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Mat_5:32. Παρεκτὸς λόγου πορν .] that is, except (see on 2Co_11:28) if an act of whoredom, committed by the woman during marriage (consequently adultery, Joh_8:41; Amo_7:17; Hos_3:3; Sir_26:9; Sir_14:12), is the motive ( λόγος , comp. Thuc. i. 102, iii. 6, lxi. 4; and see on Act_10:29). In spite of the point of controversy which lies at the foundation, Paulus and Gratz are of opinion—most recently especially, Döllinger, Christenthum und Kirche, p. 392 ff., 460 ff., ed. 2 (comp. Baeumlein in the Stud. und Krit. 1857, p. 336)—that by πορνεία , which does not mean adultery,[412] whoredom before marriage is meant, so that the man, instead of a virgin, receives one who is no longer so.[413] The correct view is already to be found in Tertullian, and in the whole old exegetical tradition, where, however, on the Catholic side, the permission was limited only to separation a toro et mensa. On the subject, comp. the explanation which was specially called forth on a later occasion, Mat_19:3 ff. But in Mar_10:11, Luk_16:18 (also 1Co_7:10 f.), this exception is not expressed, not as if Jesus had at the beginning made greater concessions to the pre-Christian Jewish marriages, and only at a later time completely denied the dissolubility of marriage (Hug, de conjugii christ. vinculo indissolub. 1816, who therefore declares, in Mat_19:9, μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ to be spurious), nor even as if that ΠΑΡΕΚΤῸς , Κ . Τ . Λ ., were a later modification, and not originally spoken by Christ (Bleek, Wittichen, Weiss, Holtzmann, Schenkel, and others), but Mark and Luke regard this exception by itself, understanding it as a matter of course; and rightly so,[414] since adultery eo ipso destroys the essence of all marriage obligations; comp. Weiss in d. Zeitschr. f. christl. Wissensch. 1856, p, 261. But as the exception which Jesus here makes cannot become devoid of meaning by means of Lev_20:10 (in answer to Schegg, see Joh_8:3 ff.), so also it is not to be annulled on critical grounds, which in view of the witnesses is impossible (in answer to Keim here and on Mat_19:9). The second half of the verse also, καὶ ὃς , κ . τ . λ ., cannot be condemned with Keim on the authority of D and Codd. in Augustine.
ΠΟΙΕῖ ΑὐΤῊΝ ΜΟΙΧᾶΣΘΑΙ ] “per alias nuptias, quarum potestatem dat divortium” (Bengel), although, according to that principle, she is still the wife of the first husband; therefore the man also, if he marries again, ΜΟΙΧᾶΤΑΙ (Mat_19:9).
ΚΑΊ ] not causal, but and, and on the other side.
μοιχᾶται ] because he has intercourse with a person who, according to the divine law, is the wife of another. That by ἈΠΟΛΕΛΥΜΈΝΗΝ , a woman who is dismissed illegally, consequently not on account of adultery, is intended, was understood as a matter of course, according to the first half of the verse.
[412] It means in general every kind of whoredom (Dem. 403. 26, 433. 25, 612. 5). Where it specially refers to adultery ( μοιχεία ) this is clear from the context, as here and Mat_19:9. Thus, for example, it means also the idolatry of the people of God, because that is adultery against Jehovah, πορνεία , as in Hos_1:2; Eze_16:15; Eze_23:43.
[413] How can one seriously suppose that Jesus could have laid down so slippery an exception! indelicate, uncertain, unwise, a welcome opening to all kinds of severity and chicanery, especially considering the jealousy of the Jews. And the exception would have to hold good also in the case of marriages with widows!
[414] But by the circumstance that Jesus here expressly quotes as an exception this actual ground of separation, which was understood as a matter of course, He excludes every other (comp. especially Calovius); and it is incorrect to say that, while He grants one actual ground of separation, He still allows several others (Grotius, de Wette, Bleek, and others; comp. also Werner in d. Stud. u. Krit. 1858, p. 702 ff.), which is quite opposed to the point of view of moral strictness, from which He excepts only that case in which the actual dissolution of the marriage in its innermost nature is directly given.—That Christ bases His answer on the question of divorce purely upon the nature of the divine ordinance of marriage as it was already given at the creation (una caro, Mat_9:5), not upon its object, is of decisive importance for the legislation in question, where we have also to observe that the altered form of divorce (the judicial) can make no change in the principles laid down by Jesus. Otherwise the legislation relating to marriage is driven on and on, by way of supposed consistency, to the laxity of the Prussian law and that of other lands (comp. the concessions of Bleek). Moreover, as regards malicious desertion, the declarations of Christ admit of application only so far as that desertion quoad formam, consequently according to its essential nature, is fully equivalent to adultery, which, however, must always be a question in each individual case. It cannot be shown from 1Co_9:15 that malicious desertion was regarded as a reason for dissolving Christian marriage. See on the passage.—Of that case of separation, where the man commits adultery, Christ does not speak, because the law, which does not know of any dismissal of the man on the part of the woman, presented no occasion to it. But the application of the principle in the case of adultery on the part of the woman to that of the man as a ground of divorce rightly follows in accordance with the moral spirit of Jesus; comp. Mar_10:12; Gal_3:28; 1Co_11:11.