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Jam_2:18. The words ἀλλʼ ἐρεῖ τις , with which this verse begins, apparently introduces an objection, as in 1Co_15:35; by which under τις a certain one is to be considered as an opponent of the thought above expressed, who with σύ addresses James, and by κἀγώ denotes himself. But against this explanation the sentiment itself is opposed; for as James reproaches those, against whom he argues, that they have indeed faith but not works, he could not possibly put into the mouth of his opponent, that the same had works, but he (James) had faith. The opinion of Pott, that σὺ … κἀγώ = ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος , cannot be justified (so also Bouman: hic … ille). By that explanation it would require to be said: σὺ ἔργα ἔχεις , κἀγὼ πίστιν ἔχω , namely, in the sense: If thou place all stress on works, I am not the less entitled to place all stress on faith. Kern attempts to remove the difficulty by taking the first sentence: σὺ πίστιν ἔχεις , as a hypothetical protasis, and the second, on the other hand, κἀγὼ ἔργα ἔχω , as the apodosis, and explains it: “If thou hast faith, so have I also works, because, as thou sayest, faith and works cannot be separated.” But to this explanation is opposed not only the fact that James has not in what has gone before properly expressed the inseparableness of faith and works, but has only presupposed it; but also that the opponent should appeal to works, whilst James considers him as a person who has no works.[135] With these difficulties it is not to be wondered at that almost all expositors have decided for the view that ἈΛΛʼ ἘΡΕῖ ΤΙς is not here to be taken as the form of an objection, and that by ΤΙς not an opponent of James is meant, but a “vir sapiens et intelligens,” to whom James assigns the part of carrying on the argument in his stead against his opponent. Wiesinger: “ ἀλλʼ ἐρεῖ τις cannot here be possibly taken, as in 1Co_15:35, Rom_9:19, as an objection, for, as ΣῪ ΠΊΣΤΙΝ ἜΧΕΙς already shows, the person introduced as speaking is on the side of James, and like him combats faith without works.” Accordingly, with ΣΎ the same opponent is addressed whom James had hitherto in view, and with ΚἈΓΏ the person called ΤΙς designates himself as agreeing with James. But against this explanation there are many objections. 1. It cannot be denied that the words ἈΛΛʼ ἘΡΕῖ ΤΙς have most decidedly the character of an objection. 2. If they are not so understood, then ἈΛΛʼ is not only an interruption, but inexplicable; Hottinger, indeed, maintains: ἈΛΛΆ hic non adversativum esse per se patet; but who will agree with him in this? De Wette assumes that by ἈΛΛΆ here is expressed not primarily the contrast with what immediately precedes, but with the error already combated. Wiesinger has, however, correctly rejected this opinion, which is the less to be justified “as the error has not yet been per se expressed.” ἀλλά must at all events be referred to what directly precedes. According to Schneckenburger, it refers ad negationem, quam notitio ΝΕΚΡΌς involvit, quasi dictum foret: ista fides non est fides, sed dicat aliquis; but that πίστις , if it has not works, is not ΠΊΣΤΙς at all, is so little the opinion of James that he ascribes a ΠΙΣΤΕΎΕΙΝ to the devils (Jam_2:19); ΝΕΚΡΆ is here arbitrarily explained as = nulla, and not less arbitrarily is it observed on ΠΊΣΤΙΝ ἜΧΕΙς : “interlocutor ad hominis errorcm descendens fidem, quam profitetur, eum habere sumit,” since James does not the least indicate that the words σὺ πίστιν ἔχεις are to be understood in the sense: “I will even assume that thou hast faith.” The opinion of several critics, that ἈΛΛΆ is here (= quin etiam) “a correction of the preceding judgment, heightening it” (Wiesinger), and indicates “that the opinion that a faith without works is dead is here surpassed” (Gunkel), is of no avail, as the opinion contained in this verse on faith without works is evidently not, as Brückner falsely thinks, stronger than that which is expressed in Jam_2:17 with ΝΕΚΡΆ ἘΣΤΙΝ .[136] Accordingly, all attempts at the explanation of ἀλλά do not attain their object.[137] 3. With this explanation it is entirely uncertain how far the speech of τις extends, and where James again resumes; and accordingly the greatest uncertainty here occurs among expositors. 4. Lastly, it cannot be perceived why James should express his own opinion in the person of another who is designated by the entirely indefinite term τις . Wiesinger and most expositors do not touch on this point at all. Baumgarten thinks that James speaks here in the words of a stranger, in order the better and the more freely to convey the notion of erroneousness in severer terms. But this is a pure fiction; that James did not shun from expressing himself freely and strongly the whole Epistle is a proof.[138] These objections are too important to permit us in spite of them to rest on the above explanation. But, on the other hand, the difficulties which arise if ἈΛΛʼ ἘΡΕῖ ΤΙς is taken as a form of objection appear to be invincible. They are only so, however, when it is assumed that the person introduced with ΣΎ as speaking means James, and with ΚἈΓΏ himself. But this assumption is by no means necessary. Since James introduces ΤΙς as speaking, so both words ΣΎ and ΚἈΓΏ can be understood as well from the standpoint of James as from that of the speaker; that is to say, that with ΣΎ the opponent with whom James argues, and against whom he asserts that πίστις without works is dead, is meant, and with ἘΓΏ James himself. The meaning, then, is as follows: But some might say in answer to what I have just stated, defending thee,[139] thou (who hast not the works) hast faith, and I, on the other hand (who affirm that faith without works is dead), have works;[140] my one-sided insisting on works is no more right than thy one-sided insisting on faith. By this explanation, which has nothing linguistically against it, not only is the nature of ἀλλʼ ἐρεῖ τις preserved, but it expresses a thought entirely suited to the context, whilst the following words give the answer by which this objection is decidedly repelled. This answer is in form not directed to the person introduced as speaking, but to the opponent with whom only James has properly to do, and whom he in his lively style can now the more directly address, as the objection made was the expression of his soul. The meaning of this answer is as follows: Hast thou actually, as that person says, faith, and if this is to be of use it must manifest itself, but this without works is impossible; thou canst not even show thy faith without works; as for myself, who have works, these are a proof that faith is not wanting, for without faith I could do no works. On δεῖξον , Schneckenburger correctly remarks: vide ne verbo tribuas significationem exhibendi et manifestandi (per vitam), sed retine primam et simplicem comprobari quasi ante judicem.
τὴν πίστιν σου is said because the opponent ascribed faith to himself (Jam_2:14); thus “the faith which thou sayest thou hast” (Wiesinger).
With the reading of the Rec. ἐκ τ . ἔργων (instead of χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων ) the words are to be taken as ironical (so also Lange), as the supposition is that works are wanting to him.
With these words not faith generally, but living faith which saves is denied to the opponent; if the same is not proved by works, it is dead.
In what James says of himself, ἔργα are the works which proceed from faith, as these could not otherwise authenticate it. It is to be observed that in the first clause τὴν πίστιν , and in the second ἐκ τῶν ἔργων , stand first, because these ideas are the points on which the whole turns.
[135] The explanation of Knapp, that the first words are interrogative: tune quia ipse fide cares, propterea eam contemnis? and to which the answer is then given: immo vero plus habeo, quam quantum tu et habes et postulas, fidem videlicet cum factis conjunctam, is correctly relinquished by himself, as it is too artificial to be considered as correct.
[136] Wiesinger observes: The person introduced as speaking not only confirms what was said before, but goes beyond it; not only that such a faith is dead, but that it cannot even prove its existence without works: it is nothing. But with these last words Wiesinger inserts a thought into the words which they by no means contain, the same thought which, according to Schneckenburger, is contained in νεκρά ἐστι .
[137] The pointing ἀλλʼ , ἐρεῖ τις , σὺ κ . τ . λ . (Schulthess, Gebser, Rauch) does in no way remove the difficulty, and has also this against it, that the closely-united formula ἀλλʼ ἐρεῖ τις is thus disunited.
[138] Lange thinks to remove the difficulty by ascribing to the words “a grand prophetical character,” whilst by τις is meant “the Gentile-Christian world,” which has proved “by its works of faith that it has had the true faith, whereas Ebionism, with its want of consistency in Christian works of love, has proved that its orthodoxy was not a living faith.” But, apart from the arbitrariness of this interpretation, ἀλλά is by it referred not to the preceding declaration, but falsely to the erroneous opinion of τις (ver. 14).
[139] The view of Stier, that by the speaker a Pharisaical Jew is to be understood, who takes occasion from the inoperative faith of Christians to mock the Christian faith in general, has been rightly rejected by Wiesinger. If James had meant by τις a Jew, he would have called him such.
[140] This is a form of expression which frequently occurs. Thus, if one speaks with Charles, and says to him: Henry says thou hast found the book which I have lost. Brückner, indeed, thinks that this example is not appropriate, but he does not give his reasons for saying so. Lange calls the explanation here given artificial, but he does not say in what its artificial character consists. The objections which Lange brings against it are founded on his having read erroneously defending himself instead of defending thee.