Heinrich Meyer Commentary - Philippians 3:16 - 3:16

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Heinrich Meyer Commentary - Philippians 3:16 - 3:16


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Php_3:16. A caution added to the precept given in Php_3:15, and the promise coupled with it: Only let there be no deviation in the prosecution of the development of your Christian life from the point to which we have attained! Neither to the right nor to the left, but forward in the same direction! This warning Paul expresses briefly and precisely thus: “Only whereto we have attained,—according to the same to direct your walk!”—that is, “however ye may be in some point otherwise minded and, therefore, may have to await further revelation, at all events ye ought not to deviate—this must in every case be your fundamental rule—from that whereto we have already attained in the Christian life; but, on the contrary, should let the further direction of your moral walk be determined by that same.” Such a general precept addressed to the Philippians conveys an honourable testimony to the state of their moral constitution on the whole, however different in individuals we may conceive the point to be from which Paul says εἰς ἐφθ ., as is evident from the very fact that he includes himself in the εἰς ἐφθ ., which could not but honour and stimulate the readers. On πλήν , nisi quod, comp. Php_1:18; on φθάνειν εἰς , to attain to anything, comp. Mat_12:28; Luk_11:26; 1Th_2:16 ( ἐπί ); Rom_9:31; Dan_4:19; Tob_5:18; Plut. Mor. p. 338 A; Apollod. xii. 242. It denotes the having come forward, the having advanced. Ewald takes it: if we had the advantage (see 1Th_4:15, and the common classical usage), that is: “in what we already possess much better and higher than Judaism.” But this reference to Judaism is not given in the text, which aims to secure generally their further progress in the development of Christian life. On στοιχεῖν with the dative of the rule: to advance (march) according to something, that is, to direct oneself in one’s constant conduct by something, see on Gal_5:16; Gal_5:25. The infinitive, however, as the expression of a briefly measured wish or command, without supplying λέγω , δεῖ , or the like (which Buttmann requires, Neut. Gr. p. 233 [E. T. 272]), stands in place of the imperative, as in Rom_12:15; see Hom. Il. i. 20, and Nägelsbach in loc.; Stallbaum, ad Plat. Rep. p. 473 A; Pflugk, ad Eur. Heracl. 314; Fritzsche, ad Rom. III. p. 86. Fritzsche, however, Diss. II. 2 Cor. p. 93, has erroneously made the infinitive dependent on ἀποκαλύψει : “praeterea instituet vos, ut, quam ego consecutus sum τῷ βραβείῳ τῆς ἄνω κλήσεως intentam mentem, ejusdem participes fieri ipsi annitamini.” Comp. Oecumenius. Decisive against this view is the plural ἐφθάσαμεν , which, according to the context (Php_3:15), cannot apply merely to Paul, as well as the fact that the antithesis of persons (ego … ipsi) is gratuitously introduced. Michaelis, who is followed by Rilliet, closely unites Php_3:16 with the sequel,[170] but in such a way that only an awkward arrangement of the sentences is attained, and the nervous vigour of the concise command is taken away.

The εἰς ἐφθάσ .—which cannot in accordance with the context denote the having attained to Christianity, to the being Christian (Hofmann’s view, which yields a meaning much too vague and general)—has been rightly explained by Chrysostom and Theophylact as relating to the attainments in the Christian life, which are to be maintained, and in the further development of which constant progress is to be made ( κατωρθώσαμεν , κατέχωμεν , Theophylact). Comp. Schinz and van Hengel. This view is corroborated by the sequel, in which Paul represents himself as model of the walk; and therefore it is not to be referred merely to the measure of the right frame of mind attained (Weiss). Most expositors understand the words as signifying the measure of Christian knowledge acquired (so also Heinrichs, Flatt, Rheinwald, Matthies, Hoelemann, de Wette, Wiesinger), in conformity with which one ought to live. In connection with this, various arbitrary definitions of the object of the knowledge have been suggested, as, for instance, by Grotius: “de circumcisione et ritibus;” Heinrichs and de Wette: concerning the main substance of the Christian faith apart from secondary matters; Schneckenburger: “that man is justified by faith, and not by the works of the law;” along with which de Wette lays stress on the point that it is not the individual more or less perfect knowledge (so usually; see Flatt, Rheinwald, Matthies) that is meant, but the collective conviction, the truths generally recognised. But the whole interpretation which refers it to knowledge is not in keeping with the text; for ἐφθάσαμεν , correlative with ΣΤΟΙΧΕῖΝ , presents together with the latter a unity of figurative view, the former denoting the point of the way already attained, and τῷ αὐτῷ στοιχεῖν , perseverance in the direction indicated by that attainment. Therefore, if by ΣΤΟΙΧΕῖΝ there is clearly (see Php_3:17) intended the moral conduct of life, this also must be denoted by ΕἸς ἘΦΘ . as respects its quality attained up to the present time. Moreover, if ΕἸς ἘΦΘ . is to be understood as referring to knowledge, there would be no motive for the prominence given to the identity by τῷ αὐτῷ .

[170] This is thrown out as a suggestion also by Hofmann, according to whom the infinitive clause ought “perhaps more correctly” to be coupled with συμμιμηταὶ κ . τ . λ ., and taken as a prefixed designation of that in doing which they are to be his imitators and to have their attention directed to those, etc. Thus the infinitive would come to stand as infinitive of the aim. But even thus the whole attempt would be an artificial twisting of the passage without reason or use.

REMARK.

What Paul means in Php_3:16 may be illustrated thus:



Here B is the point of the development of Christian life εἰς ἐφθάσαμεν , which, in the case of different individuals, may be more or less advanced. The τῷ αὐτῷ στοιχεῖν takes place, when the path traversed from A to B is continued in the direction of C. If any one should move from B in the direction of either D or E, he would not τῷ αὐτῷ στοιχεῖν . The reproach of uncertainty which Wiesinger brings against this canon, because a ἑτέρως φρονεῖν may take place which does not lie in the same direction, and generally because the power of sin might hinder the following out of this direction, would also apply in opposition to every other explanation of the εἰς ἐφθ ., and particularly to that of the knowledge attained; but it is altogether unfounded, first, because the ἑτέρως φρονεῖν only refers to one or another concrete single point ( τι ), so that the whole of moral attainment—the collective development—which has been reached is not thereby disturbed; and, secondly, because Paul in this case has to do with a church already highly advanced in a moral point of view (Php_1:5 ff.), which he might, at all events generally, enjoin to continue in the same direction as the path in which they had already travelled. Very groundless is also the objection urged by Hofmann, that the εἰς ἐφθ . must necessarily be one and the same for all. This is simply to be denied; it is an utterly arbitrary assumption.