Heb_5:13-14. Establishing of the
γεγόνατε
χρείαν
ἔχοντες
γάλακτος
καὶ
οὐ
στερεᾶς
τροφῆς
, Heb_5:12. Sense: for it is universally characteristic of him who (in a spiritual respect) has need of milk, that he is, because not of ripe age, still inexperienced in the
λόγος
δικαιοσύνης
; and this is just your case. Solid food, on the other hand, is proper only for the
τέλειοι
;
τέλειοι
, however, ye are not yet. In connection with this acceptation of the words, there is no occasion for finding anything out of place in the
γάρ
in relation to that which precedes, and either, with Storr, making it co-ordinate with the
γάρ
, Heb_5:12, and referring it back like this to Heb_5:11,—which on account of the figure Heb_5:13-14, retained from Heb_5:12, is already seen to be inadmissible,—or for saying, with Bleek and Bisping, that the progress of thought would come out more naturally if the author had written:
πᾶς
γὰρ
ὁ
ἄπειρος
λόγου
δικαιοσύνης
μετέχει
γάλακτος
·
νήπιος
γάρ
ἐστιν
.
ὁ
μετέχων
γάλακτος
] he who (in a spiritual respect) partakes of milk, i.e. only in this possesses his nourishment, is not in a position to take in solid food. Bengel: Lacte etiam robusti vescuntur, sed non lacte praecipue, nedum lacte solo. Itaque notantur hoc loco ii, qui nil denique nisi lac aut capiunt aut petunt.
ἄπειρος
λόγου
δικαιοσύνης
] sc.
ἐστίν
, he is still inexperienced in the word of righteousness. Expositors have almost without exception been guided by the presupposition (as also Bleek, de Wette, Tholuck, Kurtz still are) that
λόγος
δικαιοσύνης
is only a varying form of expression for the same idea as is expressed, Heb_5:12; Heb_5:14, by
στερεὰ
τροφή
, or, Heb_6:1, by
τελειότης
.
λόγος
δικαιοσύνης
has then either been taken as equivalent to
λόγος
δίκαιος
or
τέλειος
, and the higher, more perfect type of doctrine found indicated in the expression. So Schlichting (“sermo justitiae videtur positus pro sermone justo, h. e. perfecto ac solido”), Grotius (“Hic
δικαιοσύνης
dixit pro
τελειότητος
… et genitivus est pro adjective”), Abresch (“doctrina vel institutio justa, h. e. perfecta, plena, omnia complectens, quae ad perspicuam distinctamque pertineant doctrinae Christianae intelligentiam”), Schulz (“that true [rightly so called] higher doctrine”), Kuinoel, Bisping, Kurtz, and many others. Or
δικαιοσύνης
has been more correctly regarded as genitive of the object. In the latter case
δικαιοσύνη
is taken either, as Michaelis, ad Peirc., with an appeal to the Hebrew
öÀãÈ÷Èä
, in the sense of
ἀλήθεια
,[75] as the doctrine of the essence of the matter itself, in opposition to the typical figures thereof; or
λόγος
δικαιοσύνης
is understood specially, as by Oecumenius, of the
λόγος
περὶ
τῆς
θεότητος
τοῦ
κυρίου
, or, as by Carpzov, of the: “doctrina de sacerdotio Jesu Christi Melchisedeciano, quae dicitur
ὁ
λόγος
δικαιοσύνης
propterea, quia Melchisedecus, vi nominis,
βασιλεὺς
δικαιοσύνης
vertitur, Heb_7:2, eaque appellatio ad Christum sacerdotem applicatur, cujus
πρέπον
fuit
πληρῶσαι
πᾶσαν
δικαιοσύνην
, Mat_3:15;” or the words are made to refer, as by Primasius, Zeger, Bengel, de Wette, and others, to intellectual and moral perfection in general, as also already Chrysostom, who explains the expression by
Ἡ
ἌΝΩ
ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΊΑ
(and after him Theophylact), leaves us the choice of understanding the
ΒΊΟς
ἌΚΡΟς
ΚΑῚ
ἨΚΡΙΒΩΜΈΝΟς
(according to Mat_5:20), or
ΤῸΝ
ΧΡΙΣΤῸΝ
ΚΑῚ
ΤῸΝ
ὙΨΗΛῸΝ
ΠΕΡῚ
ΑὐΤΟῦ
ΛΌΓΟΝ
. But the fundamental presupposition, out of which all these interpretations have sprung, is an erroneous one. For the emphasis falls not upon
ΛΌΓΟς
ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΎΝΗς
, but upon the
ἌΠΕΙΡΟς
, on that account preposed. Not for a non-possession of the
ΛΌΓΟς
ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΎΝΗς
, but only for a want of experience in the same, only for an insufficient, schoolboy’s knowledge of it, does the author blame the readers. The
ΛΌΓΟς
ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΎΝΗς
in itself, therefore, stands as indifferently related to the notion of the
ΣΤΕΡΕᾺ
ΤΡΟΦΉ
or
ΤΕΛΕΙΌΤΗς
as to the notion of the
ΣΤΟΙΧΕῖΑ
, to which Ebrard reckons it. Only by the more or less exhaustive imparting of its subject-matter does it become the one or the other. For the word of righteousness is nothing more than a periphrasis of Christianity or the gospel, inasmuch as just the righteousness availing with God[76] is the central-point of its contents. Quite analogous to this mode of designation is the Pauline characterization of the gospel office of teaching by
ἠ
διακονία
τῆς
δικαιοσύνης
, 2Co_3:9, and of the teachers of Christianity by
διάκονοι
δικαιοσύνης
, 2Co_11:15; on which account also it is unnecessary, for the justification of the expression chosen, with Bleek, Bisping, and Maier, to assume an allusion to the exposition of the name Melchisedec,
βασιλεὺς
δικαιοσύνης
, given Heb_7:2.
νήπιος
γάρ
ἐστιν
] for he is still a babe, a novice in Christianity. Setting forth of the naturalness of the
ἄπειρος
λόγου
δικαιοσύνης
.
[75] Delitzsch, too, with an allusion to the use of
öÆãÆ÷
,
éùÑÆø
,
îÅéùÑÈøÄéí
, takes
δικαιοσύνη
as a synonym of
ἀλήθεια
; but will then have the genitive
δικαιοσύνης
looked upon not as expressing the contents, but as a defining of the quality of
λόγος
, and will interpret
λόγος
of the faculty of speech. Thus, then,
λόγος
δικαιοσύνης
is taken to mean: “the faculty of speaking in accordance with righteousness,” i.e. the “discourse on spiritual things which is guided in strict accord with the norm of the true, and harmoniously combines all the factors of the case, proportionately regarded, without leaving one of them out of sight;” and in ver. 13 is supposed to be contained the following “most rigid connection of ideas:” “he who must still receive milk is still ignorant of rightly-constituted, i.e. right-teaching or orthodox, discourse; for he is a child only beginning to lisp, and not yet capable of speech.” This strange view, based upon the incomprehensible grounds, that “since
νήπιος
(from
νη
and
ἔπος
) denotes one incapable of speech, an infant, there is a presumption in favour of
λόγος
in
ἄπειρος
λόγου
δικαιοσύνης
having the signification of faculty of speech,—and this signification is here the more probable in regard to the
αἰσθησήρια
occurring in the antithetic parallel clause, inasmuch as
ὁ
λόγος
, in the sense of language, is met with countless times in Philo along with the
αἴσθησις
or the
πέντε
αἰσθήσεις
, of which the organs are known as
αἰσθητήρια
,”—bears its refutation upon the face of it. It is not at all suitable to the connection, as Riehm (Lehrbegr. des Hebräerbr. p. 734) and Alford have already observed; since according to this there is no question as to the faculty for speaking on spiritual subjects, but only as to the faculty for understanding the same.—As “discourse” will Hofmann also have
λόγος
interpreted, in that he fully subtilizes the notion lying in
δικαιοσύνη
, and finds indicated by the total expression
λόγος
δικαιοσύνης
only “correct discourse.” For, according to him, the words ver. 13 are used in their most literal sense, and allude to the fact that he who is still fed with milk at the maternal breast is as yet no judge of correct discourse!
[76] Of the righteousness availing with God (comp. also Heb_11:7), have Beza, Jac. Cappellus, Peirce, Storr, Klee, Tholuck, Bleek, Stein, Ebrard, Bloomfield, and others already rightly interpreted
δικαιοσύνη
.—In the above exposition, Alford, Riehm (Lehrbegr. des Hebräerbr. p. 733), and Woerner have concurred; save that, according to Riehm, by virtue of an over-refined distinction, the gospel is not called the word of righteousness “because the righteousness availing with God is the central-point of its contents,” but “because it leads to righteousness; because, by its proclamation to man, the possibility is created and the opportunity is afforded of entering into a condition of the rightness of his relation to God, inasmuch, namely, as he assumes a believing attitude towards the word proclaimed.” But why should the author, familiar as he was with Paul’s manner of teaching, and attaching his own doctrinal presentation thereto,—albeit with independence of character,—have shrunk from recognising, as the central theme of the gospel, “the righteousness which avails with God,” since even this was only a general notion, which did not exclude a peculiar conception and treatment, where it was a question of the development of details, and insistance thereon?