Jam_1:5.
εἰ
δέ
τις
ὑμῶν
λείπεται
σοφίας
] is chiefly connected with
ἐν
μηδενὶ
λειπόμενοι
.
εἰ
is not = quoniam, quandoquidem (Estius, Laurentius), but the thought is hypothetical;
εἴ
τις
=
ὅστις
; see Wahl on the word
εἰ
.
λείπεται
σοφίας
is to be explained as
κτεάνων
λειφθεὶς
καὶ
φίλων
, in Pindar i. 2. 11, “without wealth and friends,” properly “left behind of, or falling short of;” accordingly without wisdom. Usually the meaning wanting, lacking, is given to
λείπομαι
, which, however, is not linguistically justified. James by
σοφία
, as Wiesinger correctly observes, does not mean “an arbitrary part of Christian perfection,” but the essential foundation of Christian conduct,
τὸ
αἴτιον
τοῦ
τελείου
ἔργου
(Oecumenius); for
σοφία
is here the living insight, rooted in the
πίστις
, i.e. the insight compelling to action in what is the Christian’s duty, both in whole and in its particular parts, especially in the
πειρασμοῖς
(Jam_1:2) (comp. the praise of wisdom in the Proverbs of Solomon, in the Wisdom of Solomon, and in the Book of Ecclesiasticus). Wisdom can only be given by God (
κύριος
δίδωσι
σοφίαν
καὶ
ἀπὸ
προσώπου
αὐτοῦ
γνῶσις
καὶ
σύνεσις
, Pro_2:6), and as a divine
χάρισμα
it has an impress definitely distinguishing it from the wisdom of the world; see chap. Jam_3:15; Jam_3:17.[44] The connection does not constrain us, with Bouman and others, to conceive the idea of
σοφία
only in reference to the
πειρασμοί
(Jam_1:2), and to understand by it only the doctrine concerning the Christian conduct in the
πειρασμοῖς
, expressed in Jam_1:2 (Calvin: Sapientiae nomen ad circumstantiam praestantis loci restringo, acsi dicerete. si haec doctrina ingenii vestri captu altior est, petite a Domino, ut vos Spiritu suo illuminet), or that conduct itself. The idea of
σοφία
is rather to be understood in its completeness (Theile, de Wette, Kern, Wiesinger). The reason why James here mentions it is because it was especially necessary to the Christian in his
πειρασμοῖς
; Brückner: “James thinks here of wisdom (in itself of a more general acceptation), inasmuch as it is necessary rightly to estimate and rightly to resist the trial, in order that it might not be converted into an internal temptation, instead of being the path to perfection.”[45]
ΑἸΤΕΊΤΩ
ΠΑΡᾺ
Κ
.
Τ
.
Λ
.] the same construction in Mat_20:20; Act_3:2; 1Jn_5:15.
ΤΟῦ
ΔΊΔΟΝΤΟς
ΘΕΟῦ
] instead of
ΤΟῦ
ΘΕΟῦ
ΤΟῦ
ΔΊΔΟΝΤΟς
, as Codex A reads. By the selected order of the words here, not only is the idea of giving emphatically placed near to the request, but also the participle almost becomes an attributive adjective; God is indicated as the Giver absolutely. Accordingly—as Baumgarten, Gebser, and others correctly remark—no definite object as
ΤῊΝ
ΣΟΦΊΑΝ
(Bouman) is to be supplied.
ΠᾶΣΙΝ
and
ἉΠΛῶς
are added as a more detailed statement;
ΤΟῖς
ΑἸΤΟῦΣΙΝ
is from the context to be supplied to
ΠᾶΣΙΝ
(Calvin, Estius, Piscator, Laurentius, etc.); or, better still,
ΟἾς
ΔΊΔΩΣΙ
. The adverb
ἉΠΛῶς
, only here in the N. T., is either to be understood as an ethical additional statement of
ΔΊΔΟΝΑΙ
=
ἘΝ
ἉΠΛΌΤΗΤΙ
(Rom_12:8) (so Pott, Hottinger, Kern, Theile, Bouman, uncertainly Wiesinger), or = simply, without further ceremony (so de Wette).[46] In the latter case it is prominently brought forward that God in the giving had only this in view. It is incorrectly rendered benigne (Bede, Vorstius, and others), affluenter (Erasmus, Grotius, and others), or as equivalent to
συντόμως
,
καθάπαξ
(Hesychius). By
μὴ
ὀνειδίζοντος
—as
καί
shows
ἁπλῶς
is not more closely defined, but a new point in the mode of the divine giving is added, and so that He does not reproach him to whom He gives, does not abuse him.
ὀνειδίζειν
is generally taken in the more special sense of upbraiding (Luther: “and upbraideth no man”); for which the expression in Demosthenes is appealed to:
τὸ
τὰς
ἰδίας
εὐεργεσίας
ὑπομιμνήσκειν
καὶ
λέγειν
μικροῦ
δεῖν
ὅμοιόν
ἐστι
τῷ
ὀνειδίζειν
; still more surely does Plutarch, de aud. 33, speak for this meaning:
πᾶσα
ὀνειδιζομένη
χάρις
ἐπαχθὴς
καὶ
ἄχαρις
; also in Sir_18:18; Sir_20:15; Sir_41:22, the word appears to have this more special reference.[47] Still there is no proof that James did not take it in its more general sense. Semler: non tantum significat molestam commemorationem beneficiorem, sed etiam qualemcunque reprehensionem (so also Schneckenburger, de Wette).[48] It is incorrect to explain
ὀνειδίζειν
as equivalent to aliquem ignominose cum repulsa dimittere (Morus, Zachariae, Carpzov, Storr, Augusti, Stolz, Hottinger); the refusal of a petitioner may be considered as a
ΚΑΤΑΙΣΧΎΝΕΙΝ
of the same, but
ὈΝΕΙΔΊΖΕΙΝ
never occurs in this sense, not even in Sir_20:15. The reason why James subjoins the particular statement
ἉΠΛῶς
Κ
.
Τ
.
Λ
. is by it to encourage to
ΑἸΤΕῖΝ
(Zwinglius: ut mentes alliciat, ut ad hunc unum in omni necessitate adcurrant); perhaps also with “a side glance to the rich” (Jam_1:10, chap. Jam_5:9 ff.), who do not give
ἉΠΛῶς
, and when they do give, give only
ὈΝΕΙΔΊΖΟΝΤΕς
(Wiesinger).
ΚΑῚ
ΔΟΘΉΣΕΤΑΙ
ΑὐΤῷ
] impersonal: “it shall be given him;” namely, what he asks; here, wisdom. It is erroneous directly to supply
Ἡ
ΣΟΦΊΑ
to
ΔΟΘΉΣΕΤΑΙ
as the subject (Lange), because James here evidently wishes to emphasize the relation of the giving to the asking, and accordingly the object is suppressed; comp. on this thought particularly 1Ki_3:9-12 (2Ch_1:10-12).
[44] The Etymologicum magnum thus gives the distinction between
σοφία
and
γνῶσις
:
γνῶσις
μέν
ἐστι
τὸ
εἰδέναι
τὰ
ὄντα
·
σοφία
δὲ
καὶ
τὸ
τὰ
ὄντα
γινώσκειν
,
καὶ
τὸ
τὰ
γνωστὰ
πράττειν
.
[45] Lange, indeed, defends the explanation of Calvin, but he interprets the idea of
σοφία
differently from Calvin, defining it as “the right perception of the signs of the times, and of the christological fulfilment of the theocracy in the church as well as in the faith of individuals.”
[46] Both of these explanations come essentially to the same thing, for “he that giveth with simplicity will simply give; it will be a pure, unmingled giving, without any admixture” (Stier). Lange, without reason, maintains that in this commentary
ἀπλῶς
will refer not to the giving, but to the gift.
[47] In this sense exprobare is used in Latin, e.g. Cicero, de amic.: Odiosum sane genus hominum officia exprobantium.
[48] Eustathius:
ὀνειδίζειν
οὐ
μόνον
τὸ
εὐεργεσίας
ἀναφέρειν
τοῖς
εὐεργετημένοις
…
ἀλλὰ
καὶ
ἁπλῶς
ἀνοστά
τινα
καὶ
ἐπίμομφα
λέγειν
. The assertion of Lange is unfounded, that James, according to this exposition, would utter an untenable sentiment, “because God, notwithstanding those who ask, often inflicts injuries on men.” Lange has not considered that the passage treats only of asking.