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Phm_1:13 f Ἐγώ ] I for my part.
ἐβουλόμην ] I was of the mind. Comp. ἠθέλησα , Phm_1:14, and observe not merely the diversity of notion ( βούλομαι : deliberate self-determination, see on Mat_1:19), but also the distinction of the tenses. The apostle formerly cherished the design and the wish (imperfect ἐβουλ .) of retaining Onesimus with himself, instead of sending him back to Philemon, but has become of the mind (historical aorist ἠθέλησα ), etc. Thus ἠθέλ . denotes that which supervened on the previous occurrence of the ἐβουλ ., and hindered the realization of the latter. Observe that Paul has not used ἐβουλόμην ἄν ; that would be vellem.
ὑπὲρ σοῦ ] for thee, i.e. in gratiam tuam, that thou mightest not need thyself to serve me. ὑπέρ accordingly is not here, any more than in any other passage of the N.T., used as a precise equivalent to ἀντί , although the actual relation of representation lies at the bottom of the conception in gratiam; for Paul would have taken the service of the slave as rendered by the master, to whom the slave belonged. Comp. Hofmann. This mode of regarding and representing the matter has nothing harsh about it, nor does it convey any obligation, which Philemon, had he been on the spot, would have fulfilled (Bleek), but simply the trustful presupposition, that Philemon himself would, if Paul had desired it, have ministered to him in the prison. Of this, however, Philemon was relieved by the service of the slave, which in this way stood him in good stead. Schweizer, in the Stud. u. Krit. 1858, p. 430, explains likewise correctly: for thy benefit, but takes this in the sense: “so that it would be a service rendered to thee, imputed to thee, so that I would be under obligation to thee.” But this would only have the delicacy and tenderness which are found in it, if the thought: “in order that he might serve me, with a view to place me under obligation to thee,” contained the design of Onesimus; if, accordingly, Paul had written something after this manner: ὃς ἐβούλετο πρὸς ἐμαντὸν μένειν , ἵνα κ . τ . λ ., which, however, would have asserted a self-determination incompetent to the position of a slave. No; as the passage is written, there is delicately and tenderly implied in the ὑπὲρ σοῦ the same thought, which, in accordance with Php_2:30, he might have expressed by ἵνα ἀναπληρώσῃ τὸ σοῦ ὑστέρημα ; comp. 1Co_16:17. Thus ingeniously does Paul know how to justify his ἐβουλόμην κ . τ . λ .—seeing that he would, in fact, otherwise have had no claim at all upon another’s bondsman—by the specification of design ἵνα ὑπὲρ σοῦ κ . τ . λ .
διακονῇ ] direct representation by the subjunctive, “ita quidem, ut praeteriti temporis cogitatio tanquam praesens efferatur,” Kühner, ad Xen. Mem. i. 2. 2.
ἐν τοῖς δεσμοῖς τοῦ εὐαγγ .] in the bonds, into which the gospel has brought me—in a position. therefore (comp. Phm_1:9) which makes me as needful as deserving of such loving service.
χωρὶς δὲ κ . τ . λ .] but without thy consent, that is, independent of it, I have wished to do nothing, and so have left that wish unexecuted, in order that thy good may be not as from constraint, but from free will. The thought of the apostle accordingly is: But as I knew not thine own opinion, and thus must have acted without it, I was disposed to abstain from the retention of thy slave, which I had in view: for the good, which thou showest, is not to be as if forced, but voluntary. If I had retained Onesimus for my service, without having thy consent to that effect, the good, which I should have had to derive from thee through the service rendered to me by thy servant ὑπὲρ σοῦ , would have been shown not from free will,—that is, not in virtue of thine own self-determination,—but as if compulsorily, just because independently of thy γνώμη (“non enim potuisset refragari Philemon,” Bengel[75]). Observe at the same time that τὸ ἀγαθόν σου , thy good, that is, the good which thou showest to others, is to be left quite in its generality, so that not the serviceable employment of the slave specially and in concreto is meant, but rather the category in general, under which, in the intended application, there falls that special ἀγαθόν , which is indicated in Phm_1:13. The restriction to the given case is impracticable on account of ἈΛΛᾺ ΚΑΤᾺ ἙΚΟΎΣΙΟΝ , since Paul in fact did not at all intend to procure the consent of Philemon and to retain Onesimus. This in opposition to the usual interpretation: “ τὸ ἀγαθόν , i.e. beneficium tuum hocce, quo afficior a te, si hunc mihi servum concedis,” Heinrichs; comp. Bleek. But it is an error also, with de Wette, following Estius (who describes it as probable), to understand under τὸ ἀγαθ . σον the manumission[76] of the slave, or to understand it at least as “also included” (Bleek), of which even in Phm_1:16 there is no mention, and for suggesting which in so covert and enigmatic a fashion there would not have been any reason, if he had desired it at all (but see on 1Co_7:21). According to Hofmann (comp. his Schriftbeweis, II. 2, p. 412), τὸ ἀγαθόν σου is, like ΤῸ ΧΡΗΣΤῸΝ ΤΟῦ ΘΕΟῦ at Rom_2:4, thy goodness, and that the goodness, which Philemon will show to Onesimus when he had returned into his position as a, slave; this only then becomes an undoubtedly spontaneous goodness, when the apostle refrains from any injunction of his own, whereas Philemon could not have done otherwise than refrain from punishing the slave for his escape, if Paul had retained him to himself, in which case, therefore, Philemon might have seemed to be kind compulsorily. This explanation, brought out by the insertion of thoughts between the lines, is to be set aside as at variance with the context, since there is nothing in the connection to point to the definition of the notion of τὸ ἀγαθόν σου as goodness towards Onesimus, but on the contrary this expression can only acquire its import through the delicately thoughtful ἵνα ὑπὲρ σοῦ μοι διακονῇ κ . τ . λ .
ὡς κατὰ ἀνάγκην ] emphatically prefixed, and Ὡς expresses the idea: “so that it appears as constrained.” Comp. Fritzsche, ad Rom. II. p. 360. On κατὰ ἀνάγκ ., by way of constraint (in the passive sense), by compulsion, comp. Thucyd. vi. 10. 1; Polyb. iii. 67. 5; 2Ma_15:2; on the contrast, comp. 1Pe_5:2 : μὴ ἀναγκαστῶς , ἀλλʼ ἑκουσίως ; Thucyd. viii. 27. Phm_1:3 : ΚΑΘʼ ἙΚΟΥΣΊΑΝ Ἢ ΠΆΝΥ ΓΕ ἈΝΆΓΚῌ , Plat. Prot. p. 346 B.
[75] Seneca, De Benef. ii. Phm_1:4 : “Si vis scire an velim, effice ut possim nolle.” Luther aptly remarks: a constrained will is not voluntas, but noluntas.
[76] That the manumission did take place, has been inferred from the tradition that Onesimus became a bishop. It may have taken place, but it is not meant here.