Jam_1:15. Continuing the image used in Jam_1:14, James in this verse describes what is the fruit which proceeds from
δελεάζεσθαι
ὑπὸ
τῆς
ἰδίας
ἐπιθυμίας
: Lust having conceived (i.e. become pregnant) bringeth forth sin, and sin when it is completed bringeth forth death. The object of this representation is not to give a doctrine of sin,—its origin and its end,—but by indicating the fruit of
πειράζεσθαι
, to demonstrate that it is not from God. By
εἶτα
the result of
πειράζεσθαι
, namely
τίκτει
ἁμαρτίαν
, is indicated as directly following upon it;
συλλαβοῦσα
forms the transition to it, which occurs by
ἐπιθυμία
taking the will of man captive; it, as it were, becomes pregnant, so that it bears sin.
συλλαβοῦσα
τίκτει
] corresponds to the Hebrew
åÇúÌÇäÇø
åÇúÌÅìÆã
, which is uniformly in the LXX. translated by
συλλαβοῦσα
ἔτεκε
(Gen_4:5; Gen_4:17; Gen_30:17, and other passages). By
ἁμαρτία
without the article, the fruit of
ἐπιθυμία
, according to its quality, is indicated in an entirely general manner. Sin born by lust again carries in itself its own fruit (
κύημα
), which, having come to completion, (
ἀποτελεσθεῖσα
), is brought forth out of itself (
ἀποκύει
). According to de Wette, by
ἁμαρτία
in the first clause is to be understood “the resolution or internal act,” but in the second clause (
ἡ
ἁμαρτία
ἀποτελεσθεῖσα
), “sin accomplished in the external act,” thus acts of sin. This, however, is incorrect, as—(1) by
ἡ
δὲ
ἁμαρτία
the
ἁμαρτία
already mentioned is again taken up, and therefore must have the same meaning; and (2)
ἀποτελεῖν
ἁμαρτίαν
cannot mean “sin accomplished.”[74] Wiesinger, with regard to
ΤΊΚΤΕΙ
ἉΜΑΡΤΊΑΝ
, correctly observes: “
ἉΜΑΡΤΊΑ
is sin, but whether the internal or external act is not stated;” yet
ἈΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΘΕῖΣΑ
added in the following clause shows that James considered
ἉΜΑΡΤΊΑ
as something gradually developed, for
ἈΠΟΤΕΛΕῖΝ
is not equivalent to
ΤΊΚΤΕΙΝ
(so that
ἈΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΘΕῖΣΑ
would be =
ΤΕΧΘΕῖΣΑ
, Baumgarten: “sin brought or produced into the world in such a manner”), but completed: thus
ἡ
ἁμ
.
ἀποτ
.=“sin which has attained to its complete development.” It is not entirely corresponding to the idea of James when Calvin (with whom most recent critics
Kern, Schneckenburger, Theile, Wiesinger, and others—agree) explains it as “the entire sinful life” (non unum aliquod opus perpetratum, sed cursus peccandi completus; vita impia et scelerata). As James considers
ἁμαρτία
itself personified, it is
ἈΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΘΕῖΣΑ
when it has grown to such fulness of power that it rules man’s whole life. According to this idea, it is indeed correct when several interpreters explain
ἈΠΟΤΕΛ
. by adulta; thus Bouman: peccatum, quum ad adultam pervenit aetatem; yet, linguistically, this explanation is not to be justified, as
ἈΠΟΤΕΛΕῖΣΘΑΙ
is not equivalent to adolescere. The explanation given in the earlier edition of this commentary, that by
ἉΜΑΡΤΊΑ
is meant the act of sin, is erroneous, because such a limitation of the general idea is not indicated; on this account it is not correct to think on
ἐπιθυμία
and
ἉΜΑΡΤΊΑ
as a single definite lust and sin.
Brückner considers the addition of
ἈΠΟΤΕΛΕΣΘΕῖΣΑ
is made only “in order that
ἉΜΑΡΤΊΑ
, which was at first represented as a child, might again be represented as a mother.” This, however, is incorrect; the origin and growth (or, more correctly, the completion) of sin by no means occur “in reality together at one moment;” sin bears death, which it carried in itself at the first, only when it is not interrupted in its development by a higher life-power, but has attained to its complete form.
By
θάνατος
, by which James indicates the fruit of completed sin according to its nature, is to be understood, not only temporary death (Pott: homines peccando mortales factos esse omnes consentiunt N. T. scriptores), but, as the opposite of the
ζωή
which God has promised, and will give to them who love Him, eternal death; see Rom_6:23 :
τὰ
ὀψώνια
τῆς
ἁμαρτίας
,
θάνατος
·
τὸ
δὲ
χάρισμα
Θεοῦ
,
ζωὴ
αἰώνιος
. If, therefore, nothing but
ΘΆΝΑΤΟς
is the end to which
ΠΕΙΡΆΖΕΣΘΑΙ
conducts, this cannot possibly have its reason in God, who works
ΖΩΉ
, and therefore it is absurd to say
ἈΠῸ
ΘΕΟῦ
ΠΕΙΡΆΖΟΜΑΙ
(Jam_1:13).
The expression
ἈΠΟΚΎΕΙ
(only here and in Jam_1:18 in the N. T.) is distinguished from
ΤΊΚΤΕΙ
only in this, that it indicates more definitely that
ἉΜΑΡΤΊΑ
from the beginning is pregnant with
ΘΆΝΑΤΟς
. By the explanation: meretur mortem (Bede, Laurentius, and others), a relation is introduced foreign to the context. On the mode of writing
ἈΠΟΚΥΕῖ
and
ἈΠΟΚΎΕΙ
, see Winer, p. 80 [E. T. 107]; Schirlitz, p. 184 f.
[74] De Wette incorrectly appeals to the expression
ἀποτελεῖν
ἐπιθυμίαν
in Plato, Gorg. p. 503 D, and
τελεῖν
τὴν
ἐπιθυμίαν
, as there
ἐπιθυμία
and
ἁμαρτία
are not similar, but different ideas. When Wiesinger, against the explanation of de Wette, says that
συλλαβοῦσα
indicates that “the will consents to the demand of the desire, which is the resolution or internal act,” it is, on the contrary, to be observed that these two are by no means identical, as the resolution is an act of the will, and thus is actually sin, whilst by
συλλαβοῦσα
is indicated a point preceding
τίκτειν
ἁμαρτιαν
.