Joh_8:44. After the negative statement in Joh_8:42-43 comes now the positive: Ye (
ὑμεῖς
, with great, decided emphasis—ye people, who deem yourselves children of God!) are children of the devil,[29] in the sense, namely, of ethical genesis (comp. 1Jn_3:8; 1Jn_3:12), which is further explained from
ἐκεῖνος
onward. The expression must therefore not be regarded as teaching an original difference in the natures of men (Hilgenfeld, comp. on Joh_3:6).
ἐκ
τοῦ
πατρ
.
τ
.
διαβ
.] of the father who is the devil, not of your father, etc. (De Wette, Lücke), which is inappropriate after the emphatic
ὑμεῖς
, or ought to have been specially marked as emphatic (
ὙΜΕῖς
ἘΚ
ΤΟῦ
ὙΜῶΝ
ΠΑΤΡῸς
, etc.). Nonnus well indicates the qualitative character of the expression:
ὙΜΕῖς
ΔῆΤΑ
ΤΈΚΝΑ
ΔΥΣΑΝΤΈΟς
ἘΣΤῈ
ΤΟΚῆΟς
. Hilgenfeld’s view, which is adopted by Volkmar: “Ye descend from the father of the devil,” which father is the (Gnostic) God of the Jews, is not only generally unbiblical, but thoroughly un-Johannine, and here opposed to the context. John could have written simply
ἐκ
τοῦ
διαβ
., if the connection had not required that prominence should be given to the idea of father. But in the entire connection there is nothing that would call for a possible father of the devil; the question is solely of the devil himself, as the father of those Jews. Erroneously also Grotius, who explains the passage as though it ran,
τοῦ
πατρ
.
τῶν
διαβόλων
.
καὶ
τὰς
ἐπιθυμίας
, etc.] The conscious will of the child of the devil is to accomplish that after which its father, whose organ it is, lusts. This is rooted in the similarity of their moral nature. The desire to kill is not exclusively referred to, though, as even the plural
ἐπιθυμίας
shows, it is included.
ἘΚΕῖΝΟς
, etc.] for murder and lying were just the two devilish lusts which they were minded to carry out against Jesus.
ἀνθρωποκτόνος
ἦν
ἀπʼ
ἀρχῆς
] from the beginning of the human race. This more exact determination of the meaning is derivable from
ἀνθρωποκτόνος
, inasmuch as it was through his seduction that the fall was brought about, in whose train death entered into the world (see on Rom_5:12). So Origen, Chrysostom, Augustine, Theophylact, and the majority of commentators; also Kuinoel, Schleiermacher, Tholuck, Olshausen, Klee, Maier, Lange (referring it, however, after the example of Euth. Zigabenus, also to Cain), Luthardt, Ewald, Godet, Hofmann, Schriftbeweis, I. pp. 418, 478; Müller, Lehre v. d. Sünde, II. p. 544 f. ed. 5; Lechler in the Stud. u. Kritik. 1854, p. 814 f.; Hahn, Theol. d. N. T. I. p. 355; Messner, Lehre d. Apostel, p. 332; Philippi, Glaubenslehre, III. p. 272; see especially Hengstenberg on the passage, and his Christol. I. p. 8 ff.; Weiss, Lehrbegr. p. 133 f. Compare the corresponding parallels, Wis_2:24; Rev_12:9; Rev_20:2; also Ev. Nicod. 23, where the devil is termed
ἡ
τοῦ
θανάτου
ἀρχὴ
,
ἡ
ῥίζα
τῆς
ἁμαρτίας
; see also Grimm on Wis_1:1. This view is the only one that is appropriate to the expression
ἈΠʼ
ἈΡΧῆς
, which the design of the context requires to be taken exactly (
îï áøàùÑéç
, Lightfoot, p. 1045), as it must also be understood in 1Jn_3:8. Comp. Joseph. Antiq. I. 1, 4. Others refer to Cain’s murder of his brother (Cyril, Nitzsch in the Berl. theol. Zeitschr. III. p. 52 ff., Schulthess, Lücke, Kling, De Wette, Reuss, Beitr. p. 53, Hilgenfeld, Baeumlein, Grimm), which is not, however, rendered necessary by 1Jn_3:12, and would further, without any warrant, exclude an earlier commencement; would be opposed to the national and New Testament view (see on 2Co_11:3) of the fall and the connection of the present passage; and would finally lack any allusion to it in Genesis 4; whilst, on the contrary, the antithesis between truth and falsehood, which follows afterwards, points unmistakeably to Genesis 3. Finally, inasmuch as
ἀπʼ
ἀρχῆς
must signify some definite historical starting-point, it is incorrect, with B. Crusius, to deny a reference either to the fall or to Cain’s murder of his brother, and to take
ἀνθρωποκτ
.
ἀπʼ
ἀρχῆς
as simply a general designation.
Brückner also treats the reference to a definite fact as unnecessary.
ἮΝ
] that is, during the entire past,
ἈΠʼ
ἈΡΧῆς
onwards.
Κ
.
ἘΝ
Τῇ
ἈΛΗΘ
.
ΟὐΧ
ἝΣΤΗΚΕΝ
] does not refer to the fall of the devil (2Pe_2:4; Jud_1:6), as Augustine, Nonnus, and most Catholics maintain,[30] as though
εἱστήκει
(Vulg.: stetit) had been employed, but is his constant characteristic:[31]and he does not abide in the truth,
ἐμμένει
,
ἀναπαύεται
, Euth. Zigabenus. The truth is the domain in which he has not his footing; to him it is a foreign, heterogeneous sphere of life: the truth is the opposite of the lie, both in formal and material significance. The lie is the sphere in which he holds his place; in it he is in the element proper and peculiar to him; in it he has his life’s standing.
ὅτι
οὐκ
ἔστιν
ἀλήθ
.
ἐν
αὐτῷ
] the inner ground of the preceding statement. The determining cause of this inner ground, however, is expressed by the words
ἐν
αὐτῷ
, which are emphatically placed at the end. As truth is not found in him, as it is lacking to his inner essence and life, it cannot possibly constitute the sphere of his objective life. Without truth in the inward parts—truth regarded, namely, as a subjective qualification, temper, tendency—that is, without truth in the character, a man must necessarily be foreign to, and far from, the domain of objective truth, and cannot have his life and activity therein. Without truth in the inward parts, a man deals in life with lies, deception, cunning, and all
ἀδικία
. Note that
ἀλήθ
. is used first with, and then without, the article.
ἐκ
τῶν
ἰδίων
] of that which is his own, which constitutes the proper ground or essence of his inner man,—of that which is most peculiarly his ethical nature. Comp. Mat_12:34.
κ
.
ὁ
πατὴρ
αὐτοῦ
] namely, of the liar; he, generically considered, to wit, the liar as such in general, is the devil’s child. The characterization of the devil thus aptly concludes with a declaration which at the same time confirms the reproach,
ὑμεῖς
ἐκ
.
τ
.
πατρὸς
τοῦ
διαβ
.
ἐστέ
. The less to be approved, therefore, is the common explanation of
αὐτοῦ
, as standing for
τοῦ
ψεύδους
, which is to be derived from
ψεύστης
(mendacii auctor, after Gen_3:4 f.); although, linguistically considered, it is in itself admissible (Winer, p. 181 f. [E. T. p. 138]; Buttmann, p. 93 [E. T. p. 106]). The correct view has been taken also by B. Crusius, Luthardt, Tholuck, Hengstenberg, and as early as Bengel. The old heretical explanation, “as his father,”[32] or, “also his father,” as though
αὐτοῦ
referred to the devil, and the demiurge, whose lie is the pretending to be the most high God, were really intended (Hilgenfeld, Volkmar), must be rejected; for, on the one hand, John ought at the very least, in order to avoid being completely misunderstood, to have written
ὅτι
αὐτὸς
ψ
.
ἐ
.
κ
.
ὁ
.
π
.
ἀ
.;[33] while, on the other hand, he did not in the remotest degree entertain the monstrous, wholly unbiblical notion of a father of the devil. Nay, further, a father of this kind would not at all harmonize with the context. Even a writer as early as Photius, Quaest. Amphiloch. 88, takes the opposite view; as also Ewald, Jahrb. V. p. 198 f. It was in the highest degree unnecessary that Lachmann, (Praef. II. p. 7), in order to avoid having to refer
αὐτοῦ
to the devil, should have approved the reading qui, or
ὃς
ἄν
, instead of
ὅταν
, which is supported by the feeblest evidence: “qui loquitur mendacium, ex propriis loquitur, quia patrem quoque mendacem habet.”
[29] In his Leben Jesu (p. 338 ff.), Schleiermacher groundlessly advances the opinion that Jesus had here no intention of teaching any doctrine regarding the devil, but wished merely to add force to His reproach by referring to the generally-adopted interpretation of the narrative of the fall. On the contrary, by His reproach, he not merely lays down the doctrine, but also further intentionally and explicitly expounds it, especially by assigning the ground,
ὅτι
οὐχ
ἔστιν
, etc. Baur (still in his Neut. Theol. p. 393) deduces from this passage that, according to John, Jesus had little sympathy for the Jews. He is speaking, however, not at all against the Jews in general, but merely against the party that was hostile to Him.
[30] Comp. also Martensen’s Dogmatics, § 105. Delitzsch, too (see Psychol. p. 62), explains the passage as though
εἱστήκει
were used: the devil, instead of “taking his stand in the truth,” revolted, as the god of the world, selfishly against God; for which reason the world has been “degraded and materialized” by God to a
úäå
åáäå
, etc. In this way a new creation of the world is made out of the creation in Genesis 1, and out of the first act in the history of the world, a second.
[31] At the same time, we do not mean herewith to deny to John the idea of a fall of the devil, or, in other words, to represent him as believing the devil to have been originally evil. The passage under consideration treats merely of the evil constitution of the devil as it is, without giving any hint as to its origin. This in answer to Frommann, p. 330, Reuss, and Hilgenfeld. In relation to the doctrine of the fall of the devil nothing is here taught. Comp. Hofmann, Schriftbeweis, passim; Hahn, Theol. d. N. T. I. p. 319. Such a fall is, however, necessarily presupposed by this passage.
[32] Hence, also, the readings
ὡς
and
καθὼς
καί
, instead of
καί
, which, though early in date, are supported by feeble testimony.