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Joh_8:6. Πειράζοντες αὐτόν ] denoting, not a good-natured questioning (Olshausen), but, agreeably to the standing synoptical representation of the relation of those men to Jesus, and in keeping with what immediately follows, malicious tempting. The insidious feature of the plan consisted in this: “If He decides with Moses for the stoning, He will be accused before the Roman authorities; for, according to the Roman criminal law, adultery was not punishable with death, and stoning in particular was generally repudiated by the Romans (see Staeudlin and Hug). But if He decides against Moses and against stoning, He will then be prosecuted before the Sanhedrim as an opposer of the law.” That they expected and wished for the former result, is shown, by the prejudicial way in which they introduce the question, by quoting the express punishment prescribed by Moses.[3] Their plan here is similar in design to that of the question touching the tribute money in Matthew 22. It is objected that the Romans in the provinces did not administer justice strictly in accordance with their own laws; but amid the general immorality of the times they certainly did not conform to the rigour of the Mosaic punishment for adultery; and how easy would it have been before the Roman magistrates to give a revolutionary aspect to the hoped-for decision of Jesus in favour of Moses, even if He had in some way reserved the competency of the Roman authorities! If it be said that Jesus needed only to declare Himself in favour of execution, and not exactly for stoning, it is overlooked that here was the very case for which stoning was expressly appointed. If it be urged, lastly, that when Jesus was required to assume the position of a judge, He needed only to refer His questioners to the Sanhedrim, and to tell them to take the woman thither (Ebrard), that would have amounted to a declining to answer, which would, indeed, have been the surest way of escape from the dilemma, but inappropriate enough to the intellectual temperament of Jesus in such cases. Other explanations of πειράζειν —(1) They would either have accused him to the Romans imminutae majestatis, because they then possessed the jus vitae et necis, or to the Jews imminutae libertatis (Grotius), and as a false Messiah (Godet). But that prerogative of the Romans was not infringed by the pronouncing of a sentence of condemnation; it was still reserved to them through their having to confirm and carry out the sentence. Accordingly, B. Crusius gives this turn to the question: “Would Jesus decide for the popular execution of the law … or would He peradventure even take upon Himself to pass such a judgment” (so, substantially, Hitzig also, on Joh. Markus, p. 205 ff., and Luthardt), where (with Wetstein and Schulthess) the law of the Zealots is called in by way of help? But in that case the interrogators, who intended to make use of a negative answer against Him as an overturning of the law, and an affirmative reply as an interference with the functions of the authorities, would then have put no question at all relating to the thing which they really wanted (i.e. the execution, and that immediate and tumultuous). (2) As the punishment of death for adultery had at that time already fallen into disuse, the drift of their question was simply, whether or not legal proceedings should be instituted at all (Ebrard, following Michaelis). The words themselves, and the design expressed in the κατῃγορεῖν , which could not take place before the people, but before the competent judges, as in Mat_12:10, are quite opposed to this explanation. (3) Dieck, in the Stud. u. Krit. 1832, p. 791, says: As the punishment of death for adultery presupposes liberty of divorcement, and as Jesus had Himself repudiated divorce, He would, by pronouncing in favour of that punishment, have contradicted Himself; while, by pronouncing against it, He would have appeared as a despiser of the law. But apart from the improbability of any such logical calculation on the part of His questioners as to the first alternative,—a calculation which is indicated by nothing in the text,—the ἵνα ἔχ . κατηγ . αὐτ . is decisive against this explanation; for a want of logical consistency would have furnished no ground for accusation.[4] (4) The same argument tells against Augustine, Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Aretius, Jansen, Cornelius à Lapide, Baumgarten, and many other expositors: according to whom an affirmative reply would have been inconsistent with the general mildness of His teaching; a negative answer would have been a decision against Moses. (5) Euthymius Zigabenus, Bengel, and many others, Neander also, Tholuck, Baeumlein, Hengstenberg (who sees here an unhistorical mingling of law and gospel), are nearer the mark in regarding the plan of attack as based upon the assumption, which they regarded as certain, that in accordance with His usual gentleness He would give a negative answer: γινώσκοντες γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐλεήμονα κ . συμπαθῆ , προσεδόκων , ὅτι φείσεται αὐτῆς , καὶ λοιπὸν ἕξουσι κατηγορίαν κατʼ αὐτὸν , ὡς παρανόμως φειδομένου τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου λιθαζομένης , Euthymius Zigabenus. But this explanation also must be rejected, partly even on à priori grounds, because an ensnaring casuistic question may naturally be supposed to involve a dilemma; partly and mainly because in this case the introduction of the question by ἐν δὲ τῷ νόμῳ would have been a very unwise method of preparing the way for a negative answer. This latter argument tells against Ewald, who holds that Christ, by the acquittal which they deemed it probable He would pronounce, would have offended against the Mosaic law; while by condemning, He would have violated as well the milder practice then in vogue as His own more gentle principles. Lücke, De Wette, Brückner, Baur,[5] and many other expositors renounce the attempt to give any satisfactory solution of the difficulty.
τῷ δακτύλῳ ἔγραφεν εἰς τ . γῆν ] as a sign that He was not considering their question, ὅπερ εἰώθασι πολλάκις ποιεῖν οἱ μὴ θέλοντες ἀποκρίνεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἐρωτῶντας ἄκαιρα καὶ ἀνάξια . Γνοὺς γὰρ αὐτῶν τὴν μηχανὴν , προσεποιεῖτο γράφειν εἰς τ . γῆν , καὶ μὴ προσέχειν οἷς ἔλεγον , Euthymius Zigabenus. For instances of behaviour like this on the part of one who turns away from those around him, and becomes absorbed in himself, giving himself up to his own thoughts or imaginings, from Greek writers (Aristoph. Acharn. 31, and Schol. Diog. Laert. 2. 127) and from the Rabbins, see in Wetstein. Isa_17:13 does not here serve for elucidation. What Jesus wrote is not a subject even of inquiry; nor are we to ask whether, by the act, He was symbolizing any, and if so what, answer (Michaelis: the answer “as it is written”). There is much marvellous conjecture among the older expositors. See Wolf and Lampe, also Fabricius, Cod. Apocr. p. 315, who thinks that Jesus wrote the answer given in Joh_8:7 (after Bede; comp. also Ewald, Gesch. Chr. p. 480, ed. 3, and Godet). Suffice it to say, the strange manner in which Jesus silently declines to give a decisive reply (acting, no doubt, according to His principle of not interfering with the sphere of the magistracy (here a matter of criminal law, Matthew 22; Luk_12:13-14),[6] bears the stamp of genuineness and not of invention, though Hengstenberg deems this procedure unworthy of Jesus; the tempters deserved the contempt which this implied, Joh_8:9.
Observe in ἔγραφεν the descriptive imperfect. The reader sees Him writing with His finger. The additions in some Codd. καὶ τροσποιούμενος , and (more strongly attested) μὴ προσποιούμ ., are glosses of different kinds, meaning “though He only pretended (simulans) to write;” and, “without troubling Himself about them” (dissimulans, Ev. 32 adds αὐτούς ). See Matthaei, ed. min, in loc.
[3] Observe also, in reference to this, the οὖν in ver. 5, which logically paves the way for an answer in agreement with Moses.
[4] What they really wished was to accuse Him, on the ground of the answer He would give. Hilgenfeld therefore is in error when he thinks they sought to force Him to give a decisive utterance as the obligation of the Mosaic law. By an affirmative reply (he says) Christ would have recognised this obligation, and by His non-observance of the law (Joh_5:18, Joh_7:23) He would have been self-condemned; by a negative answer He would have been guilty of an express rejection of the law. Viewing the matter thus, they could not, indeed, have accused Him on account of His answer if affirmative; they could only have charged Him with logical inconsistency. This tells substantially also against Lange’s view, viz. that they wished to see whether He would venture, in the strength of His Messianic authority, to set up a new law. If in this case He had decided in favour of Moses, they could not have accused Him (to the Sanhedrim).
[5] According to Baur (p. 170 sq.), there is nothing historical whatever in the story; it has a purely ideal import. The main idea he holds to be the consciousness of one’s own sinfulness breaking the power of every sin, in opposition to the accusation brought against Jesus by the Pharisees, that He associated with sinners, and thus was so ready to forgive.
[6] According to Luthardt, to show that the malice of the question did not deserve an answer. But the numerous testing questions proposed to Him, according to the Synoptics, by His opponents, were all of them malicious; yet Jesus did not refuse to reply to them. According to Lange’s fancy, Jesus assumed the gesture of a calm majesty, which, in its playful ease, refused to be disturbed by any street scandal. Melancthon well says: “Initio, cum accusatur mulier, nihil respondit Christus, tanquam in aliam rem intentus, videlicet prorsus a sese rejiciens hanc quaestionem pertinentem ad cognitionem magistratus politici. Postea, cum urgetur, respondet non de muliere, sed de ipsorum peccatis, qui ipsam accusabant.”