Jam_1:13. To
ὃς
ὑπομένει
πειρασμόν
James opposes
ὃς
πειράζεται
;[63] whilst the former gains
ΖΩΉ
, the end to which the latter approaches is
ΘΆΝΑΤΟς
(Jam_1:15).
First James disclaims a vain justification of the latter, and then describes the process of
ΠΕΙΡΆΖΕΣΘΑΙ
. The vain justification is introduced with the direct words of the
ΠΕΙΡΑΖΌΜΕΝΟς
:
ὍΤΙ
ἈΠῸ
ΘΕΟῦ
ΠΕΙΡΆΖΟΜΑΙ
, and then disclaimed by the expression:
Ὁ
ΘΕῸς
ἈΠΕΙΡΑΣΤΌς
ἘΣΤΙ
ΚΑΚῶΝ
Κ
.
Τ
.
Λ
.
By the direct transition from the preceding to this verse, it is supposed that by the
ΠΕΙΡΑΖΌΜΕΝΟς
spoken about, in contrast to
Ὃς
ὙΠΟΜΈΝΕΙ
ΠΕΙΡΑΣΜΌΝ
(Jam_1:12), is to be understood the person who does not endure the temptation, and consequently is not proved by it, but who succumbs under it, whilst he suffers himself to be enticed to falling away—to sin. Pott: qui tentatione vincitur, ad peccandum vincitur; Theile: agit Jacobus de turpi tentatione per tristem (tentationem); so also Olshausen, Schneckenburger, Kern, and others. This connection is denied by others; thus Calvin says: de alio tentationes genere disserit; and Wiesinger in the strongest manner: “this appears as the design of the apostle: to distinguish as much as possible those
πειρασμοῦς
and this
ΠΕΙΡΆΖΕΣΘΑΙ
, to place the latter as totally different from the former.” But the close connection with the preceding constrains us to the opinion that James has considered both in reference to each other, the
ΠΕΙΡΑΣΜΟΊ
occasioning the
ΠΕΙΡΆΖΕΣΘΑΙ
which takes place when
ἘΠΙΘΥΜΊΑ
is excited by it.[64] It is arbitrary to take the verb
πειράζεσθαι
in the clause:
μηδεὶς
πειραζόμενος
, in another sense than in the following clause:
ἀπὸ
Θεοῦ
πειράζομαι
, as Hottinger asserts: hic verbum
πειράζεσθαι
bis dicitur sensu diversi; priori loco simpliciter: adversa pati; posteriori: malis sollicitari ad defectionem (similarly Grotius, Semler; also Lange); for, according to this interpretation, the excuse:
ὅτι
κ
.
τ
.
λ
., would not correspond to the supposition contained in
μηδεὶς
πειραζόμενος
. In justification of this view, Mat_8:30 cannot be appealed to, where the same word (
νεκρόν
) is used, in the same sentence in different meanings, namely, in a proper and figurative meaning, as here the relation is entirely different.
Some expositors (Pott, Schneckenburger, and others), without reason, paraphrase
λεγέτω
by “cogitet, sibi persuadeat.” Since the words which immediately follow are introduced in the direct form, it is better to retain the usual meaning of
λέγειν
, by which it is in itself evident that the external speaking presupposes an internal, on which it is here natural to think.
James makes the
πειραζόμενος
thus briefly express the excuse, by which he would justify himself:
ὅτι
ἀπὸ
Θεοῦ
πειράζομαι
, by which he transfers the guilt from himself to God.[65]
ὍΤΙ
is the form of quotation frequently occurring in the N. T., except with Paul.
ἈΠῸ
ΘΕΟῦ
is emphatically placed first.
ἈΠΌ
is not equivalent to
ὙΠΌ
; the former points to the more distant, the latter to the nearest cause, though by later writers
ἈΠΌ
with passive verbs is sometimes used as equivalent to
ὙΠΌ
. Here, however, the usual signification of
ἈΠΌ
is to be retained, for the
ΠΕΙΡΑΖΌΜΕΝΟς
, introduced as directly speaking, would certainly not stigmatize God as the direct tempter (comp. Mat_4:1). See Winer, p. 332 [E. T. 464]. James does not with these words refer to any particular doctrine of religion and philosophy, perhaps to the doctrine of the Pharisees and Essenes on
εἱμαρμένη
(Bull, Ittig, Schneckenburger, and others), or the doctrine of Simon Magus (Calovius), but only considers generally the peculiar bias of the natural man to charge God somehow with the blame of
ΠΕΙΡΆΖΕΣΘΑΙ
, recognisable in the answer of Adam to the question of God.[66]
James grounds the rejection of the idea contained in
μηδεὶς
…
λεγέτω
that the
πειράζεσθαι
, proceeds from God, by a sentence comprising two members:
ὁ
γὰρ
Θεὸς
…
οὐδένα
. The word
ἀπείραστος
, an
ἅπαξ
λεγ
. in the N. T., has in classical Greek—in which, however, the form
ἀπείρατος
(
ἀπείρητος
) almost always occurs—either the passive meaning untempted, that is, what is not tempted or proved, or the active meaning: he who has made no trial, equivalent to inexperienced. Some expositors take the word in the second meaning; thus Schulthess: in Deum nulla malorum experentia; de Wette, Brückner, and others.[67] But, on account of the close connection with
πειράζειν
, the word has here, as most expositors assume, an ethical meaning. Yet it is incorrect to explain it actively, with Luther (God is not a tempter to evil; Vulgate: intentator), because this clause would then be tautological with the following. It is rather to be taken passively: untempted of evil, by which the idea passes from tentatus to that of tentabilis; Winer, p. 175 [E. T. 242, 243]. By the Church Fathers God is often named simply
ὁ
ἀπείραστος
; so Ignat. ad Philipp.:
τί
πειράζεις
τὸν
ἀπείραστον
; Photius, contra Manich. iv. p. 225:
πειράζειν
ἐπιχειρήσασι
τὸν
ἀπείραστον
. By this predicate the holiness of God, which is raised above all temptation to evil, is indicated, and is the motive likewise to the following thought.[68]
κακῶν
is not masculine, but neuter; not misery (Oecumenius), but evil.[69]
πειράζει
δὲ
αὐτὸς
οὐδένα
] expresses the consequence of the preceding and the pointed contrast to
ἀπὸ
Θεοῦ
πειράζομαι
.
πειράζει
is placed first for the sake of emphasis. By
αὐτός
, which most interpreters pass over, is brought forward not God’s action in contrast to “being tempted” (Theile: ipse quoque non tentat idem ille Deus, qui tentari nequit; Wiesinger: “He, self-active;” so also Lange), but shows that the
πειράζειν
indeed takes place, but from another cause (
ἡ
ἴδια
ἐπιθυμία
) than from God. The meaning of the whole verse is as follows: Let no man, when he is tempted (inwardly enticed) to evil, say, From God I am tempted: for God suffers no temptation; but (
δέ
) as to the temptation, He (God) tempteth no man: but every man is tempted, etc.[70] As regards the apparent contradiction of this with other passages of the Holy Scriptures, where the sins of men are referred to God as their reason (Gen_22:1; Deu_8:2, etc.), Calvin correctly remarks: Quum Scriptura excoecationem vel obdurationem cordis tribuit Deo, neque illi initium assignat, neque facit mali auctorem, ut culpam sustinere debeat. In his autem duobus solum Jacobus insistit.
[63] When Lange meets this with the question: “How could any one endure the temptation without having first been tempted?” he only shows that he does not understand the explanation here given.
[64] It is to be observed that James designates the trials, on which he thinks in
ὅταν
πειρασμοῖς
περιπίσητι
, ver. 3, as
πειρασμοί
. It may be said that they are not this in themselves, but only in so far as the Christian is yet a sinner, and can thus be enticed by them into sin; when this happens, then the
πειράζεσθαι
, of which James here speaks, takes place. Stier: “That there is a necessity for our all being tested and approved through, trial, springs from our sin; the tempting element in our trial, the evil in it, springs therefore from that and not from God.”
[65] He might find a justification of this in the fact that
πειρασμοί
actually spring from God. See Meyer on Mat_6:13, and on 1Co_10:13. Lange introduces inappropriate matter, maintaining in favour of the concrete relations supposed by him, that the Jews and Judaizing Christians with this word would justify their fanaticism against the Gentiles, particularly their separation from the Gentile Christians, as an affair of God (for His glory)!
[66] Many expressions in Greek authors show how natural this is to man; comp. Il.
τ
. 86:
ἰγώ
δʼ
οὐκ
αἴτιός
εἰμι
ἀλλὰ
Ζεύς
,
καὶ
μοῖρα
; Plaut. Aulul. iv. 10. 7: Deus impulsor mihi fuit; Terent. Eunuch. v. 2. 86: Quid, si hoc voluit quispiam Deus?—Such an excuse suggested itself to the Jews the more as it appeared justified by the language of the O. T. Comp. Exo_20:16. On the contrary, Philo (Quod. deter. pot. 177 D) remarks:
οὐ
ὡς
ἔνιοι
τῶν
ἀσεβῶν
,
τὸν
Θεὸν
αἴτιον
τῶν
κακῶν
φῆσι
Μωϋσῆς
. Still more fully in Schneckenburger.
[67] Buttmann, p. 148 [E. T. 170], contests this meaning, which rather belongs to the word
ἄπειρος
. But passages, as Hom. Il. ad Ven. v. 133:
ἀδμήτην
μʼ
ἀγάγων
καὶ
ἀπειρήτην
φιλότητος
; Theognis, 772:
πολλοὶ
ἀπείρητοι
δόξαν
ἔχουσʼ
ἀγαθῶν
, show that
ἀπείρατος
actually has that meaning.
[68] Lange maintains, in reference to the interpretation given above, that in this commentary
ἀπείρ
.
κακ
. is explained as equivalent to “God has no experience of evil,” and that it is said that the passive construction: “not tempted,” “not temptable,” is against grammatical usage and the connection! In a very strange manner he thinks it is here designed to strengthen the warning: Let no man say; for this saying, like all fanaticism, was a tempting God, and therefore vain and impious, because God does not suffer Himself to be tempted.
[69] Inapposite uniting of various explanations by Theile and Morus:
ἀπείρ
.
κακ
. dicitur, partim quoniam nullae miseriae possunt evenire Deo, partim quoniam per eas non potest inclinari ad peccandum, ad cupiditatem aliquam exercendam; Deus igitur est expers miseriae omnis atque etiam peccati vel pravae cupiditatis, et quia est, neque tentatur a malis ipse, neque alium tentat.
[70] The passage in Sir_15:11-12; Sir_15:20, is especially to be compared:
μὴ
εἴπῃς
ὅτι
διὰ
κύριον
ἀπέστην
,
μὴ
εἴπῃς
ὅτι
αὐτός
με
ἐπλάνησεν
.
Οὐκ
ἐνετείλατο
οὐδενὶ
ἀσεβεῖν
καὶ
οὐκ
ἔδωκεν
ἄνεσιν
οὐδενὶ
ἁμαρτάνειν
. See also 1Co_10:13.