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Commentary Index | Return to PrayerRequest.com | DownloadCambridge Greek Testament for Schools and Colleges - Romans 2:15 - 2:15
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15. οἵτινες explains the preceding phrase.
ἐνδείκνυνται, ‘give proof of’; cf. Rom 9:17; cf. 2Co 8:24; Eph 2:7; i.e. by their actions. The fact that moral goodness is found in Gentiles is assumed throughout this argument as much as the fact that all sin.
τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου. Not the law itself, but that effect which is produced by the law in those who have it. Not = “the course of conduct prescribed by the law” (S. H.); that could hardly be described as ‘written in the heart’; but “the knowledge of GOD’S will, of right and wrong,” which is found in all human consciousness, and in a heightened degree in those who have an external law; cf. Rom 7:7 f.; |[88] therefore to Rom 1:19; Rom 1:21, and different from Rom 3:20; Rom 3:28; cf. Gal 5:19; perhaps Jam 1:4; 1Th 1:3; 1Co 9:1; Mat 11:19. (Ewald, de voce συνειδήσεως p. 17, after Grotius, qu. S.H.)
[88] | parallel to
γραπτὸν ἐν τ. κ. α. Cf. for the metaphor 2Co 3:2. On καρδία the seat of knowledge and will, see above, Rom 1:24. cf. Weiss, Theol. p. 250.
συνμαρτυρούσης κ.τ.λ., explain the nature of the ἔνδειξις; cf. Rom 1:21. The cpd v[89] only here and Rom 8:16, Rom 9:1. In the two latter places the force of the συν- is clear from the context. Here apparently the other witness is ‘their actions’; cf. 2Co 1:12. It is possible, however, that the συν- is merely ‘perfective.’ cf. Moulton, p. 113.
[89] vb verb
τῆς συνειδήσεως. The primary idea of the word is (1) ‘consciousness’ as due to reflection, on the model of the use of the verb συνειδὲναι ἑαυτῷ τι, ‘to be conscious of an experience good or bad’; on this follows the meaning (2) ‘experience’ as the sum of reflective consciousness or self-knowledge, subjective always; and (3) so the ‘feeling’ which admits or rejects as alien a new candidate for admission into a man’s sum of experience; then (4), as a special development of the last meaning, ‘conscience’ as suggesting moral judgments. See Add. Note, p. 208. Here = (2) ‘their conscious experience’; the effect of the law is recognisably part of their mental equipment or consciousness, their stock of ideas; the next clause then explains how their consciousness bears this witness.
μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων = as between each other, in mutual intercourse: it is the mutual intercourse of men which arouses the moral judgment, even when that moral judgment is exercised upon the man’s own experience, as here; cf. S.H. This is an instance of the development of personality by social relations. cf. Ward, The Realm of Ends (1911), p. 366.
τῶν λογισμῶν. Their thoughts exhibit moral judgments, presupposing that knowledge which is the effect of the law. For λογισμοί cf. 2Co 10:5 only, freq. in LX[90]. Here = reflexion passing moral judgment on the contents of consciousness. (In 4 Macc. = reason as master of the passions and champion of piety.) This interpretation seems to be necessitated not only by the regular use of λογισμός but also by the context; n. esp. τὰ κρυπτὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, 16.
[90] LXX the Septuagint Version of the Old Testament
ἤ καὶ ἀπολογουμένων. The approval of conscience rarer than the condemnation, but not unknown.
ADDITIONAL NOTES
A. συνείδησις, c. Rom 2:15
The word is found only in the Pauline writings (Romans , 1 and 2 Corinthians , 1 and 2 Tim., Tit., 1 Pet., Heb.) except [Joh 8:9], and Act 23:1; Act 24:16 (speeches of S. Paul). The verb (σύνοιδα) only in 1Co 4:4. In the LXX[341] it occurs only in Wis 17:11 (R.V. conscience), Ecc 10:20 (R.V. heart), and perhaps Sir 42:18 (R.V. knowledge). The verb, Job 27:6; Lev 5:1; 1Ma 4:21; 2Ma 4:41. The two passages which make clear the use of the word are Job l.c[342], οὐ σύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ ἄτοπα πράξας, and Wisdom l.c[343], πονηρία … ἀεὶ προσείληφεν τὰ χαλεπὰ συνεχομένη τῇ συνειδήσει. In both these passages it is the state of mind which is conscious of certain actions in their moral aspects.
[341] LXX. the Septuagint Version of the Old Testament
[342] l.c. locus citatus
[343] l.c. locus citatus
The customary meaning of the substantive follows the use of the verb. σύνοιδά τινί τι = to be privy to the action of another; σύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ τι or τι πράξας = to be privy to an action or thought of my own; but, as a man in general cannot help being privy to his own thoughts and actions, the phrase is used with the special meaning of the recognition or feeling of the character, and especially the moral character, of one’s own thoughts or actions. So we get first the simple meaning, the feeling or knowledge that we have done or thought certain things imputed to us, and, secondly, the more definite meaning, the feeling or knowledge that such thoughts or actions are right or wrong. This feeling can be appealed to as a witness to character, either by the man himself appealing to his self-consciousness in support of a statement, or by others appealing to the man’s own consciousness of himself. So Wis 17:11, R.V. “Wickedness, condemned by a witness within, is a coward thing, and being pressed hard by conscience (τῃ συνειδήσει) always forecasts the worst lot,” the consciousness of being wrong makes a coward of the man. Here the conscience or consciousness is an incorruptible witness before whose evidence the man trembles. Cf. Polyb. XVIII. 26.13, οὐδεὶς οὔτως μάρτυς ἐστὶ φοβερὸς οὔτε κατήγορος δεινὸς ὡς ἡ σύνεσις ἡ ἐγκατοικοῦσα ταῖς ἑκάστων ψυχαῖς, where the last phrase = ἡ συνείδησις. It is rather as a witness than as a judge that ἡ συνείδησις is regarded in ordinary Greek use: and it is only as a witness that it is appealed to in N. T.
In Romans the word occurs three times, Rom 2:15, Rom 9:1, Rom 13:5. In Rom 2:15 and Rom 9:1 it is used of a man’s knowledge of himself, his motives and thoughts, called as a witness to his true character. In Rom 2:15 the Gentiles’ self-consciousness, knowledge of their own minds, witnesses to their possession, in a sense, of law, and so confirms the evidence of their acts. In Romans 9 :1 S. Paul’s knowledge of himself, as controlled by the ‘Holy Spirit, witnesses to the pain and distress he feels for Israel, and confirms the witness of the assertion which he makes as in Christ. In Rom 13:5 there is no idea of witness, but the consciousness of their own motives and feelings as shown in the fact that they willingly pay tribute, is appealed to as an argument for obedience.
Closely parallel to Rom 9:1 is 2Co 1:12, where the consciousness of motive is alleged as a witness to the truth of his confident assertion.
With Rom 13:5 may be grouped the passages in which an epithet is attached (Act 23:1, ἀγαθή, Act 24:16, ἀπρόσκοπος; 1Ti 1:5; 1Ti 1:19, 1Pe 3:16; 1Pe 3:21, ἀγαθή; 1Ti 3:9, 2Ti 1:3, καθαρά. Cf. Heb 9:14, καθαριεῖ τὴν συνείδησιν; Heb 13:18, καλή; Heb 10:22, πονηρά). In all these passages it is clear that the word indicates the self-consciousness which includes good or bad contents, as matter of feeling and experience, as simply a matter of self-knowledge, without any direct thought of judgment. So 1Pe 2:19, διὰ συνείδησιν θεοῦ, a remarkable phrase, seems to mean, owing to a feeling of or about GOD, bringing Him as it were into the field of conscious motive. This feeling or consciousness can be dulled by evil courses (1Ti 4:2; Tit 1:15). External ordinances leave it untouched (Heb 9:9), but it can be cleansed (Heb 9:14; Heb 10:21-22).
In 2Co 4:2; 2Co 5:11 the Apostle appeals, for the recognition of his claim, to the conscious experience (συνείδησις) which others have acquired of his character and life, their inner knowledge of him; in this use we have the substantival form of the verbal phrase σύνοιδά τινί τι. And it is possible that we have the same use in 1Co 10:28-29, where the συνείδησις may = the weak brother’s knowledge of and feeling about the acts of the strong.
In 1Co 8:7-12 we have the remarkable epithet ἀσθενής, where if we translate συνείδησις as ‘conscience,’ we have the paradox of calling a sensitive conscience weak. We can hardly get a nearer translation here than ‘feelings.’ The man ‘feels’ that to eat εἰδωλόθυτα, is wrong. This ‘feeling’ cannot be justified by reason; it is due to association (τῇ συνηθείᾳ ἕως ἄρτι τοῦ εἰδώλου), and he cannot shake it off: it is called ‘weak,’ because in it the man is not really master of himself. The argument of the passage is directed to gaining from the strong a tender consideration for those who are in this weak state of feeling. It is a pity that the true character of many ‘conscientious objections’ of the present day is obscured by their association with our modern term ‘conscience,’ when they should be really described as συνείδησις ἀσθενής.
On the whole, then, we may say that in the N.T., as in common Greek use, συνείδησις describes rather a state of consciousness, than a faculty or act of judgment: some uses of the word ‘conscience’ correspond to this meaning of συνείδησις; but in more cases than not the meaning will be adequately given by such renderings as ‘consciousness,’ ‘self-knowledge,’ or even simply ‘heart.’