Jam_1:3.
γινώσκοντες
] whilst ye may know (“in the consciousness,” de Wette). The participle, when closely connected with the imperative, participates in its meaning; see author on 2Ti_2:23; comp. 1Co_15:58; Col_3:24; Col_4:1; Heb_10:34, and other passages. It is neither simply the imperative: Luther, “and know ye,” nor simply a confirmation, so that it may be rendered by
γινώσκετε
γάρ
(Pott).
ὅτι
τὸ
δοκίμιον
ὑμῶν
(
τῆς
πίστεως
).
τὸ
δοκίμιον
(only here and in 1Pe_1:7) =
τὸ
δοκιμεῖον
, is properly the means of proving: quo quid exploratur (Pott); quo rei, quae sub examen vocatur, manifestatur sinceritas eaque probatur omne id intrinseca virtute possidere, quod extrinsecus specie ac nomine prae se fert (Heisen): thus =
κριτήριον
; so in Dionysius Halicarnassus, rhetor. 11:
δεῖ
δὲ
ὥσπερ
κανόνα
εἶναι
καὶ
στάθμην
τινὰ
καὶ
δοκίμιον
ὡρισμένον
πρὸς
ὅ
τις
ἀποβλέπων
δυνήσεται
τὴν
κρίσιν
ποιεῖσθαι
; yet generally to the idea of proving is attached that of purification and verification. Theile = probamentum; thus Herodian, ii. 10, 12:
δοκίμιον
δὲ
στρατιωτῶν
κάματος
ἀλλʼ
οὐ
τρυφή
; and the LXX. Pro_27:21 :
δοκίμιον
ἀργυρίῳ
καὶ
χρυσῷ
πύρωσις
; comp. Pro_17:3; Psa_12:7; Sir_2:5. Many expositors, as Semler, Pott, Hottinger, Schneckenburger, Theile, Bouman, adhere to the import of means, whether of proof or of purification and verification,[37] whilst they understand thereby the above-mentioned
ΠΕΙΡΑΣΜΟΊ
. In this case
ΤῸ
ΔΟΚΊΜΙΟΝ
stands for
ΤΟῦΤΟ
ΤῸ
ΔΟΚΊΜΙΟΝ
(Pott); but the necessity of supplying
ΤΟῦΤΟ
is decisive against this interpretation; besides,
ΔΟΚΊΜΙΟΝ
in 1Pe_1:7 cannot have that meaning. In that passage
ΔΟΚΊΜΙΟΝ
is = the verification effected by proof; see author in loco: and thus it is probable that this import is also here to be retained (Oecumenius =
τὸ
κεκριμένον
,
τὸ
δεδοκιμασμένον
,
τὸ
καθαρόν
);
τὸ
δοκίμιον
then is =
ΔΟΚΙΜΉ
in Rom_10:4. The distinction, that in that passage
ΔΟΚΙΜΉ
is designated as the effect, but in this as the cause of
ὑπομονή
, is not against this view, for, as Tirinus well says: duae res saepe sibi invicem sunt causa.[38] Most expositors, both ancient and modern, however, explain
δοκίμιον
here by exploratio, probatio, proof in an active sense; thus Didymus, Bede, Calvin, Laurentius, Beza, Piscator, Paraeus, Serarius, Paes, Hornejus, Baumgarten, de Wette, Kern, Wiesinger, Lange, etc. Then is valid what Bede says in reference to Rom_5:4 : Verborum differentia non sensuum in his sermonibus esse probatur Apostolorum, since there
θλῖψις
, here proof by
θλῖψις
, is named as the cause of
ὑπομονή
. Though there is nothing against this idea, this explanation is wanting in linguistic accuracy.[39] The meaning is, in essentials, the same, whether we read
τῆς
πίστεως
or not; for the
δοκίμιον
of Christians consists in nothing else than that of their faith, by which they are Christians.
πίστις
is here not used objectively = id cui fides habetur, ipsa Jesu Christi doctrina (Pott), but subjectively, assured confidence in the gospel, whose contents are Jesus Christ, as the necessary foundation of Christian conduct.
κατεργάζεται
ὑπομονήν
]
κατεργάζεσθαι
is distinguished from
ἐργάζεσθαι
in that it expresses the actual accomplishment (Meyer on Rom_1:27).
ὑπομονή
is faithful endurance (
μένειν
) under (
ὑπο
) the temptations (
πειρασμοῖς
). Baumgarten: “enduring constancy;” Theile: “stedfastness,” perseverantia, quod majus est quam patientia.[40] The importance of
ὑπομονή
for Christians is evident from Mat_10:22; Mat_24:13; comp. also Jam_5:7 ff. On the connection of
ὑπομονή
with
ἐλπίς
, see Cremer under the words
ἐλπίς
and
ὑπομονή
.
[37] Theile: Calamitates, quae natura sua virtutis
πειρασμοί
, eam sub examen discrimenque vocant, accedente demum hominis strenua opera ejusdem virtutis fiunt
δοκίμιον
eam purgantes, firmantes, commonstrantes.
[38] Wiesinger incorrectly maintains: “It is an erroneous idea that verification (
τὸ
δεδοκιμάσθαι
) produces
ὑπομονή
” (so also Rauch in his Review); for the Christian always obtains more
ὑπομονή
, in which only he can reach the goal of perfection, not because he is tried, but because he stands the test and is thus verified.
[39] Cremer (see
δοκίμιον
) is hardly right when he maintained that “the means of proof are not only, e.g., the touchstone itself, but also the trace of the metal left thereon, therefore
τὸ
δοκίμιον
τῆς
πίστεως
(Jam_1:3) is the result of the contact of
πίστις
with
πειρασμοῖς
;” for we are to consider the
πειρασμοί
not as a touchstone, but as a test by fire. However, Cremer explained the whole idea correctly by “the verification of faith.” His remark on
δοκιμή
is to be noted: that in it we are not to distinguish between the active and passive signification; that it has rather a reflex sense, either the having proved true or the proving true.
[40] Cicero, de inv. ii. 54: Patientia est honestatis aut utilitatis causa rerum arduarum ac difficilium voluntaria ac diuturna perpessio; perseverentia est in ratione bene considerata stabilis et perpetua permansio. Schneckenburger strikingly observes: Si submissionem (
τὸ
ὑπο
…) urgeas, patientiam ac tolerantiam malorum, sin
τὸ
μένειν
, constantiam et firmitatem, perseverantiam ac calamitatum ferendarum fortitudinem ab illecebris desciscendi inconcussam hoc vocabulo habebis expressam.