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Jam_3:12. This verse shows, by examples taken from nature, that from one principle opposite things cannot be produced, but that any cause can only bring forth that which corresponds to its nature. Semler incorrectly paraphrases the first question: μὴ δύναται συκῆ ἐκαίας ποιῆσαι : an fieri potest, ut ficus, cujus est dulcis natura, producat amaras oleas; for that here the contrast of sweet and bitter (which only the last clause of the verse resumes) is not designed to be expressed, is evident from what immediately follows: ἢ ἄμπελος σῦκα , where James would otherwise have mentioned the olive instead of the vine. The idea is rather that nothing can bring forth that which is not corresponding to its nature.[179] Consequently the opinion of de Wette, that here thistles (according to Mat_7:16), or something similar, instead of ἄμπελος would be more appropriate, is incorrect.
To the question follows as its conclusion the negative clause: ΟὔΤΕ ἉΛΥΚῸΝ ΓΛΥΚῪ ΠΟΙῆΣΑΙ ὝΔΩΡ , which is so construed as if the former sentence, not only in meaning, but also in form, was a negative one; ΟὔΤΕ ( à : ΟὐΔΈ ) and the omission of ΔΎΝΑΤΑΙ are thus to be explained.[180]
ἁλυκόν is the subject, and ΓΛΥΚῪ ὝΔΩΡ the object; ΠΟΙῆΣΑΙ is used in the same signification as before; thus: Nor can bitter bring forth sweet water. The opposite ideas ἁλυκόν and ΓΛΥΚΎ are emphatically placed beside each other. James hereby indicates, that if from one month the bitter (namely, the κατάρα ) and also the sweet (namely, the ΕὐΛΟΓΊΑ ) proceed, this is not only morally reprehensible, to which Jam_3:10 points, but is something impossible; accordingly, the person who curses man, who is made after the image of God, cannot also bless (praise) God, and that thus if the mouth yet express both, the εὐλογεῖν can only be mere seeming and hypocrisy (Lange).[181]
[179] Comp. Arrian, Epikt. ii. 20: πῶς γὰρ δύναται ἄμπελος μὴ ἀμπελικῶς κινεῖσθαι ἀλλʼ ἐλαϊκῶς , ἢ ἐλαία πάλιν μὴ ἐλαϊκῶς ἀλλʼ ἀμπελικῶς ; ἀμήχανον , ἀδιανόητον ; comp. also Plut. de tranq. an. p. 472 E.
[180] Buttmann (p. 315 [E. T. 367]), following Lachmann, praef. p. xliv., assumes a corruption of the passage.
[181] Gunkel incorrectly thinks that ver. 12 only discloses the unnaturalness of the conduct denounced in ver. 10, for μὴ δύναται evidently expresses impossibility. It is also to be observed, that in the last clause of ver. 12 ἁλυκόν ( ὕδωρ ) is considered as the fountain which cannot bring forth γλυκὺ ὕδωρ , and accordingly points to the bitter disposition, from which only that which is bitter (namely, the bitter κατάρα ), but not that which is sweet (namely, the εὐλογία ), can proceed. Lange correctly observes, “that the multiplying of examples has the effect of illustrating the general application of the law of life here laid down;” but he strangely supposes that “the individual examples have a symbolical meaning;” the fig-tree, the symbol of a luxurious natural life; the olives, the symbols of spiritual life, etc.