Mat_5:19. Conclusion from Mat_5:18. On
ὃς
ἐάν
with the conjunctive of the aorist, denoting that which was probably to happen in the future (the contingent futurum exactum), see Winer, p. 287 f. [E. T. 385]; Kühner, II. 2, p. 929;
ἐάν
for
ἄν
, see Winer, p. 291 [E. T. 3–90].
λύσῃ
] like
καταλῦσαι
, Mat_5:17;[403] Fritzsche and Arnoldi (after Castalio, Beza, Wolf, and others): transgressus fuerit, on account of the
ποιήσῃ
in the opposition; comp. also Ritschl, p. 40. But this
ΠΟΙΉΣῌ
partly forms a very appropriate antithesis to the
ΛΎΣῌ
in our sense, which, after
ΚΑΤΑΛῦΣΑΙ
in Mat_5:17, would be abandoned only from arbitrariness; partly there is by no means wanting between
ΛΎΕΙΝ
and
ΔΙΔΆΣΚΕΙΝ
an appropriate, i.e. a climactic, distinction (they shall declare it to be of no authority, and teach accordingly); partly it is not credible that Jesus should have declared that the transgressor of the law was
ἐλάχιστον
ἐν
τῇ
βας
.
τ
.
οὐρανῶν
, see Mat_11:11. Doing (
ποιήσῃ
) and teaching (
διδάξῃ
) refer, as a matter of course, without it being necessary to supply any object besides the general word “is” (translated: whosoever shall have done and taught it), to that which is required in the smallest commandment, and that in the sense of the
πλήρωσις
, Mat_5:17.
ΤῶΝ
ἘΝΤΟΛῶΝ
ΤΟΎΤΩΝ
ΤῶΝ
ἘΛΑΧΊΣΤΩΝ
]
ΤΟΎΤΩΝ
points back to what is designated by
ἸῶΤΑ
and
ΚΕΡΑΊΑ
in Mat_5:18, not forwards to Mat_5:22; Mat_5:28 (Bengel);
ἘΛΑΧΊΣΤΩΝ
refers, therefore, not to the Pharisaic distinctions between great and small commandments (see especially, Wetstein, p. 295 f.), but to what Jesus Himself had just designated as
ἰῶτα
and
ΚΕΡΑΊΑ
, those precepts which in reality are the least important. They stand, however, in accordance with the
ΠΛΉΡΩΣΙς
of the law, in essential organic connection with the ideal contents of the whole, and can therefore be so little regarded as having no authority, that rather he who does this (
ΛΎΣῌ
), and teaches others to act in this manner (
ΔΙΔΆΞῌ
), will obtain only one of the lowest places (one of the lowest grades of dignity and happiness) in the kingdom of the Messiah. He is not to be excluded (as Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Calovius, Wolf, Bengel, and others have misinterpreted the meaning of
ἐλάχ
.
κληθ
.), because his antinomianism is not a principle, not directed against the law as such, but only against individual precepts of the law, which in themselves are small, and whose importance as a whole he does not recognise.[404] Comp. 1Co_3:15.
Note the correlation of
τῶν
ἐλαχίστων
…
ἐλάχιστος
…
μέγας
.
[403] Comp. on
λύειν
in the sense of abrogating, overturning of laws, Joh_7:23; Herod, iii. 82; Demosth. xxxi. 12. 186. 14. Ebrard (on Olshausen) erroneously explains it: “the mechanical dissolution of a law into a multitude of casuistical and ritualistic precepts.” The
τούτων
τῶν
ἐλαχίστων
should have prevented this view. Amongst Greek writers also the simple verb represents the compound that has preceded it; comp. on Rom_15:4.
[404] Ver. 19 stands in so essential a connection with the discourse, that the supposition of Olshausen, that Jesus had in view special acts of an antinomian tendency on the part of some of His disciples, appears just as unnecessary as it is arbitrary. Köstlin and Hilgenfeld find here a very distinct disapproval of the Apostle Paul and of the Paulinites, who break free from the law; nay, Paul, thinks Köstlin, was actually named by Jewish Christians the smallest (Eph_3:8), as he so names himself (1Co_15:9). A purely imaginary combination.