Jam_3:2. The reason (
γάρ
) of the preceding; yet not so much of the warning:
μὴ
…
γίνεσθε
(Schneckenburger),—this is conditioned by
εἰδότες
κ
.
τ
.
λ
.,—as rather of the thought
μεῖζον
κρῖμα
ληψόμεθα
; namely, so that the first clause refers only to
κρῖμα
ληψόμεθα
, and only that which follows to the idea
μεῖζον
; whilst in the expression
εἴ
τις
κ
.
τ
.
λ
. the idea is contained, that as
οὐ
πταίειν
ἐν
λόγῳ
conditions
τελειότης
, sinful man is thus not in a position to bridle the tongue. Brückner incorrectly considers the clause
εἴ
τις
κ
.
τ
.
λ
. as the explanatory reason of the directly preceding sentence: “we all offend frequently, for whosoever offends not in word he only preserves himself from
πολλὰ
πταίειν
.”
The words
πολλὰ
πταίομεν
ἅπαντες
] are to be taken in their widest sense (Wiesinger, Brückner); by
ἅπαντες
(a stronger form than
πάντες
) neither the
διδάσκαλοι
simply are meant, nor is it = plerique (Grotius), and
πταίειν
points not expressly to errores, qui docentibus obvenire possint (Grotius), or to “speech which is used in teaching” (de Wette), but it comprehends all and every moral error of whatever kind it may be.[169]
πολλά
] is adverbial, as in Mat_9:14.
To this first thought that which follows is annexed
ἀσυνδέτως
.
εἴ
τις
] see chap. Jam_1:5; Jam_1:23; Jam_1:26 =
ὅστις
.
ἐν
λόγῳ
] is not to be limited to teaching proper (Pott =
ἐν
διδασκαλίᾳ
), but is equivalent to
ἐν
τῷ
λαλῆσαι
, chap. Jam_1:19;
ἐν
denotes the sphere within which the
οὐ
πταίειν
occurs; otherwise in chap. Jam_2:10. On
οὐ
after
εἰ
, see on chap. Jam_2:11.
To
οὗτος
τέλειος
ἀνήρ
,
ἐστι
is to be supplied;
οὗτος
is emphatic; what follows
δυνατὸς
κ
.
τ
.
λ
. is in apposition to
τέλ
.
ἀνήρ
; the word
ἀνήρ
is used here as in chap. Jam_1:8.
The meaning is: Whosoever offends (sins) not in speech, and thus is able to bridle his tongue, proves himself thereby to be a perfect man who is able to rule also the whole body, that is, all the other members, so that it is subject to his will. James here places the body in opposition to the man “as a relative independent power which offers moral resistance to the will of the Ego” (Wiesinger), which it is his task to bridle. The
καρδία
, indeed, is the fountain of evil deeds (Mat_15:19), but the lust which is rooted therein has so thoroughly appropriated the members of man, and as it were fixed its dwelling in them (Rom_7:23), that they appear as lusting subjects, and may be represented as such in lively concrete language. By such explanations as
ὅλον
τὸ
σῶμα
, equivalent to “the whole connection of the actions and changes of man” (Baumgarten), or = reliquae peccandi illecebrae (Pott), or = tota vita (Schneckenburger), the idea lying at the foundation does not receive its full meaning. Even the remark of de Wette, that
τὸ
σῶμα
denotes “not only all organs proper, but even the affections,” is not to be retained; on which account Brückner adds: “the latter only in so far as they are expressed by the former.” The explanation of Lange is also arbitrary, that the body here denotes the organ and symbol of all other modes of human action, with the exception of speech. Laurentius rightly observes: nihil obstat, quo minus per totum corpus intelligamus caetera corporis nostri membra: manus, pedes, etc.
[169] Brückner correctly asserts, against de Wette, that the subject in
ἅπαντες
has experienced an extension, and that the circumstance that in what follows
ἐν
λόγῳ
πταίειν
is particularly brought forward, requires for
πταίειν
here a more universal meaning.