Joh_19:11. With a clear and holy defiance, to defend against this expression of personal power at least, the supremacy of the Father, Jesus now speaks His last word to Pilate. He points the latter, with his
ἐξουσία
which he has put forward, by the reference
σταυρῶσαί
σε
, to the highest authority which has invested him with that
ἐξουσία
, but at the same time, with conciliatory mildness, deduces from it a standard to diminish the guilt of the judge. The saying breathes truth and grace.
οὐκ
εἶχες
] Thou wouldst not have.[235] “Indicativus imperfecti sine
ἄν
h. l. in firmissima asseveratione longe est aptissimus,” Kühner, ad Xen. Anab. vii. 6. 21. See also Stallbaum, ad Plat. Sympos. p. 190 C; Bremi, ad Lys. Exc. IV. p. 438 ff.; Winer, p. 286 [E. T. p. 383].
δεδομένον
] Namely, the
ἐξουσιάζειν
κατʼ
ἐμοῦ
. See Kühner, II. sec. 421; Bernhardy, p. 335. Not: the definite act of condemnation (Steinmeyer).
ἄνωθεν
] i.e. from God, Joh_3:3; Joh_3:31. That even the heathen could understand. Had Jesus said
ἐκ
τοῦ
πατρός
μου
, he would not have understood it. Pilate stands before Jesus with the
ἐξουσία
to destroy Him; but he has this power from God, and he would not possess it if God had not appointed him for the fulfilment of His destiny concerning Jesus. For this reason, however (
διὰ
τοῦτο
), that is, because he here acts not in independent self-determination, but as the divinely-ordained organ of the procedure which is pending against Him, he is not indeed free from sin, since he condemns Jesus contrary to his own conviction of His innocence; but greater is the guilt of him who delivered Jesus into Pilate’s hands, since that divinely-bestowed
ἐξουσία
is wanting to the latter. The logical connection of the
διὰ
τοῦτο
rests on the fact that the
παραδιδούς
μέ
σοι
is the high priest, to whom, consequently, no power is given by God over Him, the Messiah, who in truth is higher than the high priest; to Pilate, on the other hand, the Roman potentate, this power is lent, because, as bearer of the highest magisterial authority, he derives his warrant from God (comp. Rom_13:1), to decide concerning every one who is brought before his court, and therefore also concerning the Messiah, who has been accused and delivered up as a pretender to a crown. This power Pilate possessed simply as a Roman potentate; hence this point of view does not confuse the matter (Luthardt), but makes it clear. As
δεδομ
. is not to be transmuted into the notion of permission (Chrysostom), so also there is nothing to be found in
διὰ
τοῦτο
which is not yielded by the immediate context. Hence we are not to understand with Euth. Zigabenus (comp. Theophylact):
διότι
ἐξουσίαν
ἔχεις
καὶ
οὐκ
ἀπολύεις
με
, so that the lesser degree of guilt rests on the weakness and timidity of Pilate (comp. Luther); nor with Grotius (comp. Bengel, Baeumlein, and already Ruperti): because thou canst not know so well as the Jews (to whom
ὁ
παραδ
. is referred) who I am; nor even with Lampe: because the Jews have received no such power from God, have rather assumed it to themselves (Luthardt); but solely in harmony with the context: because thou hast the disposal of me, not from thy proper sovereignty, but from having been divinely empowered thereto.
ὁ
παραδιδούς
] he who delivers me up to thee; the affair is still in actu, those who deliver Him up stand without; hence the pres. The expression itself, however, cannot, as elsewhere in John (Joh_18:2, Joh_13:2, Joh_11:21, Joh_12:4, Joh_6:64; Joh_6:71; comp. Mar_14:21), mean Judas, who here lies entirely remote from the comparison, especially since
σοι
is used with it, nor even (so most interpreters) be understood collectively of the Jews. It is rather the chief of the Jews, the high priest Caiaphas, who is meant (so also Bengel, and now Ewald; comp. Luthardt, Baumgarten, p. 388, Hengstenberg), who ought to have recognised the Messiah, and not to have assumed to himself any power over Him.
μείζονα
] compares the sin of the
παραδιδούς
with that of Pilate, not with itself, so that its guilt is designated as aggravated by the misuse of the
ἐξουσία
of Pilate (Calvin, Wetstein, Godet, also Baur).[236] The guilt which belonged to the
παραδιδούς
in and by himself, was in truth not aggravated by the delivering over into the hands of the regular magistracy, which was rather the orderly mode of procedure.[237]
[235] Buttmann, on account of the absence of
ἄν
, would interpret the reading
εἶχες
as follows: “Thou hadst, i.e. when thou didst receive the accusation, against me … no power over me, unless it was given to thee by God for that purpose.” See Stud. u. Krit. 1858, p. 501. But irrespective of the dragging in, in this necessitous manner, of this exacter definition of time in
εἶχες
, it is in truth precisely the undoubted possession of the
ἐξουσία
which forms the presupposition of the
διὰ
τοῦτο
κ
.
τ
.
λ
. that follows. With the reading
ἔχεις
, which Buttmann prefers, he explains: “thou hast no power over me, if it had not been given thee from above,” p. 494. But why in that case should the pluperf.
ἦν
δεδομένον
stand? Instead of
ἦν
,
ἐστί
must have been used, in conformity with the sense.
[236] Baur in the Theol. Jahrb. 1854, p. 283: “Since thou hast in my case the magisterial power over life and death, those who surrender me to thee, incur by their action, in itself immoral, all the greater guilt, if they abuse the magisterial authority given to thee for their own objects.”
[237] According to Steinmeyer, p. 156, Jesus would say: “Thy power, on the other hand, to release me, is already as good as wrested from thee on the part of the
παραδιδ
.
μέ
σοι
; but on that very account thy sin is the less.” But this interpretation of
διἀ
τοῦτο
is in truth altogether untextual, as the entire conception to which it would refer is first imported.