed to adapt itself, without itself becoming figurative, to the figure of the μάχαιρα . It is presupposed that the word of God has already accomplished its work of dissection (!) to the skeleton, with its bones and sinews (!), or at least presupposed that all, so far as this, is manifestly to be performed with ease. A stop, however, is not made here, but it further separates the joints of the bones, with the sinews or tendons serving to their movement, and cuts through the bones themselves, so that the marrow they contain is laid bare. Thus, then, the word renders the whole man transparent to God and to himself, and unveils in sharpest and most rigid analysis his most psychico-spiritual and innermost physical (!) condition; whereby it is then seen that, in so far as the man has not yet given scope to the work of grace, and in so far as the latter has not yet been able to accomplish itself, the marrow of the body is as corrupt as the spirit, which is as it were the marrow of the soul, and the joints of the body as corrupt as the soul, which is as it were the joint of the spirit (!).