Heinrich Meyer Commentary - Philippians 2:3 - 2:3

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Heinrich Meyer Commentary - Philippians 2:3 - 2:3


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Php_2:3 f. Μηδὲν κατὰ ἐριθ . κενοδοξ .] sc. φρονοῦντες (not ποιοῦντες , Erasmus, Luther, Beza, Camerarius, Storr, am Ende, Rheinwald, Flatt, van Hengel, and others); so that, accordingly, what was excluded by the previous requirement τὸ αὐτὸ φρονῆτε φρονοῦντες , is here described. To take, as in Gal_5:13, μηδεὶν κενοδοξίαν as a prohibition by itself, without dependence on φρονοῦντες (see on Gal. l.c.), as J. B. Lightfoot does, is inappropriate, because the following participial antithesis discloses the dependence of the μηδὲν κ . τ . λ . on the previous participle; hence also Hofmann’s view, that there is an intentional leaving the verb open, cannot be admitted. Hoelemann combines it with ἡγούμ ., and takes μηδὲν as neutiquam; but incorrectly, for ἡγούμ . κ . τ . λ . affirms the esteeming others better than oneself, which, therefore, cannot take place in a factious ( κατὰ ἐρίθειαν , see on Php_1:17) or in a vainglorious ( κενοδοξίαν ) way. The κατὰ denotes that which is regulative of the state of mind, and consequently its character, and is exchanged in the antithetic parallel for the dative of the instrument: by means of humility, the latter being by the article set down as a generic idea (by means of the virtue of humility). The mutual brotherly humility (Eph_4:2; Col_3:12; Act_20:19) is the determining principle, by which, for example, Caius is moved to regard Lucius as standing higher, in a moral point of view, than himself, and, on the other hand, Lucius to pronounce Caius to be of a higher moral rank than himself (i.e. ἀλλήλους ἑαυτῶν ). Hoelemann erroneously refers τῇ ταπεινοφρ . to ὑπερέχ ., so that it “excellentiae designet praesidium,”—a view which the very position of the words should have warned him not to adopt.

κενοδοξία ] ostentation, only here in the N. T. Comp. Wis_14:14; Polyb. iii. 81. 9; Lucian, D. Mort. x. 8, xx. 4; and see on Gal_5:26.

Php_2:4. μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἕκαστοι σκοπ .] The humble mind just indicated cannot exist together with selfishness, which has its own interests in view. See instances of σκοπεῖν τὰ τινος , to be mindful of any one’s interests, in Herod. i. 8; Plat. Phaedr. p. 232 D; Thuc. vi. 12. 2; Eur. Supp. 302. Comp. Lucian, Prom. 14: τἀμαυτοῦ μόνα σκοπῶ . The opposite of τὰ ἑαυτῶν σκ . may be seen in 2Ma_4:5 : τὸ δὲ συμφέρον κοινῇ σκοπῶν . Comp. ζητεῖν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ , 1Co_10:24; 1Co_10:33; 1Co_13:5; Php_2:21, where ζητεῖν presents no essential difference in sense. Others consider that the having regard to gifts and merits is intended (Calvin, Hammond, Raphel, Keil, Commentat. 1803, in his Opusc. p. 172 ff., Hoelemann, Corn. Müller), which, after the comprehensive τῇ ταπεινοφρ . κ . τ . λ ., would yield a very insipid limitation, and one not justified by the context.

ἕκαστοι ] It is usually, and in other passages of the N. T. invariably, the singular that is used in this distributive apposition; the plural, however, is not unfrequently found in classical authors. Hom. Od. ix. 164; Thuc. i. 7. 1; Xen. Hell. ii. 4, 38; Herodian, iii. 13, 14.

ἀλλὰ καὶ κ . τ . λ .] a weaker contrast than we should have expected from the absolute negation in the first clause;[89] a softening modification of the idea. In strict consistency the καί must have been omitted (1Co_10:24). Comp. Soph. Aj. 1292 (1313): ὅρα μὴ τοὐμὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σόν ; and see Fritzsche, ad Marc. p. 788; Winer, p. 463 f. [E. T. 624]. The second ἕκαστοι might have been dispensed with; it is, however, an earnest repetition.

The influences disturbing unity in Philippi, disclosed in Php_2:2-4, are not, according to these exhortations, of a doctrinal kind, nor do they refer to the strength and weakness of the knowledge and conviction of individuals, as was the case in Rome (Romans 14) and Corinth (1 Corinthians 8, 10)—in opposition to Rheinwald and Schinz;—but they were based upon the jealousy of moral self-estimation, in which Christian perfection was respectively ascribed and denied to one another (comp. Php_2:12; Php_3:12 ff.). Although this necessarily implies a certain difference of opinion as to the ethical theory, the epistle shows no trace either of any actual division into factions, or of ascetic jealousy (which de Wette assumes as co-operating). But the exhortations to unity are too frequent (Php_1:27, Php_2:2 f., Php_3:15, Php_4:2 f.) and too urgent to justify us in questioning generally the existence (Weiss) of those disturbances of harmony, or in regarding them as mere ill humour and isolation disturbing the cordial fellowship of life (Hofmann). Comp. Huther, in the Mecklenb. Zeitschr. 1862, p. 640 ff.

[89] In which, in fact, it is not merely the limitation (Hofmann) to one’s own that is forbidden, as if μόνον stood along with it. What Hofmann at the same time deduces from the reading ἕκαστος (before σκοποῦντες ), which he follows, as distinguished from the subsequent ἕκαστοι (with a here wholly irrelevant comparison of Plat. Apol. p. 39 A), is sophistical, and falls, moreover, with the reading itself.